Editor’s note: Tomáš Grell is currently an LL.M. student in Public International Law at Leiden University. He contributes to the work of the ASSER International Sports Law Centre as a part-time intern.

In its press release of 28 February 2017, the International Olympic Committee ('IOC') communicated that, as part of the implementation of Olympic Agenda 2020 ('Agenda 2020'), it is making specific changes to the 2024 Host City Contract with regard to human rights, anti-corruption and sustainable development. On this occasion, IOC President Thomas Bach stated that ''this latest step is another reflection of the IOC's commitment to embedding the fundamental values of Olympism in all aspects of the Olympic Games''. Although the Host City of the 2024 Summer Olympic Games is scheduled to be announced only in September this year, it is now clear that, be it either Los Angeles or Paris (as Budapest has recently withdrawn its bid), it will have to abide by an additional set of human rights obligations.

This two-part blog will take a closer look at the execution of the Olympic Games from a human rights perspective. The first part will address the most serious human rights abuses that reportedly took place in connection with some of the previous editions of the Olympic Games. It will also outline the key characteristics of the Host City Contract ('HCC') as one of the main legal instruments relating to the execution of the Olympic Games. The second part will shed light on the human rights provisions that have been recently added to the 2024 HCC and it will seek to examine how, if at all, these newly-added human rights obligations could be reflected in practice. For the sake of clarity, it should be noted that the present blog will not focus on the provisions concerning anti-corruption that have been introduced to the 2024 HCC together with the abovementioned human rights provisions.

Examples of Olympic Games-related human rights abuses 

The large majority of Olympic Games-related human rights abuses fall into one of the following categories: (i) violations of labour-related rights; (ii) forced evictions; and (iii) repressions of civil rights, in particular the right to freedom of expression and the right to peaceful assembly. In addition, the execution of the Olympic Games can entail negative environmental impacts.

Violations of labour-related rights 

International labour standards are primarily laid down in a number of conventions and other instruments adopted by the International Labour Organization ('ILO'). The ILO identifies four cornerstone principles, namely the right to freedom of association and collective bargaining, the elimination of all forms of forced labour, the abolition of child labour and the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.[1] These principles are also reflected to a certain extent in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ('UDHR'),[2] the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ('ICCPR'),[3] the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ('ICESCR')[4] and regional human rights treaties, such as the European Convention on Human Rights ('ECHR').[5] Other fundamental labour-related rights include, for instance, the right to rest, leisure, fair wages or safe and healthy working conditions.[6]

Thousands of workers coming from both inside and outside of the Host Country are recruited in the run-up to the Olympic Games to ensure that Olympic venues are built on time. Regrettably, these workers are often subjected to multiple violations of their labour-related rights. A report published by Human Rights Watch ahead of the 2008 Summer Olympic Games in Beijing revealed, inter alia, that internal migrant workers frequently faced delayed payment of their wages and were denied basic services linked to China's household registration system, known as Hukou.[7] Furthermore, the freedom of association of these workers was restricted as they could not join China's only legal trade union body, the state-sponsored All-China Federation of Trade Unions.[8] The 2014 Winter Olympic Games in Sochi received a significant influx of migrant workers coming to Russia mostly from Central Asia. Several reports demonstrated that, in addition to unpaid wages or excessive working hours, migrant workers in Sochi were also prevented from moving to another employer as their work permits or personal identity documents were often withheld.

Forced evictions 

The United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ('CESCR') defines the term 'forced eviction' as ''the permanent or temporary removal against their will of individuals, families and/or communities from the homes and/or land which they occupy, without the provision of, and access to, appropriate forms of legal or other protection''.[9] The CESCR further specifies that forced evictions might be permissible if the individuals concerned are provided with an adequate compensation for any affected property or, in cases where forced evictions result in the individuals concerned being rendered homeless, an adequate alternative housing, resettlement or access to productive land.[10] Moreover, forced evictions should be carried out in conformity with general principles of reasonableness and proportionality.[11]

Some of the previous editions of the Olympic Games have seen whole communities being removed from their homes to make way for stadiums, accommodation facilities and infrastructure. According to research conducted by the Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions, at least 1.25 million people were displaced prior to the Beijing Games.[12] Thousands of families had been relocated from favelas in Rio de Janeiro before the 2016 Summer Olympic Games were opened. Doubts have been raised whether the affected individuals were provided with an adequate compensation and other guarantees as referred to above.[13]

Repressions of civil rights

Rule 50 (2) of the Olympic Charter stipulates that ''no kind of demonstration or political, religious or racial propaganda is permitted in any Olympic sites, venues or other areas''. Based on this provision, the Host Country may adopt laws and take measures restricting the right to freedom of expression[14] and the right to peaceful assembly.[15] The Chinese government was accused of curtailing the right to freedom of expression of domestic and foreign journalists prior to the Beijing Games. In February 2014, four LGBT-advocates from Russia were detained when they were about to protest against discrimination at the Sochi Games.

Rule 50 (2) of the Olympic Charter also prevents athletes from making political statements in any Olympic sites or venues. At the 1968 Summer Olympic Games in Mexico City, the IOC showed no tolerance for the black power salute, a political demonstration conducted by Afro-American athletes Tommie Smith and John Carlos (gold and bronze medallists in the 200-meter sprint) with the view of supporting their compatriots in the struggle against racial segregation. At the Sochi Games, the IOC did not allow Ukrainian athletes to wear black armbands in commemoration of those who died during the conflict in the country. It is arguable that such examples constitute an unlawful interference with the freedom of expression of athletes competing in the Olympic Games.[16]

Negative environmental impacts

Despite not being generally accepted as a human right per se, the right to a safe and healthy environment might be inferred from other human rights, including, for instance, the right to life or the right to food and water.[17] It should also be noted that environmental concerns are closely intertwined with the concept of sustainable development, as exemplified in the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development which provides that ''environmental protection shall constitute an integral part of the development process and cannot be considered in isolation from it''.[18]

The first Olympic Games that were widely criticized for disregarding environmental considerations were the 1992 Winter Olympic Games in Albertville.[19] By contrast, it is widely recognized that the 1994 Winter Olympic Games in Lillehammer were executed in an environmentally-sustainable manner, arguably in response to the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development which was agreed upon only few months after the closing ceremony of the Albertville Games.[20] Insofar as the more recent editions of the Olympic Games are concerned, the Rio Games faced serious difficulties relating to the polluted waters of Guanabara Bay, an Olympic venue for sailing events. In a similar vein, preparations of the upcoming 2018 Winter Olympic Games in Pyeongchang have been marred by allegations of destroying 500-year-old virgin forest to make room for a ski slope.

Introduction to the HCC

The previous section has portrayed some of the most serious human rights abuses associated with the execution of the Olympic Games. These abuses call for an adequate response from the IOC. Before proceeding to analyse whether the human rights provisions recently introduced to the 2024 HCC may constitute an effective remedy, it is essential to take a cursory look at the HCC as one of the main legal instruments linked to the execution of the Olympic Games.

What should be known in the first place

Following the completion of the selection procedure, the HCC is entered into by the IOC on the one hand and the successful Candidate City ('Host City') and the National Olympic Committee of the Host Country ('Host NOC') on the other hand. Within five months after the execution of the HCC, the Host City and the Host NOC shall form the Organising Committee of the Olympic Games ('OCOG'), an entity endowed with legal personality under the laws of the Host Country.[21] The Host City and the Host NOC shall subsequently ensure that, within one month after the OCOG's formation, the OCOG becomes a party to the HCC and adheres to all its terms.[22] Even though the Host Country itself is not a party to the HCC, it plays an important role in fulfilling the obligations contained therein. For instance, the Host Country Authorities are required to take all necessary measures to guarantee the safe and peaceful celebration of the Olympic Games.[23]

As such, the HCC in its current form consists of four separate documents which apply in the following order of precedence: (i) The HCC – Principles; (ii) The HCC – Operational Requirements which provides a detailed description of the main deliverables and other obligations to be performed by the Host City, the Host NOC and the OCOG, including, inter alia, obligations relating to finances, media or the Olympic Torch Relay; (iii) The Games Delivery Plan which outlines the main planning framework, timelines and milestones to be respected by the Host City, the Host NOC and the OCOG; and (iv) The Candidature Commitments which concerns all guarantees and other commitments contained in the Host City's candidature documentation.[24] Since the present blog deals exclusively with the HCC – Principles, all references to the HCC throughout this post should be taken to include the HCC – Principles only.

The HCC is governed by the domestic laws of Switzerland.[25] The parties thereto undertake to submit all their disputes concerning the validity, interpretation or performance of the HCC to the Court of Arbitration for Sport ('CAS'). If, for any reason, the CAS refuses to exercise its jurisdiction in a particular case, the domestic courts in Lausanne shall be competent.[26]

The main purpose of the HCC is to delegate the execution of the Olympic Games from the IOC to other actors, namely the Host City, the Host NOC and the OCOG.[27] As a general rule, these actors shall be jointly and severally liable for all their obligations, guarantees and other commitments under the HCC, whether entered into individually or collectively.[28] The Host City is primarily tasked with delivering the public infrastructure. It may create and grant powers to an Olympic Delivery Authority[29], a public entity that ''combines the functions of a local council, planning authority, transport executive, trading standards office and police service''.[30] The Host NOC is concerned predominantly with sport-related matters, whilst the OCOG is responsible for hiring suppliers and contractors to build Olympic venues, lodging athletes and officials or elaborating reports on a regular basis.[31] This is not to say, however, that the IOC is not involved in the execution of the Olympic Games. Given that the Olympic Games are the exclusive property of the IOC,[32] the IOC provides significant financial and other benefits to its agents, determines the core requirements, exercises supervision and takes measures in case of non-compliance with the HCC.

Core requirements

First and foremost, the Host City, the Host NOC and the OCOG undertake to respect the Olympic Charter and the IOC Code of Ethics. By signing the HCC (or acceding thereto), they also agree to carry out their operations ''in a manner which promotes and enhances the fundamental principles and values of Olympism as well as the development of the Olympic Movement''.[33] Other core requirements laid down in the HCC relate mostly to human rights, anti-corruption, environmental protection and sustainability, security, betting and prevention of manipulation of competitions, intellectual property rights, entry and stay of athletes and Games-related personnel, taxes, media and marketing. The provisions concerning human rights, environmental protection and sustainability will be specifically examined at a later stage.

IOC's supervision of the execution of the Olympic Games

In order to monitor the progress of, and provide guidance to, the OCOG, with respect to the planning, organisation, staging and financing of the Olympic Games, the IOC creates a Coordination Commission with members representing the IOC, the International Federations, the National Olympic Committees, OCOGs from the past, the IOC Athletes' Commission and the International Paralympic Committee, as well as experts designated or approved by the IOC.[34] As part of their mandate, members of the Coordination Commission conduct site inspections and meet with representatives of the OCOG and the Host Country on a regular basis.[35]

Measures in case of non-compliance with the HCC

The most serious measure contemplated by the HCC in the event of non-compliance therewith is its termination by the IOC and subsequent withdrawal of the Olympic Games from the Host City, the Host NOC and the OCOG. Termination of the HCC might be prompted by a failure on the part of the Host City, the Host NOC and/or the OCOG to perform ''any material obligation pursuant to the HCC or under any applicable law''.[36] That being said, the HCC sets out a two-step procedure for its termination and subsequent withdrawal of the Olympic Games. First, the IOC notifies the Host City, the Host NOC and/or the OCOG and calls upon the relevant party to remedy its failure within 60 days of receiving the notification. This time limit is shortened to 30 days if the opening ceremony of the Olympic Games is less than 120 days away.[37] Second, if the relevant party does not respond to its failure in a timely and accurate manner, the HCC shall be terminated and the Olympic Games withdrawn with immediate effect.[38] Apart from termination of the HCC and subsequent withdrawal of the Olympic Games, the IOC may decide, for example, to withhold any grant to be made to the OCOG in accordance with the HCC.[39]

Conclusion

Against the background of the reform proposals embodied in Agenda 2020, the initial failure of the 2024 HCC to incorporate human rights obligations, other than those relating to non-discrimination, was presented as an astonishing omission. Although the IOC has recently surrendered to public pressure and it has finally added human rights obligations to the 2024 HCC, its role does not end here. The second part of this blog will examine whether the insertion of human rights obligations to the 2024 HCC is to be regarded as a turning point in history of the Olympic Games or risks being an empty promise.

[1]    ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work; Article 2.

[2]    UDHR; Article 23.

[3]    ICCPR; Articles 8, 22, 26.

[4]    ICESCR; Articles 2, 8.

[5]    ECHR; Articles 4, 11, 14.

[6]    ICESCR; Article 7.

[7]    Human Rights Watch, 'One Year of My Blood: Exploitation of Migrant Construction Workers in Beijing', March 2008, at 22, 39.

[8]    Ibid., at 42.

[9]    CESCR General Comment No. 7; para. 3.

[10]   Ibid., paras. 13, 16.

[11]   Ibid., para. 14.

[12]   Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions, 'Fair Play for Housing Rights: Mega-Events, Olympic Games and Housing Rights', June 2007, at 154.

[13]   R. Gauthier, The International Olympic Committee, Law and Accountability, Routledge, 2017, at 90.

[14]   ICCPR; Article 19 (2), (3).

[15]   Ibid., Article 21.

[16]   F. Faut, 'The Prohibition of Political Statements by Athletes and its Consistency with Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights: Speech is Silver, Silence is Gold?', (2014) 14 (3) ISLJ 253.

[17]   A. Boyle, 'Human Rights and Environment: Where Next?', (2012) 23 (3) EJIL 613, at 617.

[18]   Rio Declaration on Environment and Development; Principle 4.

[19]   S. Samuel, W. Stubbs, 'Green Olympics, Green Legacies? An Exploration of the Environmental Legacies of the Olympic Games', (2012) 48 (4) International Review for the Sociology of Sport 485, at 487.

[20]   Ibid.

[21]   2024 Host City Contract – Principles; Article 3.1.

[22]   Ibid., Article 3.3.

[23]   Ibid., Article 17.1.

[24]   Ibid., Article 1.1.

[25]   Ibid., Article 51.1.

[26]   Ibid., Article 51.2.

[27]   Ibid., Article 2.

[28]   Ibid., Article 4.1.

[29]   In practice, an Olympic Delivery Authority might operate under different names.

[30]   M. James, G. Osborn, 'London 2012 and the Impact of the UK's Olympic and Paralympic Legislation: Protecting Commerce or Preserving Culture', (2011) 74 (3) Modern Law Review 410, at 419-420.

[31]   Gauthier (supra note 13) at 65-66.

[32]   Olympic Charter; Rule 7.2.

[33]   2024 Host City Contract – Principles; Article 13.1.

[34]   Ibid., Article 27.1. See also Olympic Charter; Rule 37.

[35]   A. Geeraert, R. Gauthier, 'Out-of-control Olympics: Why the IOC is Unable to Ensure an Environmentally Sustainable Olympic Games', (2017) 19 Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning 10.

[36]   2024 Host City Contract – Principles; Article 38.2. (d).

[37]   Ibid., Article 38.3. (a).

[38]   Ibid., Article 38.3. (b).

[39]   Ibid., Article 36.2. (b).

Call for papers

20 years of the World Anti-Doping Code in Action

International Sports Law Journal Conference 2025

Asser Institute, The Hague

6 and 7 November 2025

The Editors of the International Sports Law Journal (ISLJ), the Asser Institute and the Research Chair on Responsible Sport of the University of Sherbrooke invite you to submit abstracts for the ISLJ Conference on International Sports Law, which will take place on 6 and 7 November 2025 at the Asser Institute in The Hague. The ISLJ, published by Springer and T.M.C. Asser Press, is the leading academic publication in the field of international sports law and governance. The conference is a unique occasion to discuss the main legal issues affecting international sports with academics and practitioners from all around the world. 

The 2025 ISLJ Conference will focus on assessing the first 20 years (2004-2024) of operation of the World Anti-Doping Code (WADC) since its entry into force in 2004, while also discussing its future prospects, in light of the new version of the Code due to be adopted at the Busan Conference in December 2025 and the 10th Conference of the Parties to the International Convention against Doping in Sport, to be held in Paris from 20 to 22 October. The aim of the conference will be to take a comprehensive stock of the operation of the private-public transnational regulatory regime which emerged in the wake of the WADC.  This regime is structured around a complex network of national and global institutions engaged in anti-doping work (WADA, NADAs, IFs, accredited laboratories) and guided by an equally complex assemblage of norms located at the global (WADC and the WADA Standards), international (UNESCO Convention against Doping in Sport), regional (Council of Europe Anti-Doping Convention), and national (various national anti-doping legislations) level. This makes for a fascinating and convoluted transnational legal construct in need of being studied, analysed and criticised by scholars. 

Reviewing 20 years of implementation of the WADC warrants a special edition of the ISLJ Conference and of the journal, which invites scholars of all disciplines to reflect on the many questions and issues linked with it. We welcome proposals touching on the following subjects (and more): 

• The governance of the world anti-doping regime
• The public-private nature of this governance
• The transparency of this governance
• The legitimacy of this governance
• The participatory nature of this governance
• The role of scientific experts in this governance

•  The normative content of the WADC and the international standards
• The strict liability principle 
• The privacy rights of athletes under the WADC
• The sanctioning policy under the WADC
• The role of the international standards in implementing the WADC
• The compatibility of the WADC with human rights

• The glocal implementation of the WADC
• The role of local institutions (NADOs/Labs/NOCs) in the implementation of the WADC
• The tension between global (WADA) and local (NADOs/Labs/NOCs) in the implementation of the WADC
• The role of the IFs in the implementation of the WADC
• The role of the ITA in the implementation of the WADC
• The role of judicial bodies (national courts, disciplinary committees of IFs, CAS) and their jurisprudence in the implementation of the WADC 

• The effectiveness of the world anti-doping regime
• The evaluation and evolution of the effectiveness of the world anti-doping regime in preventing doping
• The role of the media in unveiling the ineffectiveness of the world anti-doping regime
• The role of states in hindering the effectiveness of the world anti-doping regime
• The world anti-doping regime as a regime with a variable geometry of effectiveness

•  The future of the world anti-doping regime: Revolution, reform or more of the same?
• Do we need a world anti-doping regime? 
• If we do, should it be reformed? How? 

Abstracts of 300 words and CVs should be sent no later than 1 June 2025 to a.duval@asser.nl. Selected speakers will be informed by 30 June 2025. The selected participants will be expected to submit a draft paper by 15 October 2025. Papers accepted and presented at the conference are eligible for publication in a special issue of the ISLJ subject to peer-review. The Asser Institute will provide a limited amount of travel and accommodation grants (max. 350€) to early career researchers (doctoral and post-doctoral) in need of financial support. If you wish to be considered for a grant, please indicate it in your submission.  

Editor’s note: Rhys Lenarduzzi recently completed a Bachelor of Law (LL.B) and Bachelor of Philosophy (B.Phil.) at the University of Notre Dame, Sydney, Australia. As a former professional athlete, then international sports agent and consultant, Rhys is interested in international sports law, policy and ethics. He is currently undertaking an internship at the T.M.C. Asser Institute with a focus on Transnational Sports Law.

As one may have gathered from the series thus far, the question that comes out of this endeavour for me, is whether redistribution in football would be better divorced from the transfer system?

In my introductory blog I point towards historical, cultural, and of course the legal explanations as to why redistribution was established, and why it might be held onto despite obvious flaws. In my second blog, I point out how the training compensation and solidarity mechanisms work in practice through an African case study, as well as the hindrance caused and the Eurocentricity of the regulations. The key take-away from my third blog on the non-application of training compensation in women’s football might be that training compensation should apply to both men’s and women’s football, or neither. The sweeping generalisation that men’s and women’s football are different as justification for the non-application to the women’s game is not palatable, given inter alia the difference between the richest and poorest clubs in men’s football. Nor is it palatable that the training compensation mechanism is justified in men’s football to incentivise training, yet not in women’s football.

In the fourth blog of this series, I raise concerns that the establishment of the Clearing House prolongs the arrival of a preferable alternative system. The feature of this final blog is to consider alternatives to the current systems. This endeavour is manifestly two-fold; firstly, are there alternatives? Secondly, are they better? 

1. Is training compensation necessary to incentivise training?

It might be the case that this question does not receive adequate attention. Though we are told there exists a need to incentivise training and the system as it stands is justified by this notion, is that truly what the redistributive mechanisms in the current form achieve? Furthermore, for all the flaws in reasoning and hindrance created by the mechanisms, is it really worth it?

During my time as an agent, I have personally never heard from a director or executive of a football club, the words or sentiment that, time - effort - money placed towards their youth football programs is done so solely, predominantly, or at all in anticipation of training compensation or solidarity payments.  Nor have I ever come across the sentiment from within any club, that a club would not care for or abandon its youth programs without the ‘dangling carrot’ of potential compensation. FIFA now refer to the redistributive mechanisms as ‘training rewards’, though one may reasonably struggle to connect these training rewards with a true definition of incentive. It appears more likely to be the case that any desire or expectation to be rewarded or compensated is an after the fact conclusion, when a player progresses professionally and a training club concludes that they are part of the reason for that players’ success. In a macro sense, given how infrequent it is for a training club to develop a professional, this seems to add weight to an argument that compensation does not create the purported incentive, or at least that clubs do not rely on the prospect.  It is because of this that I tend to lean towards the view that the incentivisation to train youth as a justification for redistributive measures may not have aged well. In any event, it would be interesting to test that intuition derived from experience, through a proper social scientific survey of clubs. Systems with such far-reaching implications should be grounded in a proper study of the socio-economic drivers of the training of football players.

On the other hand, the possibility of attracting large and exciting transfer fees is often spoken about within club walls.  For these ‘selling clubs’ with a clear intention to invest in youth and capitalise later in the form of transfer fees, such fees may be seen as compensation of sorts, but more likely as a remuneration for a deliberate though hardly risk-free investment. Moreover, these clubs do not simply abandon their first team and focus on youth and potential transfers exclusively. First team squads are also the beneficiary of strong youth systems and commonly the main reason a club invests in youth. Additionally, clubs can have a strong connection to their communities and see a combined duty and benefit of having strong youth programs. Clubs not only play a role in sustaining the social fabric of the communities to which they are situated, but benefit commercially through the many ways in which fans add value.

If it is true that compensation does not amount to incentivisation, then it is difficult to conclude that it is necessary. However, even if training compensation and the solidarity mechanism are not deemed necessary, a strong case can still be made for redistribution so long as the gap between wealthy and poor clubs remains or grows, and entire continents continue to be nurseries and the source of the muscle drain.

2. Imagining Alternative Redistributive Mechanisms

Proposing an alternative to the existing FIFA systems of redistribution is a difficult task. I have raised the concern of the Eurocentricity of the current regulations, and in proposing something else, one must be mindful that these are global regulations. If one suggests a form of taxation or tariff to redistribute, awareness of the myriad cultural differences on taxation and the multiplicity of enforcement contexts might be important. Also, whilst I have raised the question on whether compensation ought to be divorced from the transfer system, reasons for redistributing at all should be axiomatically better than not having a system of redistribution.

Intent and what is to be achieved needs to be clear. Is the ideal system of redistribution in place to reward ‘something’ or should redistribution be directed more deliberately and where it is needed, acting as welfare of a kind? I have already suggested that compensation does not incentivise clubs, though conversely, might clubs be disincentivised to grow if they only remain the beneficiaries of redistribution insofar as they stay sufficiently small and poor, whatever that threshold might be? Or could a system still incentivise growth, with clubs the beneficiaries of an amount that would not be enough to sustain themselves in full, yet enough to help them to continue to grow and commercialise? Whether greater commercialisation is a desirable change is another worthwhile question.

Despite the difficulties in suggesting an alternative, one can hope that a system of redistribution can be non-discriminative, does not create the hindrance effect to the current extent or encourage risky circumvention of the regulations (see blog 2 for detail), and is able to attain its legitimate aims. I would submit that the current systems do not tick these boxes. In this section, I provide some food for thought regarding potential alternatives, though I must caveat that I am not an economist and have not yet settled on an alternative myself.

a)     Coubertobin Tax

I will begin this section by introducing Andreff’s Coubertobin tax, in the interest of highlighting that others have thought about alternative systems of redistribution and have perhaps proposed alternatives that are arguably better than the current systems. Whilst I hope to present the Coubertobin tax adequately, one will need to read Andreff for the full picture.  Though valuable food for thought, I do not endorse the Coubertobin tax per se, as it has its flaws and remains connected to the transfer system, albeit to a lesser extent.

Inspired by a mix of the economic thought of James Tobin and Pierre de Coubertin, the idea of a Coubertobin tax “is to levy a tax at a 1 % rate on all transfer fees and initial wages agreed on in each labour contract signed by athletes and players from developing countries with foreign partners.”[1]

The objectives are as follows:

1. slightly covering the education and training cost, for his/her home developing country, of any athlete or player transferred abroad;
2. providing a stronger disincentive to transfer an athlete or a player from a developing country, the younger he/she is when the transfer takes place;
3. thus, slowing down the muscle drain from developing countries and toward professional player markets in developed countries; and
4. accruing revenues to a fund for sports development in the home developing country from the tax levied on every athlete or player transfer abroad.[2]

There is little wonder why Andreff desires to redistribute to developing countries. He has done extensive work on the correlation between economic prosperity and sporting success. This list is by no means exhaustive, but for instance, he writes extensively on the muscle drain, where athletes from developing nations move for financial and developmental reasons, which creates a myriad of follow-on issues to the home-country. He identifies the toll poverty takes on a developing country’s domestic leagues and competitions due to the muscle drain and the inability to train professionals to a world class standard. He notes that some athletes defect to other nations early and qualify for the adopted country’s national team. Per Andreff and in summary “the overall context of sport underdevelopment does not provide a strong incentive for talented players to stay in their home country even if a professional championship does exist there.”[3]

Andreff’s proposal is not set in stone and an admirable element to his work on the matter is the consistent offering of caveats that suggest, with more study and/or work, a certain piece of the Coubertobin system may benefit from amendment. Andreff describes his system as “a solution (not a panacea) which is likely to alleviate, along with some of the financial problems of developing countries, the aforementioned problem of the muscle drain.”[4] Most relevant is perhaps the idea that, the younger the player is in question regarding a transfer, the higher the tax (see suggested formulae).[5] This he submits, may put a brake on the muscle drain at such early ages, or result in greater amounts of money moved to developing nations if a club wishes to recruit a player at a significantly young age.

Andreff acknowledges hindrances, though takes a macro view that encompasses protecting minors, as well as strengthening local leagues in developing countries given the talent will remain for longer periods. One can envisage an additional positive result, in having young athletes finish non-football education having stayed at home until a later date.

Though this is my interpretation, I suspect Andreff finds it an easy task to identify the beneficiaries or winners of these transactions and therefore those parties should be the ones who pay the Coubertobin tax, on “the bill for the transfer fee and the first year wage”.[6]

Andreff raises the concern of “bargaining and corruption surrounding the tax collection in developing countries”,[7] though offers a plausible solution. “[T]he collection of the Coubertobin tax should be monitored and supervised by an international organization, either an existing one (UNDP or the World Bank) or an ad hoc one to be created.”[8] This is plausible as it is not so different to the way FIFA intends to outsource the operation of the Clearing House to a suitable and reputable organisation that would be subject to audit (see blog 4).

Andreff admits the tax “would meet with both hindrance and resistance”,[9] it would “not be easy to implement and enforce insofar as it has to be accepted on a worldwide basis”,[10] the system would contain administrative costs that would need sorting and ironing out, and there would need to be a method for disputes and perhaps fines for non-compliance.  Even so, the Coubertobin tax provides much food for thought as it is proposed for all professional sport and not just football. It attempts to address the muscle drain and the taxes proposed may prove less a hindrance than the current FIFA systems.

b)    Abolishment and Free Market Economics

If this was day one of football, there might be a strong argument for a free market approach, with emphasis on club management to make sure intelligent decisions are made to sustain clubs, with wealth the responsibility of the clubs themselves. However, we are not at the beginning of football.  Certain clubs in certain regions are the victims of much more than mismanagement, adding weight to an argument for a need to redistribute equitably.

As it stands, an equitable system or one where redistribution is directed to where it is most needed, is not in place and has not been proposed. Could it be the case, at least in the interim, that the free market is the best and fairest? The current systems appear at least somewhat a case of over-regulation with side effects that were not, or could not have been anticipated, like the hindrance effect and the pressures on vulnerable clubs to waive compensation to name just a couple.  It then seems defensible to abolish systems that do not work in the interim, than to hang on to those flawed systems until a better proposal is put forth. Instead, all efforts could be placed into study and research to remedy the obvious flaws.

Conversely, the free market in modern football would not appear to improve the situation for the kind of club I have identified frequently throughout this series, and although it may eliminate the hindrance effect, destination clubs would have their pick of players and poor clubs would undoubtedly lose all talent. Furthermore, if a system of redistribution was to be created that clearly improved football and the free-market approach had been adopted in the interim, a valid consideration might be the difficulty the relevant bodies would have in re-introducing a system of redistribution, having gone back to the free market for a period.  It is for these reasons that I can not endorse such an approach, however sympathetic I am to abolishment and the idea of alleviating hindrance and promoting free movement.

c)     FIFA Funded Solidarity: A New Model

As he addressed the Confederation of African Football’s (CAF) 42nd ordinary general assembly, FIFA President Gianni Infantino said, “I believe in Africa. I count on Africa, and you can count on me to help you to bring Africa to the top.” However admirable and applaudable are the purported goals of FIFA for Africa, and the sentiment warm, one cannot help but wonder if this African project, relevant to this blog series, could not be expedited by a substantial FIFA based investment. Infantino went on to say, “I want to see at least 50 national teams and 50 clubs from all over the world that can compete for the title of world champions with realistic chances of winning. And why shouldn’t Africa be at the top, with the incredible talent that we see shining every week, mainly in Europe’s top clubs? I am convinced it’s only a matter of commitment, work and engagement by all of us together.”

To answer the President’s question, one cannot see African clubs on top in a global sense, so long as all the best African players play, as the President said, in Europe. Further, we will continue to be less likely to see an African national team win a World Cup, whilst some of the best African players play for other nations to which they moved when they were younger, and whilst African federations are unable to organise like European federations, given they do not have the same resources.  I could of course go on, but one likely gathers my point. 

So, could FIFA make an investment sufficient to prop up Africa as it supposedly desires? Perhaps. How about an amount equal to the frequently referred gap between what is owed and paid when it comes to the redistributive mechanisms of FIFA? Could FIFA at least cover that gap? If one considers the annual financial reports, certainly, and probably further and in a more specific and deliberate fashion. Surely direct, targeted investment is preferable to leaving redistribution to the whim of a club’s good fortune to have registered a player that would go on to be a professional. That is, of course, if that player’s club did not have to waive training compensation to render a transfer possible.

The FIFA Forward Development Programme is described by FIFA as “global football development and the way we share the success of the FIFA World Cup”. It is an encouraging and frankly exciting initiative, and again one must applaud the efforts. Under the Infantino administration, FIFA has pledged more funding in this way than ever before. “On 13 June 2018, the FIFA Congress decided to increase investment in the FIFA Forward Development Programme still further for the next cycle of 2019-2022 with a 20% increase in the annual entitlement for each of the 211 member associations and six confederations.”

Anyone can go to the webpage for the FIFA Forward Programme, roll their cursor over the interactive map and see that FIFA are investing money in places of need. Disappointingly, not overly specific information is provided regarding the exact use of funding, though there are encouraging articles that unpack some of the investments and initiatives and these efforts should be commended (the FIFA Foundation Community Programme is another example of some of the encouraging work being done).  One element that is interesting and appealing within these funding programs, is the toying with an application process to be granted some form of investment. This perhaps shows an increased awareness that money ought to be distributed specifically and deliberately, to address a genuine need. Though not a trial per se, this kind of process could be used as one and may turn out to be preferable to clubs in need, who would for instance prefer to bypass the national association if that relationship is not so sturdy.   

At first glance, the almost even allocation of investment per member association found in Circular no. 1659 - FIFA Forward Development Programme – regulations (FIFA Forward 2.0) may seem equitable, though taking into account that some of the wealthier associations may be the beneficiaries of the systemic exploitation and drain that has featured in this blog series, might render the near even distribution questionable. Whilst “an additional amount of up to USD 1,000,000 is available for member associations with an annual revenue of USD 4 million or less”, one might reasonably wonder if that amount of extra funding to smaller and/or poorer associations is sufficient to affect real change.

Whilst I hope I have made clear that FIFA’s efforts ought to be commended, the overarching theme of this section is to consider if more could be done and if so, might those extra efforts to distribute funds be preferable and able to replace the current systems of redistribution connected to the transfer system. I do not find impressive the self-congratulatory theme of the statement from Alejandro Domínguez, Chairman of the FIFA Finance Committee, of being hundreds of millions of dollars under budget in the 2019 annual report, as well as possessing “sufficient liquidity”. FIFA, a not-for-profit organisation, was delighted to report that “at the 2019 year-end, total assets had increased to USD 4,504 million (four billion, five hundred and four million), chiefly made up of cash and financial assets (82%). Reserves also remained at a very satisfactory level at USD 2,586 million (two billion, five hundred and eighty-six million), clearly above the amount budgeted.”[11]

Proposing FIFA fund more redistribution is not a risk free, nor a concern free proposition, but it does appear the idea could be taken more seriously by the relevant stakeholders. FIFA’s predominate money maker is the FIFA World Cup, which is in a sense, a way of using the produce of the richest clubs in the world, which have in turn benefitted from some of the poorest clubs nursing the players until they are of age. FIFA, filling the frequently mentioned gap from the profits of the World Cup makes as much sense as any proposal. Is this not simply a case of, if more can be done then more should be done? Going off FIFA’s reports, it has the resources.

Within this potential alternative, where FIFA are responsible for raising and redistributing funding that would otherwise supposedly come from the current redistribution systems, is a change to the modality of redistribution. From what is currently intimately connected to training and transfers, this alternative provides for the much-needed decoupling, not only based on the philosophical flaws, but additionally due to the preferable practical implications that divorcing redistribution, training and the transfer market could achieve. In terms of a body or mechanism to implement an alternative like this, how might a Clearing House kind of project unfold, that adopts a specific and deliberate ethos to distributing FIFA funds? To expand, following a substantial process of planning and allocation of adequate resources, the creation of a specific arm dedicated to researching and identifying those areas of football most in need, as well as receiving and vetting applications for funding. Might that or a similar solution be achievable? It could be in-house or outsourced the same way the Clearing House is intended to be, geared to make suggestions, provide expert economic advice and proposals, reporting its findings back to FIFA for an extra layer of approval. Food for thought in any case.

3. Concluding Remarks

There is a core of wealth in football that has benefitted from, been propped up by, and drained the periphery. It is important to ensure the strength and survival of football outside this core of wealth and to actively make sure value is added to the periphery. Football needs to promote this notion and in doing so ask the question, where will the big clubs turn for talent and youth if those reservoirs which they drain are emptied and unable to continue to produce talent? 

If one is convinced that it is not necessary to incentivise training, that the current regulations have significant negative effects, that any system of redistribution should be non-discriminative, provide minimal hindrance to free movement and pursue deliberate legitimate aims, then one is in favour of overhaul. Further then, surely there is an obligation to address what can be in the immediate sense. Namely, to either default to the free market, until a convincing system of redistribution is created, or perhaps preferably, for FIFA to take the reins and fund redistribution to the periphery of football to a greater extent.

[1] Wladimir Andreff (2001). The correlation between economic underdevelopment and sport. European Sport Management Quarterly, 1, p.274.

[2] Wladimir Andreff, “A Coubertobin Tax Against Muscle Drain”, 4th Play the Game Conference: Governance in Sport: The Good, the Bad & the Ugly, Copenhagen, 6-10 November (2005) p.10.

[3] Ibid, p.5.

[4] Ibid, p.9.

[5] Ibid, p.11.

[6] Ibid, p.12.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid.

[11] FIFA Annual Report 2019 p.124.