FIFA’s Third-Party Ownership (TPO) ban entered into force on the 1 May 2015[1]. Since then, an academic and practitioner’s debate is raging over its compatibility with EU law, and in particular the EU Free Movement rights and competition rules. 

The European Commission, national courts (and probably in the end the Court of Justice of the EU) and the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) will soon have to propose their interpretations of the impact of EU law on FIFA’s TPO ban. Advised by the world-famous Bosman lawyer, Jean-Louis Dupont, Doyen has decided to wage through a proxy (the Belgian club FC Seraing) a legal war against the ban. The first skirmishes have already taken place in front of the Brussels Court of first instance, which denied in July Seraing’s request for provisional measures. For its part, FIFA has already sanctioned the club for closing a TPO deal with Doyen, thus opening the way to an ultimate appeal to the CAS. In parallel, the Spanish and Portuguese leagues have lodged a complaint with the European Commission arguing that the FIFA ban is contrary to EU competition law. One academic has already published an assessment of the compatibility of the ban with EU law, and many practitioners have offered their take (see here and here for example). It is undeniable that the FIFA ban is per se restrictive of the economic freedoms of investors and can easily be constructed as a restriction on free competition. Yet, the key and core question under an EU law analysis, is not whether the ban is restrictive (any regulation inherently is), but whether it is proportionate, in other words justified.

I will first present the key arguments of the opponents of the ban, before offering my own assessment. As the reader might know, I am no friends of FIFA and a staunch critic of its bad governance syndrome. Although I am convinced that FIFA’s governance deserves a ground-up rebuilt, I also believe that FIFA’s TPO ban is justified.

I.               Antithesis: FIFA’s TPO ban is contrary to EU law 

The legal waters are very much chartered insofar as the question of the application of EU law to FIFA’s TPO ban is concerned.[2] The key legacy of the CJEU’s jurisprudence on sport, starting with the Bosman ruling, is that FIFA’s regulations do not escape the reach of EU law and that they must be subjected to a proportionality control of the restrictions they impose on economic freedoms. The fundamental question with respect to the TPO ban is then whether it will be deemed justified and proportionate by the national courts, the CAS, the European Commission and ultimately the CJEU.

The opponents of the FIFA ban consider first and foremost that the practice of TPO (they usually prefer to refer to as Third-Party Investments or Third-Party Entitlements) is a legitimate financial investment practice, which is needed to sustain and raise the competitiveness of certain clubs. Basically if banks are reluctant to finance those clubs, then less risk-averse investors have to step in. Thus, they support investment in the training capacity of the clubs (especially in South America) and their capacity to take their chances in the most prestigious competitions (for example FC Porto or Atlético Madrid). Hence, TPO can be seen as a legitimate investment practice and its regulation left to the contractual freedom of the parties. Such a radical libertarian view is not often supported nowadays,[3] as the potential integrity risks of TPO are widely acknowledged.[4]

Instead, if the risks connected to TPO are to be tackled, it is argued that TPO should be properly regulated. In EU law jargon, this is labelled a less restrictive alternative.[5] The existence of a less restrictive alternative would point at the disproportionate nature of the FIFA ban. For example, a bundle of regulatory measures are suggested by the Spanish league (La Liga):

·      Prohibition of certain transactions based on the player's age;

·      Maximum percentage of participation in the "economic rights";

·      Quantitative limitations on the maximum number of players per club;

·      Maximum remuneration for the investor;

·      Prohibition of certain clauses that may limit the independence and autonomy of the clubs; and

·      Prohibition of transactions depending on the investor's particular status or business (or participation in the same) such as shareholders, directors and managers of the clubs.

The proposed regulatory changes would undeniably be an improvement with regard to the current situation. However, I do not believe they are sufficiently credible to undermine the legality of FIFA’s TPO ban.

II.             Thesis: FIFA’s TPO ban is compatible with EU law

A.    The necessity to tackle the integrity risks generated by TPO

First, we need to come back to the function and functioning of TPO deals. There is a reason why banks refuse to offer loans to certain clubs. They are often in difficult financial situations, their revenues do not add up with their expenses. Investment funds fill this gap, they replace banks in financially supporting these clubs. In return, they expect a modern version of the “pound of flesh”, a share of the transfer fee attached to a specific player. For a club, the TPO investments will only be fruitful while it is successful on the pitch and lucky in picking the players it recruits. It is a very risky bet on the future. In good times everybody wins, but in bad times the club is in deep trouble (see FC Twente’s fate). The TPO system works as a devil’s circle, the club is drawn into more and more TPO deals to stay financially viable.

Furthermore, TPO deals are not unlike the complex financial instruments that led to the terrible financial crisis of 2008. They give way to similar conflicts of interest. Where banks were selling derivatives based on subprime mortgages to their clients while betting against them at the same time, TPO funds might push their clients to recruit (thanks to loans they have generously provided for high interests) a mediocre player in which they already have a stake. Another option would be for a TPO fund, which is often (if not always) also acting as an agent, to force the departure of a player by triggering an offer which the club cannot refuse (or it would have to buy back the rights which is impossible due to its financial situation). The many hat(s) of TPO investment funds are extremely worrying in terms of conflicts of interest.[6] The most dangerous, though in my view less likely (but see the Tampere case), risk being that TPO investors would use their broad networks of influence to fix games. FIFA’s objective of curbing those risks is clearly a legitimate one.

The heart of the trade of TPO funds is to leverage the hubris of football clubs, to corner them into making a bad financial deal in return for a credible shot at winning a title. But once the high is over, the low starts and the awakening is rather uncomfortable. The high financial risks saddled to the club are sustainable only so long as it is a winner. As soon as its fate on the pitch turns, the bad news accumulates and not unlike a bank run the club crashes, while the investors have more often than not managed to escape before the fall. In short, unless you truly believe in the superpowers of the invisible hand of the market, this practice, as well as the financial practices that led to the financial crisis, deserves either a thorough regulation or an outright ban.

B.    Is there a realistic regulatory alternative to the ban?

The key question for the assessment of the TPO ban under EU law is whether the many negative externalities triggered by the use of TPO could be tackled by the way of a less restrictive encroachment on the economic freedoms of the investors/clubs than the FIFA ban. Critics of the ban have very much insisted on the existence of less restrictive regulatory alternatives and put forward some proposals. Yet, I am of the opinion that these alternatives are generally unworkable in the present context. The main reason being that FIFA is incapable to properly regulate and control the TPO investment market. This is due to the fact that FIFA does not dispose of the legal competence needed to force investment funds to disclose information. To do so, it must be empowered by governments to be able to cease the information wanted, which is unlikely. Some would object, that this could be done via the FIFA TMS system put in place to supervise international transfers. But it would be extremely difficult for FIFA to verify any complex set of contractual information entered into the TMS. The destiny of former article 18 bis of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfers of Players (see the 2014 version here) is there to prove this point. Under article 4.2 of Annexe 3 of the FIFA RSTP 2014, Clubs were already supposed to provide a “Declaration on third-party payments and influence”. Nonetheless, in previous years, FIFA was unable to charge any club (except for Tampere in a match-fixing context and due to a local police investigation) on the ground that an investor was exercising undue influence, mainly because it lacked the knowledge needed to do so. This is exemplified in the case of the ERPA signed by Doyen and FC Twente, which was only partially disclosed to the Dutch Football Association.

If FIFA is powerless, how is it supposed to enforce the ban? Well here lies the crucial difference between a ban and complex regulation. A ban is simpler to enforce, as it is merely a black-or-white matter. FIFA will be able to rely on investigative journalists unearthing investment contracts linked to transfers. The mere existence of a TPO contract will lead to a dissuasive sanction, without the need to get into the nitty-gritty details of each case. It thus makes it easier for FIFA to control the use of TPO and to force investment funds to come out in the open and take charge of the management of a club if they wish to stay active on the transfer market. The higher probability of being caught linked to the use of TPO will most likely work as a strong deterrent for clubs to engage in such a financing practice. This is undeniably a blunt instrument, and in an ideal world a true regulation of the TPO market would be put in place and enforced, but this ideal world is not compatible with the pluralist and complex transnational legal setting in which the transfer system operates. The complex regulatory schemes proposed as substitute to the ban are very well intended, but they do not take into account the extreme difficulty (and costs) linked to their implementation. The fiasco of the old FIFA Players’ Agents Regulations illustrates the practical constraints that burden any regulation of the football transfer market.

C.    TPO is not compatible with the 2001 agreement between the European Commission and FIFA

There is a final argument in favour of the compatibility of the TPO ban with EU law, which is grounded in the 2001 agreement between FIFA, UEFA and the European Commission. As should be obvious by now, the existence of TPO is dependent on the existence of the FIFA transfer system. Such a transfer system is unknown in other industries (though one could very well imagine a transfer system for academics for example). In turn, the FIFA transfer system restricts the economic freedom of both clubs and players. The European Commission highlighted these restrictions during its investigation of the FIFA transfer system in the early 2000s. However, the Commission signed an agreement with FIFA and UEFA signalizing its support for a new (the current) FIFA transfer system in 2001 and put an end to its investigation. This support was conditioned on the idea that a form of transfer system was needed to maintain the contractual stability necessary to the existence of stable and successful teams.[7] This is the fundamental assumption that underlies the compatibility with EU law of the FIFA transfer system, and therefore the sheer existence of TPO. Yet, TPO as a practice is per se promoting contractual instability. Players have to change clubs for TPO investors to cash in on their investments. It is perfectly logical for TPO contracts to include various clauses strongly incentivizing clubs to sell their players. If not, they will have to bear the costs, for example, of paying a fee (usually the invested amount plus a healthy interest) in case the player leaves the club on a free transfer, or forcing the club to buy back at market rate the investors’ shares in the economic right of a player in case of an offer above a minimum price. For a cash-strapped club, e.g. a club that lost access to the banking system and has to turn to TPO investors, this is usually impossible and means that it will be forced to sell-on the player. In a way, TPO is a radical perversion of the deal stroke by FIFA/UEFA and the Commission. The transfer system was meant to ensure that contractual stability is secured in football, not to enhance contractual instability. This contradiction between TPO and the rationale conditioning the legality under EU law of the FIFA transfer system will necessarily bear on the EU Commission’s analysis of FIFA’s TPO ban.

Conclusion: TPO is a symptom, the transfer system is the problem

20 years of the Bosman case oblige, the case has been back in the news cycle this week (see here, here, and here). It is widely credited, or rather blamed, for having changed football for bad, turning it into some kind of commercial monster. I very much doubt this storytelling is right. It is based on a collective misreading of the case. Bosman took stock of a contemporary development in football at that time: the eagerness of the ���football family” to commercialize its activities by primarily selling TV rights in a monopoly position. What Bosman is about, then, it is the regulation of this economic activity. Central questions are: How should the proceeds be distributed and especially who should bear the costs of ensuring competitive balance amongst the teams? Until Bosman the players were the main losers, they could not move freely across Europe and in some countries they could not transfer for free even after the end of their contracts. This situation was deemed an unjustified restriction on the player’s freedom by the Court. Nevertheless, and this is widely forgotten, Bosman is not about dogmatically ensuring that economic freedoms and a deregulated market always prevail. In fact, Advocate General Lenz was advocating as an alternative to the transfer system that the economic revenues derived from TV rights be shared more equally to ensure competitive balance.[8] This is obviously an important restriction on the economic freedom of clubs and leagues, yet the Court endorsed it as viable alternative.[9] Since then, the Court has repeatedly approved various type of sporting regulations restricting the economic freedoms of athletes or clubs.[10] After Bosman, FIFA and UEFA (supported by many clubs) insisted on maintaining a transfer system instead of the alternative suggested by Lenz and the Court. Despite the Commission’s aforementioned challenge of the legality of the FIFA transfer system, FIFA and UEFA were able to marshal the political support of the most influential Member States (France, Germany and the UK) in their bid to save the transfer system.[11] This led to the 2001 agreement and to the survival of the transfer system in its current form.

It is certainly ironical that the transfer system is based on the same legal principles denounced by UEFA and FIFA officials when they talk of slavery regarding TPO. This hypocrisy, rightly pointed out by the critics of the ban,[12] does not entail that the TPO ban is contrary to EU law, as they in turn seem to assume. However, it does imply that TPO as a practice is just the tip of the iceberg. In fact, it is a symptom, as well as the murky world of agents, of a global transfer market gone rogue. This is due mainly to the insistence of FIFA in transforming players into moveable assets included on the balance sheets of clubs. The transfer system is certainly not about contractual stability or the financing of training facilities. Indeed, FIFA is trumpeting the growing number of transfers each year (see this year’s celebratory press release here) and is very much dragging its feet as far as enforcing training compensations and solidarity payments is concerned.[13] Undoubtedly, there is some doublespeak going on. If clubs are forced to turn to TPO investors it is mainly because FIFA and UEFA (and the big clubs) have refused to put in place the necessary redistributive mechanisms to ensure a minimum of competitive balance as was advocated by the CJEU in the Bosman ruling 20 years ago (and by the EU Commission recently). Instead, they have put their faith into a transfer system that is neither correcting competitive imbalances nor guaranteeing contractual stability (a view supported by Stefan Szymanski on behalf of FIFPro). FIFA has lost control over its Frankenstein-like transfer system and it is desperately trying to rein its negative externalities with regulatory patches (e.g. UEFA’s Financial Fair-play Rules or FIFA’s TPO ban). In this regard, the TPO ban is unlikely to contravene EU law, but it is also unlikely to be a solution to the many problems caused by FIFA and UEFA’s handling of the post-Bosman football era.

[1] See FIFA Circular no. 1464 announcing the ban.

[2] This is well done by Johan Lindholm in his article: Can I please have a slice of Ronaldo? The legality of FIFA’s ban on third-party ownership under European union law.

[3] The Spanish Competition Authority comes close to such a view in its advisory opinion criticizing FIFA’s TPO ban. It states at page 6 (in Spanish): “Se ha de partir del hecho de que si el mercado ha facilitado la aparición de estas operaciones es porque una multitud de agentes (tanto clubs como jugadores), actuando de manera descentralizada, han considerado que es lo mejor para sus intereses. Por tanto, la prohibición del TPO resulta en una limitación de la capacidad de obrar y de la libertad de empresa, restringiendo el uso de una conducta que en principio es maximizadora de beneficios (o minimizadora de pérdidas).”

[4] Even though very reluctantly by the Spanish Competition Authority, see p.9-10.

[5] This is also the view of Johan Lindholm, he considers that “regulation is likely a legally more successful response to the perceived ills of TPO”.

[6] This is also true for other types of third party funding, for example in arbitration.

[7] This is in essence the meaning of paragraph 57 of the EU Commission’s rejection decision in the Affaire IV/36 583-SETCA-FGTB/FIFA. The paragraph states : « La protection des contrats pendant une période de durée limitée qui se traduit par des sanctions correspondant notamment à la suspension du joueur pendant une période de 4 mois à 6 mois (dans des cas de récidives) semble indispensable pour garantir la construction d’une équipe. Un club a besoin d’un temps minimum pour construire son équipe. Si un joueur pouvait rompre unilatéralement son contrat dès la première année et être transféré à la fin de la saison vers un autre club, sans aucune sanction autre que la compensation financière, son club d’origine n’aurait pas de possibilité de construire convenablement son équipe. Les sanctions visent donc à démotiver les joueurs de rompre unilatéralement leurs contrats pendant les deux premières années pour permettre l’existence d’équipes stables. En raison des spécificités du secteur en cause la durée de la période protégée et des sanctions semble être proportionnée aux objectifs légitimes quelles visent à atteindre. »

[8] See in particular paragraphs 218-234 of his Opinion.

[9] See para. 110 of the Bosman ruling.

[10] For example: Selection rules in Deliège; Transfer windows in Lehtonen; FIFA’s agent regulation in Piau; Doping sanctions in Meca-Medina; Training compensations in Bernard. The European Commission also recognised the legality of UEFA’s rule limiting the multiple ownership of clubs in ENIC.

[11] On this episode see Borja Garcia’s article, ‘The 2001 informal agreement on the international transfer system’.

[12] In his article Johan Lindholm criticizes this moral posture taken by FIFA and UEFA. He rightly points at its hypocrisy: “[…] a third party owning fifty percent of the economic rights to a player is the very height of moral corruption, but a club owning one hundred percent of the same right is not only perfectly acceptable but also applauded”.

[13] A recent study commissioned by the European Clubs Association (ECA) on the transfer market, shows (at page 88) that the solidarity payments are way below the 5% threshold imposed by the FIFA RSTP (reaching instead only 1,15% of the transfer fees).

This year’s FIFA congress in Sao Paulo should not be remembered only for the controversy surrounding the bid for the World Cup 2022 in Qatar. The controversy was surely at the centre of the media coverage, but in its shadow more long-lasting decisions were taken. For example, the new Regulations on Working with Intermediaries was approved, which is probably the most important recent change to FIFA regulations. These new Regulations will supersede the Regulations on Players’ Agents when they come into force on 1 April 2015. In this blog post we compare the old and the new Regulations followed by a short analysis and prospective view on the effects this change could have. 

The Road to the New Regulations

Players’ agents, or “intermediaries” should we use FIFA’s new terminology, provide their services to football players and clubs to conclude employment contracts and transfer agreements. FIFA has been regulating this activity since it introduced the first Regulations on players’ agents on 1 January 1996. Even though the Regulations were amended several times since then, it is only during the last five years that a permanent consultation process was put in place. According to a FIFA press release, the consultation process involved member associations, confederations, clubs, FIFPro and professional football leagues. Surprisingly however, the press release does not mention whether agent stakeholders, such as Pro Agent were also consulted. The ultimate objective of these consultations was to propose a new system that is more transparent and simpler in its implementation and administration.[1] At the beginning of 2013, a Sub-Committee for Club Football was set up to deal exclusively with the issue of reforming the Players’ Agents Regulations. Later on that year the Committee presented a draft for the FIFA Congress 2013 based on the following three findings:

1. The current licensing system should be abandoned

2. A set of minimum standards and requirements  must be established in FIFA’s future regulatory framework

3. A registration for intermediaries must be set up [2]

The draft Regulations were finally approved by the FIFA Executive Committee on 21 March 2014 and by the FIFA Congress on 11 June 2014. Furthermore, the three objectives outlined are supposedly reflected in the new Regulations.  

A Rough Comparison of the Old and New Agents/Intermediaries Regulations

In the following flowcharts we have summarized the key requirements enshrined in both the old and the new agents/intermediaries FIFA regulations. This provides a clear comparison of the differences and similarities existing between the two regulatory frameworks.

Flowchart: Becoming an Agent under the Old FIFA Regulations
FlowchartRegulationsPlayers'Agents.jpg (179.7KB) 

Flowchart: Becoming an Intermediary under the New FIFA Regulations
FlowchartRegulationsonWorkingwithIntermediaries.jpg (146.5KB)

By abandoning the old licensing system, the procedure to become an intermediary becomes much simpler than before. The applicant does not have to undergo an examination by FIFA anymore, nor does he need to conclude a professional liability insurance in his own name or provide a bank guarantee from a Swiss bank for a minimum amount of CHF 100,000. Furthermore, in contrast to the old Regulations, legal persons can now also act as intermediaries. Thus, in the near future we can expect players such as Cristiano Ronaldo, Radamel Falcao and coach Jose Mourinho to be represented by the agents’ company GestiFute rather than simply the agent Jorge Mendes. 

However, it should be noted that FIFA’s new Regulations on Working with Intermediaries are to be considered as minimum standards or requirements. In accordance with Art. 1(3), the right of associations to go beyond these minimum standards/requirements is preserved. In other words, national associations can set higher thresholds for becoming an intermediary should they wish for. In order to better understand the practical reality of the regulation of agents it is therefore necessary to analyse to what extent different associations set different standards and requirements.  

Registration

Under the new Regulations, the national associations will still be responsible for adopting a registration system regarding the intermediaries. However, several important changes between the old and the new Regulations can be deciphered, including the contractual terms between the intermediary and the player/club and the remuneration terms.  

Contractual terms

Under the old Regulations, the representation contract between the agent and the player and/or club would only be valid for a maximum period of two years. Moreover, the contract could be extended for another period of maximum two years (Art. 19(3) of the old Regulations). According to Art. 3 of the new Regulations, "intermediaries must be registered in the relevant registration system every time they are individually involved in a specific transaction". Players and clubs disclose all the details to the association when called upon. Thus, by allowing players not to be contractually bound to a specific intermediary for a specific period of time, the bargaining position of the player when engaging the services of an intermediary is likely to increase.

Remuneration terms

In both the old as well as in the new Regulations the amount of remuneration shall be calculated on the basis of the player’s basic gross income. [3] Nonetheless, where under the old Regulations the remuneration is calculated on the basis of the player’s annual income, under the new Regulations the remunerations is calculated on the basis of the player’s income for the entire duration of the contract. Moreover, as stipulated in Art. 7(3)a) of the new Regulations, the “total amount of remuneration per transaction due to intermediaries (…) should not exceed 3% of the player’s basic gross income for the entire duration of the contract”. Secondly, the new Regulations prohibit any payment to intermediaries when the player is a minor.[4] With the new provisions on remuneration FIFA hopes to avoid that intermediaries exploit players. Indeed, in many countries it is still common practice for players to (unknowingly) sign contracts with their agents forcing them to pay a much higher share of their income. This was perfectly possible under the old Regulations since it did not provide a remuneration limit due to the players’ agents and there was no prohibition regarding remuneration to the agent when the player is a minor and should be way more difficult under the new Regulations.

Conclusion
With the new Regulations FIFA attempts not to regulate access to the activity anymore, but instead to shape the practice itself: players and clubs are authorised to choose any parties as intermediaries and can change intermediary at any moment since they are not bound by a contract with the intermediary. Furthermore, with the remuneration limit of 3% of the player’s income FIFA aims to limit the risk of players being exploited by their intermediaries.

Even though FIFA has explicitly stated the new Regulations will not deregulate the profession, it seems that it is placing the main responsibility to regulate onto the national associations. Not only will all the national associations be required to introduce a registration system, but they are also responsible for enforcing the rules and for imposing sanctions in case the new Regulations are breached. As we have seen, when selecting an intermediary, players and clubs shall act with due diligence. However, the definition of the interpretation of the notion of due diligence is left open and could differ from country to country.

With the game of football becoming ever more globalised and with an ever increasing amount of international transfers of players, regulating the profession of agent/intermediary at the national level is becoming increasingly difficult. In this context, FIFA has adopted a surprising orientation by delegating the responsibility to regulate the profession to the national associations.

[1] http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/organisation/administration/news/newsid=2301236/

[2] http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/organisation/bodies/congress/news/newsid=2088917/

[3] The Regulations on Players’ Agents, Art. 20(1) and the Regulations on Players’ Agents, Art. 7(1)

[4] The Regulations on Players’ Agents, Art. 7(8)

Since the landing on the sporting earth of the Übermensch, aka Usain Bolt, Jamaica has been at the centre of doping-related suspicions. Recently, it has been fueling those suspicions with its home-made scandal around the Jamaica Anti-Doping Commission (JADCO). The former executive of JADCO, Renee Anne Shirley, heavily criticized its functioning in August 2013, and Jamaica has been since then in the eye of the doping cyclone.

In light of the reluctance of Jamaica to remedy the failures of JADCO, the World Ani-Doping Agency (WADA) ordered a formal review of the anti-doping practices on the Island. In case of a negative report, WADA would have declared Jamaica non-compliant, this would in turn trigger sanctions by Sport Governing Bodies, in extreme cases even a full ban from major international events (Olympic Games or World Cups). In order to avoid such a dire fate the sporting Minister of Jamaica and the head of WADA met on November 2013 and a reform plan for the Jamaican anti-doping organisations was agreed. The minister accepted to undertake a legislative review of anti-doping law in Jamaica and to evaluate JADCO’s governance and management structure. Furthermore, the Jamaican government allocated new funds to the fight against doping. In short, JADCO is being restructured, this is very much a work in progress, but WADA is strongly backing the reforms so far.

Furthermore, in 2013, Jamaican track and field athletes have been hit by a strange string of positive doping cases: Asafa Powell, Sherone Simpson, Veronique Campbell-Brown, Allison Randall,  Damar Robinson, and (in 2012) Dominique Blake. All those cases lead to sporting bans of various lengths by Jamaica Athletics Administrative Association’s  (JAAA) Disciplinary Panel. However, even the Jamaican doping justice is scrambling, the probity of some judges have been doubted and calls to reverse the bans in the cases of Asafa Powell and Sherone Simpson have been heard. Anyhow, the cases will probably end up in front of CAS.

Before CAS, the weaknesses of the Jamaican anti-doping system became overt in the Campbell-Brown case. Indeed, in that case, the JADCO acknowledged that it had been, as a matter of policy choice, constantly ignoring the WADA International Standards for Testing. Thus, CAS was prompt to assert that “systematic and knowing failure, for which no reasonable explanation has been advanced, is deplorable and gives rise to the most serious concerns about the overall integrity of the JAAA’s anti-doping processes, as exemplified in this case by the flaws in JADCO’s sample collection and its documentation” (§182). Consequently, the ban on Veronique Campbell-Brown was lifted. Additionally, in a recent decision (2 May 2014) in the Dominique Blake case, CAS reduced the 6-year ban to 4,5 years because, among other reasons, “she was provided with barely any anti-doping education” and “she has only had one previous experience with doping control (when she was 19 years-old)”.

What kind of lessons does the fiasco of the anti-doping system in Jamaica holds for the whole World Anti-Doping edifice? Well, first, that the local level matters a lot. Indeed, if local authorities are inefficient and/or unwilling to address the various dimensions (education, compliance, enforcement) of the anti-doping fight, the WADA and its rules lose relevance. This might engender loopholes in the global anti-doping regime, thus creating discrepancies between athletes. Indeed, some might be very strictly monitored due to their residence being in a complying country, while others will systematically escape any control or punishment due to insufficient procedural standards. Hence, for the WADA Regime to be successful in reining in doping and ensuring a level playing field for athletes, WADA must urgently warrant that enforcement asymmetries are avoided.

The UEFA Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play Regulations have been implemented by UEFA since the season 2011/12 with the aim of encouraging responsible spending by clubs for the long-term benefit of football. However, the enforcement of the break-even requirement as defined in Articles 62 and 63 of the Regulations (arguably the most important rules of FFP) has only started this year. Furthermore, UEFA introduced recently amendments to the Procedural rules governing the Club Financial Control Body (CFCB) allowing settlement agreements to be made between the clubs and the CFCB.  

On Friday 16 May, UEFA finally published the nine separate settlement agreements between the respective clubs and the CFCB regarding the non-compliance with the Financial Fair Play (FFP) break-even requirements. The nine agreements are summarized in the table below:  

Tablewiththeninesettlementagreements.jpg (325.3KB)

Interestingly enough, unlike the other clubs, Manchester City, who had a deficit of €180m in the past two seasons, agreed with the CFCB to have a maximum deficit obligation imposed on them this season already. According to the statement on their website, they are on course to financially break-even by 31 May 2014: “rather than having an accumulative allowance of €30m of losses over the next two reporting years, Manchester City will have specific stipulated allowances for 2013/14 and 2014/15 of €20m and €10m respectively.  Significantly, Manchester City plans to be profitable in 2014/15 and in the years that follow.” 

Official statements by the other clubs express a similar view that the imposed sanctions will not bear negative consequences. For example, PSG got caught by the FFP Regulations due to the overvaluation of the sponsorship deal with QTA. [1] The financial numbers for other clubs are a very well kept secret, in practice it would be highly relevant to know why some clubs had to settle for €60m, others for €12m (FC Zenit), and some for only €200K. Thus, it is of paramount importance that UEFA be transparent and releases the full reasoning and facts leading up to the specifics of the settlements. 

The nine settlement agreements provide for more open questions than answers. For example, why can FC Zenit register up to 22 players for UEFA competitions for 2014/15, when Manchester City, PSG, FC Anzhi and Rubin Kazan are only allowed to register 21?  

Unless a third party decides to challenge the agreements in accordance with Article 16 (2) of the Procedural rules governing the CFCB[2], which is highly unlikely at this stage, we will not get to know more about the reasoning and the factual circumstances of the different cases. Furthermore, we will need to wait for at least another year to get the chance to have the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) pronounce itself on the break-even requirement and the new settlement procedure. Taking into account that the clubs concerned do not appear to be substantially affected by the sanctions, it remains very much unclear whether UEFA’s aim of encouraging responsible spending by clubs for the long-term benefit of football is achieved by the break-even requirement and more particularly by these settlements.

[1] Article 61 (2) of UEFA Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play Regulations states that the acceptable deviation is €5m

[2] Article 16.2. of the Procedural rules governing the UEFA Club Financial Control Body, edition 2014 foresees that: “Any decision of the CFCB chief investigator to conclude a settlement agreement or to apply disciplinary measures within the meaning of Article 14(1) (c) may be reviewed by the adjudicatory chamber at the request of a directly affected party within ten days from the date of publication of the decision.”

Introduction

The year 2015 promises to be crucial, and possibly revolutionary, for State aid in football. The European Commission is taking its time in concluding its formal investigations into alleged State aid granted to five Dutch clubs and several Spanish clubs, including Valencia CF and Real Madrid, but the final decisions are due for 2015.

A few months ago, the Commission also received a set of fresh State aid complaints originating from the EU’s newest Member State Croatia. The complaints were launched by a group of minority shareholders of the Croatian football club Hajduk Split, who call themselves Naš Hajduk. According to Naš Hajduk, Hajduk Split’s eternal rival, GNK Dinamo Zagreb, has received more than 30 million Euros in unlawful aid by the city of Zagreb since 2006.

Investigations into potential aid granted to Dinamo are not something new. Croatia’s most successful club was already under scrutiny by the Croatian Competition Agency (CCA) prior to the country joining the EU on 1 July 2013. In a highly controversial decision dated from 13 June 2013, the CCA decided to terminate the proceedings. With Croatia joining the EU, the CCA ceased to have the legal competence to carry out State aid investigations. Instead, the European Commission has the exclusive competence to deal with the Dinamo Zagreb case.

It is no secret that football and politics, including direct State intervention, go hand-in-hand in many EU Member States. Remarks made by Spanish Government officials after news broke out that the Commission commenced formal investigations relating to Spanish clubs illustrate this point, thereby making it more sensitive for the Commission to decide these cases.

In that sense, the Dinamo Zagreb case could prove a real snake pit, since State funding of professional sports undertakings is authorised by a national law known as the “Sports Act”. In Naš Hajduk’s eyes, joining the EU has not changed existing practices since Dinamo is still receiving unlawful State aid. In fact, they believe that the main reason for the City of Zagreb’s public funding is to preserve the dominant position of Dinamo Zagreb in Croatian football. Furthermore, according to the complainant, the CCA’s decision to declare the aid compatible with Croatian national law was unjustifiable because the CCA did not correctly interpret the relevant provisions stipulated in the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and its Member States and the Republic of Croatia and the Treaty concerning the accession to the EU of the Republic of Croatia. 

This blog post will briefly discuss the measures imposed by the relevant Croatian authorities regarding public funding to Croatian sporting entities in general and Dinamo Zagreb in particular in light of the decision of the CCA. Furthermore, now that a complaint has been lodged with the Commission, I will analyse the key legal issues raised by the case.  

Background

Since Croatia gained its independence from Yugoslavia in 1991, GNK Dinamo Zagreb has been the country’s most successful football club by a distance. It has won 16 national championships in total, and is currently well on its way to win its 10^th consecutive title. Notwithstanding all the sporting success, it has suffered great financial difficulties in this period of time, which climaxed in a Croatian Court declaring the football club bankrupt in 2002. However, after restructuring the club, Dinamo was allowed to remain active in the highest professional football league of Croatia.[1]

Since the introduction of the latest version of the Sports Act in 2006, Dinamo has been consistently included in the public financing programs adopted on the basis of Articles 74-76 (Sport Financing) of this Act. Article 75 allows public funding in sport on State level, whereas Article 76 allows for public funding in sport on regional and local level. Article 76 (1) lists the types of programs that are suitable for public finding. The list includes: implementing sporting activities of children, youth and students; sports preparations, Croatian and international competitions, as well as the general and special health protection of athletes; hiring persons to do professional work in sports and; planning, construction, maintenance and use of sports facilities important to the public authorities.[2]

In Zagreb, for example, the system of public funding works as follows: The Zagreb Sports Association (SSGZ), a public institution or “sports community” created by the City of Zagreb, submits a proposal to the city regarding the public needs for sport within the city.[3] The final decision on this proposal and the annual budget for the public needs for sporting entities within the city lies with the governing body of the City of Zagreb in accordance with Article 74 (2) and 76 (4).

In general terms, the program on public funding in sport of the SSGZ includes:

• Investing in the development of young athletes;

• Encouraging participation in sport for larger number of citizens, especially children and youth.

However, the program also includes:

• Improving the quality of elite professional sport that encourages the development of sport and contributes to the reputation of the City of Zagreb

• Planning, construction, maintenance and use of sports facilities important to the City of Zagreb.

The criteria of what can be considered “elite professional sport” are found in the Conclusion on the allocation criteria for the promotion of professional sport.[4] Funding for elite professional sport could be awarded to all sporting entities who have won a European title, who have gained the right to participate in European competitions, or that are successful in domestic and/or European professional competitions. Based on these criteria, special agreements were signed between the City of Zagreb and elite professional sport entities such as basketball club KK Cibona, waterpolo club HAVK Mladost, handball club RK Lokomotiva Zagreb and football club GNK Dinamo Zagreb.[5]

The City of Zagreb argued that public funding to these elite sport clubs was needed because the private market did not provide sufficient sponsor money in order for these clubs to compete at an adequate competitive level. Nonetheless, the complaints were launched by people who believe that the part of the program that allows specific funding for elite professional sport creates a financial advantage for a selective groups of professional sport clubs, which in turn can lead to unlawful State aid under EU law or under article 70 (1) (iii) of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement.[6] It was therefore no great surprise that the Croatian Competition Agency was urged to decide whether the public funding to one of the recipients, Dinamo Zagreb, amounted to a breach of the EU State aid rules. 

The CCA’s decision

The CCA considered the measures not to constitute unlawful State aid under the Stabilisation and Association Agreement.[7] More specifically, the CCA argued that until Croatia joined the EU on 1 July 2013, the City of Zagreb complied with all the requisites of the Program of public needs in sport and with Article 76 of the Sports Act. Given that “the Sports Act, which is in force and applicable in the Republic of Croatia (…), enables the financing of professional sports by local and regional governments, including the City of Zagreb, the (CCA) has found that there are no legal requirements for assessing whether the resources assigned to Dinamo Zagreb (should be) considered illegal state aid.”[8]

However, the CCA underlined that from the date of accession onwards EU Law will be applicable to Croatia and recognised that the Sport Act could contradict the EU State aid rules.[9]  Consequently, the CCA recommended the Croatian legislator to reformulate the relevant provisions in the Sports Act.[10] Therefore, since joining the EU the Sports Act contains a new paragraph which reads as follows: In accordance with the provisions of (the Sports Act), the financing of professional sports by the national, regional and local governments of Croatia and the city of Zagreb that effects trade between the Croatian State and other EU Member States is only possible if (the financing) is in line with the rules regarding State aid.[11] However, according to the CCA, with Croatia joining the EU, the CCA seized to have the competence for carrying out further State aid investigations for the measures granted to Dinamo Zagreb from both before as after the date of accession.[12]

The question whether aid granted to Dinamo Zagreb specifically due to a lack of sponsor money constituted unlawful State aid was also discussed by the CCA in its decision. In the end, the CCA held that it was “unable to determine whether the sponsoring contracts signed between publicly owned legal persons and (Dinamo Zagreb) contained State aid due to the following: from 2010 to 2012 (Dinamo Zagreb) did not receive financing from sponsoring contracts concluded with (public entity) Zagrebacki Holding, whereas at the moment of signing of the concerned contracts (public entity) Croatia Osiguranje acted as a market economy investor while the City of Zagreb Tourist Board and (public entity) Hrvatska Elektroprivreda signed sponsoring contracts not only with (Dinamo Zagreb) but also with other professional sport clubs.”[13]

The CCA’s decision to consider the public funding in line with the Sports Act and the Program of public needs in sport was heavily criticised, especially by Naš Hajduk. In their view, the CCA erred in their decision to justify the aid granted to Dinamo Zagreb. Their second concern involves the funding programs themselves, which are still in place after Croatia’s accession to the EU. Since 2006, Dinamo has received up to 244 million Kuna (31.7 million Euro) by the City of Zagreb for a variety of services, and there is no indication that the City of Zagreb is planning to seize the funding any time soon.  

The complainants’ arguments

Firstly, the complaint stipulates that Dinamo Zagreb is receiving unlawful State aid because it is allowed to use the Maksimir Stadium and several training grounds free of charge. This “free of charge lease agreement” has been anchored in several agreements signed between the City of Zagreb and Dinamo Zagreb, the latest of which being signed on 13 October 2011 for a period of five years with the possibility of extending that lease. Using the football stadium and the training grounds for free constitutes a selective advantage, they argue, because no private operator would consider leasing out real estate free of charge.

Secondly, Naš Hajduk argues that the maintenance costs of the stadium are not being paid by Dinamo Zagreb, but by the City of Zagreb. In fact, the maintenance costs for the period 2010 – 2014 amounted to 4.8 million Euro. This amount can be considered as an unlawful aid granted to Dinamo Zagreb.

Thirdly, the City of Zagreb has funded (and still does) the operating costs of “sport clubs of a particular importance for the city”. Operating costs include: Youth development and expenses made by Dinamo Zagreb’s youth categories; travel and accommodation costs for matches played in European competitions, international friendlies and training programs; the organisation of home games in European competitions; and “other development programs”.

Fourthly, Naš Hajduk regards the fact that the City of Zagreb has (partially) paid the salaries of the football trainers working for Dinamo for the last three years as further evidence of unlawful State aid. As a rough average, the city pays the club 100.000 Kuna (13.000 Euro) a year per trainer. According to the complainant, 30 trainers received this amount in 2012, 23 in 2013 and 22 in 2014. In fact, the operating costs and the payment of trainer salaries combined would amount to nearly 4.9 million Euros.

Fifthly, in addition to describing which measures should be deemed as unlawful State aid, Naš Hajduk argued in the complaint that regardless of whether the measures are considered illegal State aid or not, the Croatian authorities failed to meet their notification obligation as stipulated in Article 108 (3) TFEU and Article 2 of the Procedural Regulations 659/1999. A notification by the Croatian authorities, they argue, is not just a procedural obligation for Member States, but it would also lead to greater transparency on public funding and would take away any doubts disagreeing citizens, such as themselves, might have about how the State spends public money.

Lastly, the complainant pointed out to the Commission that the CCA erred in its decision to justify the public funding under the national Sports Act. The principle of supremacy of EU law is also applicable as regards accession treaties such as the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and its Member States and the Republic of Croatia and the Treaty concerning the accession to the EU of the Republic of Croatia.  

Is Dinamo Zagreb receiving (unlawful) State aid?

Naš Hajduk believes, and perhaps rightly so, that the advantages gained by the free of charge lease contract, the maintenance costs of the stadium, the operating costs reimbursements and the trainer salaries cannot be justified because of “lack of sponsorship from the private sector”. Moreover, as regards the lease and maintenance agreements between the club and the city, there is a realistic possibility that the City of Zagreb did not behave in accordance with the Market Economy Investor Principle[14] and that Dinamo gained a financial advantage from these deals. It would not be the first time that the Commission would find such agreements contrary to Article 107 (1) TFEU. For example, in its decision regarding alleged municipal aid to several professional Dutch football clubs, the Commission found that the payment agreement between the municipality of Tilburg and the football club Willem II for the stadium provided a selective advantage to Willem II with the use of public resources. In essence, the Commission accepted the possibility that stadiums belonging to municipalities that are not rented out at market conditions to professional football clubs could entail State aid.[15]

Similarly, it cannot be denied that an undertaking would gain a financial advantage if the public authorities were to fund a large part of its operational costs, such as travel expenses, accommodation costs and (youth) trainings. The question remains however, whether the payment by the City of Zagreb of the operational costs endured by Dinamo Zagreb are selective. It is important to note the legal basis for the measures are found in the Sports Act, which is applicable in the entire Republic of Croatia. Even though it is not clear whether the public funding granted to other sport clubs in Zagreb differed from the public funding granted to the football club Dinamo, the measures do appear to be selective. Firstly, the criteria for public funding set by the SSGZ distinguish between professional sport that can be considered elite and (professional) sport not considered elite. Because Dinamo is considered an “elite professional sports clubs”, it is entitled to receive public funding. However, other professional sporting entities that are not considered “elite professional sports clubs” do not receive this public funding. Therefore, if the contested measures by the City of Zagreb are solely granted to Dinamo Zagreb for being an “elite sporting entity”, the measures could be considered selective in the light of Article 107 (1) TFEU. Secondly, the selectivity criterion should also be assessed by comparing how different regional and local governments fund their respective “elite sporting entities”. Once a discrepancy is found from one region to another regarding the amount of money granted to sports (i.e. because some local governments simply have more money to spend), the measure could be deemed selective.

Apart from determining whether the public funding of Dinamo could entail State aid, as is the case with all State aid cases, one has to look at possible arguments that could justify the measures. Keeping in mind recent State aid decisions, it becomes clear that measures that support sport’s educational, public health, social and recreational functions will be declared compatible with EU law.[16] It is therefore worth remembering that Article 76 (1) of the Croatian Sports Act, also includes the possibility of public funding with the aim of implementing sporting activities of children, youths and students, protecting the health of athletes and hiring persons to do professional work in sports. Furthermore, on numerous occasions in the last few years, the European Commission has declared State aid provided for sports infrastructure compatible, with EU law.[17]

The facts of the Dinamo Zagreb case show that at least part of the aid measures are aimed at supporting the educational functions of sport, i.e. covering expenses of Dinamo’s youth teams. Moreover, the City of Zagreb’s decision to aid Dinamo paying for the maintenance costs of the stadium and training grounds could show similarities with Commission decisions where such aid was declared justified. These measures may, in principle, be compatible with EU law, where there is a clear common objective. However, the positive effects on the common objective must outweigh the negative effects on competition and trade in order for these measures to be compatible with EU law. Therefore, in the Dinamo Zagreb case, this balancing test has to determine whether the objectives of the measures (i.e. improving the quality of elite professional sport that contributes to the reputation of the City of Zagreb and the planning, construction, maintenance and use of sports facilities important to the City of Zagreb) outweigh the negative effects this could have on other entities in general, and football clubs in particular.

In addition, it should not be forgotten that Croatia joined the EU on 1 July 2013. This means that Dinamo Zagreb received the contested aid before and after the date of accession. Therefore, another key question is to what extent the Commission can sanction Croatia for aid measures implemented before the accession date. It follows from settled EU case law that Articles 107 – 109 TFEU and the Procedural Regulations 659/1999 are applicable on to a Member State only as from its accession to the European Union.[18] Moreover, it follows inter alia from EU case law[19], and Article 19 of the Procedural Regulations that existing aid can be found to be incompatible with prospective effect only. With regard to the Dinamo Zagreb case, this effectively means that the Commission can only order a recovery of the aid granted to the football club after the date of accession. Therefore, should the Commission, for example, decide that the stadium lease agreement (signed in 2011) constitutes unlawful State aid, it can only order the recovery of the advantage gained through this agreement as of 1 July 2013.

The last point that Naš Hajduk addressed in their complaint to the Commission that the CCA incorrectly allowed the aid to be granted to Dinamo because it was compatible with Croatian national law. Irrespective of whether the CCA interpreted the Accession Treaties correctly or incorrectly, it is my understanding that EU law does not allow the Commission the power to overrule the CCA’s decision. As has been stated above, since the Commission can only order the recovery of the aid granted after the date of accession, it has no competence to decisions made regarding State aid before the date of accession. In other words, any options Naš Hajduk could have in challenging the CCA’s decision have to be found in national appeal procedures.

The Dinamo Zagreb State aid case currently finds itself in a preliminary investigatory phase. Given the Commission’s inconsistency regarding the time frames to decide whether to commence formal investigations or not, it is impossible to say if we can expect news from Brussels any time soon. Nonetheless, this case will certainly drive forward the discussion in the quickly expanding field of State aid and sport.

[1] Vanja Smokvina, “Case Law of the Croatian Supreme Court in the Fields of Sports Law – Emphasis on Labour Relations”, International Sports Law Journal, 2012/1-2, pages 106 - 108

[2] Article 76 (1) points 2, 4, 5 and 8 of the Sports Act

[3] Article 76 (2) of the Sports Act

[4] A Croatian version of the Program is available on: http://www.zagreb.hr/default.aspx?id=60227.

^[5] CCA UP/I 430-01/13-05/001, Financing of the Football Club Dinamo by the City of Zagreb and other publicly owned legal entities, pages 7 – 10 (Croatian version).

[6] Article 70 (1) (iii): “The following are incompatible with the proper functioning of the Agreement, in so far as they may affect trade between the Community and Croatia: any State aid which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or certain products.”

[7] CCA UP/I 430-01/13-05/001, Financing of the Football Club Dinamo by the City of Zagreb and other publicly owned legal entities, (English version), page 1

[8] CCA UP/I 430-01/13-05/001, Financing of the Football Club Dinamo by the City of Zagreb and other publicly owned legal entities, pages 19

[9] Ibid, page 18

[10] Tatjana Jakovljević, “Public Support for Sports: The Name of the Game – Football!”, EStAL, 3/2013, page 445

[11] Article 74 (3) of the Sports Act

[12] CCA UP/I 430-01/13-05/001, Financing of the Football Club Dinamo by the City of Zagreb and other publicly owned legal entities, (English version), page 1

[13] Ibid

[14] The essence of the MEIP is that when a public authority invests in an enterprise on terms and in conditions which would be acceptable to a private investor operating under normal market economy conditions, the investment is not a State aid.

[15] SA.33584 – Alleged municipal aid to professional Dutch football clubs Vitesse, NEC, Willem II, MVV, PSV and FC Den Bosch in 2008-2011, paras. 51-52

[16] See for example: SA.31722 - Supporting the Hungarian sport sector via tax benefit scheme

[17] See for example: SA.37109 – Football Stadiums in Flanders; SA.35440 - Multifunktionsarena der Stadt Jena and; SA.37342 - Regional Stadia Development in Northern Ireland

[18] Case C-262/11 Kremikovtzi AD, paragraph 50

[19] Ibid, paragraph 54

It’s been a long wait, but they’re finally here! On Monday, the European Commission released its decisions regarding State aid to seven Spanish professional football clubs (Real Madrid on two occasions) and five Dutch professional football clubs. The decisions mark the end of the formal investigations, which were opened in 2013. The Commission decided as follows: no State aid to PSV Eindhoven (1); compatible aid to the Dutch clubs FC Den Bosch, MVV Maastricht, NEC Nijmegen and Willem II (2); and incompatible aid granted to the Spanish football clubs Real Madrid, FC Barcelona, Valencia CF, Athletic Bilbao, Atlético Osasuna, Elche and Hércules (3). 

The recovery decisions in particular are truly historic. The rules on State aid have existed since the foundation of the European Economic Community in 1958, but it is the very first time that professional football clubs have been ordered to repay aid received from (local) public authorities.[1] In a way, these decisions complete a development set in motion with the Walrave and Koch ruling of 1974, where the CJEU held that professional sporting activity, and therefore also football, is subject to EU law. The landmark Bosman case of 1995 proved to be of great significance as regards free movement of (professional) athletes and the Meca-Medina case of 2006 settled that EU competition rules were equally applicable to the regulatory activity of sport. The fact that the first ever State aid recovery decision concerns major clubs like Real Madrid, FC Barcelona and Valencia, give the decisions extra bite. Therefore, this blog post will focus primarily on the negative/recovery decisions[2], their consequences and the legal remedies available to the parties involved.[3]

The launch of the formal investigations

The three Commission decisions to launch formal State aid investigations into alleged aid granted to Spanish professional football clubs were all made public on 18 December 2013. The first investigation concerned “possible privileges regarding corporate taxation of Real Madrid, FC Barcelona, Athletic Bilbao, and Atlético Osasuna. These four clubs are exempted from the general obligation for professional football clubs to convert into sport limited companies. The effect of this exemption is that these clubs enjoy a preferential corporate tax rate of 25% instead of 30% applicable to sport limited companies.” The second investigation involved Real Madrid specifically, and was opened after the Commission expressed its doubts over “a very advantageous real property swap with the City of Madrid. This swap was based on a re-evaluation of a plot of land at a value of €22.7 million, instead of its earlier supposed value in 1998 of €595 thousand”. The third investigation dealt with three clubs from the autonomous region of Valencia: Valencia CF, Elche FC and Hércules CF. In this case, the Commission decided to investigate State guarantees by the Valencia Institute of Finance for a bank loans of (1) €75 million to Valencia CF; (2) €14 million to Elche CF; and (3) €18 million to Hércules CF. The Real Madrid real property swap case and the Valencia CF case have previously been analyzed on this blog (here, here and here).[4]

Purely based on the decisions to open formal investigations, there was little doubt as to whether the criteria of Article 107(1) were fulfilled[5]: The football clubs in question received a selective economic advantage deriving from a measure taken by public authorities and which involved a transfer of State resources. This advantage has affected trade and threatens to distort the internal market. What remained unclear was whether the Member States could convince the Commission to declare the State aid compatible under Article 107(3)c) TFEU,[6] and, if not, how high the recovery would be. The complexity of the Real Madrid case in particular led to uncertainty as to whether a possible recovery decision would merely imply Real Madrid having to pay a lump sum to the city of Madrid, or whether one or more land transactions would have to be undone.[7]

Last but not least, it should be kept in mind that ordering recovery of State aid is a politically sensitive decision. Given that State aid investigations are always directed at the Member State (with limited room for interested party intervention, including the beneficiary), such proceedings are inherently political. Furthermore, from analyzing Commission speeches and policy documents, such as the recently published Report on Competition Policy 2015, one will reach the conclusion that actively enforcing EU competition law, including State aid law, in sport, is not a Commission priority. Any recovery decision in the professional sport sector, therefore, would need to serve as a blueprint for future cases: it should prevent other public authorities to grant State aid to professional sport clubs in contravention of State aid rules. 

The Commission’s press release ordering the State aid recovery

Though the press release does not provide all the facts, it includes many interesting elements. First of all, the privileges regarding corporate taxation of Real Madrid, FC Barcelona, Athletic Bilbao, and Atlético Osasuna were found to be incompatible State aid, and each club has to repay between €0 and €5 million depending on what the Spanish authorities determine in the recovery process. The press release further states that Spain adjusted its legislation on corporate taxation to end this discriminatory treatment. This last point is especially important, because it demonstrates that the “bite” of State aid could exceed a mere recovery order. Simply opening a formal investigation into this issue has made the Spanish authorities reconsider its corporate taxation and adjust it accordingly to prevent future State aid being granted. Moreover, tackling unfair corporate tax advantages has been a priority for the Commission for the last few years.[8]

As regards Real Madrid’s advantageous real property swap with the City of Madrid, the Commission concluded that the football club was only entitled to a compensation of €4.3 million, so that Real Madrid obtained an advantage of €18.4 million. In other words, the city of Madrid needs to recover €18.4 million from Real Madrid. Although this calculation seems rather straightforward, it should be noted that the press release only refers to the re-valuation of one of the lands transferred. This means that only one land transaction was found to be incompatible with EU State aid rules, while all the land transactions remain valid.

In the third and final decision the Commission determined that Valencia, Hércules and Elche will need to repay €20.4 million, €6.1 million and €3.7 million respectively. The Commission acknowledged that the three clubs were in financial difficulties when the public institution Valencia Institute of Finance, placed a public guarantee on bank loans provided to the football clubs, but did not find this difficulties sufficiently severe to declare the aid compatible with the internal market.[9] The fact that the clubs paid no adequate remuneration for the guarantees, and that the State financing was not linked to any restructuring plan, made the Commission decide to order the recovery of that aid. The arguments brought forward by the Spanish authorities defending the State aid measure will not be known until the non-confidential version of the decision is published in a few months. What we do know is that at the time the formal investigation was launched in December 2013, the Spanish authorities had not communicated any restructuring or liquidation plan to the Commission, nor were any of the conditions met for authorizing restructuring aid under the Community Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty, even though the three clubs were in severe financial difficulties.[10]  

The consequences of the negative and recovery decisions

It is important to make a distinction between negative decisions and recovery decisions.[11] They are, in fact, two separate decisions. As can be read in Articles 9(5) and 16(1) of the State Aid Procedural Regulations 2015/1589, the negative decision precedes the recovery decision. Under a negative decision, the Commission decides that the aid shall not be put into effect for not being compatible with the internal market. Any plans to grant future State aid under that measure will automatically be halted. The recovery decision can only be granted if the aid, or part of the aid, has been granted in the past, such as in the cases at hand.[12] The decision orders the Member State concerned to take all necessary measures to recover the aid from the beneficiary.[13] As can be read in the Commission’s Recovery Notice, the main objective of the recovery order is to re-establish the situation existing before the aid was unlawfully granted.[14] The recovery, which is subject to a limitation period of 10 years[15], “shall be effected without delay and in accordance with the procedures under the national law of the Member State concerned”.[16]  This means that it is up to Spain to decide on the procedure of how and when it recovers the aid, in accordance with its own national law.

Since the negative and recovery decisions are addressed to Spain, it may institute proceedings against the negative decision and/or the recovery decision, pursuant to Article 263 TFEU. The Spanish central government has not yet announced its position regarding the decisions or whether it plans to launch an appeal. The city of Madrid and the autonomous region of Valencia on the other hand, have both declared that they wish to recuperate the State aid granted to the respective football clubs.[17] Article 263 TFEU also allows any natural or legal person to challenge a Commission decision that is of direct and individual concern to them. In other words, now that for example Real Madrid is ordered to repay €18.4 million to Spain, it is directly affected by the recovery decision and has already publicly stated that it will initiate proceedings against the Commission.

The General Court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine at first instance actions referred to in Article 263 TFEU. A decision by the General Court may be subject to a right of appeal to the Court of Justice.[18] Contrary to the General Court, the Court of Justice could decide, under Article 278 TFEU, that the recovery order should be suspended.   

Conclusion

The negative and recovery decisions could have consequences for the relationship between the Spanish State (particularly local governments) and professional football. The practices now condemned by the European Commission are known to have been taking place for decades. A recently published report by Transparency International, for example, discusses how Spanish football clubs, in collaboration with the local governments, would turn to urban speculation with the objective of making easy money. The report used an agreement between the city of Murcia and its local football club Real Murcia as an example. The Real Madrid case, which is also about urban speculation, is another example of this standardized practice in Spain. The fact that the Commission orders recovery of aid from the richest and most successful club in Spain, should send a message to the smaller clubs and cities that urban/ land agreements between clubs and public authorities are not unconditionally accepted.

In addition, the decisions will especially be tough for Valencia, Hércules and Elche, three clubs known to be in financial difficulties already. Valencia has already announced that it “reserves the right to appeal to the European Court of Justice”, but one wonders whether it is worth the risk, considering the legal fees attached to such an appeal. On the other hand, the public authorities will realize that granting State aid to professional football clubs can bounce back hard, if it is not granted pursuant an objective of general interest and in a transparent manner. Furthermore, rescue aid, such as in Valencia, cannot be granted without implementing a restructuring plan at the same time. A proper restructuring plan will help limit the possibility of the club returning to financial difficulties in the future. Finally, clubs too must be aware that they must live “within their own means” and that they cannot always depend on local public institutions to bail them out of there financial troubles.   

[1] For the discussion on why there was (and still is) so little State aid enforcement in the professional sport/football sector, see Ben Van Rompuy and Oskar van Maren, “EU Control of State Aid to Professional Sport: Why Now?” In: “The Legacy of Bosman. Revisiting the relationship between EU law and sport”, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2016.

[2] The distinction between a negative decision and a recovery decision will be explained further below.

[3] A specific blog post on the State aid decision concerning the Dutch football clubs will be made shortly.

[4] For an even more detailed (factual) analysis of the Real Madrid case, see: Oskar van Maren, “The Real Madrid case: A State aid case (un)like any other?” 11 Competition Law Review 1:83-108.

[5] Even though Real Madrid has always insisted the real property swap was not economically advantageous, since the value of the real property was calculated in accordance with market conditions. Supra note 4.

[6] Under this provision, State aid that facilitates the development of certain activities or of certain economic areas, where such aid does not adversely affects trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest, may be considered compatible with the internal market.

[7] It is a matter of discussion whether the Real Madrid case concerns only the land transaction of July 2011, or whether a second land transaction of November 2011 should be included in the same investigation. Supra, note 4.

[8] Report from the Commission COM(2016) 313 of 15 June 2016 to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions – Report on Competition Policy 2015, pages 12-13.

[9] Contrary to the State aid granted to FC Den Bosch, MVV, Willem II and NEC, where the Commission determined that the aid was granted in line with the 2004 Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty.

[10] Commission decision of 18 December 2013 SA.36387 – Alleged aid in favour of three Valencia football clubs, para.44.

[11] A third option, as stipulated in Article 9(3) of the State aid Procedural Regulation, is the positive decision. This is a decision where the Commission decides that the aid is compatible with the internal market. The decision allowing the aid to the Dutch clubs is an example of a positive decision. Challenging a positive decision under Article 263 TFEU is also possible for the Member State concerned, should it wish to do so.

[12] The aid is, for example, not granted yet when the Member State simply notifies the Commission of its plan grant State aid. Should the Commission declare the plan to grant State aid incompatible with the internal market, then there will be no need to order recovery as well.

[13] The Commission, however, can decide against a recovery order if it believes that such a recovery would be contrary to a principle of Union law. This gives the Commission the possibility to declare a State aid measure incompatible with EU law on the one hand, but not order recovery of that aid on the other.

[14] Notice from the Commission (2007/C 272/05) of 15 November 2007 Towards an effective implementation of Commission decisions ordering Member States to recover unlawful and incompatible State aid, point 2.2.

[15] Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 of 13 July 2015 laying down detailed rules fort the application of Article 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 17(1).

[16] Ibid., Article 16(3).

[17] It is worth mentioning that at the time the State aid was granted, the Spanish Conservative Party, PP, was in power in Madrid as well as in the autonomous region of Valencia. These two local governments are nowadays formed by opposition parties. On the other hand, the PP is still the biggest political party at national level.

[18] Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union C 326/47 of 26 October 2010, Article 256(1).

Since yesterday FIFA is back in turmoil (see here and here) after the FIFA Council decided to dismiss the heads of the investigatory (Cornel Borbély) and adjudicatory (Hans-Joachim Eckert) chambers of the Independent Ethics Committee, as well as the Head (Miguel Maduro) of the Governance and Review Committee. It is a disturbing twist to a long reform process (on the early years see our blogs here and here) that was only starting to produce some tangible results.

This journey to a new FIFA started in 2015 after the events that eventually pushed Sepp Blatter and Michel Platini out, and Gianni Infantino in. As noted by the FIFA Reform Committee in its final report, it became clear FIFA needed to undertake “significant modification to its institutional structure and operational processes […] to prevent corruption, fraud, self-dealing and to make the organisation more transparent and accountable”.[1] The Reform Committee put forward a series of recommendations, which later culminated in a set of reforms approved during the Extraordinary FIFA Congress held in Zurich the 26 February 2016. Greater transparency and accountability were the leading mantras of the reform, which – broadly speaking – hinged on (i) generating a cultural change at FIFA, (ii) fostering greater participation of member associations and stakeholders in FIFA and, most importantly, (iii) reforming the principles of governance at FIFA. The essence of the reform process was about changing the governance structures and ethos at FIFA. This was to be done mainly by:

• Separating the political and management functions
• Financial Transparency and Transparency of Compensation
• Term Limits and Eligibility Checks
• Promotion of the role of women in football

And, to be fair to FIFA, on paper at least, things changed quite dramatically over last year, here is how.

1.     The new FIFA Council                                                                          

First, the reform changed the political and administrative structure of FIFA. The Executive Committee being replaced by the Council, a new body with a different composition and set of competences. The Council’s larger size is aimed at ensuring broader participation and representativeness. While the Executive Committee comprised 24 members plus the FIFA President, the Council is composed of 36 members plus the FIFA President. The Congress elects the President, whereas the other members of the Council represent the confederations. Each Confederation president is ex officio a vice-president of the Council. UEFA has three vice-presidents at the Council and the other Confederations one each, for a total of eight vice-presidents. The rest of the members are divided as follows: four from CONMEBOL and CONCACAF, six from AFC, UEFA and CAF, and two from OFC. 

One of the main objectives of the governance reform was to reduce the possibility of conflicts of interests. To this end, a firm separation between political decision-making and management was considered crucial. Even though the Council’s role is supposed to be confined within the boundaries of supervising FIFA’s administration and defining strategic directions, it retains strong steering powers through its competence, enshrined in Article 34 FIFA Statutes, to nominate and dismiss the members of FIFA’s Committees as well as FIFA’s Secretary General. Nevertheless, the executive functions are delegated to the Secretary General, who has the duty to carry out the day-to-day business and implement the strategies outlined by the Council. While, the Chief Compliance Officer, oversees this activity and reports to the independent Audit and Compliance Committee.

2.     The introduction of eligibility checks

The FIFA reform committee recognized that a trustworthy governance of FIFA requires that the executives be, as much as possible, free of conflicts of interest. Hence, all the members of the Council are now subject to eligibility checks carried out by the Review Committee, a special commission within the newly created Governance Committee, formed by its chairperson, its deputy chairperson and one independent member. The members of the Governance Committee are in turn subject to eligibility checks carried out by the investigative chamber of the Ethics Committee. According to Art. 27(8) FIFA Statutes: “candidates for the positions of chairperson, deputy chairperson and members of each of the Audit and Compliance Committee and the judicial bodies must pass an eligibility check carried out by the Review Committee”.[2] The Secretary General is required to fulfil an eligibility check as well[3] and so do the candidates for standing committees.[4] This new check is the cornerstone of FIFA’s governance reform. In the absence of truly open and fair democratic elections to determine who exercises power inside FIFA, the eligibility checks are a fundamental brake to control the pool of potential executives and ensure a modicum of ethical virtue amongst them.

3.     The strive for financial transparency

The FIFA Reform Committee Report proposed to make public the compensation packages of FIFA’s executives. Thus, the new Art. 51(10) FIFA Statues imposes a duty to disclose the individual compensation of the FIFA President, the members of the Council and the Secretary General. The compensation of the said members and the Compensation Rules are determined by the Compensation Sub-Committee within the Audit and Compliance Committee.[5] Indeed, in its 2016 Governance Report, published in April 2017, FIFA disclosed the compensation packages of its executives. This was a much-needed development in light of the way Blatter, Platini and co were playing with FIFA’s finances, sometimes/often to their own benefits.

4.     The limited role of the FIFA President

The reformed Statutes reduced the role and discretionary power of the FIFA President, who is now depositary of a more ambassadorial than executive role. Pursuant to Art. 35 FIFA Statutes, the President has no right to vote at the Congress and has one ordinary vote in the Council. The new provision repealed the possibility for the President to have a casting vote whenever votes are split equally inside the FIFA Council.[6] And yet, due to his capacity to set the agenda of the FIFA Council and to steer the Council’s appraisal of the Secretary General, his influence inside the constitutional structure of FIFA should not be underestimated.

5.     The introduction of term limits

The need to answer to transparency and accountability demands also resulted in the provision of term ceilings for the most prominent figures within the Organisation. The President, the members of the Council and the members of the independent committees can serve their office for no more than three terms, whether consecutive or not, of 4 years each.[7]

6.     The representation of women

FIFA recognised that “football governance at all levels needs to include more women in order to create a more diverse decision-making environment and culture”.[8] It has aimed to achieve this goal in two ways. First, FIFA adopted gender equality as an explicit statutory objective.[9] Second, and more visibly, each Confederation has to reserve for women at least one seat at the FIFA Council.[10]

7.     The reform of the standing committees

In order to improve efficiency the number of standing committees was reduced from 26 to 9. The current standing committees, which “advise and assist the Council in their respective fields of function”[11] are: the Governance Committee, the Finance Committee, the Development Committee, the Organising Committee for FIFA Competitions, the Member Associations Committee, the Player’s Status Committee, the Referees Committee, the Medical Committee and the Football Stakeholder Committee. The latter was freshly created to foster greater engagement with the football stakeholders.

Some specific requirements to be fulfilled by the members of the committees are laid out in Art. 39 FIFA Statutes. Paragraph 3 of that provision states that, while the general rule is that members of the committees can be at the same time members of the Council, the members of the Governance Committee, the independent members of the Finance Committee and the independent members of the Development Committee cannot simultaneously belong to the Council.[12]

Furthermore, at least 50% of the members of the Governance Committee, Development Committee and Finance Committee need to fulfil the independence criteria as defined in the FIFA Regulations.[13] These independence criteria need to be fulfilled also by the chairpersons, deputy chairpersons and members of the FIFA judicial bodies, i.e. the Disciplinary Committee, the Ethics Committee (both its investigatory and the adjudicatory chambers) and the Appeal Committee.[14] Furthermore, the members of the Audit and Compliance Committee must not belong to any other FIFA body.[15] The same applies to all the members of the FIFA judicial bodies.[16]

Conclusion: Plus ça change, moins ça change?

To sum up, on paper FIFA did change. It is undeniably a bit more transparent (but we are still waiting for the publication of the Garcia Report or of the decisions of the Ethics Committee) and its executives are a bit more likely to face independent counter-powers (e.g. Ethics Committee or the Governance Committee). FIFA’s reforms rely on a double strategy:

·       independent ex ante control on who is to exercise power inside the organization and;

·       independent ex post review of how this power is exercised.

And yet, with Blatter becoming a phantom of an almost forgotten past, the urge to reform is quickly receding. In fact, reform at FIFA is a bit like the ebb and flow. Its urgency, rises with the tide of public outrage at corruption scandals, and diminishes with public indifference in the face of a new business as usual.

Yesterday, 9 May 2017, we ebbed anew. It seems that the FIFA Council has decided that the time for reforms has past. New sponsors are lining up for the next world cups, the old guard is gone and the time seems ripe to turn the page. However, the institutional changes introduce over the last year made sense only if they are being monitored by strong independent institutions (the Ethics Committee and the Governance Committee), whose members do not feel that they are at the mercy of the power of the FIFA Council. Their role is to be disagreeable and to act as counter-powers, if they are dismissed at will when they do their job then the whole house of cards of FIFA reforms falls apart and we are back to square one. The dismissal and departure of independent and highly qualified academics like Miguel Maduro (with whom I  had the pleasure to work with at the European University Institute during my PhD) and Joseph Weiler are a sign that the Governance Committee and its capacity to control access to FIFA’s most powerful positions is being curtailed. Maybe it’s due, as some seem to think, to the Committee’s decision to bar access to the FIFA Council to Russia’s infamous former sports minister Mutko. In any event, it’s seems that FIFA’s strong (mostly) men are unimpressed by the benefits of “good governance”.

The tide will certainly turn again. Scandals will arise and force through new changes. Nonetheless, one is left to wonder whether the Swiss State and/or the European Union should not forcefully intervene to impose once and for all certain basic “constitutional” requirements  (e.g. independence, transparency, separation of powers) to a global body that exercises a strange form of public-private authority.

[1] 2016 FIFA Reform Committee Report, 2 December 2015, p. 1.

[2] Art. 27(8) FIFA Statutes.

[3] Art. 37 (3) FIFA Statutes.

[4] Art. 39(5) FIFA Statutes.

[5] Art. 51 FIFA Statutes.

[6] Art. 35 FIFA Statutes.

[7] Art. 33 FIFA Statutes.

[8] 2016 FIFA Reform Committee Report, 2 December 2015, p. 9.

[9] Art. 2 f) FIFA Statutes includes “the full participation of women at all levels of football governance” among the objectives of FIFA. The heading of Art. 4 FIFA Statues was amended to explicitly include ‘gender equality’.

[10] Art. 33(5) FIFA Statutes.

[11] Art. 39(2) FIFA Statutes.

[12] Art. 39(3) FIFA Statutes.

[13] Art. 40(1), Art. 41(2) and Art. 42 (1) FIFA Statutes.

[14] Art. 52(4) FIFA Statutes.

[15] Art. 51(1) FIFA Statutes.

[16] Art. 52(5) FIFA Statutes.

The Pechstein decision of the Oberlandesgericht of Munich is “ground-breaking”, “earth-shaking”, “revolutionary”, name it. It was the outmost duty of a “German-reading” sports lawyer to translate it as fast as possible in order to make it available for the sports law community at large (Disclaimer: This is not an official translation and I am no certified legal translator). Below you will find the rough translation of the ruling (the full German text is available here), it is omitting solely the parts, which are of no direct interest to international sports law.

The future of CAS is in the balance and this ruling should trigger some serious rethinking of the institutional set-up that underpins it. As you will see, the ruling is not destructive, the Court is rather favourable to the function of CAS in the sporting context, but it requires a fundamental institutional reshuffling. It also offers a fruitful legal strategy to challenge CAS awards that could be used in front of any national court of the EU as it is based on reasoning analogically applicable to article 102 TFEU (on abuse of a dominant position), which is valid across the EU’s territory.

Enjoy the read! 

Antoine

PS: The translation can also be downloaded at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2561297

OLG München · 15 January 2015 · Az. U 1110/14 Kart

Part 1. The facts (omitted)

Part 2. Holdings of the Court

A. The claim is partially receivable

I. The international competence of the German courts (omitted)

67 - II. The arbitration clause signed on the 2 January 2009 by the appellant (Pechstein) and the respondent nr 2 (ISU) does not preclude access to the ordinary courts

68 - To this end the question whether the CAS, designated by the arbitration clause, can be considered a real arbitration tribunal, despite the fact the parties have no equal influence on its composition, can stay open. The arbitration clause would also be null in that case.

1. […]

2. […]

71 - 3. The arbitration clause is in the present case inapplicable because it goes against antitrust law

a) […]

aa) […]

bb) […]

75 - b) The arbitration clause signed on the 2 January 2009 between Pechstein and ISU is invalid based on Art. 34 EGBGB, §134 BGB, §19 Abs. 1, Abs.  4 Nr. 2 GWB.

76 - aa) The ISU is a monopolist on the market for the access to Speed-Skating World Championships and therefore in a dominant position in the sense of §19 Abs.1, Abs 4 Nr. 2 GWB.

77 - An economic activity, in the sense of the German Act against restraints of Competition (GWB), is any activity consisting of offering goods or services on a market. If this condition is fulfilled, the fact that an activity is linked to sport cannot preclude the application of the Competition rules (C-49/07 MOTOE v. Greece). Sports associations offering their services on the market of sports competitions are to be considered undertakings.

78 - In the present case, the market for the organisation of the World Championships in speed skating is the relevant market. Contrary to the view of ISU, the participation to the event cannot be supplanted by the participation in national competitions, due to the worldwide interest it triggers and the connected side revenues that successful athletes can hope for.

79 – […]Moreover, it is not convincing to argue that international events as the Open Belrus Cup, the Cup of Kazakhstan, the Dutch Classics or the International Race-Seniors could trigger the same interest and be substitutable to the World Championships.

80 - ISU is thus, because of the “One-place-principle”[1], the only provider on the market for the organisation of World Championships in Speed-Skating and therefore, due to the absence of competition, a monopolist in a dominant position in the sense of § 19 Abs. 2 Nr. 1 GWB.

81 - bb) An undertaking in a dominant position is prohibited under § 19 Abs. 1, Abs. 4 Nr. 2 GWB from demanding payment or other business terms which differ from those which would very likely arise if effective competition existed.

82 - Hence, the ISU could not require Pechstein to agree to the arbitration clause signed on 2 January 2009.

83 - (1) The notion of terms of trade is be understood broadly. It comprises everything that can be agreed on contractually, including an agreement to arbitrate disputes excluding the recourse to national courts.

84 - aaa) Contrary to the opinion of ISU, the applicability of § 19 Abs. 1, Abs. 4 Nr. 2 GWB is not precluded because the signing of the arbitration clause was mandated to ISU by the International Convention Against Doping in Sport from the 19^th October 2005 ratified by Switzerland.

85 - The Convention does not include a rule imposing a duty to conclude an arbitration clause in favour of CAS. Rather, it refers in Art. 4 §1 to the principles of the World Anti-Doping Code, which in turn in Article 13.2.1 provides that in cases involving international competitions or international athletes, appeals against anti-doping decisions can only be submitted to CAS. It cannot be assumed, despite the compliance mandate that the Code imposes to its signatories in Article 23.2.2, that the Convention includes this provision in the fundamental principles to which the State parties have to abide following Art.4 §1. Moreover, the obligations stemming from Art. 4 par.1 require transposition by the national states as foreseen by Art.5 1) of the Convention. It is not clear from the submissions of ISU that Switzerland has introduced any law that would impose to ISU the duty to sign arbitration clauses in favour of CAS.

86 - The fact that the ISU may have felt that it had to sign arbitration clauses in favour of CAS due to other non-legal reasons, as for example to preserve its recognition by the IOC, is irrelevant in the context of this competition law analysis. 

87 – bbb) Omitted

88 - (2) The imposition of an arbitration clause by the organizer of International sporting competitions is not per se an abuse of a dominant position.

89 - aaa) In fact, sound and weighty arguments speak in favour of avoiding to leave to the many potentially competent national courts the duty to deal with disputes arising between athletes and International federations in the framework of international competitions, and instead to refer them to a single sports tribunal. In particular, a uniform competence and procedure can preclude that similar cases be decided differently, and therefore safeguard the equal opportunities of athletes during the competitions.

90 - bbb) Contrary to the view of the first instance court, arbitration agreements between a dominant organizer of international sports competitions and the athlete taking part in these competitions are not per se invalid due to the lack of free will of the athlete.

91 - Omitted

92 - Art 6 par. 1 ECHR is opposed to the validity of an arbitration agreement to which one of the parties has not acquiesced. But, if consent is present, the sole fact that this consent was necessary economically to be able to exercise one’s profession is not sufficient to constitute a violation of the rights warranted by Art.6 par.1 ECHR. 

93 - (3) Nevertheless, the fact that ISU required from Pechstein to sign an arbitration agreement in favour of CAS is an abuse of dominant position.

94 - It can be assumed that, due to the above-mentioned advantages, athletes would agree to the competence of a neutral arbitral tribunal if free competition would prevail on the market for the organisation of international competitions. However, an arbitration clause in favour of CAS would not be agreed under normal circumstances, as the one-sided designation of the potential arbitrators favours the associations (the International federations – such as the ISU – the national Olympic Committees and the International Olympic Committee) involved in disputes with athletes as regard the composition of the arbitral panel. Athletes accept this arrangement only because they have to in order to participate in international sporting competitions. 

95 - aaa) The aforementioned sports associations have a decisive influence on the selection of the persons acting as CAS arbitrators

96 – a-1) Pursuant to the CAS procedural rules of 2004, in place at the moment of the signing of the arbitral convention, the parties have to select an arbitrator amongst the list of CAS arbitrators compiled by ICAS [R33 par.2 of the procedural rules and S6. Nr.3 of the Statutes].

97-103 […]The Court goes on to describe the composition of the ICAS as provided for in article S4 and the mode of selection of the arbitrators included on the CAS list as provided for in article S14 of the statutes. 

104 - These provisions regulating the selection of the potential CAS arbitrators favour the sports associations in disputes against athletes, thus embedding a structural imbalance that is threatening the neutrality of CAS.

105 - Sports association hold, with 12 members directly designated by them, the majority in ICAS. Already through this situation they enjoy, due to the majority rule applying in ICAS’ decision-making procedure, a favourable position that enables them to have a decisive influence on the composition of the list of CAS arbitrators. Furthermore, due to the fact that the 12 members previously designated by the sporting associations nominate them, the independence of the 8 other members of ICAS is also not preserved. Even the CAS statutes themselves do not assume the independence of the ICAS members and of the CAS arbitrators, as they require that the last 4 ICAS members and the last fifth of CAS arbitrators be independent from the organisations which were responsible for the nomination of all the other previous members of both ICAS and the CAS arbitrators list.

106 - This disproportionate influence creates the risk that the persons included on the CAS arbitrators list predominantly or even entirely favour the side of the sporting associations over the athletes. This is also true concerning the arbitrators that are not suggested by the sporting association, but are selected in view to protect the interest of athletes or on the basis of their independence, as they are designated by ICAS members chosen by the sporting associations. A balanced influence of the parties on the composition of the arbitral tribunal that would be needed to safeguard its independence is thus not provided. Such a structural deficiency threatens the neutrality of the arbitral tribunal; this is independent of the fact whether the persons included on the CAS list of arbitrators are in any way linked to the sports associations, as this would actually open the possibility to challenge their nomination. Even when the personal integrity of the persons included on the CAS list is not affected, there is a potential risk that arbitrators share the worldview of the sports associations rather than the one of the athletes.

107 - The imbalance in favour of the sports associations is not offset by the fact that the CAS arbitrators’ list comprises a minimum of 150 persons, as the risk of a potential capture by the sports associations extends to each one of them.

108 - a-2) Moreover, an imbalance in favour of the sports associations is also grounded in the fact that in the appeal procedure before CAS, when the parties have not managed to agree on a name (see R 50 par.1 procedural rules 2004), the president of the panel is designated by the president of the appeal division of CAS, while the president of the appeal division is himself nominated by ICAS, which is structurally dependent on the sporting associations, through a simple majority decision. In this way, the sports associations can also exercise an indirect influence on the third member of the arbitral panel competent to deal with a specific dispute. The trust of the parties in the independence and impartiality of an arbitral tribunal is eroded when there are reasons to fear that the judge facing them has been designated specifically in regard of the specific case at hand. Thus, it is necessary to take measures to combat the sheer possibility and suspicion of a manipulation of the designation of the judge.

109 - bbb) There is no rational justification for such an imbalance in favour of the sports associations 

110 - Contrary to the arguments of the ISU, a shared interest of the sports associations and the athletes cannot justify such an imbalance, as especially in disputes between athletes and sports associations no shared interest can be identified, to the contrary opposing interests are facing each other. In this regard, the fact that sports functionaries were often athletes in the past is also not a sufficient guarantee to ensure that the interests of the athletes are adequately protected.

111 - The circumstance that in a dispute between an international sports association and an athlete, the national sports association decides to support the athlete – as it was the case here in front of CAS - is not sufficient to challenge the fundamental homogeneity of the interests of the sports association. Surely, the national sports association concerned might have a specific interest that their own successful athlete be cleared, but other national sports associations do not share this interest so much that from a general point of view one can assume a homogeneity of the interests.[…]

112 - Finally, the argument of the ISU regarding the lack of organisation of the athletes that would hinder their participation in the drafting of the CAS arbitrators list must be rejected. If it would be impossible to involve athletes in the drafting of the list then athletes should be freed from their duty to nominate an arbitrator from the list, and be authorized to pick the arbitrator they wish – possibly under the condition of abstract qualification requirements.

113 - ccc) The reason why athletes accept to subject their disputes with sports associations to an arbitration tribunal, the composition of which is mainly determined by sports associations, is solely linked to the monopoly position of the sports associations. If the athlete could participate to the World Championship while agreeing to the competence of a neutral arbitration tribunal, we can safely assume that only this arbitration clause would be agreed upon to the detriment of the arbitral tribunal structurally favourable to the sports associations.

114 – Omitted

115 - ddd) The departure from arbitration agreements that would have been signed under normal conditions of competition strips Pechstein from her fundamental right of constitutional rank, flowing from the rule of law principles, to access to national courts and to a legally mandated judge (Art. 101 Abs. 1 Satz 2 GG). Hence, the arbitration agreement goes beyond the intensity threshold required for the recognition of an abuse of dominant position. 

116 - eee)[…] German law specific considerations to the notion of abuse of dominance not directly linked to the sporting context.

117 - (4) No need to discuss the other arguments raised by Pechstein against the CAS. […]

118 - cc) The arbitral convention is contrary to the ban on abuses of dominant position ((§ 19 Abs. 1, Abs. 4 Nr. 2 GWB) and therefore null and void on the basis of § 134 BGB. [...]

119 - c) The contradictory behaviour of Pechstein cannot justify refusing to grant her access to the ordinary courts.

120 - Based on its wording the arbitration clause covers a wide scope of potential disputes. The fact that Pechstein claims damages in front of the ordinary courts does not stand in contradiction with the fact that she challenged the doping sanction in front of CAS.  Even if the appeal to CAS would constitute a, legally doubtful, recognition of its competence to deal with the doping sanction, it would not entail that this recognition extends to every potential other dispute between the parties.

121 - Moreover, it has not been demonstrated by the ISU, nor is it clearly understandable, why, based on good faith, it could legitimately rely on the expectation that Pechstein would refer other disputes to CAS. Indeed, the fact that the arbitral convention underlying CAS competence is the result of an abuse of a dominant position by the ISU speaks out against any such legitimate expectations.

122 - 4. The fact that Pechstein signed, in the framework of the arbitral procedure involving her doping sanction, the Order of Procedure from the 29 September 2009, does not constitute an arbitration clause barring access to the ordinary courts, as it was in any case only referring to the specific dispute before CAS. Thus, it cannot constitute a valid arbitration agreement covering other disputes.

123 - III. Pechstein’s complaint is partially admissible. […]

124 – 128 Omitted

129 - B. As far as the complaint is admissible it is not yet ready for decision. Contrary to the view of the first instance court, the complaint cannot be discarded on the basis of the res judicata effect of the CAS award.

130 - I. It is true that the procedural relevance of a foreign arbitral awards, in particular its res judicata effect, does not necessitate a particular recognition process; but, this implies that the fundamental conditions for the recognition be fulfilled, which is not the case in the present instance.

131 - II. The recognition of the CAS award – which would anyway only be possible if CAS would constitute a proper arbitral tribunal – would go contrary to the public order. Consequently, the CAS award cannot be recognized due to § 1061 Abs. 1 Satz 1 ZPO in relation with Art. V par. 2. b) of the New York Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards from the 10^th June 1958.

132 - 1. An arbitral award violates the ordre public, and is thus not recognizable, when it leads to an outcome that is obviously incompatible with the fundamental principles of German law, and therefore breaches the prime foundations of the German legal order. However, not any decision potentially contrary to German mandatory laws constitutes a violation of the ordre public. 

133 - Fundamental provisions of competition law are part of the ordre public exception to the recognition of arbitral awards in the sense of Art. 5 par.2 b) New York Convention (CJEU, 4 June 2009, C-8/08 - T-Mobile Netherlands BV u.a./Raad van hestuur van de Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit; CJEU, 13. July 2006 - C-295-298/04 - Vincenzo Manfredi/Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA;  CJEU 1. June 1999 - C-126/97 - Eco Swiss China Time Ltd/Benetton International; [...])

134 - 2. Thus the CAS award cannot be recognized

135 - a) In the present case the ISU was barred by § 19 Abs. 1, Abs. 4 Nr. 2 GWB from imposing the arbitration agreement onto Pechstein. The recognition of an award based on an agreement contrary to competition law would perpetuate the abusive conduct of the ISU, which would be contrary to the objective underlying the ban on abusive practices imposed by the competition rules. This is further confirmed by the fact that Pechstein disposes, on the basis of § 33 Abs. 1 Satz 1 GWB, of a right to require the ISU to remedy the consequences of the forced arbitration clause. This includes the fact that the ISU cannot rely on the CAS award issues on the basis of this arbitration agreement.

136 - Omitted

137 - b) The question whether with Pechstein’s appeal to CAS or her signing of the Order of Procedure a new arbitration agreement was concluded can stay unanswered.  Indeed, this would also constitute a perpetuation of the abuse of a dominant position by the ISU. Pechstein had no other credible option available to obtain the right to participate to the Winter Olympics taking place between the 12 and 28 February 2010 in Vancouver, but to appeal to CAS on the basis of the arbitral agreement of the 2 January 2009.  A recourse to the Swiss courts was in light of their jurisprudence, as confirmed later by the ruling of the Swiss Federal tribunal on the CAS award, not particularly promising. Similarly, a request for an order to be authorised to participate to the Olympics in front of the German courts can hardly be deemed a reliable alternative mean due to the uncertainties related to the assessment of their international competence in that matter.

138 - III. Due to the impossibility to recognize the CAS award, German Courts are not bound by its findings in their evaluation of the legality of the doping sanction in order to assess the legitimacy of Pechstein’s damage claims. 

[1] The concept of « Ein-Platz-Prinzip » is specific to German law and qualifies the fact that sports associations are monopolists by nature.