Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

The EU State aid and sport saga: The Real Madrid Decision (part 1)

Out of all the State aid investigations of recent years involving professional football clubs, the outcome of the Real Madrid case was probably the most eagerly awaited. Few football clubs have such a global impact as this Spanish giant, and any news item involving the club, whether positive or negative, is bound to make the headlines everywhere around the globe. But for many Spaniards, this case involves more than a simple measure by a public authority scrutinized by the European Commission. For them, it exemplifies the questionable relationship between the private and the public sector in a country sick of never-ending corruption scandals.[1] Moreover, Spain is only starting to recover from its worst financial crisis in decades, a crisis founded on real estate speculation, but whose effects were mostly felt by ordinary citizens.[2] Given that the Real Madrid case involves fluctuating values of land that are transferred from the municipality to the club, and vice versa, it represents a type of operation that used to be very common in the Spanish professional football sector, but has come under critical scrutiny in recent years.[3] 

By ordering the recovery of the granted State aid, the Commission showed that certain (land) transaction agreements between a public authority and a private entity can be caught by EU (State aid) law, regardless of the size and fame of the private entity. The ‘Real Madrid Saga’ (which, in addition to the Commission’s final decision, also includes the Commission’s opening decision, a number of rulings by Spanish national courts[4], a more than likely review by the Court of Justice of the EU, and a new deal between the club and the municipality) might serve as harbinger, in the professional football sector at least, for a shift towards more transparent and responsible conduct by clubs and public authorities.

This two-part blog will attempt to provide an overview of the ‘Real Madrid Saga’ in its broadest sense. The first part will briefly[5] outline the facts that led to the opening of the State aid investigation, and then analyse the role played by the Spanish national courts in the ‘Saga’. The second part will focus on the recovery decision of 4 July 2016 and dissect the arguments used by the Commission to reach it.  


The facts

The municipality of Madrid and Real Madrid have a rich history of land transactions. In fact, a particular agreement from 2001 was already questioned by a Member of the European Parliament, even though the European Commission, at that time, saw no reason to launch a full State aid investigation.

However the agreement of 29 July 2011 did not manage to escape Commission scrutiny. This agreement, referred to by the Commission as the “2011 settlement agreement”[6], settled two earlier agreements between the city Council and Real Madrid dating from 1991 and 1998 respectively. A simple analysis of the 2011 settlement agreement clarifies why the Commission doubted its legality. In 1998 Real Madrid transferred half of their old training grounds to the municipality. Additionally to a large sum of money, the club was to receive a number of terrains spread out over the municipality, including a terrain located in the area called Las Tablas valued by the technical services of the municipal administration at €595.194 in 1998.[7] At that time, the two parties “were of the opinion that the classification ‘reserved for sport’ would not exclude its transfer to private ownership”. This land was however never officially transferred to Real Madrid, and the entry of a local urban law in 2001 made the actual transfer legally impossible, because it stipulates that plots reserved for sport must be in public ownership. This was confirmed in 2004 by the Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Madrid (Madrid High Court), which ruled that the local urban laws prevent any private entity from holding the legal property over this type of plot (like the terrain in Las Tablas).[8] As a result, in 2011, the Council decided to compensate the football club not for the original value of €595.194 but for a staggering €22.693.054,44! Once again, this value was determined by the technical services of the municipal administration. Real Madrid was not compensated in the form of a sum of money, but rather it was presented with a packet of terrains including four terrains of a total area of 12.435 m/2 in the street Mercedes Arteaga in the Carabanchel district of Madrid.[9]

This last plot of land transferred to Real Madrid formed the subject of another land agreement dating from November 2011. The agreement became known as operation Bernabeú-Opañel and consisted of the following: The Council is to transfer to the club a terrain which borders the Bernabéu stadium. This would permit Real Madrid to cover its stadium with a roof, and to build a shopping centre and a hotel on the façade situated on the Paseo de la Castellana (one of Madrid’s most important streets). In return, the club agreed to transfer to the Council the shopping centre Esquina del Bernabéu, which is situated on the other side of the stadium. The Council would then demolish the shopping centre and convert it into a public park. The club also promised to transfer back to the Council parts of the four terrains located in the street Mercedes Arteaga that it received as part of the 29 July 2011 Agreement. In addition to the transfers of the old shopping centre and the terrains located in the street Mercedes Arteaga, Real Madrid is also to pay €6.6 million to the Council. The Council, however, encountered an obstacle in its own urban laws, which did not permit private parties, like Real Madrid, to construct on public terrains owned by the Council. Therefore, on 16 November 2012, the Government of the autonomous region of Madrid announced that the local urban law was to be modified ad hoc to enable the operation Bernabeú-Opañel.[10]

Even though no formal State aid complaint was ever submitted, the Commission nonetheless opened a formal investigation on 18 December 2013 based on “press reports and information sent by citizens”.[11] In its opening decision, the Commission provided a preliminary assessment of the 2011 settlement agreement under the EU State aid rules. It expressed doubts with regard to the legality of the transfer of the terrain in Las Tablas to Real Madrid; with regard to the evaluation of the market value of the Las Tablas plot of land; and with regard to market conformity of the value of the properties which were transferred to Real Madrid by the 2011 settlement agreement. Interestingly enough, although the Commission barely mentioned the operation Bernabeú-Opañel in its preliminary assessment (let alone assess it), it also doubted whether the subsequent exchange of land around the Bernabéu Stadium was carried out at market conditions.[12] 


The role of the national courts

In January 2012, the ecological movement Ecologistas en Acción (EeA) found several legal irregularities with regard to the Bernabeú-Opañel agreement, including the fact that no mention was made of the 2011 settlement agreement. It subsequently started legal proceedings in front of the Spanish administrative Court claiming that the ad hoc modification of the urban regulations was contrary the general interest and sought its annulment under Spanish law. In March 2013, a second action for annulment of the operation Bernabéu-Opañel was sought by the Ruiz-Villar family. For the sake of clarification, in the past this family was the owner of the land on which the Bernabéu stadium is build, as well as the plot of land next to the Bernabéu stadium that the Council wants to transfer to Real Madrid. Their action led to the judgment by the Madrid High Court of 2 February 2015, which will be elaborated on below. 


The Order for Interim Measures of 31 July 2014

At the time the European Commission opened a formal investigation in December 2013, EeA’s action for annulment under Spanish law was pending at the Madrid High Court. The fact that the European Commission was investigating the matter provided EeA the legal opportunity to invoke the so-called ‘standstill obligation’. The ‘standstill obligation’, found in Article 108(3) TFEU has direct effect and can therefore be called upon in front of national courts. Article 108(3) reads as follows: “The Member State concerned shall not put its proposed measure into effect until this procedure has resulted in a final decision (by the Commission)”. In other words, from the moment the Commission starts investigating the alleged State aid measure, the national court has an obligation to protect competitors and other third parties against (potential) unlawful aid since the Commission’s own powers to do so are limited.[13] It is, furthermore, settled case law that third parties who are not affected by the distortion of competition resulting from the aid measure can also have a sufficient legal interest of a different character, such as EeA, in bringing ‘standstill’ proceedings before a national court.[14]

EeA could not invoke the ‘standstill obligation’, as regards the 2011 settlement agreement, since the land transactions subject to that agreement had already taken place. Therefore, its focus was on preventing Real Madrid from carrying out the Bernabéu-Opañel project until the Commission closed its State aid investigation. On the one hand, this focus made sense given that EeA was also involved in a case in front of the same Court aiming to annul the operation Bernabéu-Opañel. On the other hand, it was not prima facie clear whether the ‘standstill operation’ also applied to the operation Bernabéu-Opañel, since the Commission’s opening decision made little reference to this project. In other words, it was not known whether the Commission was, in fact, actually investigating this operation.

In its Order for Interim Measures of 31 July 2014, the Madrid High Court stated that“(i)t does not correspond to this Chamber to determine at this procedural moment whether the transaction constitutes an illegal State aid or not but the inclusion of [the plots located in the street Mercedes Arteaga] in the scope of the [operation Bernabéu-Opañel] are sufficient circumstantial elements in order to determine a direct connection between the investigation undertaken by the Commission and the object of the present appeal”.[15]

With the link between the 2011 settlement and the operation Bernabéu-Opañel established by the Court, it recognised two possible reasons to suspend the renovation of the Bernabéu stadium:

- To safeguard the interests of the justiciable;

- To protect the affected parties by the distortion of competition caused by the aid.[16]

As regards the former, in essence the Madrid High Court had to decide whether EeA had standing to request the ‘standstill’. The CJEU has been quite clear on this matter: in principle, national procedural rules apply to ‘standstill’ proceedings.[17] In Spain, in administrative cases involving urban matters, the so-called acción publica urbanística, or urban public action principle, applies. This principle grants very extensive procedural rights to third parties who have a limited direct interest to launch proceedings in urban matters, including EeA in the Real Madrid case.[18] Indeed, given the possibility that procedural rights for third parties in urban matters are broader in Spain than in some, if not most, other EU Member States, standstill proceedings in other Member States could well be declared inadmissible for lack of interest under similar conditions.

With the standing of EeA recognized, the Court went on to suspend the renovation of the stadium not only to protect EeA of the distortion of competition caused by the concession of the aid, but also to protect Real Madrid itself. Allowing the renovation to go ahead could have very negative consequences for the football club if the aid were ordered to be recovered, such as the demolition of the newly renovated part of the stadium.[19] The argument that the suspension served to protect Real Madrid is hard to follow, since, as the EU State aid rules stipulate, it is up to the Member State to decide how incompatible State aid is recovered.[20] The Spanish authorities ordering Real Madrid to demolish its own stadium seems to be a rather exaggerated eventuality. Furthermore, one wonders whether suspending the renovation of the stadium really helps Real Madrid when, at that stage, there were not that many indications that the Commission was actually investigating the operation Bernabéu-Opañel.  


The judgment of 2 February 2015 ordering the annulment of the operation Bernabéu-Opañel

Any remaining criticisms regarding the Madrid High Court’s decision to suspend the renovation of the stadium were swiftly set aside when the same Madrid High Court annulled the whole operation in its judgment of 2 February 2015. As explained above, this was based on the action of annulment sought by the Ruiz-Villar family. This blog will not analyse this judgment in full detail, because it does not make any reference to the State aid investigation or any other aspect of EU law. The important element to take from this judgment, however, is that an ad hoc modification of the (local) urban law is only valid if it fulfils the general interest and not just the interest of one (private) party.[21] Real Madrid has publicly expressed that it intends to “convert the Club in a sporting institution of reference in the world. The aim is for the stadium to have a maximum level of comfort and services superior to the most modern and advanced sporting stadiums in the world”.[22] This objective was not considered by the court to be an objective of general interest and, consequently, does not allow for an ad hoc modification of the urban laws.

As a result, Real Madrid had to restart its entire renovation project while a potential negative decision State aid decision from the European Commission was still looming. Moreover, as will be shown in the second part of this blog, even though this judgment did not make a single reference to the State aid investigation, it still played an important role in the final outcome of the investigation.


[1] Elena G. Sevillano and Bruno G. Gallo, “Así gana el Madrid”, El País, 6 November 2011. See also “Ten Spain corruption scandals that will take your breath away”, The Local, 28 January 2016.

[2] Ozlem Akin et al., “The Real Estate and Credit Bubble: Evidence from Spain”, Barcelona GSE Working Paper Series Working Paper nº 772.

[3] See for example Nefer Ruiz Crespo, “Urban speculation by Spanish football clubs”, in Transparency International, “Global Corruption Report: Sport”, Routledge February 2016; and “Spain Corruption Report”, GAN Business Anti-Corruption Portal.

[4] Most notably Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Madrid - Sección nº01 de lo Contencioso- administrativo - Pieza de Medidas Cautelares- 357/2013 – 01, 31 July 2014; and Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Madrid - Sección nº01 de lo Contencioso- administrativo – Procedimiento Ordinario 371/2013, 2 February 2015.

[5] The background information on the Real Madrid case is more extensively found in a previous blog entitled: Oskar van Maren, “The EU State aid and Sport Saga – A blockade to Florentino Perez’ latest “galactic” ambitions (part 1)”.

[6] Commission decision SA.33753 of 4 July 2016 on the State aid implemented by Spain for Real Madrid CF, para. 6.

[7] Ibid, para. 10.

[8] Ibid, paras. 13-15.

[9] Oskar van Maren, “The EU State aid and Sport Saga – A blockade to Florentino Perez’ latest “galactic” ambitions (part 1)”.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Commission decision SA.33753, para. 1. For more information on why the Commission opened this case without a formal complaint, see Ben Van Rompuy and Oskar van Maren, “EU Control of State Aid to Professional Sport: Why Now?” In: “The Legacy of Bosman. Revisiting the relationship between EU law and sport”, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2016.

[12] Commission decision SA.33753 of 18 December 2013, State aid– Spain Real Madrid CF, paras. 41-43.

[13] Commission notice of 9 April 2009 on the enforcement of State aid law by national courts (2009/c 85/01), para.25. See also: Oskar van Maren, “The Real Madrid case: A State aid case (un)like any other?” 11 Competition Law Review 1:104.

[14] Commission notice on the enforcement of State aid law by national courts, para. 72. See also in that regard Case C-174/02, Streekgewest, ECLI:EU:C:2005:10, para. 19.

[15] Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Madrid - Sección nº01 de lo Contencioso- administrativo - Pieza de Medidas Cautelares- 357/2013 – 01, 31 July 2014, page 5. Disclaimer: This is an unofficial translation by the author of the blog.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Commission Notice on the enforcement of State aid law by national courts, para.70. See also Case C-368/04, Transalpine Ölleitung in Österreich, ECLI:EU:C:2006:644, para. 45. The Court also held that national procedural rules apply “as long as those national rules do not render excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by EU law”. In other words, if it is more difficult to get standing under national procedural rules than under EU procedural rules, then EU procedural rules apply.  

[18] Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Madrid - Sección nº01 de lo Contencioso- administrativo - Pieza de Medidas Cautelares- 357/2013 – 01, 31 July 2014, page 5.

[19] Ibid, page 6.

[20] Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 of 13 July 2015 laying down detailed rules fort the application of Article 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 16(3).

[21] Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Madrid - Sección nº01 de lo Contencioso- administrativo – Procedimiento Ordinario 371/2013, 2 February 2015, page 10.

[22] Ibid, page 9.

Comments (5) -

  • Florentino Perez

    2/11/2017 8:33:52 AM |

    If there was no formal complaint, why did the Commission say in the first paragraph of its opening decision of 18 December 2013 that "Spain was asked to comment on the complaint on 20 December 2011"? Why should they ask Spain to comment on a complaint that does not exist?

  • Oskar van Maren

    2/15/2017 4:27:54 PM |

    Thank you for your interesting question Florentino. The way I see it, Spain was asked to comment on press reports and detailed information sent by citizens. Information sent by citizens cannot be seen as a 'formal' complaint, because citizens are generally not considered an interested party. Indeed, in the final decision the Commission changed its wording and asked Spain to comment "on this information" instead of complaint.

  • Florentino Perez

    2/18/2017 11:35:43 AM |

    But the requirement to be an interested party in order to submit a formal complaint was only introduced by the Commission in 2013. The Commission asked Spain to comment on a complaint in 2011 (as confirmed in the opening decision of 18 December 2013) but then dropped any reference to that complaint in its final decision.  It is a very dodgy behaviour by any standard to change the description of the events five years later. This may explain why they had to act, there was a "Schrodinger" complaint.

  • Oskar van Maren

    2/22/2017 11:14:29 AM |

    You are right, it is a bit strange that the Commission changed the description in the final decision. I still think, though, that the description of "the complaint" in the opening decision is a direct reference to the description of "detailed information sent by citizens" in the sentence before. Since I don't know who these citizens were (let alone know how the information sent was formulated), it is difficult to determine whether this information can be considered "a complaint" under the old requirements. Under the new requirements, it appears that this cannot be considered "a complaint".

  • Oskar van Maren

    2/22/2017 11:20:07 AM |

    In any case, I would be happy to continue this discussion with you, and share ideas on this issue. Therefore, feel free to contact me directly via email. Best, Oskar

Comments are closed
Asser International Sports Law Blog | The Rise and Fall of FC Twente

Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

The Rise and Fall of FC Twente

Yesterday, 18 May 2016, the licensing committee of the Dutch football federation (KNVB) announced its decision to sanction FC Twente with relegation to the Netherland’s second (and lowest) professional league. The press release also included a link to a document outlining the reasons underlying the decision. For those following the saga surrounding Dutch football club FC Twente, an unconditional sanction by the licensing committee appeared to be only a matter of time. Yet, it is the sanction itself, as well as its reasoning, that will be the primary focus of this short blog.


Background

By way of reminder, FC Twente is the typical example of a professional football club who had been “punching above its weight” for years. After taking over the club in 2003, president Joop Munsterman and his fellow associates took extreme financial risks in order to overtake clubs like PSV and Ajax as the best club in the Netherlands. At first they were successful, but winning the Dutch league in 2010 did not prove enough for the overambitious executives of FC Twente. The club started spending more money than ever on the transfer marker and new massive loans were taken to upgrade the stadium to Champion League standards. Unfortunately, all this extra spending did not materialize in extra sporting successes. Furthermore, the money derived from selling players was not sufficient to service the debt incurred in the process.

Yet, the scope of FC Twente’s financial trouble did not become apparent until November 2015. It was then that footballleaks released the Economic Rights Participation Agreement (ERPA), or TPO agreement, the club had signed with the Maltese investment company Doyen. The fine prints of the ERPA, explained in our blog of 2 December, took everyone by surprise, including the KNVB’s licensing committee. More than the precarious state of the club’s finances, it was the fact that FC Twente had deliberately mislead the KNVB regarding its relationship with Doyen that shocked the Dutch federation.[1]

As an immediate reaction to Twente’s omissions, on 15 December, the licensing committee decided to conditionally withdraw FC Twente’s license, unless the club collaborates fully to an independent internal investigation into its structure and governance. Moreover, the licensing committee sanctioned FC Twente with a €45,250 fine and a three-year exclusion from participating in European competitions. The report of the internal investigation, published on 1 March 2016, highlighted the complete lack of transparency in transfer matters, i.e. all the transfers and their financing were taken care of by vice-president Van der Laan without the involvement of other board members. The ‘Additional Agreement’ signed with Doyen, for example, was never mentioned in any of the board meetings. The report also brought to light a fresh case of deliberate deceit of the licensing committee in the transfer of Dusan Tadic to Southampton the summer of 2014. According to FC Twente’s original disclosure to the KNVB, Tadic’s agent would receive €1.8 million, which was 15% of the transfer amount. However, in January 2016, a month after FC Twente promised full collaboration in the investigation, it suddenly turned out that Tadic’s agent still had a claim of €1.8 million based on a second agreement between him and the club regarding the same transfer. Not only was this second agreement never notified to the licensing committee, it was also never mentioned to the investigators during several meetings held in December 2015. 


The licensing committee’s decision

In a nutshell, the licensing committee decided to unconditionally withdraw FC Twente’s license, but to simultaneously grant it a new license so that it is permitted to play in the Dutch second professional league. The committee held that:

“The Dutch licensing system was repeatedly, deliberately and systematically undermined by FC Twente and the licensing committee was repeatedly, intentionally and purposely misled. This behavior undermines the functioning of the licensing system, contributes to an unfair competition between professional football clubs, creates income for FC Twente it would not have obtained under fair conditions (e.g. income from the selling of TV rights) and leads to player transfers that possibly would not have taken place had the club behaved ethically.”[2]

It added that it had already considered an unconditional withdrawal of the license in December 2015, but decided against it because it needed more information, such as an independent report. The licensing committee’s conclusions drawn from the report was twofold. On the one hand, the licensing committee praised the fact that FC Twente collaborated with the investigation, that it promised to continue with the reorganization of the club’s governance structure after  a new license was granted[3] and that it will not ask for a UEFA license for the next three seasons.[4]

On the other hand, the licensing committee felt it needed to act as a consequence of the new information regarding the Tadic transfer. The committee determined that the “Doyen Gate” was not an isolated incident, but that it fitted in a pattern of systematic unethical behavior by FC Twente’s management. Consequently, it concluded that FC Twente had breached Article 9 of the Dutch license regulation, which requires a license holder (i.e. a professional football club) to timely provide the licensing committee all the relevant information and documents regarding the club’s financial situation, transfer details, etc. Interestingly enough, the license regulation offers only two sanction possibilities for breaching Article 9: A fine of maximum €45.250 under Article 11(1); or the complete withdrawal of the license under Article 12(2)c). The option to sanction a club with a relegation to the lower divisions is currently not an option, as stipulated by the license committee in paragraph 9 of its decision.

The lack of alternative options proved to be problematic for the licensing committee because it found a fine of €45.250, given the circumstances, disproportionately light, but the decision to withdraw the license disproportionately heavy.[5] A complete license withdrawal could realistically lead to the disappearance of FC Twente, a football club with (as held by the licensing committee) an important role in the Enschede region. “The licensing committee is aware that the effects (of a collapse) could be disastrous for FC Twente, its employees, financers, supporters and professional football in the region”.[6] With this statement, the licensing committee is demonstrating that it is taking into account inter alia the guarantee issued by the municipality of Enschede on a loan of €32 million for FC Twente in December 2015, under the condition that the club would obtain a license. Without this loan, FC Twente would have gone bankrupt. In the end, the licensing committee came up with the rather pragmatic solution to withdraw unconditionally FC Twente’s license, immediately followed by the granting of a new license to participate in the second professional league, “in order to limit the disproportionate consequences of the license withdrawal”.[7]

What makes the licensing committee’s decision worthy of debate is that the regulations, strictly speaking, do not provide for the option to replace a first division license with a second division license. The committee admits that it has sought the limits of the licensing regulations, but defends its decision by stating it is sanctioning FC Twente for its past actions in a proportionate manner while taking into account the interests of the club and its stakeholders.  


Aftermath

In an official statement following the decision, FC Twente declared that its currently studying all its options. Although an appeal remains one of the possibilities, one could argue that it might be too risky for FC Twente to do so. Concretely, an appeal would probably lead to a sanction that actually exists under the regulations: A fine of €45.250 or an unconditional withdrawal of a license. A more interesting issue is whether any other professional club might consider questioning this decision. Clubs who believe to have been placed in a disadvantageous position as a result of FC Twente’s deliberate and systematic deceit, could argue that the current sanction does not address the gravity of the misconduct. Moreover, the fact that the sanction is not enshrined in the KNVB’s regulations, could make it difficult for the licensing committee to uphold it in an appeal procedure.

This decision puts the final nail in FC Twente’s coffin. The surprising rise and brutal downfall of the Dutch club exemplifies the advantages and downsides of TPO. This practice (and other financial tricks linked to the transfer system) enabled Twente to leverage up and make the impossible possible (winning the Eredivisie), but at the same time strapped it with an unsustainable debt that has brought the club to its knees. Basically, fans must choose between a few seconds (or years) of glory on the one hand, or a sustainable future for their club on the other.



[1] FC Twente had not disclosed to the KNVB an Annex, called ‘Additional Agreement’, to the ERPA that insinuated far-reaching influence by Doyen in employment and transfer-related matters, thereby breaching FIFA and KNVB Regulations.

[2] The licensing committee’s decision, page 1.

[3] In this regard it should be noted that four FC Twente board members resigned in March as a result of the report. See “FC Twente geeft toelichting op onderzoeksrapport Knüppe” (http://www.fctwente.nl/blog/2016/03/fc-twente-geeft-toelichting-onderzoeksrapport-knuppe/).

[4] The licensing committee’s decision, page 3.

[5] Ibid., page 4.

[6] Ibid., page 5.

[7] Ibid.

Comments are closed
Asser International Sports Law Blog | The CAS Ad Hoc Division in 2014: Business as usual? – Part.1: The Jurisdiction quandary

Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

The CAS Ad Hoc Division in 2014: Business as usual? – Part.1: The Jurisdiction quandary

The year is coming to an end and it has been a relatively busy one for the CAS Ad Hoc divisions. Indeed, the Ad Hoc division was, as usual now since the Olympic Games in Atlanta in 1996[1], settling  “Olympic” disputes during the Winter Olympics in Sochi. However, it was also, and this is a novelty, present at the Asian Games 2014 in Incheon.  Both divisions have had to deal with seven (published) cases in total (four in Sochi and three in Incheon). The early commentaries available on the web (here, here and there), have been relatively unmoved by this year’s case law. Was it then simply ‘business as usual’, or is there more to learn from the 2014 Ad Hoc awards? Two different dimensions of the 2014 decisions by the Ad Hoc Division seem relevant to elaborate on : the jurisdiction quandary (part. 1) and the selection drama (part. 2).


Part. 1: The Jurisdiction quandary: Too early to be judged!


The scope of jurisdiction of the Ad Hoc Division of CAS is provided for in article 1 of the ‘Arbitration Rules for the Olympic Games’ (the same is true for the Asian Games)[2]. However, legal uncertainties over this scope of jurisdiction remain a defining feature. Many earlier disputes in front of the Ad Hoc division have tackled this question, and this has been true again this year.[3]

It is not so much the scope rationae personae that might be problematic, although one case arose at the Asian games in which two former squash players were denied access to the Ad Hoc division on the basis of not being “participating athletes”.[4] Nor is it the rationae materiae that has been a real problem, as claimants tend to submit disputes, which are related to the Games. No, the problem child is usually the jurisdiction rationae temporis. Indeed, article 1 of the rules states that “any disputes covered by Rule 61 of the Olympic Charter, insofar as they arise during the Olympic Games or during a period of ten days preceding the Opening Ceremony of the Olympic Games” can be subjected to the jurisdiction of the Ad Hoc Division. So the key question is: When does a dispute “arise”? 

In the Birkner case[5], the Ad Hoc Division in Sochi had to grapple extensively with the question of when the dispute arose as, during the hearing, the respondent, Comitato Olympico Argentino, “denied the existence of a basis of jurisdiction of the panel”. The case concerned a selection drama for the Sochi Games (see part 2); jurisdiction rationae personae and rationae materiae were unproblematic. The CAS did examine whether the local remedies were exhausted, and considered that “that there were no internal remedies to exhaust”.[6] The only barrier left for jurisdiction to be asserted was the ratione temporis. In short, “did the dispute arise in the required time frame?”[7]

This “vexing issue” [8] was touched upon repeatedly in past Ad Hoc division awards.[9] In the Birkner case, it had to be demonstrated that the dispute arose not earlier than the 28 January 2014, 10 days before the opening ceremony scheduled for the 7 February 2014. The panel first reaffirmed the fact that “the date when the dispute arose cannot, per se, be the date when the Request for Arbitration is filed” .[10]  So, back to the key question, when did the dispute arise?

The award refers extensively to the Schuler case[11]. In its main holding on jurisdiction, the 2006 panel considered that “it would not be possible to say that a dispute had arisen until Ms Schuler had decided to appeal and had filed notice of her appeal”.[12] Nevertheless, the 2014 panel refused to consider the Schuler precedent to be applicable to the Birkner case for two reasons: the factual situation is different and the reasoning used in Schuler is fundamentally flawed.

On the factual side, contrary to the Schuler case, the panel finds that “[i]n the present case […] the explanation was not given on a date inside the required period, as it was either on 20 January 2014, which is the date of the letter of explanation, or on 22 January 2014, which is the date on which the Applicant says that she received that letter”.[13] Both of these dates being well before the 10 days period, the panel is of the opinion that it lacks jurisdiction. On the legal side, the panel is clearly not “convinced by the legal reasoning adopted in the Schuler case” .[14] In fact, it considers that “[s]uch conclusion could extend the jurisdiction of the ad hoc Division outside the precise and limited framework set by the Rules, which this Panel is required to respect and apply” [15]. The panel is of the opinion that “the date when a dispute arises is in general […] the date of the decision with which the Applicant disagrees” .[16] However, “[s]uch a date can arise later […] if […] the decision is not self-explanatory and requires some explanation in order for the parties to know with certainty that they are in disagreement”.[17]

This is a noteworthy consideration, which indicates a substantial reduction of the scope of jurisdiction of the CAS Ad Hoc Division. If the parties do not agree to the jurisdiction of CAS (in practice they often do not contest the jurisdiction[18]) it will render more difficult the referral of a dispute to the Ad Hoc Division. This understanding of the start of a dispute is contradicting the overall aim of the Ad Hoc Division, which is to deal swiftly with all disputes intimately linked to the Games. In this light, a more flexible interpretation of the jurisdiction rationae temporis, as suggested in the Schuler case, is preferable. Athletes are no legal experts; they (and sometimes their lawyers) need time to find their way through the jungle of sporting regulations and dispute resolution mechanisms potentially applicable. The crucial importance of the Olympic Games for an athlete’s career call for an interpretation of the start of the dispute that focuses on the intention to challenge the decision as highlighted in the Schuler award[19]. Moreover, any doubts concerning the starting date of the dispute should play in favour of the athlete, unless the time between the date of notification of the contentious decision and the decision to lodge a complaint in front of CAS is disproportionately (and abusively) long. The attack by the Birkner panel on the reasoning adopted in Schuler is no anodyne move; in the future it may threaten the access to justice of athletes and their ability to obtain a swift and fair decision, in a context where they most urgently need it.

 



[1] On the early days of the CAS Ad Hoc Division at the Olympics, the book by Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler is a must read : G. Kaufmann-Kohler, Arbitration at the Olympics, Kluwer Law, 2001.

[2] Article 1 of the Arbitration Rules for the OG stipulates that:

“The purpose of the present Rules is to provide, in the interests of the athletes and of sport, for the resolution by arbitration of any disputes covered by Rule 61 of the Olympic Charter, insofar as they arise during the Olympic Games or during a period of ten days preceding the Opening Ceremony of the Olympic Games.”

“In the case of a request for arbitration against a decision pronounced by the IOC, an NOC, an International Federation or an Organising Committee for the Olympic Games, the claimant must, before filing such request, have exhausted all the internal remedies available to him/her pursuant to the statutes or regulations of the sports body concerned, unless the time needed to exhaust the internal remedies would make the appeal to the CAS Ad Hoc Division ineffective.”

[3] CAS OG 14/03; CAS AG 14/01; CAS AG 14/02.

[4] See CAS AG 14/01, §2.5. See also CAS OG 12/03, §2.3.

[5] CAS OG 14/03

[6] CAS OG 14/03, §5.14

[7] CAS OG 14/03, §5.17-5-30

[8] CAS OG 14/03, §5.20

[9] Most notably in the Schuler case, CAS OG 06/002. For a general commentary see: I.S.LR. 2006 pp.50-51 and A. Rigozzi, ‘The decisions rendered by the CAS Ad Hoc Division at the Turin Winter Olympic Games 2006’, Journal of International Arbitration 23 (5): 453-466, 2006

[10] CAS OG 14/03, §5.21

[11] CAS OG 14/03, §5.24

[12] CAS OG 06/002, §14

[13] CAS OG 14/03, §5.25

[14] CAS OG 14/03, §5.25

[15] CAS OG 14/03, §5.27

[16] CAS OG 14/03, §5.28

[17] CAS OG 14/03, §5.28

[18] See for example CAS OG 14/01 §6.2 and CAS OG 14/02 §6.5

[19] In cases, in which the dispute overtly arose earlier than 10 days before the games such a restrictive interpretation could be tolerated. See for example: CAS OG 12/03, §2.3.23; CAS OG 12/02, §4.10; CAS OG 12/04, §5.2.

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Asser International Sports Law Blog | The EU State aid and sport saga: The Real Madrid Decision (part 2)

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Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

The EU State aid and sport saga: The Real Madrid Decision (part 2)

This is the second and final part of the ‘Real Madrid Saga’. Where the first part outlined the background of the case and the role played by the Spanish national courts, the second part focuses on the EU Commission’s recovery decision of 4 July 2016 and dissects the arguments advanced by the Commission to reach it. As will be shown, the most important question the Commission had to answer was whether the settlement agreement of 29 July 2011 between the Council of Madrid and Real Madrid constituted a selective economic advantage for Real Madrid in the sense of Article 107(1) TFEU.[1] Before delving into that analysis, the blog will commence with the other pending question, namely whether the Commission also scrutinized the legality of the operation Bernabeú-Opañel under EU State aid law. By way of reminder, this operation consisted of Real Madrid receiving from the municipality the land adjacent to the Bernabéu stadium, while transferring in return €6.6 million, as well as plots of land in other areas of the city. 


The Commission’s ‘pragmatic’ solution regarding the Operation Bernabéu-Opañel

As was explained in part 1 of this blog, during the formal investigation period (i.e. from 18 December 2013 until 4 July 2016), the operation Bernabéu-Opañel (referred to by the Commission as the ‘2011 urban development agreement’) was firstly suspended by the Madrid High Court (31 July 2014) and later completely annulled (2 February 2015) by that same Court. It is worth reiterating that the Court believed there to be a sufficient link between the 2011 settlement agreement and the operation Bernabéu-Opañel in order to examine the agreements together.[2]

The Commission, however, was actually surprisingly brief on this matter. As can be read from paragraphs 79 and 80 from the decision, “(a)s a result of (the judgment of 2 February 2015), the 2011 urban development agreement has been cancelled between the parties. Consequently, that agreement will no longer be implemented so that the Commission assessment of the 2011 urban development agreement has become without object. The present Decision therefore only examines the 2011 settlement agreement under State aid rules”.[3]

From an EU State aid law perspective, declaring the operation Bernabéu-Opañel “without object” makes sense. With the agreement annulled, there has been no transfer of resources from the State to Real Madrid of any sorts, nor could Real Madrid have obtained an economic advantage from an annulled agreement. Therefore, removing all the problematic aspects of the agreement from a State aid perspective. Yet, it does remain slightly ironic that that the ‘standstill obligation’ was applied to an agreement that was later on never analysed by the Commission. True, the subsequent annulment (based solely on Spanish administrative law) made Commission scrutiny redundant, but one does wonder what the Commission would have decided had the Madrid Court not annulled the operation. 


The 2011 settlement agreement under Article 107(1) TFEU

By way of reminder, in the opening decision, the Commission primarily doubted whether:

1) It was impossible for the Council of Madrid to transfer the Las Tablas property to Real Madrid;

2) This legal impossibility automatically led to an obligation for the Council of Madrid to compensate Real Madrid;

3) A market value of the Las Tablas plot of land has been sought;

4) And whether the value of the properties which were transferred to Real Madrid by the 2011 settlement agreement were market conform.[4]

In reaction to the opening decision Spain argued that transferring the plot in Las Tablas was illegal based on the local urban law 9/2001 of 2001, this interpretation was later confirmed by the Spanish High Court in 2004. Yet, this was already the case in 1998 when the Madrid Council agreed to transfer the land to Real Madrid.[5] Given that Real Madrid had legitimate expectations that it was the owner of the land, it has suffered damages as a consequence of the transfer’s invalidity. As a consequence, Real Madrid needed to be compensated by an amount equal to the market value of Las Tablas in 2011, namely €22.693.054,44. Since this sum was calculated on the basis of an objective model set by the Ministry of Economy and Industry[6], Spain considered that it matched the market value and could not constitute State aid.

The economic advantage criterion according to the market economy operator principle

The Commission’s State aid assessment essentially revolved around the question whether the 2011 settlement agreement between the Council of Madrid and Real Madrid resulted in an economic advantage to the benefit of Real Madrid.[7] As is standard Commission practice[8], “to determine whether a particular transaction carried out by a public authority has been carried out in line with normal market conditions, it is necessary to compare the behaviour of that public authority with that of a similarly situated hypothetical “market economic operator” operating under normal market conditions. If the “market economy operator” would have entered into that transaction under similar terms, then the presence of an advantage may be excluded as regards that transaction”.[9] Referring to EU case law[10], the Commission argued that a prudent market operator would carry out his own ex ante assessment on the basis of sound economic and legal evaluations, when entering such transactions. Public authorities cannot claim that evaluations made after the transaction, based on a retrospective finding that it was actually economically rational, like the Madrid Council did in this case, is the course of action that a prudent market operator would take under similar circumstances.[11]

In continuation, the Commission indicated the two criteria it used in order to determine whether the amount of compensation offered to Real Madrid was in line market conditions:

1) The probability that the Madrid Council would be held liable for its inability to perform its contractual obligations;

2) And the maximum extent of its financial exposure resulting from finding such a liability.[12]

Though these criteria are clearly cumulative, it should be noted that the Commission did not support the criteria with a reference to case law, its own decisional practice or documents of (soft) law. Be that as it may, based primarily on these criteria the Commission concluded that a market economy operator in a similar situation to the Madrid Council would not have entered into the 2011 settlement agreement.

As regards the first criteria, the Commission argued that the Madrid Council should have sought legal advice so as to establish the likelihood that it was indeed liable for not performing its contractual obligations. Without legal advice, the Commission found it hard to believe that a prudent market operator would have assumed full legal liability, especially considering “the legal uncertainties surrounding the potential impossibility to perform (the land transaction), the legal consequences of that potential impossibility, and the Madrid Council’s ability to remedy that legal impossibility through other means”.[13] The Commission seems definitely correct in questioning the chain of events that eventually led to the compensation of more than €20 million. Even though, as Spain now claims[14], it was already legally impossible to transfer the land in 1998, why did the Madrid Council sign this agreement in the first place? After the introduction of local urban law 9/2001, shouldn’t the parties have been aware of the legal impossibility at that moment, or in any case after the 2004 judgment of the Madrid High Court? Consequently, why did the Council wait until 2011 before compensating Real Madrid? In paragraphs 103 and 104, the Commission also drew an interesting comparison with the operation Bernabéu-Opañel. Although this latter operation was declared void by a Spanish Court for not being in line with the general interest, it simultaneously shows that reclassifying a terrain from public to private (sport) use is not entirely legally impossible. In other words, by analogy, the plot in Las Tablas could have been reclassified for private use (provided the reclassification served the general interest) and be legally transferred to Real Madrid.

With regard to the second criteria, i.e. the maximum extent of the Madrid Council’s financial exposure resulting from finding such a liability, the Commission firstly argued that the different valuations of 1998 and 2011 of the land in Las Tablas were based on the mistaken assumption that this land could have been transferred in 2011, which, in hindsight appeared to be legally impossible. “Assuming the Madrid Council could not be held liable for that legal impossibility, for which it never solicited legal advice, it is at least arguable that the market value of the plot in its relationship with Real Madrid would be zero, since the land in question cannot be transferred”.[15] On the other hand, and assuming the Madrid Council is liable and Real Madrid had a right to a compensation, this amount should have been way less than €22 million as a Commission-assigned study concluded. Taking into account the Commission’s consideration that the correct parameter for the valuation of the concerned plot is the long-term exploitation of the land for sport use, the study arrived at a valuation in 2011 of €4.275 million.[16]

For all the above reasons, the Commission established that the Madrid Council had not acted as a prudent market operator. It had not sought legal advice before entering the 2011 settlement agreement, and the subsequent compensation granted to Real Madrid too high. In conclusion, by means of the 2011 settlement agreement, a selective economic advantage was granted to Real Madrid and the State aid criteria of Article 107(1) TFEU were fulfilled. As a result, the amount of aid that Spain was required to recover from the football club amounted to €18.418.054,44 (€22.693.054,44 - €4.275.000) plus interests.[17]


The aftermath

On 2 September 2016, the municipality of Madrid officially ordered Real Madrid to repay €20.3 million, an obligation complied with by the club in early November. Nonetheless, the Real Madrid ‘saga’ has not come to an end. In fact, now that Real Madrid’s appeal is registered by the CJEU, it has become clear that it could take several more years until the case is finally closed. The pending questions are; what are the grounds of Real Madrid’s appeal and could the appeal be successful?

As a preliminary remark, neither Spain nor Real Madrid have claimed that the 2011 settlement agreement falls, or could fall, under one of the exceptions of Article 107(3) TFEU. In principle, this does not prevent Real Madrid from advancing a compatibility plea in front of the General Court, even though it did not raise the argument during the formal investigation.[18] Nonetheless, given the Commission’s wide discretion in applying the exceptions of Article 107(3)[19], the review of the legality of its decision is restricted to determining whether the Commission committed a manifest error in its assessment of the facts or misused its powers.[20] Moreover, as the Commission indicates in paragraph 135 of the decision, the aid granted to Real Madrid is considered as operating aid.[21] In other words, the aid releases an undertaking from costs which it would normally have to bear in its day to day activities.[22] Both the Commission and the CJEU have been very reluctant in permitting operating aid since it rarely facilitates the development of certain economic activities without adversely affecting trading conditions.[23]

In a press-release following the Commission’s announcement of its recovery decision, Real Madrid inter alia argued that the valuation method used in the 2011 settlement agreement is the “only objective method, as it is based in the cadastral value, legally obliging for all Spanish City Councils, and therefore is applied in all transaction between City Councils and third parties whether they are public or private”.[24] The Commission’s final decision takes note of the criticism expressed by Real Madrid regarding the Commission-assigned valuation study, especially concerning the (in its eyes erroneous) valuation method used for the study.[25] Though the Commission rebutted Real Madrid’s criticism[26], it will be up to the General Court of the EU (and potentially later the Court of Justice) to decide whether the Madrid Council used the correct valuation method when determining the 2011 value of las Tablas. This will not be completely new territory for the General Court, given the rich jurisprudence available on valuation methods.[27] As regards the standard of review applied by the General Court, Conor Quigley argues that “where the Commission is found by the Court to have committed a sufficient error of assessment, the decision will be annulled”.[28] It is settled EU case law, that the valuation method must be based on the available objective, verifiable and reliable data, which should be sufficiently detailed and should reflect the economic situation at the time at which the transaction was decided, taking into account the level of risk and future expectations.[29] The General Court remains, however, entitled to fully review and assess the valuation methods presented by the Commission and the interested parties.[30]

The Real Madrid case is too complex and intertwined to draw definitive conclusions on the possible outcome of the appeal. Nonetheless, the thorough State aid assessment conducted by the Commission in its decision should not be underestimated. This will be a tough “legal match” on an entirely new turf for Real Madrid.



[1] By way of reminder, Article 107(1) TFEU reads: “Save as otherwise provided in the Treaties, any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the internal market”.

[2] See Oskar van Maren, “The EU State aid and sport saga: The Real Madrid Decision (part 1)”, Asser International Sports Law Blog, 15 November 2016.

[3] Commission decision SA.33753 of 4 July 2016 on the State aid implemented by Spain for Real Madrid CF, paras. 79 and 80.

[4] Commission decision SA.33753 of 18 December 2013, State aid– Spain Real Madrid CF, paras. 41-43.

[5] Interestingly enough, Spain’s comments contradict Real Madrid’s comments, according to which, as can be read in paragraph 46 of the decision, Spanish law did allow Las Tablas to be reclassified for private use in 1998 and beyond until a specific law that prohibits that was introduced in 2001.

[6] Commission decision SA.33753 of 4 July 2016 on the State aid implemented by Spain for Real Madrid CF, paras. 29-36.

[7] Since it was clear State resources were transferred, that the measure was selective and that it at least had the potential of affecting intra-Union trade, the other criteria of Article 107(1) TFEU were only briefly discussed.

[8] See also e.g. Commission decision SA.41613 of 4 July 2016, on the measure implemented by the Netherlands with regard to the professional football club PSV in Eindhoven.

[9] Commission decision SA.33753 of 18 December 2013, State aid– Spain Real Madrid CF, para. 88.

[10] Case C-124/10 P Commission v. EDF ECLI:EU:C:2012:318, paras. 84, 85 and 105.

[11] Commission decision SA.33753 of 18 December 2013, State aid– Spain Real Madrid CF, para. 89.

[12] Ibid, para. 92.

[13] Ibid, para. 94.

[14] Ibid, para. 29.

[15] Ibid, para. 108.

[16] Ibid, paras. 111-112.

[17] Ibid, paras. 139-142.

[18] See for example T-110/97 Kneissl Dachstein v Commission ECLI:EU:T:1999:244, para. 102.

[19]Case T-304/08 Smurfit Kappa Group v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2012:351, para. 90.

[20] Conor Quigley, “European State Aid Law and Policy”, Hart Publishing, 3rd edition (2015), pages 738-739. See also for example T-20/03 Kahla/Thüringen Porzellan v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2008:395, para. 115.

[21] Commission decision SA.33753 of 18 December 2013, State aid– Spain Real Madrid CF, para. 135.

[22] See for example Case C-172/03 Heiser ECLI:EU:C:2005:130, para. 55.

[23] Quigley, page 276.

[24] Real Madrid further found it surprising that the Commission used a valuation made by an architect’s office in Barcelona to dictate their decision. Though many will find this comment by Real Madrid rather amusing, it once again shows that the rivalry between the two clubs (and cities) far exceeds the performances on a football field.

[25] Commission decision SA.33753 of 18 December 2013, State aid– Spain Real Madrid CF, para. 89.

[26] Ibid, paras. 119-128.

[27] See for example T-366/00 Scott v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2007:99; and C-239/09 Seydaland Vereinigte Agrarbetriebe ECLI:EU:C:2010:778.

[28] Quigley, page 737. Based on the case law of the Court, it is not entirely clear whether a “sufficient error of assessment” by the Commission is enough for the Court to annul the decision.

[29] T-366/00 Scott v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2007:99, para. 158. See also Commission Notice C 262/1 of 19 July 2016 on the notion of State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, para. 101.

[30] Case T-274/01 Valmont v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2004:266.

Comments (1) -

  • Florentino Perez

    2/11/2017 9:19:30 AM |

    According to the ecological movement (EeA), the advantage for Real in the transfer of the plots in the Opanel district in exchange for the super prime area in front of the Bernabeu Stadium was approx. €60 million which is not unreasonable considering the actual market prices in both areas. That was the lion's share of the aid. Add this to the three years of delay in the stadium redevelopment (no IPIC naming rights at €20-25 million a year and no increase in the match day revenue) and you will see the that the Saga has been ruinous for Real that has been overtaken in the meantime by United and Barca in the revenue league.

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Asser International Sports Law Blog | New Transnational Sports Law Articles Released on SSRN - Antoine Duval

Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

New Transnational Sports Law Articles Released on SSRN - Antoine Duval

I have just released on SSRN four of my most recent articles on Lex Sportiva/Transnational Sports Law. The articles are available open access in their final draft forms, the final published version might differ slightly depending on the feedback of the editors. If you wish to cite those articles I (obviously) recommend using the published version.

I hope they will trigger your attention and I look forward to any feedback you may have!

Antoine


Abstract: This chapter focuses on the emergence of a transnational sports law, also known as lex sportiva, ruling international sports. In the transnational law literature, the lex sportiva is often referred to as a key example or case study, but rarely studied in practice. Yet, it constitutes an important playground for transnational legal research and practice, and this chapter aims to show why. The focus of the chapter will first be on the rules of the lex sportiva. Law, even in its transnational form, is still very much connected to written rules against which a specific behaviour or action is measured as legal or illegal. As will be shown, this is also true of the lex sportiva, which is structured around an ensemble of rules produced through a variety of law-making procedures located within different institutions. The second section of this chapter will aim to look beyond the lex sportiva in books to narrate the lex sportiva in action. It asks, what are the institutional mechanisms used to concretize the lex sportiva in a particular context? The aim will be to go beyond the rules in order to identify the processes and institutions making the lex sportiva in its daily practice. Finally, the enmeshment of the lex sportiva with state-based laws and institutions is highlighted. While the lex sportiva is often presented as an autonomous transnational legal construct detached from territorialized legal and political contexts, it is shown that in practice it operates in intimate connection with them. Hence, its transnational operation is much less characterized by full autonomy than assemblage.


Abstract: This chapter aims to show that the work of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (‘CAS’), which is often identified as the institutional centre of the lex sportiva, can be understood as that of a seamstress weaving a plurality of legal inputs into authoritative awards. In other words, the CAS panels are assembling legal material to produce (almost) final decisions that, alongside the administrative practices of sports governing bodies (‘SGBs’), govern international sports. It is argued that, instead of purity and autonomy, the CAS’ judicial practice is best characterised by assemblage and hybridity. This argument will be supported by an empirical study of the use of different legal materials, in particular pertaining to Swiss law, EU law and the European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’), within the case law of the CAS. The chapter is a first attempt at looking at the hermeneutic practice of the CAS from the perspective of a transnational legal pluralism that goes beyond the identification of a plurality of autonomous orders to turn its sights towards the enmeshment and entanglement characterising contemporary legal practice.


Abstract: Has the time come for the Court of Arbitration for Sport to go public? This article argues that after the Pechstein decision of the European Court of Human Rights, CAS appeal arbitration must be understood as forced arbitration and therefore must fully comply with the due process guarantees enshrined in Article 6(1) ECHR. In particular, this entails a strong duty of transparency with regard to the hearings at the CAS and the publication of its awards. This duty is of particular importance since the rationale for supporting the validity of CAS arbitration, if not grounded in the consent of the parties, must be traced back to the public interest in providing for the equality before the (sports) law of international athletes. Thus, the legitimacy and existence of the CAS is linked to its public function, which ought to be matched with the procedural strings usually attached to judicial institutions. In short, if it is to avoid lengthy and costly challenges to its awards, going public is an urgent necessity for the CAS.


Abstract: In 1998 the FIFA welcomed the Palestinian Football Association as part of its members - allegedly, as an attempt by then FIFA President, the Brazilian João Havelange, to showcase football as an instrument of peace between Israeli and Palestinians. Ironically, almost 20 years after Palestine’s anointment into the FIFA family, instead of peace it is the conflict between Israeli and Palestinians that moved to FIFA. In recent years the Palestinian Football Association (PFA) and the Israeli Football Association (IFA) have been at loggerheads inside FIFA over the fate - I will refer to it as the transnational legality – of five (and then six) football clubs affiliated to the IFA which are physically located in the Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT). This chapter chronicles the legal intricacies of this conflict, which will serve as a backdrop to discuss arguments raised regarding the legality of business activities of corporations connected to the Israeli settlements. Indeed, as will be shown in the first part of this chapter, the discussion on the legality of economic activities in the OPT has recently taken a business and human rights turn involving systematic targeting of corporations by activists. Interestingly, we will see that this business and human rights turn also played a role in the conflict between the IFA and the PFA. This case study is therefore an opportunity to examine how the strategy of naming and shaming private corporations, and in our case not-for-profit associations, for their direct or indirect business involvement in the settlements has fared. It is also an occasion to critically assess the strength of the human rights ‘punch’ added to the lex sportiva, by the UNGPs.

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Asser International Sports Law Blog | The Spanish TV Rights Distribution System after the Royal Decree: An Introduction. By Luis Torres

Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

The Spanish TV Rights Distribution System after the Royal Decree: An Introduction. By Luis Torres

On the first of May 2015, the Spanish Government finally signed the Royal Decree allowing the joint selling of the media rights of the Spanish top two football leagues. The Minister for Sport stated that the Decree will allow clubs to “pay their debts with the social security and the tax authorities and will enable the Spanish teams to compete with the biggest European Leagues in terms of revenues from the sale of media rights”.[1]Although the signing of the Royal Decree was supposed to close a very long debate and discussion between the relevant stakeholders, its aftermath shows that the Telenovela is not entirely over. 

This blog post will first provide the background story to the selling of media rights in Spain. It will, thereafter, analyse the main points of the Royal Decree and outline how the system will work in practice. Finally, the blog will shortly address the current frictions between the Spanish League (LFP) and the Spanish football federation (RFEF). 


I. The road to the royal decree 

The old individual selling system 

The individual selling model of media rights in Spain was adopted in the 1997/1998 season. The Spanish individualized marketing system required that the TV operators and the clubs sign individual agreements over the media rights for La Liga games. Obviously, not all the agreements were born equals. The two biggest clubs in Spain, Real Madrid and FC Barcelona, were soon deriving much more revenue from TV rights as the other clubs. Hence, it is not surprising that latter have been asking for a bigger share of the TV rights revenues since then. For the 2014/15 season, for example, Barcelona and Madrid earned 140 million € each, whereas Córdoba, Eibar and Deportivo la Coruña have only earned 17.5 million €. Even the last winner of La Liga (Atlético de Madrid) has received only 45 million € (3.1 times less than Barcelona and Madrid). Meanwhile, the overall sum paid by the operators to all the teams (MEDIAPRO Agency and PRISA Media Group) reached 742.5 million €/year for a three-year deal (2012/13 to 2014/15).[2] 

Due to the delay in approving the Royal Decree, some clubs (such as Barcelona) decided to sign an individual contract with a TV operator for the 2015/16 season. Consequently, it is unlikely that La Liga will be able to collectively sell its media rights for the next season. However, the new system should be in place for the 2016/17 season.  

Disagreements prior to the Royal Decree 

The negotiating process prior to signing the Royal Decree involved three main stakeholders: the Spanish Government (CSD –High Sports Council- and the Minister for Sport), the RFEF and, obviously, the LFP. The most difficult hurdle to overcome was the RFEF’s demand of a non-negotiable 2% share of the broadcasting revenues. Both the CSD and the LFP refused to budge and considered that the RFEF should not get more than 1%. The negotiations were especially tense as a consequence of a personal feud between the presidents of the main bodies involved.  

Why a Royal Decree? 

Notwithstanding the RFEF’s outspoken disapproval, the Royal Decree 5/2015 was adopted by the Council of Ministers on 30 April 2015 and was published in the Official Journal on the following day. In principle, a Royal Decree is only used for extraordinary and urgent matters and the Spanish Parliament must consolidate it in a law 30 days after its approval, which was done, last week. Nevertheless, one may question whether this was truly a matter of urgency requiring the introduction of a Royal decree. According to the explanatory memorandum of the Royal Decree it is justified on the basis of the public interest in securing a new system to commercialize the media rights. The justifications included in the Decree read as follows: 

“Concerning the media rights of professional football competitions, three reasons justify the need for an urgent response by the Government: first, the undisputed social relevance of professional sport, second, the repeated and unanimous demands to intervene from all parties involved and, finally, the need to promote competition in the market for the ‘pay-per-view’ television.”[3]

 

II. The new LFP’s media rights collective selling system 

The LFP’s media rights remain owned by the clubs. However, the football clubs are obliged to assign the right to commercialize them to the organizing bodies of the competition, i.e. the LFP (first and second division) and the RFEF (the cups).[4] 

The conditions for the joint selling of the media rights

In accordance with article 4 of the Royal Decree, the organising bodies will commercialize the media rights on an exclusive or non-exclusive basis.  Moreover, the procedure must be fair and equitable. The LFP and the RFEF will define the different packages commercialized in line with Article 4(4) of the Royal Decree.  These conditions will be attached by the organizing body into categories (‘packages’), depending whether it is on an exclusive basis or not, the time of the game and the duration (maximum 3 years), in accordance with the Article 4(4). The structure of the packages will be set out when the collective selling takes place.  

The specific distribution key of the revenues derived from the collective selling is enshrined in Article 5: 90% of the revenues will go to the first division clubs, and 10% to the second division clubs.   

Graph: Distribution of the money regarding the media rights of the first and second division:


 


Payments by the clubs after the distribution of revenue: The overdue debts to the Public Revenue and the indirect solidarity contributions.  

After receiving their share of revenue from the media rights, the clubs must first cover their overdue debts with the Spanish tax authorities. Indeed, Article 6(2) holds that “(t)he payment of overdue and payable debts owed to the ‘State Agency Tax Administration’ and the ‘General Treasury of the Social Security’ shall be considered on a preferential basis”. No club will be able to carry out the indirect solidarity payments foreseen by Article 6(1), if they do not reimburse their outstanding liabilities with the public authorities.

It is a well-known fact that Spanish football clubs have accumulated large amounts of debts over recent years. Indeed, at the end of the year 2013, the debt of the Spanish football amounted to 3.600 million € in total, with “around 700 million” to the public authorities. The Royal Decree is also aimed at tackling this longstanding debt “addiction” of many Spanish football clubs.                                             

Furthermore, in accordance with article 6(1) of the Decree, the clubs will have to make solidarity contributions to specific funds and Institutions promoting football and sport. These contributions will only be made after the obligatory contributions to the tax authorities have been paid. The five contributions include:

  1. 3.5% of the broadcasting revenues will be used to create a ‘Compensation Fund’ in order to assist relegated clubs from the first Division to the second and from the second division to the third division (in Spain known as the second division “B”). Out of the Compensation Fund, 90% will flow to the relegated clubs from the first Division and 10% to the relegated clubs from the second Division.

  2. 1% of the broadcasting revenues will go to the LFP for the purpose of promoting the League on the domestic and international market.

  3. 1% of the broadcasting revenues will go to the RFEF as a solidarity contribution to develop amateur football[5].

  4. Up to 1% of the broadcasting revenues will go to the Consejo Superior de Deportes (CSD), a Spanish Governmental body encouraging the development of sport in Spain. The goal of this contribution is to finance the social protection of high-level athletes (not just football players).

  5. A further 0,5% of the broadcasting revenues will go to the CSD, and shall be distributed in the following way:

    1. Aid to female football clubs participating in the Women’s First Division, covering social security contributions.

    2. Aid to football clubs participating in the Second Division “B”, in order to pay social security contributions.

    3. Aid to associations or unions of players (‘AFE’), referees, coaches and trainers. 


The Spanish cup and Supercup revenue-sharing criteria

The packages will be made according to the criteria similar to those applicable to the LFP’s media rights. The revenue generated by the RFEF’s competitions will be shared as follows (Article 8):

  1. 90% will be directly allocated to the LFP teams (first and second division). This money will be distributed to these clubs using similar criteria as for LFP Competitions. The revenue share depends on the results obtained by the teams in the cup. The distribution envisaged foresees 22%, for the winner; 16%, for the runner-up; 9%, for the semi-finalists; 6%, for the quarter-finalists; and 2,5%, for the clubs who got knocked-out the round of the last 16.

  2. 10% will be used for the promotion of lower (semi) professional football and amateur football, that is to say, for clubs who play in the cup but are not in first or second division.


III. The Problem with the Decree: RFEF and AFE’s Opposition 


The main beneficiaries, i.e. the clubs, are quite exultant after the publication of the Royal Decree. Nonetheless, two bodies believe that they are the principal losers of the distribution model adopted, namely the RFEF and AFE (Spanish Professional Footballer's Association). In fact, the RFEF and AFE’s discontent is such that they have threatened to organize a strike paralysing the last few games of the current season, should the Decree not be renegotiated.

RFEF

The RFEF wanted 2% of the total revenue for itself, but the Decree allocated to the RFEF only 1% of the total. , As discussed above, this share will be paid indirectly by the club as outlined in Article 6(1). This implies that the federation will get paid only once, and if, the clubs have serviced their overdue debts with the public authorities.

In addition to this, the Federation did not obtain any compensation for women’s football or (semi) professional football in lower divisions. The competence for supporting women’s football and lower professional football rests with the CSD even though it is the RFEF that is in charge of the organisation of the competitions. In other words the RFEF has no control over the money flowing into the competitions it is responsible for. 

AFE

The frustration expressed by AFE (Professional Footballer's Association) is also understandable. The players have not obtained a fixed share of the broadcasting revenues, as is the case in England (1.5%) or France (1.09%). Nevertheless, according to the Royal Decree, AFE will receive from the CSD a contribution of “up to 0.5%” (Article 6(1)(e), par. 3). Moreover, the players’ representatives claim they were unjustifiably excluded from the negotiations. Without the ability of partaking to the negotiations, they were unable to secure higher guarantees for the players regarding the payment of the salaries in the lower divisions of Spanish football. Given that many players do not receive their salaries on time in the lower Spanish divisions, this money would have been a potential solution to a chronicle problem.

The strike

In return, AFE (supported by elite players like Casillas, Xavi, Piqué or Ramos) threatened with a strike. For its part, RFEF suspended all the Spanish football competitions. In response to these moves, the LFP lodged a case against AFE in the Spanish Courts, requesting the suspension of the strike and the recognition of its illegality as it would lack a legitimate ground and would violate the existing collective bargaining agreement. 

The Audiencia Nacional (the National High Court in Spain) decided on 14 May in a preliminary decision to suspend the strike. This decision ensured that the last two games of the season and the final of the Copa del Rey will be played. The case is still pending and awaits a decision on the merits. The hearing will be held on 17 June. The parties have already commenced negotiations in order to reach an agreement before the hearing. But, given that the Royal Decree has been ratified by the Parliament, very few substantial changes to the system put in place by the Decree can be made. Thus, only minor peripheral adjustments are to be expected.  

Conclusion

In my opinion, there are two key aspects that must be kept in mind. First, the duty to pay overdue debts to the public Authorities. This mandatory requirement cannot be found in any other countries and is clearly linked with the specific problems that exist in Spanish football with regard to the clubs’ indebtedness and the enmeshment of local politicians in their management. On the other hand, the other key change introduced by the Royal Decree will be that La Liga will be in a position to negotiate a much hoped for gigantic TV deal with the broadcasters. A deal, which will not exclusively benefit Real Madrid and FC Barcelona. The economic gap between these two teams and the rest of the pack was growing bigger and bigger over the last years. With the new system in place, this gap is poised to be reduced. Nevertheless, the distribution method still heavily favours the status-quo. The traditionally large clubs are rewarded for having a large number of supporters, and for their past performances. Hence, it is still virtually impossible for a smaller Spanish clubs to become, over a short time span, one of the top-earning clubs in La Liga.



[1] IUSPORT: “Aprobado el Real Decreto-Ley de los derechos audiovisuales del fútbol”

http://iusport.com/not/6713/aprobado-el-real-decreto-ley-de-los-derechos-audiovisuales-del-futbol/

[2] MARCA, “Así será el reparto del dinero televisivo”, available at http://www.marca.com/2015/05/01/futbol/1430467483.html

[3] RD 5/2015, Explanatory Memorandum.

[4] Article 2 RD 5/2015.

[5] This percentage may be expanded by agreement

Comments (3) -

  • Marca Espana

    6/23/2015 1:20:22 PM |

    Interesting that the article fails to even mention that the new and "fairer" revenue sharing system will not be applicable until at least 2022 since the royal decree's transitional disposition provides that Barca and Real will continue to earn as much as they have been earning for at least six seasons. Smoke and mirrors but not a lot of change for the next six years. Our Spanish friends may have hoped that nobody would read the small print...

    For a more complete take on the new decree, I suggest reading the following article published by The Independent.

    www.independent.co.uk/.../...tv-deal-10243057.html

  • Luis Torres

    6/23/2015 3:56:16 PM |

    Thanks for the comment. You are right to point out that Real Madrid and FC Barcelona will continue to earn as much as they earned this season (2014/15) for the next six years. However, it is important to take into account that the revenue sharing favours the status quo. This is a formal way to state that RM and FCB are not going to suffer a disadvantage when the time to share the money comes.
    The second transitional provision (pages 15-16 of the Decree) will only jeopardise the applicability of new collective selling system if LaLiga sells the TV rights for a total amount which is less than the amount for which they are sold now individually by the clubs themselves. However, provided that the amount of money paid for the collective rights is bound to increase, the scenario that you sketch is, in my opinion, hypothetical.
    This provision, and specifically its point b), assures that if any club receives an amount lower than the amount received this season (2014/15) with the individual selling system, the other clubs will have to “compensate” this club. In other words, the clubs that are receiving a higher amount through the new collective selling system, will have to give this positive income to clubs which receive a lower amount.
    To conclude, and taking into account the amount that La Liga is expected to receive for the collective selling (at least €1,000M per season for the upcoming years), the situation you are exposing is merely hypothetical.
    Nonetheless, you are right, both RM and FCB will receive at least the same amount as this season, in a way similar as all the other clubs, who will also receive at least the same amount as this season.

    • Marca Espana

      6/24/2015 12:19:15 PM |

      Apologies but the numbers just do not add up. If La Liga were to sell its TV rights for the €1,000M that you mention (i.e. €900M for the first division and €100M for the second division), Real's and Barca's calculation would be as follows:

      - €22.5M which is 1/20 of the common pool
      - €37M of the merit pool for Barca. Real a bit less, about €34M since it has had worse results during the last few seasons
      - €45M of the support pool (which is capped at 20% for each club and it is likely that, since they are fully in control of the committee that decides how this is calculated, Real and Barca will pay themselves the maximum)

      This means that if the new "fairer" system would be applicable (i.e. in the absence of the transitional disposition) Barca would be entitled to €104M and Real to €101M instead of the €140M that they earned during the 2014/5 season.

      Just by way of comparison Rayo Vallecano's earnings would increase from €18M during the 2014/5 season to approx €34M
      (€22,5M common pool + €6M + €5,5M support) if they were calculated under the new "fairer" system.

      Unfortunately and by virtue of the feudal privilege provided to Real and Barca by the transitional disposition, "mighty" Rayo will be obliged by law to give up part of this increase to "compensate" poor Real and Barca for their loss to ensure that they keep on earning at least €140M until at least 2022.

      This means that the rest of the vassal clubs will have to pay their El Clasico lords as much as €75M annually to fund their European expansion.

      Crony capitalism at its absolute best. Fortunately we are fully aware by now that the juicy bits of any law related to Real & Barca are always to be found in the additional/transitional dispositions. The preamble and the first part of the laws ("PLCs are a great form of incorporation", "We have created a fair system to distribute the TV rights", etc.) shall be ignored.

Comments are closed
Asser International Sports Law Blog | The Scala reform proposals for FIFA: Old wine in new bottles?

Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

The Scala reform proposals for FIFA: Old wine in new bottles?

Rien ne va plus at FIFA. The news that FIFA’s Secretary General Jérôme Valcke was put on leave and released from his duties has been quickly overtaken by the opening of a criminal investigation targeting both Blatter and Platini.

With FIFA hopping from one scandal to the next, one tends to disregard the fact that it has been attempting (or rather pretending) to improve the governance of the organisation for some years now. In previous blogs (here and here), we discussed the so-called ‘FIFA Governance Reform Project’, a project carried out by the Independent Governance Committee (IGC) under the leadership of Prof. Dr. Mark Pieth of the Basel Institute on Governance. Their third and final report, published on 22 April 2014, listed a set of achievements made by FIFA in the area of good governance since 2011, such as establishing an Audit and Compliance Committee (A&C). However, the report also indicated the reform proposals that FIFA had not met. These proposals included the introduction of term limits for specific FIFA officials (e.g. the President) as well as introducing an integrity review procedure for all the members of the Executive Committee (ExCo) and the Standing Committees.

In the interest of, and commitment to, transparency”, FIFA made publicly available on 10 September 2015 an 8-point reform plan issued by the Chairman of the Audit and Compliance Committee, Domenico Scala. The report maps the current governance problems FIFA is facing and outlines a list of reform proposals the A&C wants FIFA to implement. More concretely, the A&C believes that the ExCo is FIFA’s main problem, and urges the ExCo to reform itself.

This blog post aims to analyse the proposals submitted by the A&C. It will do so by firstly explaining what the FIFA Executive Committee is, what its powers are and how its members get elected. This allows us to understand the criticism this institution has received in the past by, e.g. the Independent Governance Committee, and by the A&C today. In continuation, a comparison will be made between this latest report on FIFA governance and the 2014 report issued by the IGC. The comparison will help us answer the question to what extent FIFA is seriously trying to undergo the necessary reforms. Lastly, the blog post will determine whether the proposals made by Scala and the A&C can be realistically implemented by FIFA and, where necessary, its Members and the Confederations. 


The FIFA Executive Committee: How it works and why it is criticised

The ExCo is the executive body of FIFA and consists of 25 members: The FIFA President, eight Vice-Presidents and 16 members, including one female member. The FIFA President and the female Member of the ExCo are elected by the FIFA Congress (the legislative body of FIFA, of which all the National Associations are a Member and have one vote each)[1], whereas the Vice-Presidents and the other members are appointed by the Confederations (i.e. UEFA, CONMEBOL, AFC, CAF, CONCACAF and OFC)[2]. It should be noted that the Confederations themselves are not members of FIFA. All members of the ExCo are elected for four years and may be re-elected indefinitely.[3] The tasks of the ExCo include determining the dates, locations and format of the FIFA tournaments and electing the General Secretary on the proposal of the FIFA President.[4] Moreover, the ExCo designates the members of each standing committee.[5] An example of such a standing committee is the Finance Committee, whose task is to monitor the financial management and advise the ExCo on financial matters and asset management.[6]

In a concept paper from September 2011, the IGC described the ExCo as an “assembly of member delegates” rather than executive body. “The nature of the Executive Committee as an assembly of delegates is further supported by its large size (24 members in 2011) and few meetings (two meetings per year)”.[7]

The often-mentioned governance problem of the ExCo involves the ‘double’ or even ‘triple heads’ of some of its members. For example, the man who is president of the Spanish football association (RFEF) since 1988, Ángel María Villar, is also vice-president of UEFA since 1992 and FIFA Executive Committee member since 1998. Having important functions in three related, though different, organisations could trigger severe independency and conflict of interest issues. Furthermore, as the A&C pointed out in his 8-point reform plan, “the misconduct of some, even if it happens ‘only’ at the Confederation / national association level, has a tremendous impact in FIFA itself”.[8] One only needs to remember the example of former ExCo Members, Jack Warner and Chuck Blazer, who in their other function as president and vice president of the CONCACAF laundered millions of dollars and were charged with corruption.[9]

In its concept paper, the IGC already underlined the lack of independent supervision within the ExCo and suggested introducing a number of independent ExCo Members.[10] Further recommendations were substantiated in the IGC’s final report, which included implementing integrity review procedures for all members of the ExCo and the Standing Committees performed by FIFA centrally, and having the FIFA Congress confirm each ExCo member appointment or re-appointment by the Confederations.[11] Nonetheless, more than four years after the publication of the first IGC report and even after the 2015 FIFA corruption scandal, which led to the arrests of ExCo Members Jeffrey Webb and Eugenio Figueredo, the way ExCo Members get elected has not changed. For example, so far a requirement for integrity checks of new Members has not been introduced. 


Comparing the Final Report by the Independent Governance Committee and the Scala reform plan

The Final Report by the IGC contained a list of achievements including:

• Dividing the Ethics Committee into an investigatory and an adjudicatory chamber;

• Revising the Code of Ethics, through which the rules of conduct and expected behaviour (e.g. new standards regarding conflicts of interest, gifts and other benefits, bribery and corruption) are more clearly described;

• Establishing an Audit & Compliance Committee with the typical supervisory role of an Audit Committee and the additional responsibilities for a Compliance Program as well as for Compensation & Benefits;

• Establishing that the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Audit & Compliance Committee are independent and meet the necessary professional requirements.[12]

In addition to the list of achievements, the report listed a set of recommendations that were not implemented. The main recommendations are listed in the table below, together with the list of reform proposals found in the 8-point reform plan. 


 

Report by the Independent Governance Committee

Scala reform plan

Term Limits

The introduction of term limits for all ExCo members, not only the President.

Introduction of Term limits for the President, the (other) ExCo members, the Secretary General and members of independent committees to three terms of office (each of four years).

Age Limits

Introducing age limits is less important in case terms of office will be implemented.

The introduction of age limits appears to be less effective.

Election of the ExCo Members

The ExCo Members should each be individually confirmed by Congress decision upon their appointment or re-appointment by the Confederations.

Direct election of FIFA Executive Committee members by the Congress. Confederations will retain a right to propose candidates.

 

Integrity Check of ExCo Members

Integrity review procedure for ExCo and Standing Committee members performed by FIFA centrally.

Enhanced and centralized integrity checks performed by the Investigatory Chamber of the FIFA Ethics Committee.

Further recommendations with the aim of improving the functioning of the ExCo

At least two independent Members to be added to the Executive Committee.

 

Division of the present ExCo into two separate bodies: a Governing Body (strategic matters, supervision) and a Management Board (executive functions).

Disclosure of individual compensations

A publication of information in the area of compensation and benefits on a best-practice level inspired from multinational corporations or international organization.

Individual and detailed disclosure of the remunerations of the President, the other ExCo members, the Secretary General and (at least) of the Chairmen of the independent committees.

FIFA’s Member Associations and the Confederations

An overall greater focus should be on the Confederations and their leadership.

The Member Associations, through their votes at a Confederation level and at the FIFA Congress, should take over a more active and independent role in choosing the future FIFA leadership.

Introduction of higher standards of governance at Confederation and member association levels.

Introduction of equal integrity checks at Confederation and National Association level.

Introduction of equal term limits at Confederation and National Association level.

Other recommendations

The Chairman of the Audit & Compliance Committee should have access to and can participate as an observer in all Committee meetings within FIFA, including the ExCo.

Significant reduction of the number and size of the standing committees.

Committees that bear a high risk of conflicts of interests occurring must have independent chairmen.


Analysing the two governance reports

As a preliminary note, it is worth mentioning that the establishment of the FIFA Audit and Compliance Committee came about after the IGC suggested doing so in their report, published on 20 March 2012.[13]

A quick look at the above table shows that the recommendations by the IGC and those listed in the 8-point reform plan are very similar. First of all, the introduction of term limits for the FIFA President and ExCo Members is encouraged in both reports, whereas introducing age limits is discouraged. Secondly, both reports agree that there should be an integrity check for at least the President and the ExCo Members performed by FIFA itself. What these integrity checks would entail still needs to be clarified. Thirdly, it is clear that individual compensations of the President and the ExCo Members need to be disclosed to the public. Both reports contend this is essential to improve the governance and transparency of FIFA. Lastly and, in our opinion, most importantly, both reports agree that the Confederations and Member Associations play a most essential role when attempting to effectively improve the governance of FIFA. Where the two reports slightly differentiate from one another is on what the exact position of the Confederations and Member Associations should be, how they are involved in the electoral process of the FIFA President and ExCo members, and how they should be reformed themselves.

In its report, the IGC highlights the importance of the Confederations and national associations, but it does not suggest any substantial reform in this regard. In fact, the second recommendation of the report stipulates that “the members of the Executive Committee should each be individually confirmed by Congress decision upon their appointment or re-appointment by the Confederations”.[14] The IGC’s suggestion of a limitation of the Confederation’s role in the election process of the ExCo members was heavily criticised by, most notably, UEFA. All the UEFA members voted unanimously against the introduction of term limits for ExCo members during the FIFA Congress of January 2013. UEFA also held the view that the Congress should not have the right to confirm Confederation candidates delegated to the ExCo and that integrity checks on candidates should not be performed by FIFA but by the Confederations.[15]

The Scala proposal has a slightly different take on the role of the Member Associations and the Confederations, especially with regard to the election to the ExCo: “all members of the FIFA Executive Committee (are) to be directly elected by the FIFA Congress. The Confederations will retain a right to propose candidates.”[16] Furthermore, “Confederations and FIFA Member Associations have to issue adequate ethics and disciplinary regulations and set up the bodies required to implement them. All persons assigned to FIFA bodies have to pass strict integrity checks in their respective Confederations and national associations.”[17] Lastly, there has to be an obligation for Confederations and Member Associations “to establish integrity checks with regard to positions in their top governing bodies as a precondition for eligibility”.[18]

A conclusion that can be drawn from the Scala reform plan is that it assumes the same governance problems highlighted in the IGC reports, especially as regards the ExCo, but suggest more far-reaching proposals. Improving the governance of the ExCo cannot simply be achieved by introducing term limits and integrity checks at FIFA level, rather similar reforms must be introduced in the Confederations and in the National Associations. This would require that the Confederations and National Associations put in place credible integrity self-checks. Yet, it is clear from the recent past that the Confederations are not willing to implement this type of accountability mechanisms, nor are they really committed to giving them the necessary teeth. 


Conclusion: Can the Scala reform plan be implemented?

The Scala report offers a newish take on old recipes to solve FIFA’s bad governance syndrome. Nearly all of the reforms proposed require amending the FIFA Statutes. For example, “the passing of the integrity check and the introduction of equivalent integrity checks by Confederations and Member Associations to qualify for elections to FIFA governing bodies need to be included in the FIFA Statutes and therefore need to be adopted by the Congress”.[19] Similarly, “direct elections of members of the FIFA Executive Committee mandatorily needs to be provided for in the FIFA Statutes; corresponding revisions would therefore have to be approved by the FIFA Congress”.[20] In accordance with Article 26(6) of the FIFA Statutes, for a proposal to adopt or amend the Statutes, a simple majority (more than 50%) of the valid votes cast is required. Procedurally, implementing the reforms proposed by Scala is straightforward: a simple majority of the votes at a FIFA Congress (the next one being on 26 February 2016) is needed.

However, achieving a simple majority might not be as simple as that. Introducing term limits, for example, would mean that many of the Members voting for this measure would create an “expiration date” for a job they have held for years (decades even in many cases) and do not want to lose. One only needs to remember the fact that during the FIFA Congress of January 2013, the Members of UEFA voted unanimously against the introduction of term limits for ExCo members.

Introducing integrity checks at FIFA level is one thing, but having similar checks at the Confederation and/or National level would imply that the people voting at the FIFA Congress would introduce integrity checks against themselves. In any normal global organisation this should not be a problem. However, as regards the governance of football, in light of the never-ending list of scandals, one can easily understand why many members would prefer not to see such integrity checks taking place in their backyard.

Scala attacks the ‘old boys’ networks’ within the ExCo, the Confederations and the Member Associations.[21] Similarly, the IGC held that “the ultimate success of the reform depends on a change in culture on all levels of the organization, especially with the key opinion leaders who need to lead by example and act in the interest of FIFA and football overall”.[22] Changing FIFA is not only about pushing a reform measure through the FIFA Congress, already an extremely difficult endeavour, it is also about changing a culture of omerta and corruption that has been around since the organisation’s earliest days, and to which the key players want to cling on as long as possible. Whether this can be done from inside the organization is doubtful. Instead, only the pressure of the public and the external legal control exercised by national (and European) authorities will force the great leaders of the beautiful game to bend and finally put in place mechanisms securing their accountability.



[1] Article 25(2)q) of the FIFA Statutes (2015 Edition) – available at http://resources.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/generic/02/58/14/48/2015fifastatutesen_neutral.pdf.

[2] Article 20(3)g) of the FIFA Statutes.

[3] Article 30 of the FIFA Statutes

[4] Articles 30 and 31 of the FIFA Statutes

[5] Article 34(3) of the FIFA Statutes. This provision also stipulates that the members of the Audit and Compliance Committee are elected by the FIFA Congress.

[6] Article 35 of the FIFA Statutes.

[7] Governing FIFA – Concept Paper and Report, 19 September 2011, page 13.

[8] “Substantiation of the Reform Proposals Presented at the FIFA Executive Committee Meeting of 20 July 2015”, Reports submitted to the FIFA Executive Committee by the independent Chairman of the FIFA Audit and Compliance Committee, page 4.

[9] For more information on the Chuck Blazer case, read our previous Blog post.

[10] “Governing FIFA”, Concept Paper and Report, 19 September 2011, pages 23-25.

[11] “FIFA Governance Reform Project”, Final Report by the Independent Governance Committee to the Executive Committee of FIFA, page 12.

[12] Ibid, pages 11-12.

[13] “FIFA Governance Reform Project”, First Report by the Independent Governance Committee to the Executive Committee of FIFA, page 9.

[14] Supra 11, page 12.

[15] Ibid, page 10

[16] Supra 8, page 26.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Ibid, page 25.

[19] Ibid, page 8.

[20] Ibid, page 11.

[21] Ibid, page 4.

[22] Supra 11, page 11

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Asser International Sports Law Blog | The 2014 Dortmund judgment: what potential for a follow-on class action? By Zygimantas Juska

Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

The 2014 Dortmund judgment: what potential for a follow-on class action? By Zygimantas Juska

Class actions are among the most powerful legal tools available in the US to enforce competition rules. With more than 75 years of experience, the American system offers valuable lessons about the benefits and drawbacks of class actions for private enforcement in competition law. Once believed of as only a US phenomenon, class actions are slowly becoming reality in the EU. After the adoption of the Directive on damages actions in November 2014, the legislative initiative in collective redress (which could prescribe a form of class actions) is expected in 2017.[1] Some pro-active Member States have already taken steps to introduce class actions in some fashion, like, for example, Germany.

What is a class action? It is a lawsuit that allows many similar legal claims with a common interest to be bundled into a single court action. Class actions facilitate access to justice for potential claimants, strengthen the negotiating power and contribute to the efficient administration of justice. This legal mechanism ensures a possibility to claim cessation of illegal behavior (injunctive relief) or to claim compensation for damage suffered (compensatory relief).   


Class actions in antitrust and the sport sector

Throughout the years, US class actions have become an important tool to strengthen good governance in the sports sector. Due to alleged antitrust infringements, US sports organizations have been hit with a series of class action lawsuits.  The most recent and the most prominent example is the antitrust class action lawsuit O'Bannon v. NCAA. On 8 August 2014, the US District Court ruled in favour of former UCLA basketball player O'Bannon and 19 others, declaring that the National Collegiate Athletic Associations’ (NCAA) longstanding refusal to compensate athletes for the use of their name, image and likenesses (NILs) violates US antitrust laws. Previously, the college sports governing body required student-athletes  to sign ‘Form 08-3a’  in which they authorize the NCAA to use their “name or picture to generally promote NCAA championships or other NCAA events, activities or programs”, without receiving compensation. If the NCAA loses the appeal, it must allow schools to give athletes some of the money they bring in by licensing their NIL. For further discussion on the O’Bannon case, see my previous blog.

In the EU, however, antitrust class actions remain an underrated remedial option in EU competition policy and the sports sector (the same is true for competition law in general). As is well known, sports federations often have practical monopolies within certain markets. In particular, due to the substantial economic revenues of these markets, sports federations have the tendency to abuse their dominant position in contradiction with Article 102 TFEU. It is not unthinkable that the positive experiences with class actions in the US may serve as an inspiration for victims in the EU to go against powerful sports organizations. Here, useful insights may be derived from the German Handball case, which can be used as an example to explore the potential of class actions as a remedy. On 15 May 2014, German Bundesliga teams (30 of them) won the antitrust case against the International Handball Federation (IHF) and the German Handball Federation (DHB) at the regional court of Dortmund (Landgericht). For further discussion on the 2014 Dortmund judgment, see here.  


The 2014 Dortmund judgment: A comparative analysis with the O’Bannon case

The Court in Dortmund held that an obligatory release system of players for activities of their respective national teams without compensation constitutes an abuse of a dominant position prohibited by German competition law (§ 19 Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen, GWB) and Article 102 TFEU, while it also breaches the principle of good faith in contractual performance.[2] Until the judgment, German Bundesliga clubs had no other way but to release their players if they were invited to join their national team within the international calendar. According to the IHF Player Eligibility Code, “a club having a foreign player under contract is obliged to release such player to his National Federation if he is called up to take part in activities of that federation's national team” (Article 7.1.2). Furthermore, a club releasing a national player was not entitled to receive any kind of compensation and in the event of personal injury the insurance coverage was not provided (Articles 7.2-7.3). After the judgment, the IHF and the DHB should pay a fair compensation for the time of the release of the player.  

On the one hand, both cases have striking similarities. The judgments concern antitrust infringements by powerful sports federations, the IHF (also the DHB) and the NCAA respectively. Professional clubs / student athletes in both cases are not entitled to compensation due to the rules that have been set by sports organizations. The German case concerns the obligation for professional clubs to release players to national team events without receiving compensation, while the US case concerns the prohibition for student athletes to receive compensation from NIL.

On the other hand, although both cases concern antitrust infringements by the sports organizations, they also have vital differences. Most importantly, the O'Bannon case is an antitrust class action lawsuit filed against the NCAA. This class action proved to be a powerful instrument that managed to jeopardize the long-standing fundamental principle of amateurism on which the whole economic and social system of the NCAA lies. Until now, however, the 2014 Dortmund judgment has been an ordinary litigation according to German law. However, it does share some similarities with O’bannon that may justify a class action in the form of an injunctive relief (at least, in the first instance), subject to some exceptions.  


Indirect class action for an injunction

What is injunctive relief in class action cases? According to the European Commission, the courts should treat claims for injunctive orders requiring cessation of or prohibiting a violation of rights granted under EU law in order to prevent any or further harm causing damages.[3] According to the German law, in case of danger of recurrence, the infringer has to refrain from his conduct.[4] Perhaps surprisingly, the 2014 Dortmund judgment already fulfils the conditions for an indirect class action for an injunction.

First, a group of claimants (a total of 30 Bundesliga clubs) sued the IHF and the DHB before the regional court of Dortmund. They argued (together) that mandatory release of players to the national team constitutes an abuse of a dominant position prohibited by EU and German competition law. The Dortmund court ruled in favour of the handball clubs. It seems that handball clubs only seek the cessation of the unlawful practice, yet they have not claimed the compensatory relief, aimed at obtaining compensation for damage suffered.  

Second, the claim has been initiated by victims of antitrust infringement. Under the GWB, victims are allowed to bring private actions for injunctive relief in 101 and 102 TFEU infringement cases (Sec. 33).

Third, the Forum Club Handball (FCH) financially supported the court case. This may appear as third-party financing since the financial support was provided by a private third party who is not a party to the proceedings.[5] 

Although the handball clubs dropped a quiet collective bombshell, the action cannot be considered as a real class action. Simply, there was no intention to pursue a class action. Another point is that the legal standing to bring the representative action has been limited to a law firm. In Germany, collective antitrust action can be brought by a body, which has a legal standing and to whom the claims of victims of a cartel have been assigned (Sec. 33 (2) GWB). Similarly, under Sec. 8 of the German Unfair Competition Act (UWG), the claims can be sought by: a) competitor; b) qualified entities listed with the Federal Office of Justice or, in case of foreign entities, with the European Commission; and (c) by Chambers of Industry and Commerce or Craft Chambers. For these reasons, the action brought by the clubs cannot be classified as a class action, because they have chosen to be represented by an attorney. It is not unthinkable that eventually the case will appear before the court as a follow-on compensatory class action, if the IHF and the DHB lose the appeal (if necessary, the proceedings before the Court of Justice).   


Compensatory class action: why it could be a big deal?

If the handball clubs achieve an injunction in the final Court decision, the follow-on representative action for damages may be brought against the IHF and the DHB. Some provisions in German law facilitate the incentives to bring damages claims for antitrust infringements. According to Sec. 33(4) GWB, antitrust class actions should be brought after a final decision of a public authority finding there has been a violation of competition law. Furthermore, the 8th Amendment of GWB broadens the scope of the legal standing in such a way that all associations of undertakings that are affected by an infringement, as well as consumer associations, are in principle able to claim the enforcement of German competition law in courts (including by demanding damages). Yet it appears that the UWG provisions are not applicable in this case. Under Sec. 8 available remedies allow to pursue only injunctive relief. Under Sec. 9 damages are claimed by competitors (only). Sec. 10 aims at skimming off profits (paid to the Treasury), but not at compensating victims. Due to the fact that illegal profits go to the Treasury in successful cases, the handball clubs would potentially not be happy with the expected outcome.

If the IHF and the DHB lose the appeal, the handball clubs can to a significant extent rely on the final decision. Considering that an indirect form of collective action has already been pursued by the handball clubs in the first instance, a common consent of the parties involved in the case (the major condition for class action) can be easily achieved. Still, the major concern is to solve the issue of legal standing. An actual example of class action that goes with the grain of the German law and is the Cement Cartel Case, in which 28 damaged companies purchased the cartel-related claim to Cartel Damage Claims group (CDC).[6] It is a Brussels based professional litigation that turns burdensome claims into valuable assets, taking the hassle of quantification and subsequent enforcement. The substantiation of the claim is based on evidence gathered from the cartel proceedings and the damaged companies.  In the context of the German handball case, CDC could commence the acquisition of damages claims from handball clubs and then file the collective antitrust damages action against the IHF and the DHB. This is in line with the Sec. 33 GWB under which CDC has legal standing and to whom the claims under Art. 101 and 102 TFEU have been assigned. An action brought by CDC is attractive to the handball clubs because it would strengthen the negotiating power and would reduce litigation costs, as the claim is led (or even purchased) by CDC.  

If the conditions for the admissibility of class action are fulfilled, the IHF and the DHB should fear potential damages. In particular as a result of the inconsistent application of the Player Eligibility Code, the claimants are in a favourable position. Despite the fact that the Code states that “a club releasing a national player shall not have any claim to compensation”, the IHF agreed to pay compensation to the clubs for the release of their players to the national team during the 2011 and 2013 World Championships. To make matters even worse, the IHF provided insurance for the players’ salaries in case of personal injury (contrary to the Article 7.3.2).[7] This suggests that in principle a compensation and insurance coverage are compatible with the Eligibility Code and thereby the interests of the IHF are not jeopardized. The perceived inconsistency provides more clout to the claimants, suggesting that the harm has already been presumed. If the plaintiffs achieve an injunction in Court, they potentially may claim broad compensation, including other undisputed World Championships[8], the Olympic Games, continental championships as well as the qualification matches and tournaments for these events. However, it is even not the worst potential outcome for the IHF. Indeed, due to the Court of Justice (CJEU) decision in Case C-302/13 flyLAL-Lithuanian Airlines, potentially all handball clubs from EU Member States can claim damages from the IHF, if they are part of the federation. In that case, the Latvian Supreme Court sent a request for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU, asking whether a Lithuanian court judgment ordering provisional measures in a damages case can be recognized and enforced in Latvia. The CJEU ruled that actions brought by undertakings seeking redress or compensation for damage resulting from alleged infringements of EU competition law, can be qualified as a ‘civil and commercial matter’, within the meaning of Article 1(1) of Regulation No 44/2001, and enforceable in Latvia under the provisions of the said regulation. Thus, the CJEU opened a wealth of opportunities for handball clubs (if the final decision in Germany is successful) to claim damages wherever they are based on the EU’s territory. Given that follow-on damages claims have a high success rate, the winning chances are high. Hence, since the common legal and factual features of each individual claim are observed, the class action would be an effective instrument to obtain redress, also adding to the deterrence goals.


Compensatory class actions: a powerful instrument to ensure better governance in sport (federations)?

If the German handball clubs bring a compensatory class action, it has the potential to become an important precedent for many other sports. One successful case may open a Pandora’s Box that would put a lot of pressure on the sports federations’ regulations.  

By forming the group, claimants (such as handball clubs) are able to bundle individual claims and thus trigger efficiency gains by tackling common legal, factual and economic issues collectively.[9] As such, the defendants can handle the risks attached to private litigation and the probability of winning the case increases since multiple plaintiffs have larger financial means. Therefore, a group of claimants having larger financial means can employ more qualified lawyers and economic experts for antitrust cases. A package of collected claims from victims are easier introduced and defended before the court, meaning that damages are proved with sufficiently high probability and thus the chance of receiving compensation is high. When focussing on sanctions, class actions appear to deter abusive conduct, therefore strengthening good governance in sport. If all victims can sue a sports federation, the group will force the infringer to internalize the negative effects of the damage caused as close as possible to the full-compensation principle that is embedded in the EU reform on private enforcement.[10] Sport entities, knowing that class actions may be used against them and anticipating that the expected cost of the infringement may increase significantly, would think twice before violating the competition rules. The achievement of better governance would solve, or at least diminish, the problem of under-enforcement of EU competition rules in the sports sector. Even if the handball case does not result in an antitrust class action, victims from other sports should pay particular attention to such a fruitful litigation model.



[1] It was adopted Commission Recommendation of 11 June 2013 on common principles for collective redress mechanisms in the Member States for injunctions against and claims on damages caused by violations of EU rights, COM (2013) 3539/3, 11.6.2013 (‘Recommendation’).

[2] German Civil Code, Section 242 (“An obligor has a duty to perform according to the requirements of good faith, taking customary practice into consideration”).

[3] Recommendation COM (2013) 3539/3, sec. 19. In the area of injunctive relief, the European Parliament and the Council have already adopted Directive [2009/22/EC OJ L 110, 1.05.2009]  on injunctions for the protection of consumers' interests

[4] GWB, sec. 33.

[5] Recommendation COM (2013) 3539/3, Sec 14-16.

[6] http://www.carteldamageclaims.com/portfolios/cdc-german-cement-cartel/. On 17 December 2013 the Regional Court of Düsseldorf dismissed the action in its entirety [Case No. 37 O 200/09]. CDC has appealed the judgment to the Higher Regional Court in Düsseldorf.

[7]See http://www.forumclubhandball.com/?p=707 and http://www.forumclubhandball.com/?p=707. The outcome had been reached after the negotiations with the FCH in 2010-2011.

[8] The IHF decided to pay compensation for the release of players to the 2011 and 2013 World Championships.

[9] Z. Juska, ‘Obstacles in European Competition Law Enforcement: A Potential Solution from Collective Redress’ (2014) 7 EJLS, 149.

[10] Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union’ COM (2013) 404 final, 11.6.2013

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