It’s been a long wait, but they’re finally here! On Monday, the European Commission released its decisions regarding State aid to seven Spanish professional football clubs (Real Madrid on two occasions) and five Dutch professional football clubs. The decisions mark the end of the formal investigations, which were opened in 2013. The Commission decided as follows: no State aid to PSV Eindhoven (1); compatible aid to the Dutch clubs FC Den Bosch, MVV Maastricht, NEC Nijmegen and Willem II (2); and incompatible aid granted to the Spanish football clubs Real Madrid, FC Barcelona, Valencia CF, Athletic Bilbao, Atlético Osasuna, Elche and Hércules (3). 

The recovery decisions in particular are truly historic. The rules on State aid have existed since the foundation of the European Economic Community in 1958, but it is the very first time that professional football clubs have been ordered to repay aid received from (local) public authorities.[1] In a way, these decisions complete a development set in motion with the Walrave and Koch ruling of 1974, where the CJEU held that professional sporting activity, and therefore also football, is subject to EU law. The landmark Bosman case of 1995 proved to be of great significance as regards free movement of (professional) athletes and the Meca-Medina case of 2006 settled that EU competition rules were equally applicable to the regulatory activity of sport. The fact that the first ever State aid recovery decision concerns major clubs like Real Madrid, FC Barcelona and Valencia, give the decisions extra bite. Therefore, this blog post will focus primarily on the negative/recovery decisions[2], their consequences and the legal remedies available to the parties involved.[3]

The launch of the formal investigations

The three Commission decisions to launch formal State aid investigations into alleged aid granted to Spanish professional football clubs were all made public on 18 December 2013. The first investigation concerned “possible privileges regarding corporate taxation of Real Madrid, FC Barcelona, Athletic Bilbao, and Atlético Osasuna. These four clubs are exempted from the general obligation for professional football clubs to convert into sport limited companies. The effect of this exemption is that these clubs enjoy a preferential corporate tax rate of 25% instead of 30% applicable to sport limited companies.” The second investigation involved Real Madrid specifically, and was opened after the Commission expressed its doubts over “a very advantageous real property swap with the City of Madrid. This swap was based on a re-evaluation of a plot of land at a value of €22.7 million, instead of its earlier supposed value in 1998 of €595 thousand”. The third investigation dealt with three clubs from the autonomous region of Valencia: Valencia CF, Elche FC and Hércules CF. In this case, the Commission decided to investigate State guarantees by the Valencia Institute of Finance for a bank loans of (1) €75 million to Valencia CF; (2) €14 million to Elche CF; and (3) €18 million to Hércules CF. The Real Madrid real property swap case and the Valencia CF case have previously been analyzed on this blog (here, here and here).[4]

Purely based on the decisions to open formal investigations, there was little doubt as to whether the criteria of Article 107(1) were fulfilled[5]: The football clubs in question received a selective economic advantage deriving from a measure taken by public authorities and which involved a transfer of State resources. This advantage has affected trade and threatens to distort the internal market. What remained unclear was whether the Member States could convince the Commission to declare the State aid compatible under Article 107(3)c) TFEU,[6] and, if not, how high the recovery would be. The complexity of the Real Madrid case in particular led to uncertainty as to whether a possible recovery decision would merely imply Real Madrid having to pay a lump sum to the city of Madrid, or whether one or more land transactions would have to be undone.[7]

Last but not least, it should be kept in mind that ordering recovery of State aid is a politically sensitive decision. Given that State aid investigations are always directed at the Member State (with limited room for interested party intervention, including the beneficiary), such proceedings are inherently political. Furthermore, from analyzing Commission speeches and policy documents, such as the recently published Report on Competition Policy 2015, one will reach the conclusion that actively enforcing EU competition law, including State aid law, in sport, is not a Commission priority. Any recovery decision in the professional sport sector, therefore, would need to serve as a blueprint for future cases: it should prevent other public authorities to grant State aid to professional sport clubs in contravention of State aid rules. 

The Commission’s press release ordering the State aid recovery

Though the press release does not provide all the facts, it includes many interesting elements. First of all, the privileges regarding corporate taxation of Real Madrid, FC Barcelona, Athletic Bilbao, and Atlético Osasuna were found to be incompatible State aid, and each club has to repay between €0 and €5 million depending on what the Spanish authorities determine in the recovery process. The press release further states that Spain adjusted its legislation on corporate taxation to end this discriminatory treatment. This last point is especially important, because it demonstrates that the “bite” of State aid could exceed a mere recovery order. Simply opening a formal investigation into this issue has made the Spanish authorities reconsider its corporate taxation and adjust it accordingly to prevent future State aid being granted. Moreover, tackling unfair corporate tax advantages has been a priority for the Commission for the last few years.[8]

As regards Real Madrid’s advantageous real property swap with the City of Madrid, the Commission concluded that the football club was only entitled to a compensation of €4.3 million, so that Real Madrid obtained an advantage of €18.4 million. In other words, the city of Madrid needs to recover €18.4 million from Real Madrid. Although this calculation seems rather straightforward, it should be noted that the press release only refers to the re-valuation of one of the lands transferred. This means that only one land transaction was found to be incompatible with EU State aid rules, while all the land transactions remain valid.

In the third and final decision the Commission determined that Valencia, Hércules and Elche will need to repay €20.4 million, €6.1 million and €3.7 million respectively. The Commission acknowledged that the three clubs were in financial difficulties when the public institution Valencia Institute of Finance, placed a public guarantee on bank loans provided to the football clubs, but did not find this difficulties sufficiently severe to declare the aid compatible with the internal market.[9] The fact that the clubs paid no adequate remuneration for the guarantees, and that the State financing was not linked to any restructuring plan, made the Commission decide to order the recovery of that aid. The arguments brought forward by the Spanish authorities defending the State aid measure will not be known until the non-confidential version of the decision is published in a few months. What we do know is that at the time the formal investigation was launched in December 2013, the Spanish authorities had not communicated any restructuring or liquidation plan to the Commission, nor were any of the conditions met for authorizing restructuring aid under the Community Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty, even though the three clubs were in severe financial difficulties.[10]  

The consequences of the negative and recovery decisions

It is important to make a distinction between negative decisions and recovery decisions.[11] They are, in fact, two separate decisions. As can be read in Articles 9(5) and 16(1) of the State Aid Procedural Regulations 2015/1589, the negative decision precedes the recovery decision. Under a negative decision, the Commission decides that the aid shall not be put into effect for not being compatible with the internal market. Any plans to grant future State aid under that measure will automatically be halted. The recovery decision can only be granted if the aid, or part of the aid, has been granted in the past, such as in the cases at hand.[12] The decision orders the Member State concerned to take all necessary measures to recover the aid from the beneficiary.[13] As can be read in the Commission’s Recovery Notice, the main objective of the recovery order is to re-establish the situation existing before the aid was unlawfully granted.[14] The recovery, which is subject to a limitation period of 10 years[15], “shall be effected without delay and in accordance with the procedures under the national law of the Member State concerned”.[16]  This means that it is up to Spain to decide on the procedure of how and when it recovers the aid, in accordance with its own national law.

Since the negative and recovery decisions are addressed to Spain, it may institute proceedings against the negative decision and/or the recovery decision, pursuant to Article 263 TFEU. The Spanish central government has not yet announced its position regarding the decisions or whether it plans to launch an appeal. The city of Madrid and the autonomous region of Valencia on the other hand, have both declared that they wish to recuperate the State aid granted to the respective football clubs.[17] Article 263 TFEU also allows any natural or legal person to challenge a Commission decision that is of direct and individual concern to them. In other words, now that for example Real Madrid is ordered to repay €18.4 million to Spain, it is directly affected by the recovery decision and has already publicly stated that it will initiate proceedings against the Commission.

The General Court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine at first instance actions referred to in Article 263 TFEU. A decision by the General Court may be subject to a right of appeal to the Court of Justice.[18] Contrary to the General Court, the Court of Justice could decide, under Article 278 TFEU, that the recovery order should be suspended.   

Conclusion

The negative and recovery decisions could have consequences for the relationship between the Spanish State (particularly local governments) and professional football. The practices now condemned by the European Commission are known to have been taking place for decades. A recently published report by Transparency International, for example, discusses how Spanish football clubs, in collaboration with the local governments, would turn to urban speculation with the objective of making easy money. The report used an agreement between the city of Murcia and its local football club Real Murcia as an example. The Real Madrid case, which is also about urban speculation, is another example of this standardized practice in Spain. The fact that the Commission orders recovery of aid from the richest and most successful club in Spain, should send a message to the smaller clubs and cities that urban/ land agreements between clubs and public authorities are not unconditionally accepted.

In addition, the decisions will especially be tough for Valencia, Hércules and Elche, three clubs known to be in financial difficulties already. Valencia has already announced that it “reserves the right to appeal to the European Court of Justice”, but one wonders whether it is worth the risk, considering the legal fees attached to such an appeal. On the other hand, the public authorities will realize that granting State aid to professional football clubs can bounce back hard, if it is not granted pursuant an objective of general interest and in a transparent manner. Furthermore, rescue aid, such as in Valencia, cannot be granted without implementing a restructuring plan at the same time. A proper restructuring plan will help limit the possibility of the club returning to financial difficulties in the future. Finally, clubs too must be aware that they must live “within their own means” and that they cannot always depend on local public institutions to bail them out of there financial troubles.   

[1] For the discussion on why there was (and still is) so little State aid enforcement in the professional sport/football sector, see Ben Van Rompuy and Oskar van Maren, “EU Control of State Aid to Professional Sport: Why Now?” In: “The Legacy of Bosman. Revisiting the relationship between EU law and sport”, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2016.

[2] The distinction between a negative decision and a recovery decision will be explained further below.

[3] A specific blog post on the State aid decision concerning the Dutch football clubs will be made shortly.

[4] For an even more detailed (factual) analysis of the Real Madrid case, see: Oskar van Maren, “The Real Madrid case: A State aid case (un)like any other?” 11 Competition Law Review 1:83-108.

[5] Even though Real Madrid has always insisted the real property swap was not economically advantageous, since the value of the real property was calculated in accordance with market conditions. Supra note 4.

[6] Under this provision, State aid that facilitates the development of certain activities or of certain economic areas, where such aid does not adversely affects trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest, may be considered compatible with the internal market.

[7] It is a matter of discussion whether the Real Madrid case concerns only the land transaction of July 2011, or whether a second land transaction of November 2011 should be included in the same investigation. Supra, note 4.

[8] Report from the Commission COM(2016) 313 of 15 June 2016 to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions – Report on Competition Policy 2015, pages 12-13.

[9] Contrary to the State aid granted to FC Den Bosch, MVV, Willem II and NEC, where the Commission determined that the aid was granted in line with the 2004 Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty.

[10] Commission decision of 18 December 2013 SA.36387 – Alleged aid in favour of three Valencia football clubs, para.44.

[11] A third option, as stipulated in Article 9(3) of the State aid Procedural Regulation, is the positive decision. This is a decision where the Commission decides that the aid is compatible with the internal market. The decision allowing the aid to the Dutch clubs is an example of a positive decision. Challenging a positive decision under Article 263 TFEU is also possible for the Member State concerned, should it wish to do so.

[12] The aid is, for example, not granted yet when the Member State simply notifies the Commission of its plan grant State aid. Should the Commission declare the plan to grant State aid incompatible with the internal market, then there will be no need to order recovery as well.

[13] The Commission, however, can decide against a recovery order if it believes that such a recovery would be contrary to a principle of Union law. This gives the Commission the possibility to declare a State aid measure incompatible with EU law on the one hand, but not order recovery of that aid on the other.

[14] Notice from the Commission (2007/C 272/05) of 15 November 2007 Towards an effective implementation of Commission decisions ordering Member States to recover unlawful and incompatible State aid, point 2.2.

[15] Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 of 13 July 2015 laying down detailed rules fort the application of Article 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 17(1).

[16] Ibid., Article 16(3).

[17] It is worth mentioning that at the time the State aid was granted, the Spanish Conservative Party, PP, was in power in Madrid as well as in the autonomous region of Valencia. These two local governments are nowadays formed by opposition parties. On the other hand, the PP is still the biggest political party at national level.

[18] Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union C 326/47 of 26 October 2010, Article 256(1).

The UEFA Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play Regulations have been implemented by UEFA since the season 2011/12 with the aim of encouraging responsible spending by clubs for the long-term benefit of football. However, the enforcement of the break-even requirement as defined in Articles 62 and 63 of the Regulations (arguably the most important rules of FFP) has only started this year. Furthermore, UEFA introduced recently amendments to the Procedural rules governing the Club Financial Control Body (CFCB) allowing settlement agreements to be made between the clubs and the CFCB.  

On Friday 16 May, UEFA finally published the nine separate settlement agreements between the respective clubs and the CFCB regarding the non-compliance with the Financial Fair Play (FFP) break-even requirements. The nine agreements are summarized in the table below:  

Tablewiththeninesettlementagreements.jpg (325.3KB)

Interestingly enough, unlike the other clubs, Manchester City, who had a deficit of €180m in the past two seasons, agreed with the CFCB to have a maximum deficit obligation imposed on them this season already. According to the statement on their website, they are on course to financially break-even by 31 May 2014: “rather than having an accumulative allowance of €30m of losses over the next two reporting years, Manchester City will have specific stipulated allowances for 2013/14 and 2014/15 of €20m and €10m respectively.  Significantly, Manchester City plans to be profitable in 2014/15 and in the years that follow.” 

Official statements by the other clubs express a similar view that the imposed sanctions will not bear negative consequences. For example, PSG got caught by the FFP Regulations due to the overvaluation of the sponsorship deal with QTA. [1] The financial numbers for other clubs are a very well kept secret, in practice it would be highly relevant to know why some clubs had to settle for €60m, others for €12m (FC Zenit), and some for only €200K. Thus, it is of paramount importance that UEFA be transparent and releases the full reasoning and facts leading up to the specifics of the settlements. 

The nine settlement agreements provide for more open questions than answers. For example, why can FC Zenit register up to 22 players for UEFA competitions for 2014/15, when Manchester City, PSG, FC Anzhi and Rubin Kazan are only allowed to register 21?  

Unless a third party decides to challenge the agreements in accordance with Article 16 (2) of the Procedural rules governing the CFCB[2], which is highly unlikely at this stage, we will not get to know more about the reasoning and the factual circumstances of the different cases. Furthermore, we will need to wait for at least another year to get the chance to have the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) pronounce itself on the break-even requirement and the new settlement procedure. Taking into account that the clubs concerned do not appear to be substantially affected by the sanctions, it remains very much unclear whether UEFA’s aim of encouraging responsible spending by clubs for the long-term benefit of football is achieved by the break-even requirement and more particularly by these settlements.

[1] Article 61 (2) of UEFA Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play Regulations states that the acceptable deviation is €5m

[2] Article 16.2. of the Procedural rules governing the UEFA Club Financial Control Body, edition 2014 foresees that: “Any decision of the CFCB chief investigator to conclude a settlement agreement or to apply disciplinary measures within the meaning of Article 14(1) (c) may be reviewed by the adjudicatory chamber at the request of a directly affected party within ten days from the date of publication of the decision.”

Since the landing on the sporting earth of the Übermensch, aka Usain Bolt, Jamaica has been at the centre of doping-related suspicions. Recently, it has been fueling those suspicions with its home-made scandal around the Jamaica Anti-Doping Commission (JADCO). The former executive of JADCO, Renee Anne Shirley, heavily criticized its functioning in August 2013, and Jamaica has been since then in the eye of the doping cyclone.

In light of the reluctance of Jamaica to remedy the failures of JADCO, the World Ani-Doping Agency (WADA) ordered a formal review of the anti-doping practices on the Island. In case of a negative report, WADA would have declared Jamaica non-compliant, this would in turn trigger sanctions by Sport Governing Bodies, in extreme cases even a full ban from major international events (Olympic Games or World Cups). In order to avoid such a dire fate the sporting Minister of Jamaica and the head of WADA met on November 2013 and a reform plan for the Jamaican anti-doping organisations was agreed. The minister accepted to undertake a legislative review of anti-doping law in Jamaica and to evaluate JADCO’s governance and management structure. Furthermore, the Jamaican government allocated new funds to the fight against doping. In short, JADCO is being restructured, this is very much a work in progress, but WADA is strongly backing the reforms so far.

Furthermore, in 2013, Jamaican track and field athletes have been hit by a strange string of positive doping cases: Asafa Powell, Sherone Simpson, Veronique Campbell-Brown, Allison Randall,  Damar Robinson, and (in 2012) Dominique Blake. All those cases lead to sporting bans of various lengths by Jamaica Athletics Administrative Association’s  (JAAA) Disciplinary Panel. However, even the Jamaican doping justice is scrambling, the probity of some judges have been doubted and calls to reverse the bans in the cases of Asafa Powell and Sherone Simpson have been heard. Anyhow, the cases will probably end up in front of CAS.

Before CAS, the weaknesses of the Jamaican anti-doping system became overt in the Campbell-Brown case. Indeed, in that case, the JADCO acknowledged that it had been, as a matter of policy choice, constantly ignoring the WADA International Standards for Testing. Thus, CAS was prompt to assert that “systematic and knowing failure, for which no reasonable explanation has been advanced, is deplorable and gives rise to the most serious concerns about the overall integrity of the JAAA’s anti-doping processes, as exemplified in this case by the flaws in JADCO’s sample collection and its documentation” (§182). Consequently, the ban on Veronique Campbell-Brown was lifted. Additionally, in a recent decision (2 May 2014) in the Dominique Blake case, CAS reduced the 6-year ban to 4,5 years because, among other reasons, “she was provided with barely any anti-doping education” and “she has only had one previous experience with doping control (when she was 19 years-old)”.

What kind of lessons does the fiasco of the anti-doping system in Jamaica holds for the whole World Anti-Doping edifice? Well, first, that the local level matters a lot. Indeed, if local authorities are inefficient and/or unwilling to address the various dimensions (education, compliance, enforcement) of the anti-doping fight, the WADA and its rules lose relevance. This might engender loopholes in the global anti-doping regime, thus creating discrepancies between athletes. Indeed, some might be very strictly monitored due to their residence being in a complying country, while others will systematically escape any control or punishment due to insufficient procedural standards. Hence, for the WADA Regime to be successful in reining in doping and ensuring a level playing field for athletes, WADA must urgently warrant that enforcement asymmetries are avoided.

This year’s FIFA congress in Sao Paulo should not be remembered only for the controversy surrounding the bid for the World Cup 2022 in Qatar. The controversy was surely at the centre of the media coverage, but in its shadow more long-lasting decisions were taken. For example, the new Regulations on Working with Intermediaries was approved, which is probably the most important recent change to FIFA regulations. These new Regulations will supersede the Regulations on Players’ Agents when they come into force on 1 April 2015. In this blog post we compare the old and the new Regulations followed by a short analysis and prospective view on the effects this change could have. 

The Road to the New Regulations

Players’ agents, or “intermediaries” should we use FIFA’s new terminology, provide their services to football players and clubs to conclude employment contracts and transfer agreements. FIFA has been regulating this activity since it introduced the first Regulations on players’ agents on 1 January 1996. Even though the Regulations were amended several times since then, it is only during the last five years that a permanent consultation process was put in place. According to a FIFA press release, the consultation process involved member associations, confederations, clubs, FIFPro and professional football leagues. Surprisingly however, the press release does not mention whether agent stakeholders, such as Pro Agent were also consulted. The ultimate objective of these consultations was to propose a new system that is more transparent and simpler in its implementation and administration.[1] At the beginning of 2013, a Sub-Committee for Club Football was set up to deal exclusively with the issue of reforming the Players’ Agents Regulations. Later on that year the Committee presented a draft for the FIFA Congress 2013 based on the following three findings:

1. The current licensing system should be abandoned

2. A set of minimum standards and requirements  must be established in FIFA’s future regulatory framework

3. A registration for intermediaries must be set up [2]

The draft Regulations were finally approved by the FIFA Executive Committee on 21 March 2014 and by the FIFA Congress on 11 June 2014. Furthermore, the three objectives outlined are supposedly reflected in the new Regulations.  

A Rough Comparison of the Old and New Agents/Intermediaries Regulations

In the following flowcharts we have summarized the key requirements enshrined in both the old and the new agents/intermediaries FIFA regulations. This provides a clear comparison of the differences and similarities existing between the two regulatory frameworks.

Flowchart: Becoming an Agent under the Old FIFA Regulations
FlowchartRegulationsPlayers'Agents.jpg (179.7KB) 

Flowchart: Becoming an Intermediary under the New FIFA Regulations
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By abandoning the old licensing system, the procedure to become an intermediary becomes much simpler than before. The applicant does not have to undergo an examination by FIFA anymore, nor does he need to conclude a professional liability insurance in his own name or provide a bank guarantee from a Swiss bank for a minimum amount of CHF 100,000. Furthermore, in contrast to the old Regulations, legal persons can now also act as intermediaries. Thus, in the near future we can expect players such as Cristiano Ronaldo, Radamel Falcao and coach Jose Mourinho to be represented by the agents’ company GestiFute rather than simply the agent Jorge Mendes. 

However, it should be noted that FIFA’s new Regulations on Working with Intermediaries are to be considered as minimum standards or requirements. In accordance with Art. 1(3), the right of associations to go beyond these minimum standards/requirements is preserved. In other words, national associations can set higher thresholds for becoming an intermediary should they wish for. In order to better understand the practical reality of the regulation of agents it is therefore necessary to analyse to what extent different associations set different standards and requirements.  

Registration

Under the new Regulations, the national associations will still be responsible for adopting a registration system regarding the intermediaries. However, several important changes between the old and the new Regulations can be deciphered, including the contractual terms between the intermediary and the player/club and the remuneration terms.  

Contractual terms

Under the old Regulations, the representation contract between the agent and the player and/or club would only be valid for a maximum period of two years. Moreover, the contract could be extended for another period of maximum two years (Art. 19(3) of the old Regulations). According to Art. 3 of the new Regulations, "intermediaries must be registered in the relevant registration system every time they are individually involved in a specific transaction". Players and clubs disclose all the details to the association when called upon. Thus, by allowing players not to be contractually bound to a specific intermediary for a specific period of time, the bargaining position of the player when engaging the services of an intermediary is likely to increase.

Remuneration terms

In both the old as well as in the new Regulations the amount of remuneration shall be calculated on the basis of the player’s basic gross income. [3] Nonetheless, where under the old Regulations the remuneration is calculated on the basis of the player’s annual income, under the new Regulations the remunerations is calculated on the basis of the player’s income for the entire duration of the contract. Moreover, as stipulated in Art. 7(3)a) of the new Regulations, the “total amount of remuneration per transaction due to intermediaries (…) should not exceed 3% of the player’s basic gross income for the entire duration of the contract”. Secondly, the new Regulations prohibit any payment to intermediaries when the player is a minor.[4] With the new provisions on remuneration FIFA hopes to avoid that intermediaries exploit players. Indeed, in many countries it is still common practice for players to (unknowingly) sign contracts with their agents forcing them to pay a much higher share of their income. This was perfectly possible under the old Regulations since it did not provide a remuneration limit due to the players’ agents and there was no prohibition regarding remuneration to the agent when the player is a minor and should be way more difficult under the new Regulations.

Conclusion
With the new Regulations FIFA attempts not to regulate access to the activity anymore, but instead to shape the practice itself: players and clubs are authorised to choose any parties as intermediaries and can change intermediary at any moment since they are not bound by a contract with the intermediary. Furthermore, with the remuneration limit of 3% of the player’s income FIFA aims to limit the risk of players being exploited by their intermediaries.

Even though FIFA has explicitly stated the new Regulations will not deregulate the profession, it seems that it is placing the main responsibility to regulate onto the national associations. Not only will all the national associations be required to introduce a registration system, but they are also responsible for enforcing the rules and for imposing sanctions in case the new Regulations are breached. As we have seen, when selecting an intermediary, players and clubs shall act with due diligence. However, the definition of the interpretation of the notion of due diligence is left open and could differ from country to country.

With the game of football becoming ever more globalised and with an ever increasing amount of international transfers of players, regulating the profession of agent/intermediary at the national level is becoming increasingly difficult. In this context, FIFA has adopted a surprising orientation by delegating the responsibility to regulate the profession to the national associations.

[1] http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/organisation/administration/news/newsid=2301236/

[2] http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/organisation/bodies/congress/news/newsid=2088917/

[3] The Regulations on Players’ Agents, Art. 20(1) and the Regulations on Players’ Agents, Art. 7(1)

[4] The Regulations on Players’ Agents, Art. 7(8)

In June 2014, two prominent Dutch speed skaters, Mark Tuitert (Olympic Champion 1500m) and Niels Kerstholt (World Champion short track), filed a competition law complaint against the International Skating Union (ISU) with the European Commission.

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Today, the European Commission announced that it has opened a formal antitrust investigation into International Skating Union (ISU) rules that permanently ban skaters from competitions such as the Winter Olympics and the ISU World and European Championships if they take part in events not organised or promoted by the ISU. The Commissioner for Competition, Margrethe Vestager, stated that the Commission "will investigate if such rules are being abused to enforce a monopoly over the organisation of sporting events or otherwise restrict competition. Athletes can only compete at the highest level for a limited number of years, so there must be good reasons for preventing them to take part in events."

Since the case originates from legal advice provided by the ASSER International Sports Law Centre, we thought it would be helpful to provide some clarifications on the background of the case and the main legal issues at stake. 

1. What are the events leading to the complaint? 

In December 2011, a private entity, Icederby International, informed the ISU of its intentions to start organising international speed skating events with an innovative competition format, combining long track and short track skating. At that time, Icerderby International was considering hosting betting activities on the races alongside the tracks. 

In January 2012, the ISU issued a revised Code of Ethics stipulating that persons subjected to the Code ought “to refrain from participating in all forms of betting or support betting or gambling related to any event/activity under the jurisdiction of the ISU”. 

In November 2013, Dubai is awarded the organisation of the World Expo 2020. Icederby International secured a contract to organise an annual speed skating event in Dubai as part of the programme leading up to the World Expo. The first Dubai Icederby Grand Prix Exhibition 2014 was to take place in October 2014. The organisers clarified that there would be no on-site betting activities during the planned Icederby events since betting activities are strictly prohibited in Dubai. 

In March 2014, the ISU nonetheless issued a statement (Communication No. 1853) saying that, because the competitions organised by Icederby International are “possibly being closely connected to betting”, they would not sanction them. The ISU also threatened that anyone participating in events organised by Icederby International would become persona non grata within the ISU. 

2. Persona non grata … what does that mean?  

According to the ISU Eligibility rules,[1] a person skating or officiating in an event not sanctioned by the ISU and/or its Members (i.e. the individual national associations) becomes ineligible to participate in ISU activities and competitions (Rule 102, para. 2 (ii)). This sanction applies not only to the skaters, but also to coaches, trainers, doctors, team attendants, team officials, judges, referees, volunteers, and anyone else engaging in a relation with the ISU.  

A person who is or has been ineligible may be reinstated as an eligible person (Rule 103, para. 1). However, this does not apply to a skater that participated in a non-sanctioned event (Rule 103, para. 2). In other words, once a skater participates in an event not organised or promoted by the ISU, he or she is banned for life from participating in the Winter Olympic Games or any of the ISU events such as the World and European Championships. In practice this would put an end to the athlete’s sporting career. 

3. Why is the ISU allegedly violating the EU competition rules? 

The complainants contend that the ISU Eligibility Rules, in particular Rule 102, as well as its enforcement by the ISU in the case at hand, constitutes a violation of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. The main premise of the complaint is that the sanction of a lifelong ban cannot be considered inherent and proportionate to the pursuit of any legitimate objective.

The ISU Eligibility Rules are laid down in the ISU General Regulations, which the Members of the ISU have adopted. This is a decision taken by an association of associations of undertakings, within the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU. By their very nature, the restrictions imposed by the Eligibility Rules have the potential to restrict competition because they raise virtually insurmountable barriers to entry and expansion on the market for the organisation of international speed skating events (i.e. the organisation of such events require access to the human resources controlled by the ISU). This directly and manifestly affects the interests of the skaters (and ultimately has the potential to harm the welfare of sports fans). 

Additionally, the ISU and its Members enjoy a position of collective dominance, which amounts to an absolute monopoly, on the market for the organisation of international speed skating events.[2] The ISU Eligibility Rules enable the ISU (and its Members) to prevent or impede effective competition on the market for international speed skating events. In short, the complainants argue that the ISU effectively abuses its powers to foreclose competitors on this and other related markets. The ISU Eligibility Rules are not simply there “on the books” but are actively invoked by the ISU to deter skaters (and officials etc.) from breaching these rules by participating/officiating in non-sanctioned events.[3] 

The initiative to launch the Icederby International Competitions exemplifies that there is a demand for more international speed skating events in addition to those that the ISU administers, both in terms of new competition formats and competing events. This need is also evident from the limited prize money that is available for long track and short track skaters in ISU sanctioned international speed skating events. The prize money available for individual skaters in a typical season with 21 international speed skating competitions (13 long track / 8 short track) is a minimum of $ 0 and maximum of $ 109,000 (long track) / $ 31,900 (short track). If speed skaters would be able to participate in the Dubai Icederby Grand Prix, which is but one out-of-season single event, they would earn individually a minimum of $ 37.650 and a maximum of $ 130,000. In other words, a short track skater could earn more by simply participating in the Icederby event than he/she would be able to earn by winning all of the ISU sanctioned international competitions during an entire season. 

While the ISU’s decision not to sanction the Icederby International Competitions is an important contextual element, the complainants are not asking the European Commission to denounce that decision. Rather, their complaint focuses entirely on the disproportionate sanction prescribed by Rule 102(2) of the ISU General Regulations. Because Icederby International is the first major organisation that wishes to organise international speed skating events without the ISU’s approval, the radical anti-competitive nature of the ISU Eligibility Rules has only now manifested itself. Any other (future) initiative to organise a non-sanctioned international speed skating event would likewise face the disproportionate restrictions imposed by the ISU Eligibility Rules. 

It is undisputed that an international sports federation, such as the ISU, may legitimately assert the interests of the sport it administers. Yet it is doubtful that the ISU could rely on its Code of Ethics (that only applies to events and activities “under the jurisdiction of the ISU”) to render ineligible any person skating or officiating in events in compliance with national laws. Sole participation in a non-sanctioned speed skating event should not constitute a threat to the integrity of speed skating that would justify a total ban. 

4. What is the remedial scope of EU competition law? 

The ISU Eligibility rules and the ISU’s conduct deprive speed skaters from the benefits that a situation of fair and open competition on the market for the organisation of international speed skating events would offer them. The scope for intervention on the basis of EU competition law is evident from previous decisional practice. 

In the FIA case, the European Commission was confronted with similar rules contained in several regulations notified by the Fédération International de l’Automobile (FIA). The International Sporting Code of the FIA provided that no licence holder could participate in an international Formula One event that is not entered on the FIA calendar. Anyone that would not comply with this provision would have their licence withdrawn and thus would be excluded from any event authorized by FIA. This and other restrictive rules led the Commission to make, in its Statement of Objections, the preliminary assessment that FIA “was using its regulatory powers to block the organization of races which competed with the events promoted or organized by FIA (i.e. events from which FIA derived a commercial benefit”.[4] The Commission eventually closed the case after having reached a settlement with FIA, which provided inter alia that FIA no longer would prevent teams and circuit owners to participate in and organise other races provided that essential requisite safety standards are met.[5] 

More recently, National Competition Authorities (NCAs) have also intervened on the basis of national and EU competition law. For example: 

• In Sweden, the Market Court confirmed that two clauses in the Swedish Automobile Sports Federation (SBF)’s Common rules, according to which its members were forbidden from participating as drivers and event staff in races not sanctioned by the SBF, violated Article 101 TFEU.^[6] The Court therefore upheld the decision of the Swedish NCA, which obliged the SBF to amend its Common rules so that they no longer prevent licence holders from applying for, participating in or being functionaries at unsanctioned motor races.^[7] In 2014, the Swedish NCA also closed an investigation into a loyalty clause applied by the Swedish Bodybuilding Association (SKKF) after the SKFF committed no longer to suspend or fine athletes, coaches, officials or judges for participating in non-sanctioned competitions.^[8]

In Italy, the NCA launched antitrust investigations into the regulations and conduct of the national motor sports federation (ACI) and equestrian sports federation (FISE) under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. The FISE investigation focused on clauses forbidding FISE members from participating in equestrian events and activities organized by other entities (subject to exclusion from the federation). The investigation was closed after FISE committed to remove the anti-competitive clauses from its statutes. FISE also committed to allow the use of its affiliated clubs’ facilities by independent event organizers.[9] The ACI investigation focused on several regulatory and statutory provisions intended to limit access to the market for the organization of motor sport events for competitors. In 2009, the NCA adopted a commitment decision after the ACI undertook to inter alia allow its members to participate in events not organized by the federation.[10]

In Ireland, the NCA opened an investigation into a rule of Show Jumping Ireland (SJI) that prevented members of the SJI to compete at unaffiliated show jumping events. The case was closed after the SJI committed to amend the rule to address the competition concerns. Since then, members of SJI who enter into unaffiliated show can only be penalized if the show has not signed up to the specified Health and Safety Standards and has not provided the SJI with evidence of adequate insurance.[11] 

Two important lessons can be drawn from this decisional practice. 

First, save for compliance with objective technical safety standards, the decisional practice has consistently found that rules prohibiting the participation of its members in non-sanctioned events violated Articles 101 and/or 102 TFEU and had to be abolished. Evidently, to be deemed proportional, the sports federation would still be required to prove that a certain non-sanctioned event would be less safe than its own events.[12] 

Second, all national cases dealt with rules of national federations. In the Swedish bodybuilding case (2014), the contested rule was the national equivalent of a clause contained in the Constitution of the International Bodybuilding Federation. Yet the remedial action was purely national in scope. The SKKF committed no longer to apply the restriction in Sweden, but the rule continues to be enforced by the IFBB and all other European member federations. The much wider scope of the parties affected by a rule from an international sports federation makes it necessary to tackle the restriction at the EU level. 

5. What are the next procedural steps? 

Since this is the first time in more than a decade that the European Commission is conducting an in-depth antitrust investigation in the field of (regulatory aspects of) sport, the decision to open proceedings delivers a powerful message. 

The opening of an in-depth antitrust investigation does not prejudice the finding of a violation of the European competition rules, however. It only signals that (1) the initial assessment led to the conclusion that there are “reasonable indications of a likely infringement” and (2) the Commission will further pursue the case as a matter of priority with a view to adopting a decision.[13] The Commission will thus allocate recourses on the case and endeavour to resolve the case in a timely manner.

Unless the Commission would in the end conclude that there is not sufficient evidence to find an infringement, the case will be resolved through the adoption of a prohibition or commitment decision.  

The ISU could offer commitments suitable to address the competition concerns arising from the investigation. The Commission might then conclude that there are no longer grounds for actions. Instead of formally establishing a violation of the EU competition rules, a commitment decision will simply make those commitments legally binding. In the alternative, the Commission will proceed to a prohibition decision, requiring the ISU to bring the infringements to an end. For this purpose, it may impose on the ISU remedies proportionate to the infringement committed and necessary to bring the infringement to an end and impose a fine. 

6. Why is this case so important? 

Needless to say, the stakes are significant and extend well beyond the sport of speed skating. 

Only a handful of international sport federations have truly experienced the “Bosman effect” and faced scrutiny of their regulatory overreach under the European competition rules. The fact that most international sports federations are based in Switzerland, outside the EU, may further explain a lack of awareness about the need to comply with EU competition law. Of course, this does not mean they are immune: anti-competitive practices that appreciably affect the EU market are drawn into the net of EU competition law. 

While the compliance of sporting rules with EU competition law needs to be assessed on a case-by-case basis, the European Commission did present an indicative list of sporting rules that are likely to infringe Articles 101 and 102 TFEU in its 2007 White Paper on Sport. Rules shielding sports associations from competition are mentioned. Other than in the area of revenue generating activities related to sport (in particular the sale of sports media rights), however, the body of competition case law at the EU level dealing with organisational sporting rules is limited. Even though sports associations usually have practical monopolies in a given sport, the remedial potential of EU competition law to influence their regulatory actions (that often have significant economic consequences) remains underexplored.[14]  

The Commission’s decision to pursue this case therefore has an important precedent-setting value. This is particularly true for the numerous international sports federations that also disproportionally restrict athlete participation in unsanctioned events with penalties ranging from fines, periods of ineligibility, and lifetime bans. For instance: 

• International Federation of Volleyball (FIVB): since 2009, all athletes that take part in unauthorized beach volleyball events will have their membership withdrawn for all FIVB competitions (period of ineligibility up to a life ban).[15] Surprisingly, different sanctions apply to participation in volleyball competitions of non-FIVB recognized organizations (e.g. a fine on the club involved of CHF 30.000 and suspension of the club, teams, players, and officials involved for a period up to two years).[16]

International Swimming Federation (FINA): any affiliated member having any kind of relationship with non-affiliated bodies shall be suspended for a minimum period of one year up to a maximum period of two years.[17]

International Netball Federation (INF): any person participating in any capacity in an unsanctioned event is automatically ineligible to participate in INF events for a minimum of 12 months thereafter.[18]

International Gymnastics Federation (FIG): gymnasts taking part in unsanctioned competitions or exhibitions may not claim to be eligible to participate in the Olympic Games.[19]

International Cricket Council (ICC): other than in exceptional circumstances, a person participating in unofficial cricket events shall not be selected or permitted to participate in official events for a minimum of one year thereafter.[20]

International Hockey Federation (FIH): any athlete or other individual participating in an unsanctioned event is automatically ineligible for one year to participate in any FIH event.[21]

The mere threat of drastic sanctions, combined with the general lack of objective, transparent, and non-discriminatory rules governing the authorization of international sports events, enables federations to de facto block events that could compete with the events they organise and promote. In the absence of sufficient procedural safeguards, this clearly raises concerns about a conflict of interest between a federation’s power to authorise the organisation of events and the federation’s commercial interests in promoting its own events.

The ISU case will hopefully provide a much-needed reminder to sports federations that without valid justifications they cannot use their private regulatory power to foreclose competitors or hinder the freedom of EU athletes and sports personnel to exercise economic activities. 

Disclaimer: the author represents and advises the complainants in their antitrust proceedings.

[1] ISU General Regulations (2014), available at http://static.isu.org/media/165642/constitution-and-general-regulations-version-july-31-2014.pdf

[2] This has already been recognized by the German courts in the Pechstein case.

[3] In its 2014 statement (Communication No. 1853), the ISU found it opportune to remind all its members “that participation in any international ice skating competition not sanctioned by the ISU will result in the loss of eligibility of the participants”.

[4] Notice published pursuant to Article 19(3) of Council Regulation No 17 concerning Cases COMP/35.163, Notification of FIA Regulations, COMP/36.638, Notification by FIA/FOA of agreements relating to the FIA Formula One World Championship, COMP/36.776  GTR/FIA & others (2001/C 169/03), OJ C169/6-7

[5] European Commission, XXXIst Report on Competition Policy 2001, para. 221 et seq.

[6]  Swedish Market Court's ruling 2012:16 in Case A 5/11, Svenska Bilsportförbundet v Konkurrensverket (December 20, 2012) available at http://www.kkv.se/t/NewsArchive.aspx?id=529  (see also e.g. http://www.kkv.se/t/NewsPage____8672.aspx ).

[7] Konkurrensverket (Swedish Competition Authority) Decision of 13 May 2011 in Case 709/2009, available at http://www.kkv.se/upload/Filer/Konkurrens/2011/Beslut/09-0709.pdf.

[8] Konkurrensverket (Swedisch Competition Authority) Decision of 28 May 2014 in Case 590/2013, available at http://www.konkurrensverket.se/upload/Filer/Konkurrens/2014/13-0590.pdf.

[9] Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, Federitalia/Federazione Italiana Sport Equestri (FISE), Decision n°18285 of 28 July 2008, Bolletino n° 19/2008. 

[10] Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, Gargano Corse/ACI, Decision n° 19946 of 30 June 2009, Bolletino n° 23/2009.

[11] The Competition Authority, Show Jumping Ireland, case summary available at http://www.tca.ie/images/uploaded/documents/201205%20Case%20Summary%20-%20SJI.pdf

[12] Swedish Market Court's ruling 2012:16 in Case A 5/11, Svenska Bilsportförbundet v Konkurrensverket (December 20, 2012) available at http://www.kkv.se/t/NewsArchive.aspx?id=529; The Competition Authority, Show Jumping Ireland, case summary available at http://www.tca.ie/images/uploaded/documents/201205%20Case%20Summary%20-%20SJI.pdf.

[13] European Commission, Antitrust Manual of Procedures (2012), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/antitrust_manproc_3_2012_en.pdf

[14] Ben Van Rompuy, "The role of EU competition law in tackling abuse of regulatory power by sports associations" (2015) 22 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 2, 174-204.

[15] FIVB, Beach Volleyball Handbook 2013, Article 9.1 and 11.3. 

[16] FIVB, Disciplinary Regulations, Article 15.2 and Sports Regulations Volleyball, Article 46.6.

[17] FINA, General Rules 2013-2017, Rule GR4.

[18] INF, General Regulations – Appendix – Regulations on Sanctioned & Unsanctioned Events: Guidance Notes (August 2013).

[19] FIG, Technical Regulations, Appendix B (Rules of Eligibility for the International Gymnastics Federation).

[20] ICC, Regulations for Approved/Disapproved Cricket and Domestic Cricket Events, Section 32.4.

[21] FIH, Regulations on Sanctioned & Unsanctioned events, Article 2.

Editor’s note: Tomáš Grell comes from Slovakia and is currently an LL.M. student in Public International Law at Leiden University. He contributes also to the work of the ASSER International Sports Law Centre as a part-time intern.

On 2 December 2010, the FIFA Executive Committee elected Qatar as host of the 2022 FIFA World Cup ('World Cup'), thereby triggering a wave of controversies which underlined, for the most part, the country's modest size, lack of football history, local climate, disproportionate costs or corruption that accompanied the selection procedure. Furthermore, opponents of the decision to award the World Cup to the tiny oil-rich Gulf country also emphasized the country's negative human rights record.

More than six years later, on 3 January 2017, the Commercial Court of the Canton of Zurich ('Court') dismissed the lawsuit filed against FIFA[1] jointly by the Dutch trade union FNV, the Bangladeshi Free Trade Union Congress, the Bangladesh Building and Wood Workers Federation and the Bangladeshi citizen Nadim Shariful Alam ('Plaintiffs').[2] The Plaintiffs requested the Court to find FIFA responsible for alleged human rights violations of migrant workers in connection with the World Cup in Qatar. Had the Plaintiffs' claims been upheld by the Court, such decision would have had far-reaching consequences on the fate of thousands of migrants, mostly from India, Nepal and Bangladesh, who are currently working on the construction of sporting facilities and other infrastructure associated with organization of the World Cup. 

Based on the above, this two-part blog seeks to provide a general overview of the respective proceedings before the Court, focusing primarily on the key legal arguments regarding FIFA's responsibility for human rights abuses committed in the territory of a State being charged with organization of the World Cup. The first part will briefly describe the dire humanitarian conditions for migrant workers in Qatar following the country's successful bidding contest in 2010 and summarize the central claims advanced by the Plaintiffs. The second part will shed its light on the reasoning which led the Court to reject the Plaintiffs' claims. It will also examine the conclusions reached by the Court in context of the responsibilities of transnational corporations for extra-territorial human rights abuses they might have directly or indirectly triggered.

Human rights situation in Qatar 

In conformity with its Constitution[3] and international law[4], Qatar as a sovereign State shall ensure that human rights are respected within its jurisdiction. Qatar holds the world's highest ratio of immigrants to citizens, the latter representing only 10 % of the country's overall population which is estimated at 2,000,000. It has been suggested that the number of male migrant workers in Qatar has more than doubled since 2010, from 800,000 to approximately 1,700,000 at present.[5] According to the report published by the International Trade Union Confederation, more than 7,000 workers might die before the new stadiums finally open their gates for spectators in late November 2022. Regardless of the large volume of construction works which have to be done before the World Cup in Qatar actually kicks off, such figure simply cannot be ignored. To put this into some perspective, deaths of eight workers had been reported shortly before the start of the latest FIFA World Cup in Brazil. 

The vast majority of alleged human rights violations in Qatar stems from domestic labour law regulation which, until very recently, prescribed the so-called kafala system. Under the system, foreign workers are tied to their employers or sponsors, known as kafeels, that retain the final word on their legal residence in Qatar. Should a foreign worker wish to change his or her job within the country, an explicit consent is required from the kafeel. In this regard, François Crépeau, United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants, characterized the kafala system as ''a source of abuse'' and carried on to conclude that ''there is no valid justification for maintaining this system''. In a similar vein, several non-governmental organizations condemned the kafala system. For instance, Amnesty International has identified eight particular ways in which some migrants working on the refurbishment of the Khalifa International Stadium in Doha are being exploited, ranging from forced labour to appalling living conditions. The nature of the kafala system could well be illustrated against the background of Zahir Belounis' case, a French-Algerian football player and former captain of Qatari club El Jaish. After his employment contract had been prematurely terminated by El Jaish, Belounis brought legal action against the club's directors[6] for unpaid wages. As a counteraction, the Qatari club refused to grant him an exit visa and, as a result, he remained trapped in the country without income for more than two years. However, there is a significant difference between the circumstances of Mr. Belounis' case and those migrants who are currently working on construction sites. While the former was in a position to pursue legal redress, the latter normally lack the necessary financial resources to do so. 

As regards the proceedings under scrutiny, the Plaintiffs contend that the kafala system violates Qatari domestic law, Swiss law and international labour and human rights law.[7] In particular, they argue that Qatar facilitates forced labour[8] by: (i) the employer's control over residence permits; (ii) prohibiting workers to switch employer; (iii) allowing abusive contracts; (iv) allowing high recruitment fees; (v) not effectively opposing passport confiscation; and (vi) the lack of effective redress and legal enforcement of the protection of workers' rights.[9] Given that their passports are routinely being retained[10], migrant workers are also constrained in their freedom of movement.[11] Owing to the fact that Qatari domestic law prohibits migrant workers from organizing in trade unions, their freedom of association[12] is virtually non-existent.[13] Furthermore, the Plaintiffs invoke[14] the violation of the fundamental right not to be discriminated against[15] and the right to an effective remedy.[16] 

In response to public outrage generated by the kafala system, Qatari government has been recently compelled to introduce certain reforms to its labour laws. Nonetheless, the ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions assumes that the respective changes will have little impact on observance of human rights in relation to migrant workers residing in Qatar. The ILO has already notified Qatar that, should not the humanitarian conditions for migrant workers be ameliorated before March 2017, it will subsequently launch a Commission of Inquiry. It is important to note, however, that the ILO's enforcement mechanisms are rather weak.[17]

Linkage to FIFA's responsibility 

The previous section has demonstrated the existence of reasonable doubts regarding Qatar's compliance with its human rights obligations. In order to hold FIFA accountable for Qatar's failure to respect human rights, a linkage needs to be established between FIFA's conduct and the respective violations occurring in the Gulf country. This section takes a closer look at how the Plaintiffs, from a legal point of view, strive to establish such linkage in their lawsuit. 

Pursuant to Article 3 of the 2016 FIFA Statutes, FIFA commits itself to preservation of ''all internationally recognised human rights.'' Article 4 thereof provides that ''discrimination of any kind against a country, private person or group of people on account of race, skin colour, ethnic, national or social origin, gender, disability, language, religion, political opinion or any other opinion, wealth, birth or any other status, sexual orientation or any other reason is strictly prohibited and punishable by suspension or expulsion.'' FIFA supports its commitment to protect and promote human rights also by communicating its visions, such as the one to build a better future for all through football. That being said, the Plaintiffs argue that FIFA's obligation to respect human rights does not flow only from its internal regulations. In their view, FIFA shall bear responsibility primarily under Swiss law and (to a certain extent) also under international law.

FIFA's responsibility under Swiss law 

The Plaintiffs assert that Swiss tort law applies to the present case by virtue of the choice-of-law rules set forth in the Swiss Act on Private International Law ('IPRG').[18] In respect of FIFA's responsibility under Swiss tort law, the Plaintiffs' core argument rests on the so-called endangerment principle. According to this principle, a person that brings about a dangerous situation shall take the necessary precautions in order to prevent potential harm. Applied to the case at hand, FIFA's responsibility emanates primarily from its decision to award the World Cup to Qatar without simultaneously demanding that the country gets rid of the kafala system. The Plaintiffs firmly state that FIFA has the power to make such demands from World Cup-hosts.  

With regard to the strong position that FIFA holds vis-à-vis World Cup-hosts, the key features of the bidding procedure and subsequent coordination between FIFA and the elected country require further elaboration. Article 37 of the 2010 FIFA Statutes stipulates that ''the Organising Committee for the FIFA World Cup shall organise the FIFA World Cup in compliance with the provisions of the regulations applicable to this competition, the List of Requirements and the Organising Association Agreement.''[19] This Organising Association Agreement is signed with all countries (their national football associations) that wish to participate in the selection procedure. It contains the List of Requirements. The underlying purpose of such documentation is to ensure that potential World Cup-hosts are prepared to abide by FIFA's requirements in case they are eventually selected.[20] For example, the Organising Association Agreement concluded between FIFA and the South African Football Association ahead of the 2010 FIFA World Cup comprises a variety of requirements concerning, inter alia, infrastructure, security, broadcasting rights, intellectual property rights or financing. It is critical to note, however, that human rights demands are conspicuously absent from the agreement in question. The said agreement explicitly provides that ''FIFA owns the championship and all rights relating thereto on an exclusive worldwide basis, including all organisation, marketing, broadcast and other rights to the matches and other events.'' The Plaintiffs categorize the FIFA World Cup as 'take-it-or-leave-it' deal, claiming that host States are not in a position to negotiate about the requirements imposed by FIFA.[21] Indeed, the fear of losing the privilege to organize the prestigious FIFA World Cup serves as a significant impulse for World Cup-hosts to adhere to FIFA's standards. The Plaintiffs further note that FIFA uses its tremendous influence to force host States to modify their domestic laws for the duration of the tournament. In this regard, they particularly refer to the well-known 'Budweiser Law' – a law enacted by Brazil in the run-up to the 2014 FIFA World Cup which essentially allowed beer sales at match venues despite the fact that the sale of alcohol had been prohibited in Brazil's stadiums for nearly 10 years. 

Alternatively, the Plaintiffs put forward that, being aware of Qatar's unwillingness or inability to improve the human rights situation in the country, FIFA should have excluded Qatar from the bidding procedure.[22] Examples like that of Indonesia which was ruled out from the World Cup selection procedure because it did not provide sufficient government guarantees, demonstrate that FIFA possesses the power to take such action. In addition, the Plaintiffs suggest that FIFA may suspend a member in line with its Statutes.[23] As recently as 28 October 2016, Guatemala was suspended from international football due to the refusal of its national football federation ('FEDEFUT') to recognize the mandate of a normalisation committee established by FIFA predominantly in order to bring the FEDEFUT internal regulation in line with the FIFA Statutes. One of the most prominent cases of suspension dates back to the summer of 2014 when the FIFA Emergency Committee suspended the Nigeria Football Federation on account of government intervention. Earlier precedents show that FIFA had suspended its members also by reasons of negative human rights record (South Africa during the apartheid era or former Yugoslavia during the period of war in Balkan).[24] 

The Plaintiffs further maintain that FIFA's responsibility under Swiss tort law is also triggered by its ongoing failure to improve the plight of migrant workers trapped in Qatar by not demanding the Gulf country to efficiently set aside its controversial labour laws.[25]

FIFA's responsibility under international law 

The lawsuit filed with the Court refers to soft law provisions enshrined in the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights ('UN Guiding Principles') unanimously endorsed by the United Nations Human Rights Council in 2011. These principles address the corporate responsibility to respect human rights. United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mr. Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein, described the UN Guiding Principles as ''the global authoritative standard, providing a blueprint for the steps all states and businesses should take to uphold human rights.'' Although the said principles do not constitute a binding source of international law, FIFA has already communicated its positive commitment to abide by these principles. At the same time, FIFA has announced that, starting from the 2026 FIFA World Cup, bidding regulations would incorporate human rights-related criteria. That being said, coupled with FIFA's large-scale commercial activities, the UN Guiding Principles seem to be more than a reasonable point of reference in this regard. 

In April 2016, Professor John Ruggie, the author of the UN Guiding Principles, completed the report on what it would entail for FIFA to embed human rights compliance across its global operations. His team has elaborated 25 specific recommendations which might be roughly summarized as follows: (i) adopt a clear and coherent human rights policy; (ii) embed respect for human rights; (iii) identify and evaluate human rights risks; (iv) address human rights risks; (v) track and report on implementation; and (vi) enable access to remedy. Likewise the lawsuit, the respective report articulated that FIFA shall use ''every opportunity to press host countries to support [FIFA's] new statutory human rights commitment.''

Conclusion 

In light of the foregoing considerations, the Plaintiffs asked the Court to oblige FIFA to redress the persistent human rights violations of migrant workers by compelling the competent Qatari authorities to bring about the necessary change. As an alternative, they requested the Court to declare the mere illegality of those human rights abuses. The monetary compensation sought by the Plaintiffs amounted to relatively modest sums.[26] 

In sum, the lawsuit under examination in this blog raises a number of remarkable challenges which would undoubtedly deserve a fair share of attention. The portrayal of FIFA as a stronger party in its relations with World Cup-hosts underscores the blurring distinction between the role of sovereign states and non-state actors in contemporary international society.[27] In fact, it raises crucial questions from the perspective of international legal theory. How is it possible that transnational corporations can interfere with the principle of state sovereignty? Is it only the consent of the state concerned that is involved? Where does this cornerstone principle of international law have its limits and to what extent is it relevant in current international relations? Although the Court does not give clear-cut answers to these questions, its position with respect thereto could be inferred from its ruling. This is exactly what remains to be tackled in the second part of this blog that will be published in the coming days. 

[1] Our most sincere acknowledgement goes to Prof. Liesbeth Zegveld who has kindly provided us with the relevant documentation and information that is subject to analysis in the present blog.

[2] Ruling of the Commercial Court of the Canton of Zurich, HG160261-O, 3 January 2017

[3] The Permanent Constitution of the State of Qatar, 2004, Art. 6

[4] Qatar is a State Party, inter alia, to the following international human rights law treaties: (i) Arab Charter on Human Rights; (ii) International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination ('CERD'); (iii) Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; or (iv) United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its accompanying Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children (also referred to as the Palermo Protocol). In addition, Qatar is a Member State of the International Labour Organization ('ILO') and has ratified six out of the eight ILO Conventions.

[5] Lawsuit submitted to the Court by the Plaintiffs on 8 December 2016, para. 97             

[6] In fact, some of the club's directors were high-ranked members of Qatari government

[7] Supra note 5, para. 259

[8] See the ILO 1930 Convention concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour (No. 29); the ILO 1957 Convention concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour (No. 105)

[9] Supra note 5, para. 160

[10] Ibid., para. 231

[11] See Art. 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; Arts. 26, 27 of the 2004 Arab Charter on Human Rights; Art. 5 (i) (d) CERD

[12] See Arts. 20, 23 (4) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; Arts. 24, 35 of the 2004 Arab Charter on Human Rights; Art. 5 (e) (ii) CERD; the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work

[13] Supra note 5, para. 232 ff.

[14] Ibid., para. 239 ff.

[15] See the 1958 ILO Convention concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation; Art. 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; Arts. 3, 11 of the 2004 Arab Charter on Human Rights; Art. 5 CERD

[16] See Art. 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; Arts. 12, 22, 23 of the 2004 Arab Charter on Human Rights

[17] A. Erfani, 'Kicking Away Responsibility: FIFA's Role in Response to Migrant Worker Abuses in Qatar's 2022 World Cup', (2015) 22 (2) Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal 623, at 641

[18] See Art. 133 (2) IPRG

[19] Reference is being made to the 2010 FIFA Statutes since they were in force at the time when the World Cup was awarded to Qatar (i.e. on 2 December 2010). Art. 37 of the 2010 FIFA Statutes is now reflected in Art. 43 of the 2016 FIFA Statutes.

[20] Supra note 5, para. 75

[21] Ibid., para. 267

[22] Ibid., para. 285

[23] See Art. 14 of the 2010 FIFA Statutes (now reflected in Art. 16 of the 2016 FIFA Statutes)

[24] Supra note 5, para. 288

[25] Ibid., para. 293

[26] Supra note 2, p. 2-3

[27] H. Meier, B. García, 'Protecting Private Transnational Authority against Public Intervention: FIFA's Power over National Governments', (2015) 93 (4) Public Administration 890