In this blog we continue unpacking Doyen’s TPO deals based on the documents obtained via footballleaks. This time we focus on the battle between Doyen and Sporting over the Rojo case, which raises different legal issues as the FC Twente deals dealt with in our first blog.

I.              The context: The free-fall of Sporting

Sporting Lisbon, or Sporting Club de Portugal as the club is officially known, is a Portuguese club active in 44 different sports. Although the club has the legal status of Sociedade Anónima Desportiva, a specific form of public limited company, it also has over 130.000 club members, making it one of the biggest sports clubs in the world.

The professional football branch of Sporting is by far the most important and famous part of the club, and with its 19 league titles in total, it is a proud member of the big three cartel, with FC Porto and Benfica, dominating Portuguese football. Yet, it has not won a league title since 2002.

The members of Sporting get to elect the club’s president. A typical election campaign is akin to a political one with regard to status, media coverage and campaign funds. In fact, former Sporting president Pedro Santana Lopes went on to become the Prime Minister of Portugal in 2004-2005. In 2011, the elections were hotly disputed with Godinho Lopes defeating his main rival Bruno de Carvalho by only 300 votes. A request by De Carvalho to recount the votes was later dismissed, causing local unrests and police intervention.

Under Godinho Lopes’ presidency, Sporting obtained very poor sporting results, including a seventh place in the 2012/13 season, the worst ranking in the club’s history. New elections were held in 2013 and won by Bruno de Carvalho in a landslide. In addition to underwhelming results on the field, it turned out that the financial health of the club off the field was also at risk. Bruno de Carvalho faced a loss of €43 million in the 2012/13 season alone. This large financial debt was one of the reasons why on 1 October 2014, the General Assembly approved the proposal by the new Board of Directors to press liability charges against Godinho Lopes for breaching due diligence duties.

In the midst of the financial and managerial chaos surrounding Sporting, one dispute stands out as being relevant to our series of blogs on Doyen’s TPO deals. Faced with financial difficulties, Godinho Lopes had recourse to Doyen Sport to finance the recruitment of a number of players, amongst them Marco Rojo, an Argentine defender coming from Spartak Moscow in 2012. After two years at the club, the player was transferred against a healthy €20 million fee to Manchester United in 2014. However, the club staunchly refused to pay out the share of the economic rights owned by Doyen. Thus, giving way to a legal dispute on which we will put the spotlight in this blog. Although the case is still pending in front of CAS, several documents related to it were published on the footballleaks website.[1]

II.            The facts: the Rojo case

Before analysing the fine prints of the Economic Rights Participation Agreement (ERPA) between Doyen and Sporting concerning the economic rights of Rojo, a bit of background on the player and his career is needed. Marcos Rojo is an Argentine professional football player who appeared on the elite football scene at a young age. In 2009, by the age of 19, he won the Copa Libertadores with his side Estudiantes de la Plata, and in 2011, aged 21, he was a regular starter for the Argentinian national team during the Copa America. Sporting, under Godinho’s presidency, signed Rojo from Spartak Moscow for €5.43 million in July 2012.[2] In order to finance the signing of Rojo, Sporting needed fresh money, thus it turned to Doyen as a “last resort initiative”.[3] As provided by the ERPA, the Maltese investment company paid € 3 million and obtained in return 75% of Rojo’s Economic rights. The agreement includes similar provisions to the ones outlined in detail in our FC Twente blog. Notably, in the case Sporting would receive a transfer offer for Rojo of more than €8 million, Doyen could request that the club accept the offer or pay an amount equivalent to 75% of the offer to buy back the rights of the player from the fund. Moreover, in the case the club was to renew the contract of the player or failed to avoid that his contract runs out, it was bound to pay a minimum fee of €4.2 million (in case of renewal, Doyen could also chose to keep its share of the player’s economic rights).

Rojo’s outstanding 2014 World Cup (he was selected for the World Cup All-Star Team) triggered interest from English Premier League clubs, most notably Southampton and Manchester United. Both sides were keen on signing him in the summer of 2014, but Sporting president De Carvalho had no intention of selling him. According to De Carvalho, Rojo was key to the club’s ambition of becoming Portuguese champion. Sporting claimed that Doyen, via its director Nelio Lucas, was “promoting and forcing this transfer” and, thus, “violating his duty to respect Sporting’s independence in transfer related matters”.[4] De Carvalho maintained that Doyen’s influence breached then art.18bis of the FIFA RSTP. In retaliation against Doyen’s perceived influence, Sporting refused to pay to Doyen the agreed 75% share of the proceeds from the transfer of Rojo to Manchester United. Instead, it argued that Doyen had breached its contractual duties and declared the ERPA (and the guarantees attached to it) null and void. Nonetheless, the club did transfer back to Doyen the €3 million it invested at the outset. Hence, Sporting put Doyen’s contractual edifice to the test and Doyen was forced to go to court (and more precisely to the Court of Arbitration for Sport) to try to enforce its rights under the ERPA agreement.

III.         The showdown: The CAS as ultimate arbiter of the legality of Doyen’s TPO contracts

The ERPA signed by Doyen and Sporting contains both a clause defining Swiss law as the law applicable to the contract and the CAS as the jurisdiction competent to deal with disputes arising out of the contract.[5] Henceforth, it was mandatory for Doyen to turn to the CAS as soon as it became obvious that it would not recoup the 75% it believes it was owed on Rojo’s transfer. The dispute was finally heard by a CAS panel in June of this year and the final decision is still, as far as we know, pending (see the outstanding coverage of the issue by Tariq Panja from Bloomberg, here and here). The case is of great importance to Doyen, if the CAS finds that Doyen’s ERPA is contrary to Swiss law, this finding will most likely apply to each of Doyen’s TPO deals that are based on a similar model and dramatically weaken its contractual position. The good news for Doyen is that it probably has only relatively few ERPA’s still in place (for example FC Twente and Doyen agreed to put an end to their agreement), as the FIFA ban should have blocked it from entering into new agreements.

This case is not about former article 18bis of the FIFA RSTP, as is often misunderstood. This would come only into play if FIFA were to sanction Sporting for having had recourse to an ERPA with Doyen, an issue that might still arise and a configuration potentially already at play in the FC Twente case. The Rojo dispute between Sporting and Doyen, however, is of a purely contractual nature. It is only about whether Doyen’s TPO deals are compatible with Swiss civil law. In this regard, footballleaks has recently published a very interesting document: a confidential report by a Swiss law firm on the legality of Doyen’s Model ERPA in light of Swiss law. This report raises a number of thorny legal issues that the CAS will have to weigh on.

The ERPA between Doyen and Sporting must abide by the requirements of Swiss civil law. In general, the Swiss Civil Code is favourable to contractual autonomy, yet there are some restrictions to the freedom of the parties. To be valid, an agreement should not be contrary to the bonos mores. In other words, the moral values or ethical principles supported by the Swiss legal system. Indeed, as foreseen by Art. 20.1 of the Swiss Code of Obligations, a “contract is void if its terms are impossible, unlawful or immoral”.

The whole Rojo case in front of the CAS is likely to hang on the determination whether Doyen’s ERPA model is immoral or not from the Swiss perspective. Immorality is constituted especially if the contract introduces a serious imbalance between the obligations of the parties. The Swiss law firm mandated by Doyen doubted the signature of an ERPA would create such imbalance, simply because “both the FUND [Doyen] and the Club have rights and obligations according to the Agreement”.[6] This falls a bit short. As we have seen, Doyen uses the leverage offered by the financial difficulties of clubs (FC Twente or Sporting) to impose very harsh contractual conditions and high interest rates. This harshness is clearly acknowledged in the ERPA. For example, clause 10.6 indicates that Sporting “is conscious of the harshness and the severity of the consequences of clauses 10.4 and 10.5”. Whether the embedded contractual imbalance in the ERPA is sufficient to be deemed immoral under Swiss law is for the CAS to decide, but it is not a possibility that should be discarded lightly. Moreover, this potential immorality is also supported by the willingness of FIFA to ban TPO as it points at the conflicts of interest and integrity risks arising out of its use.

The ERPA could also be contrary to art. 27.2 of the Swiss Civil Code, which provides that: “No person may surrender his or her freedom or restrict the use of it to a degree which violates the law or public morals”. According to the Swiss law firm contracted by Doyen, this is especially the case if a legal entity’s “economic freedom is restricted in such a way that its economic existence is in danger”.[7] It also argued that, “the undertakings of the Club cannot in principle be considered excessive”, as “there is no obvious disparity between the considerations of the Parties”.[8] Here again, the arguments provided by Doyen’s law firm are feeble at best. In fact, the contractual imbalance is openly acknowledged in Doyen’s own contract. The economic freedom of Sporting (or FC Twente for that matter) is so drastically reduced that a club is forced into selling its best players at Doyen’s will.[9] Those players are at the heart of the “economic existence” of a club. In fact, the fate of FC Twente illustrates how the loss of its best players led to the club facing financial and sporting bankruptcy.

Finally, Sporting is also likely to have argued that Doyen was in breach of its contractual duties. Clause 14 of the ERPA stipulates that Doyen “recognizes that the Club is an independent entity in so far as the Club’s employment and transfer-related matters are concerned and [Doyen] shall not, either though this Agreement or otherwise, seek to exert influence over these matters […]”. The Club claimed in its termination letter of the ERPA that “Doyen has seriously and irremediably violated its obligations of non-influence in Sporting transfer policy […] which constitutes a material breach of the agreement”. Swiss contract law may entail the right for Sporting to refuse to execute its part of the deal in case of breach of contract by Doyen. In that regard, Sporting would have had to factually demonstrate the faulty character of Doyen’s intervention in Rojo’s transfer.

It is certainly not a given that the CAS will consider Doyen’s ERPA contrary to Swiss law or for Doyen to be in breach of its contractual duties, but there are credible legal arguments that point in both directions. Surely, the hubris of the management of Sporting and FC Twente is chiefly responsible for the terrible deals closed with Doyen. Yet, Doyen leveraged their dire financial situations and irrational ambitions to strong-arm them into one-sided agreements that are imposing unfair terms on the clubs. Doyen takes on very little risk: If a player fails to become a star, the fund will recoup its investment plus very reasonable interests (unless the club is bankrupt); if a player breaks through, it will pocket the jackpot. The fund is a true vulture fund geared to the football industry. It buys under-priced assets (economic rights attached to players) in fire sales and hopes for a huge profit.

We will hear soon from the CAS whether it deems this practice legal under Swiss law. In any event, FIFA has decided to ban TPO outright, raising the opposite question of the compatibility of the ban with EU law. This will be the subject of our final blog.

[1] The documents used, especially the ERPA applicable to Rojo and the termination letter send out by Sporting, might be blocked or unavailable due to complaints lodged by Doyen. They are on file with the authors.

[2] http://www.transfermarkt.nl/marcos-rojo/profil/spieler/93176.

[3] Rojo ERPA, 23 August 2012, p.2.

[4] Letter of termination of the ERPA, 14 August 2014, para.15. See also paras 17-20.

[5] Rojo ERPA, 23 August 2012, clause 22 and 23.

[6] FRORIEP, ‘Memorandum on certain questions of Swiss law in relation to a draft ERPA’, para.16.

[7] Ibid, para.23.

[8] Ibid, para.25.

[9] Doyen could not ignore the fact that those clubs were in such financial difficulties, that they would be unable to pay on their own the share of a transfer offer above the agreed amount and thus retain their player.

In a recent judgment, the Brussels Court of First Instance confirmed the legality of a so-called surety undertaking, i.e. an agreement in which the parents of a minor playing football guarantee that their child will sign a professional contract with a football club as soon as the child reaches the legal age of majority.

This long-awaited ruling was hailed, on the one hand, by clubs as a much needed and eagerly anticipated confirmation of a long-standing practice in Belgian football[1] and, on the other hand, criticised by FIFPro, the international player’s trade union, in a scathing press release.

Background

Jason Eyenga-Lokilo (“Jason Lokilo”), born on 17 September 1998, joined the youth academy at Belgian top club, RSC Anderlecht (“Anderlecht”), in the spring of 2007. Anderlecht had set up a specific youth academy a couple of months earlier, which combined school education and football training for young football players.

As Jason Lokilo was one of the youth academy’s more promising prospects, Anderlecht and Lokilo’s parents entered into an agreement in which the parents, in exchange for a payment of 75,000 EUR (paid in instalments), guaranteed Anderlecht that their son was going to sign his first professional contract with the club upon turning 16, i.e. the minimum age in Belgium for signing a player contract. This same agreement stipulated that the parents were liable to pay Anderlecht a lump sum of 450,000 EUR in damages, if their son did not sign such a player contract.

When, in 2013, Aston Villa made a request to Anderlecht to give Jason Lokilo a trial when he was 15 years of age, Anderlecht refused, citing the player’s training obligations and the existing surety undertaking. Jason Lokilo’s father, a football agent, then told Anderlecht that he wanted to revise the terms of the surety undertaking, given the fact that a number of European football ‘powerhouses’ wanted to sign his son. Anderlecht refused his demand.

In June 2014, Jason Lokilo and his parents sent a letter to Anderlecht arguing that the surety undertaking was unlawful and hence null and void. Jason Lokilo alleged that unacceptable coercion had been put on him to sign his first contract with Anderlecht, which the player and his advisers considered was contrary to public policy. Anderlecht replied that it considered the surety undertaking to be perfectly valid since the surety did not prevent the player from signing his first professional contract with another club.

By the end of July of 2014, the gridlock between both parties ended with Jason Lokilo leaving Anderlecht and the latter club starting court proceedings against Jason Lokilo’s parents for a damages claim of 450,000 EUR.

Jason Lokilo eventually signed a contract with Crystal Palace in the summer of 2015.[2]

The Brussels Court of First Instance ruling

In its 22 November 2016 judgment, the Brussels Court of First Instance (“CFI”) confirmed the principle of this surety undertaking in the context of professional football.

The CFI referred to Article 1120 of the Belgian Civil Code that expressly allows the principle of a surety undertaking. A surety undertaking under Belgian civil law can be defined as an agreement in which one party promises another party regarding what a third party (who is either absent or legally not competent) will do, give or refrain from doing. The third party retains the freedom not to commit himself, since he, as a third party, is not bound by the agreement. However, the contracting party that made the promise will in that case be liable to pay the contractually foreseen damages if this third party eventually does not commit himself.

The main question the court had to decide was to determine whether the surety undertaking had a valid object and cause.

Jason Lokilo’s parents first argued that the contract was contrary to public policy legislation, considering the contract violated the freedom of association principle enshrined in the Convention on the Rights of the Child (“UNCRC”), the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) and the European Social Charter (“ESC”). The CFI did not follow this reasoning, simply stating that the surety undertaking did not bind Jason Lokilo and did not prevent him from signing a contract with another club.[3]

Lokilo’s parents also invoked an alleged violation of Belgian federal legislation, which prohibits player contracts below the minimum age requirement. This argument was cast aside by the court since at no point in time was a player contract signed below the legal minimum age of 16.

Furthermore, Lokilo’s parents argued that the contract breached a (regional) decree guaranteeing an amateur sportsperson the right to leave their club free-of-charge at the end of each sporting season. The CFI repeated that Lokilo was not bound by the surety undertaking and could still freely leave Anderlecht, stating that this outcome was, moreover, exactly what Lokilo did in 2014. An aggravating circumstance for the CFI was the fact that Lokilo’s father had indicated to Anderlecht that Aston Villa in 2013 was willing to cover the 450,000 EUR in damages, as a result of which the CFI considered these damages were ‘clearly not an obstacle for Jason Lokilo to leave Anderlecht’.

The argument invoked by Lokilo’s parents under EU law (free movement) was also dismissed by the CFI ‘for lack of a cross-border EU element’[4].

In the end, the CFI granted damages to Anderlecht but limited the amount payable by the parents, on the one hand, based on the grounds that Jason Lokilo’s mother was not an agent (and hence not professionally active in football) and, on the other hand, because 450,000 clearly exceeded the actual damages suffered by Anderlecht. The CFI set the damages ex aequo et bono at 140,000 EUR instead.

Some considerations

The Lokilo case echoes the Spanish Baena case,[5] although the latter concerned a slightly different situation and had a clearly different outcome.

Where the Spanish Supreme Court in its 5 February 2013 ruling considered a pre-contractual agreement concluded on behalf of a minor football player at odds with the minor’s best interests and therefore contrary to public policy, the CFI adopted a rather strict ‘pacta sunt servanda’ approach.

The CFI considered that the surety undertaking did not prevent Lokilo from signing a contract with a club other than Anderlecht. This finding may be correct from a strictly legal perspective, but ignores the reality that a child may not want to pursue his or her career at another club if he realises that, by doing so, his or her parents will be liable to pay damages. Moreover, under Belgian law, while a minor is indeed of legal age to sign his or her first professional contract when turning 16, the minor in principle still needs parental authorisation to do so until reaching 18 years of age. Parents might of course not be very inclined to agree to their child signing his or her first professional contract elsewhere, and therefore not provide the necessary parental authorisation, if doing so triggers important financial liabilities for them…

The surety undertaking seems also incompatible with regional decrees guaranteeing amateur sportsmen the right to leave their club free-of-charge at the end of each sporting season. These decrees are considered to have a public policy character by the case law, and disallow any hindrance, financial or otherwise, when moving to another sports club.[6] The fact that the surety undertaking related to a switch from an amateur to a professional contract,[7] did not alter the fact that the player was not free to leave for another amateur club when turning 16 either, since he was forced to sign a professional contract with Anderlecht when turning 16 or see his parents face the prospect of paying hefty compensation.

Arguments regarding the fundamental rights of the minor were either not invoked or not upheld by the CFI. The CFI stated that the matter concerned a contract between the parents and the club and not between the player and the club, as a result of which the minor’s fundamental rights were not jeopardised.

This argument is frankly unconvincing.

It should be noted that the UNCRC[8] recognises the right of a child to freedom of association[9] and the right to participate freely in cultural life.[10] The UNCRC furthermore protects children from economic exploitation.[11] The UNCRC provides also that “in all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.”

The UNCRC is often labeled as ‘soft’ law,[12] with Belgian case law even considering most of its provisions lacking a self-sufficient or self-executing character;[13] yet, the UNCRC remains a treaty with clear moral authority. Moreover, a number of its provisions do have direct effect, especially when read in combination with other international legal sources, such as the ECHR and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. The obligation to consider the best interests of the child is expressly incorporated in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.[14] Even though the obligation to observe the child’s best interests is not expressly laid down under the ECHR, the ECtHR incorporates this obligation also in its case law.[15] One could further argue that the surety undertaking disproportionally affects the career development and perspectives of a player who is a minor, and so violates that player’s proprietary rights[16] and the right to family life that both the player and the player’s family enjoy.[17]

In addition, both the Belgian Constitution[18] and the Belgian Economic Code[19] protect the freedom for each individual to freely choose his or her occupation. This freedom can only be curtailed through or by law.[20] An agreement jeopardising one’s freedom to freely choose one’s occupation, has an unlawful causa and is null and void.[21]

The statement made by the CFI that the EU internal market law does not apply due to a lack of cross-border effect is at odds with the fact that Lokilo clearly intended to join a club outside Belgium, within the EEA (as shown by Aston Villa’s interest and his eventual signing with Crystal Palace), a fact that was not contested by Anderlecht. As Anderlecht is a Belgian football ‘powerhouse’, and clearly one of the top clubs in Belgium (if not the top club), a player aiming higher than Anderlecht would necessarily have to look at opportunities abroad.

If EU law is deemed to apply, then the guiding principles of the Bernard case must be observed. The CJEU, in its Bernard ruling,[22] recalled that an obstacle to the freedom of movement of workers can be accepted only if it pursues a legitimate aim and is justified by overriding reasons in the public interest. The CJEU clearly accepted recruitment and training of players as a legitimate aim. Even where that is so, that measure’s application still must be such as to ensure the objective’s achievement and not go beyond what is necessary for that purpose. In considering whether a system restricts the freedom of movement, the specific characteristics of sport, and of football in particular, their social and educational function, should be taken into account. One may even take into account the costs of training other players that do not succeed at establishing a professional career (the player factor).[23]

This being said, the surety undertaking mechanism in this case seems overly restrictive for the player. Although, again, a surety undertaking binds the parents and not the player, and damages can only be claimed from the parents, the surety undertaking obviously ultimately serves to discourage a player from exercising his or her right of free movement. Moreover, the player already suffers a restriction upon his or her free movement, following the training compensation mechanism in place under FIFA regulations, which is criticisable in its own right.[24] The surety undertaking constitutes an additional burden on the player’s free movement. In Bernard, although the CJEU seemed to accept the principle of training compensation, the CJEU dismissed the French arrangements governing young players (‘joueurs espoirs’) since they did not involve compensation for real training costs incurred, but rather were damages for breach of contractual obligations calculated with reference to the total loss suffered by the club. And taking into account the actual loss suffered by Anderlecht is exactly what the CFI has done. To the extent a surety undertaking goes beyond what is necessary to encourage the recruitment and training of minors (and funds those activities), a violation of the EU internal market law seems given.

Conclusion

In conclusion, based on the considerations set out above, it can certainly not be excluded that the ruling will be overturned on appeal. Such an appeal, which would bring the case before the Brussels Court of Appeal, is being considered by the player’s parents, but has not yet been lodged.

Apart from the doubt around their enforceability, it should be noted that payments under surety undertakings may in addition give rise to (social) tax issues, if they are not structured correctly.[25] [26]

The problem with the surety undertaking in the Lokilo case predominantly lies with the surety undertaking’s disproportionate character in the specific case at hand. Less restrictive solutions could, in the author’s view, be envisaged, although exploring such alternatives would exceed the scope of this article.

[1] Surety undertakings, together with money lending contracts (loan to parents pledging that their child will sign first professional contract, non-reimbursable if child effectively signs contract), are common practice with Belgian top level teams.

[2] Jason Lokilo is still a member of the Crystal Palace Academy. Crystal Palace offered Anderlecht compensation for an approximate amount of 45,000 EUR, which Anderlecht refused.

[3] “(…), la convention de porte-fort litigieuse n’engageait que les parents de Jason vis-à-vis du club et ne créait aucune obligation pour lui”

[4] “Or, contrairement à l’arrêt Bernard qu’ils invoquent (arrêt du 16 mars 2010 – pièce 3 de leur dossier), M. et Mme Lokilo ne démontrent pas, dans le cas present, l’existence d’un élément d’extranéité.”

[5] Sentencia de 5 de febrero de 2013. STS 229/2013. Tribunal Supremo. Sala de lo Civil. http://www.iurismuga.org/es/bases-de-datos/jurisprudencia/144-jurisprudencia-derecho-espanol/8153-sts-n-de-resolucion-26-2013-de-05-02-2013-sentencia-baena. The case was invoked by the parents before the CFI but considered irrelevant because, according to the CFI, the contract between Baena and Barcelona was entered into by (on behalf of) the minor player.

[6] Vred. Ghent 16 September 2013, role n° 130318.

[7] The relevant decrees apply to amateur sports, not professional sports.

[8] http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CRC.aspx

[9] Article 15 UNCRC

[10] Article 31 UNCRC

[11] Article 32 and 36 UNCRC. One may argue that, in the end, a child is used to generate money through (later) transfers and sponsorship deals.

[12] H. Stalford, Children and the European Union: Rights, Welfare and Accountability, Hart Publishing, [2012], 34.

[13] Belgian case law has been reluctant to grant direct effect to the UNCRC: cf. Cass. 11 June 2010, obs. S. Van Drooghenbroeck, Le droit international et européen des droits de l’homme devant le juge national, Larcier, [2014], 196 and following.

[14] Article 24 (2) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights

[15] Handbook on European law relating to the rights of the child, European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 75.

[16] Article 1 of ECHR First Protocol: “Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. (…)”.

[17] Article 8 ECHR

[18] Article 23 Constitution

[19] Article II.9 of the Economic Code. This is one of the oldest Belgian public policy principles, previously laid down in the famous Decree D'Allarde of 2 - 17 March 1791

[20] C.E. 12 July 1993, JLMB [1993], 1442, note J.F. NEURAY

[21] Cass. 29 September 2008, C.06.443.F, JTT [2008] 464.

[22] CJEU 16 March 2010, Olympique Lyonnais v Olivier Bernard and Newcastle United.

[23] i.e. the ratio of players who need to be trained to produce one professional player.

[24] S. Weatherill, European Sports Law, T.M.C. Asser Press [2014], 485 and following.

[25] The tax and social security authorities may e.g. argue that these payments relate to the (future) employment contract of the player.

[26] The surety undertaking’s ‘nephew’, the money lending contracts, in addition pose problems under Belgian finance law since clubs as a rule do not possess the necessary licences or authorisations.

Editor's note: Dr Despina Mavromati is an attorney specializing in international sports law and arbitration (Sportlegis Lausanne) and a UEFA Appeals Body Member. She teaches sports arbitration and sports contracts at the University of Lausanne, Switzerland

As the title indicates, this short note only deals with selected procedural issues and questions arising out of the very lengthy Semenya Judgment. In a nutshell, the SFT dismissed Semenya’s appeal to set aside the CAS Award, which had denied the request of Caster Semenya (Semenya, the Athlete) to declare unlawful the Differences of Sex Development (DSD) Regulations of World Athletics (formerly IAAF).[1]

At the outset, it has to be reminded that the CAS Award dealt with the merits of the Semenya case in a final and binding way by rendering an arbitral award according to Article R59 of the CAS Code (and Article 190 of the Swiss Private International Law Act – PILA). Therefore, the SFT did not act as an appellate court but rather as a cassatory court, entitled to review only whether the exhaustively enumerated grounds for annulment set out in Article 190 (2) PILA were met (and provided that they were properly invoked and substantiated in the motion to set aside said award).

The granting - and subsequent lifting - of the suspensive effect of the DSD Regulations

This was one of the few cases in sports arbitration where the SFT granted an urgent interim relief (mesures superprovisionnelles), by ordering World Athletics to suspend the implementation of the DSD Regulations, only to lift such relief shortly afterwards for lack of prima facie “reasonable chances of success”. The fate of the motion to set aside the CAS Award appeared to be ominous already at that stage. Another relatively recent case where the SFT granted interim relief (only to revoke it later) was the Guerrero case. 

Legal interest of a federation in order to “support” its member athletes

According to the admissibility conditions of the Law on the Federal Tribunal (LTF), the party filing a motion to set aside a CAS award must have a current interest worthy of protection. It is e.g. extremely difficult to meet this condition in a case relating to a competition that already took place. It One must also have a “personal” legal interest worthy of protection (see the SFT judgment in the matter of FIFA v. P. Guerrero & WADA). World Athletics contested the “personal” legal interest of Athletics South Africa but the SFT drew the distinction between this case and one of its previous judgments (the Guerrero case), where FIFA had contested a doping-related sanction imposed by the CAS before the SFT. Other than in the Guerrero case, the Athlete’s national federation (ASA) had not previously rendered a decision on the Athlete; moreover, national federations are directly concerned by the DSD Regulations to the extent that they need to actively collaborate with their international federation for their effective implementation (Semenya Judgment, at 4.1.3) This means that, in similar cases in the future, member federations have also standing to challenge the validity of such regulations.

Waivers to appeal to the SFT against CAS awards are invalid, full stop.

The waiver to bring the case before the CAS included in the disputed DSD Regulations was, obviously, invalid to the extent that it was not the “fruit of an explicit consent” by the Athlete. The latter had thus the right to contest the CAS Award before the SFT and this federal jurisprudence has remained unaltered since the groundbreaking Cañas SFT judgment (see the Semenya Judgment at 4.2.4).

The CAS independence revisited – even though not questioned by the parties

Unlike other athletes, Caster Semenya did not attack the CAS Award suggesting the lack of independence or impartiality of the CAS—either as an arbitral institution or as the subjective independence of its arbitrators (see the Semenya Judgment at 5.1.2). The SFT still deemed important to repeat its jurisprudence on the institutional independence and the specialized character of the CAS, to which the parties brought their dispute (see the Semenya Judgment including all references to SFT and ECtHR case law at 5.1.2).

The meaning - and limits - of the SFT leitmotiv “facts established by the CAS Panel are binding upon the SFT”

This is the reason most often invoked by the SFT when declaring inadmissible a particular grievance raised by the parties as a “criticism of appellatory nature” (see also “faits constatés dans la sentence” in the Semenya Judgment at 5.2.2). It is well-known that, unlike the de novo review by the CAS under Article R57 CAS Code, the SFT will not review the facts as they were established by the CAS Panel – save for the most exceptional circumstances (see the Semenya Judgment at 5.2.3 f.).

In the particular circumstances of this case, the facts binding on the SFT did not prevent the latter from reviewing the legality of the DSD Regulations. The SFT could however only consider the facts as they were established in the CAS award and not in the parties’ version of facts, to the extent that these versions deviated from the CAS factual findings (see the Semenya Judgment at 6). As such, the starting point for such analysis (and obviously one of key importance) was the Panel’s factual finding that athletes subject to the DSD Regulations enjoy an “overwhelming” advantage over other female athletes that are not subject to such regulations (see the Semenya Judgment -“avantage insurmontable”- at 9.6.2, at 9.8.2 and 11.1).

Swiss law not applicable in the case at hand

With the international federation based in Monaco (an exception to the rule that international federations are based in Switzerland), the CAS Panel proceeded to the interpretation of the DSD Regulations based on the IAAF Constitution and Rules, the Olympic Charter, and Monegasque law. As such, it held that Swiss law was not applicable to the merits and the SFT confirmed such finding (See the Semenya Judgment at 5.1.1). This, however, does not seem to have any influence on the SFT’s findings to the extent that the latter is not an appellate court and should not evaluate the application of Swiss–or any other—law applied in the specific case (see the Semenya Judgment at 9.1).

Violation of the constitution of the panel for unduly limiting its (full) scope of review

The Athlete raised a—rather unusual—ground for annulment (particularly based on the ground of irregular composition of the tribunal) because the panel had allegedly refused to amend or complement the DSD Regulations, thereby unduly limiting its scope of review. The SFT dismissed the plea holding that the full power of review of the panel related to the control of the proportionality of the DSD Regulations and not their amendment. The SFT dismissed the plea as unfounded, even though it implicitly considered that this plea does not even fall within the scope of irregular composition of the arbitral tribunal under Article 190 (2) (a) PILA but could – at most – constitute a violation of the parties’ right to be heard (see the Semenya Judgment -with further references- at 7).

Violation of substantive public policy – the three pleas invoked by the Athlete

Caster Semenya’s request for annulment of the CAS Award due to a violation of substantive public policy was divided into three pleas: the violation of the principle of prohibition of discrimination, the violation of personality rights of the Athlete and the violation of the Athlete’s human dignity. In this respect, the two conflicting groups were the athletes subject to the DSD Regulations against the athletes who were not subject to the DSD Regulations.

Horizontal Application of the Prohibition of discrimination ?

The prohibition of discrimination as foreseen in Art. 8 (2) of the Swiss Constitution applies to the relation between individuals and the State and has no “horizontal” effect. Sports associations are considered “private” parties notwithstanding their size and thus discrimination resulting from such private parties does not form part of the essential values that form public policy. The “private” character of sports associations has long been an obstacle for athletes when invoking violations of their constitutional guarantees and was also mentioned in this judgment (at 9.4).

Notwithstanding its insistence on the “private” character of sports associations, the SFT does seem to hesitantly develop its jurisprudence. Similar to the principles of interpretation under Swiss law, where the SFT has held that statutes of large federations must be interpreted in accordance with the principles of interpretation of a (states’) legal acts (see e.g. the Kuwait Motorsport SFT Judgment), the SFT acknowledged in the Semenya case that the relationship between an athlete and a large (international) sports association bears similarities to the relationship between an individual and a state (see the Semenya Judgment, at 9.4).

In any event, this interesting debate will have to wait for another judgment since the SFT eventually found that there was no violation of the prohibition of the principle of discrimination by following the argumentation of the CAS Panel, whereby a discriminatory measure can still be allowed if justified by a legitimate objective (in casu the principle of equality of chances). In the case at hand, the SFT relied on the assessment made by the CAS Panel which, after hearing all the arguments raised by the parties, resulted in a reasonable outcome (or at least to a “not unreasonable” outcome) (see the Semenya Judgment, at 9.4 and at 9.8.3.3).

Breach of personality rights and the difference from the Matuzalem judgment

On the breach of personality rights plea, the SFT reiterated its limited scope within the public policy grievance, which requires a clear and severe violations of a fundamental right. Again, the DSD Regulations were not found to fall within the (narrow) scope of Art. 27 Swiss CO, neither from the viewpoint of physical integrity nor from the viewpoint of economic freedom (see the Semenya Judgment, at 10.1).

Other than in the Matuzalem case (the first – and only SFT judgment that annulled a CAS award for violation of substantive public policy so far), the athlete would still be capable of participating in the specified competitions after complying with the conditions set out in the DSD Regulations; moreover, there was no imminent risk of their economic existence as was in the Matuzalem case, whereas the measure was found to be able to achieve the desired goal, were necessary and proportionate (see the Semenya Judgment at 10.5).

Violation of human dignity

The SFT seemed to endorse the CAS Panel’s findings in this respect, and concluded that the impossibility to participate in specific competitions would not amount to a violation of the athlete’s human dignity.

Should the SFT broaden the scope of public policy for sports arbitration? The SFT still says “no”

The scope of substantive public policy according to well-established jurisprudence of the SFT is extremely narrow and such limited review is compatible with the ECtHR (see the Semenya Judgment with references to the Platini Judgment at 5.2.5; see also the Semenya Judgment at 9.8.3.3). The SFT, once again, refused to broaden the scope of the public policy as a ground for annulment of CAS awards. This reminds us of a somewhat different yet analogous attempt of the parties in the SFT Judgment 4A_312/2017. The SFT had reiterated its position that there should be no different notion of public policy tailored to sports arbitration.[2]

Closing remarks: The Athlete’s requests for relief and the inherent limits of arbitration in similar cases

It is interesting to note that the Athlete did not appeal to the CAS against a decision finding her ineligible to compete based on the concrete application of the DSD Regulations. She rather filed a claim with the CAS attacking the legality of the DSD Regulations– for all the reasons mentioned in the CAS award and the SFT judgment.

This resulted in the CAS Panel finding – and the SFT confirming - that the DSD Regulations could not be invalidated as such but left the door open for future challenges: the DSD Regulations may prove disproportionate in their application, if e.g. it should prove impossible to apply them, in case of a specific athlete subject to the DSD Regulations where their application proves impossible or disproportionate (see the Semenya Judgment, at 9.8.3.5).

The Athlete would thus – theoretically – be able to file a new case with the CAS, once the DSD Regulations were implemented and following a potential decision on ineligibility. This shows the difficulty in directly challenging a set of regulations in cases where the hearing authority considers that it is rather their application in a concrete case that may give rise to a specific violation of athletes’ rights. The CAS panel, as an arbitral tribunal, is inherently limited by the scope of the appeal, which in the present case was Caster Semenya’s claim to have the DSD Regulations declared invalid as such.

[1] For an insightful overview of the facts behind the judgment and the findings of the SFT, see Marjolaine Viret, Chronicle of a Defeat Foretold: Dissecting the Swiss Federal Tribunal’s Semenya Decision – in the Asser International Sports Law Blog of 9 September 2020.

Editor's note: This report compiles all relevant news, events and materials on International and European Sports Law based on the daily coverage provided on our twitter feed @Sportslaw_asser. You are invited to complete this survey via the comments section below, feel free to add links to important cases, documents and articles we might have overlooked.

The Headlines 

Caster Semenya learns that it is not always easy for victims of discrimination to prevail in court

The world of sport held its breath as the Secretary General of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) Matthieu Reeb stood before the microphones on 1 May 2019 to announce the verdict reached by three arbitrators (one of them dissenting) in the landmark case involving the South African Olympic and world champion Caster Semenya. Somewhat surprisingly, the panel of arbitrators came to the conclusion that the IAAF’s regulations requiring female athletes with differences of sexual development to reduce their natural testosterone level below the limit of 5 nmol/L and maintain that reduced level for a continuous period of at least six months in order to be eligible to compete internationally at events between 400 metres and a mile, were necessary, reasonable and proportionate to attain the legitimate aim of ensuring fair competition in female athletics, even though the panel recognised that the regulations were clearly discriminatory. Ms Semenya’s legal team decided to file an appeal against the ruling at the Swiss Federal Tribunal. For the time being, this appears to be a good move since the tribunal ordered the IAAF at the beginning of June to suspend the application of the challenged regulations to Ms Semenya with immediate effect, which means that Ms Semenya for now continues to run medication-free.

Champions League ban looms on Manchester City

On 18 May 2019, Manchester City completed a historic domestic treble after defeating Watford 6-0 in the FA Cup Final. And yet there is a good reason to believe that the club’s executives did not celebrate as much as they would under normal circumstances. This is because only two days before the FA Cup Final the news broke that the chief investigator of the UEFA Club Financial Control Body (CFCB) had decided to refer Manchester City’s case concerning allegations of financial fair play irregularities to the CFCB adjudicatory chamber for a final decision. Thus, the chief investigator most likely found that Manchester City had indeed misled UEFA over the real value of its sponsorship income from the state-owned airline Etihad and other companies based in Abu Dhabi, as the leaked internal emails and other documents published by the German magazine Der Spiegel suggested. The chief investigator is also thought to have recommended that a ban on participation in the Champions League for at least one season be imposed on the English club. The club’s representatives responded to the news with fury and disbelief, insisting that the CFCB investigatory chamber had failed to take into account a comprehensive body of irrefutable evidence it had been provided with. They eventually decided not to wait for the decision of the CFCB adjudicatory chamber, which is yet to be adopted, and meanwhile took the case to the CAS, filing an appeal against the chief investigator’s referral.

The Brussels Court of Appeal dismisses Striani’s appeal on jurisdictional grounds

The player agent Daniele Striani failed to convince the Brussels Court of Appeal that it had jurisdiction to entertain his case targeting UEFA’s financial fair play regulations. On 11 April 2019, the respective court dismissed his appeal against the judgment of the first-instance court without pronouncing itself on the question of compatibility of UEFA’s financial fair play regulations with EU law. The court held that it was not competent to hear the case because the link between the regulations and their effect on Mr Striani as a player agent, as well as the link between the regulations and the role of the Royal Belgian Football Association in their adoption and enforcement, was too remote (for a more detailed analysis of the decision, see Antoine’s blog here). The Brussels Court of Appeal thus joined the European Court of Justice and the European Commission as both these institutions had likewise rejected to assess the case on its merits in the past.

Sports Law Related Decisions

• Court of Justice of the European Union (General Court) – Judgment in the case Real Madrid Club de Futbol v European Commission

Official Documents and Press Releases

CAS

• CAS – Caster Semenya, Athletics South Africa (ASA) and International Association of Athletics Federation (IAAF): Decision
• CAS – Caster Semenya, Athletics South Africa (ASA) and International Association of Athletics Federation (IAAF): Executive summary
• CAS – Decision in the arbitration procedure between Worawi Makudi and FIFA: Sanction reduced
• CAS – Elections of the Board Members of the International Council of Arbitration for Sport (ICAS)
• CAS – Weighlifters Mikalai Novikau and Ruslan Nurudinov found to have committed anti-doping rule violations at the London 2012 Olympic Games

FIFA

• FIFA – Adjudicatory Chamber of the independent Ethics Committee sanctions Jose Maria Marin
• FIFA – FIFA Appeal Committee confirms ban imposed on Marco Polo Del Nero
• FIFA – FIFA Appeal Committee passes decision on appeal lodged by Chelsea FC
• FIFA – FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022 to be played with 32 teams
• FIFA – Nine individuals sanctioned for match manipulation
• FIFA – RSC Anderlecht and Belgian Football Association sanctioned for international transfers of minors
• FIFA – Worldwide extension of suspension imposed on intermediaries Carmine and Vincenzo Raiola

IOC

• IOC – From food and uniforms to sponsorship deals: IOC guides to help the Olympic Games and the sports sector adopt sustainable sourcing practices
• IOC – Future Olympic Games elections to be more flexible
• IOC – Independent research conducted on behalf of the IOC demonstrates global strength of the Olympic values
• IOC – IOC Evaluation Commission 2026 begins working visit to Milan-Cortina
• IOC – IOC Evaluation Commission confirms passion and expertise of Milan-Cortina project shaped by Olympic Agenda 2020
• IOC – IOC Executive Board proposes 10 new members for election to the IOC Session
• IOC – IOC releases Evaluation Commission 2026 report
• IOC – IOC sanctions one athlete for failing anti-doping tests at London 2012
• IOC – IOC sanctions two athletes for failing anti-doping tests at London 2012
• IOC – Uncovered: The work and value of the IOC Athletes’ Commission

UEFA

• UEFA – AC Milan referred to CFCB Adjudicatory Chamber
• UEFA – CFCB update on 2018/19 monitoring of clubs under FFP settlements
• UEFA – FK Vardar and PFC Levski Sofia avoid potential exclusion from UEFA club competitions
• UEFA – Law changes to apply from 25 June in UEFA competitions
• UEFA – Manchester City referred to CFCB Adjudicatory Chamber
• UEFA – Three clubs exit FFP settlement agreement
• UEFA – Time for Action: First ever UEFA women’s football strategy launched

WADA

• WADA – Timor-Leste becomes 188^th country to ratify UNESCO Anti-Doping Convention
• WADA – WADA announces self-suspension of the Helsinki laboratory
• WADA – WADA congratulates Presidential nominee Witold Banka
• WADA – WADA Foundation Board moves forward with implementation of governance reforms
• WADA – WADA hails 30^th Anniversary of Council of Europe Anti-Doping Convention
• WADA – WADA publishes four new Technical Documents
• WADA – WADA publishes independent report into allegations of improper conduct
• WADA – WADA publishes revised International Standard for Laboratories
• WADA – WADA publishes Stakeholder Notice regarding meat contamination
• WADA – WADA reinstates Bucharest Laboratory
• WADA – WADA statement on refusal of Beckie Scott and Edwin Moses to cooperate with independent investigation
• WADA – WADA successfully retrieves samples from Moscow Laboratory
• WADA – WADA welcomes significant decision by Court of Arbitration for Sport

Other

• AIU (Athletics Integrity Unit) – After Ukraine sprinters’ ban, AIU to extend its blood profiling strategy ahead of the IAAF World Championships Doha 2019
• AIU (Athletics Integrity Unit) – Athletics Integrity Unit and Abbott World Marathon Majors announce new intelligence and testing programme in groundbreaking anti-doping initiative
• Centre for Sport and Human Rights – Mapping accountability and remedy mechanisms for sport
• CIES Football Observatory World football expatriates: Global study 2019
• CIES Sports Intelligence – Governance and financial landscape of top European football clubs
• Council of Europe Ground-breaking international treaty on match-fixing to enter into force in September
• Human Rights Watch – Belarus: Use European games to spur media freedom
• IAAF – IAAF letter to the World Medical Association
• IAAF – IAAF publishes briefing notes and Q&A on female eligibility regulations
• TIU (Tennis Integrity Unit) – Benjamin D’Hoe suspended and fined for betting on tennis
• TIU (Tennis Integrity Unit) – Brazilian tennis player Joao Souza provisionally suspended by independent Anti-corruption Hearing Officer
• TIU (Tennis Integirty Unit) – Independent Anti-corruption Hearing Officer suspends Osman Torski for breach of the Tennis Anti-corruption programme
• TIU (Tennis Integrity Unit) – Independent members appointed to the Supervisory Board for Tennis Integrity
• TIU (Tennis Integrity Unit) – Issam Taweel found guilty of match-fixing offences by independent Anti-corruption Hearing Officer
• TIU (Tennis Integrity Unit) – Lifetime ban and $20,000 fine for Helen Ploskina after being found guilty of match-fixing offences
• TIU (Tennis Integrity Unit) – Nigerian tennis player Henry Atseye provisionally suspended by independent Anti-corruption Hearing Officer
• TIU (Tennis Integrity Unit) – Suspended sentence and fine for Mohamed Safwat after failing to report corrupt approaches to the Tennis Integrity Unit
• TIU (Tennis Integrity Unit) – Tennis coach Miguel Tobon suspended and fined for selling wild cards
• TIU (Tennis Integrity Unit) – Tennis umpire Svetlana Teryaeva facing sanction after failing to report a corrupt approach to the Tennis Integrity Unit
• TIU (Tennis Integrity Unit) – The Tennis Integrity Unit and Marco Trungelliti
• UCI (Union Cycliste Internationale) – UCI declaration concerning E-mountain bike
• UCI (Union Cycliste Internationale) – UCI statement on Operation Aderlass
• UOKiK (Office of Competition and Consumer Protection in Poland) – UOKiK will inspect sports associations
• World Medical Association Physician leaders reaffirm opposition to IAAF rules

In the news

Doping

• ESPN Kenya’s Olympic track coach banned 10 years
• Sean Ingle World’s top marathon runners to face innovative anti-doping programme
• Duncan Mackay Critics of WADA decision to reinstate Russia care more about politics than clean sport, claims President Sir Craig Reedie
• Michael Pavitt Arrests made in France over alleged drug trafficking operation
• Michael Pavitt Biathlon Integrity Unit to be set up by IBU in response to doping, fraud and corruption allegations
• Eddie Pells Polish minister to lead WADA; outspoken candidate sidelined
• Dan Roan US proposes making WADA funding conditional on governance reforms and greater transparency
• Gabrielle Tetrault-Farber Russian anti-doping chief calls for dismissal of athletics federation head

Football

• Associated Press FIFA bans South Sudanese official for taking soccer money
• BBC Sport Mino Raiola: Paul Pogba’s agent banned for three months by FIFA
• Andy Brown Bulgaria relegates FC Vereya on receipt of UEFA match-fixing information
• David Conn 2022 World Cup in Qatar to remain as a 32-team tournament, FIFA announces
• David Conn Manchester City accuse UEFA of leaks amid Champions League ban threat
• David Conn Manchester City furious after UEFA investigation is sent for final judgment
• David Conn Premier League clubs’ record £4.8 billion revenues widens gap to rest of Europe
• David Conn Premier League finances: The full club-by-club breakdown and verdict
• David Conn Promotion and relegation part of explosive Champions League plans
• Marina Hyde UEFA’s ‘parking ticket’ fines will not rein in football’s maverick clubs
• Sean Ingle Manchester City and PSG should be thrown out of Europe, says La Liga president
• Amy Lawrence and Sean Ingle Arsenal’s Henrikh Mkhitaryan to miss Europa League final over safety fears
• Liam Morgan Sierra Leone could be welcomed back by FIFA after president and secretary general cleared of corruption
• Tariq Panja A trove of FIFA secrets, locked inside a New Jersey storage locker
• Tariq Panja Bundesliga’s chief executive isn’t keen to join Premier League
• Tariq Panja China’s soccer push takes a new tack: Naturalizing foreign players
• Tariq Panja FIFA drops plan for 48-team World Cup in 2022
• Tariq Panja For Europe’s soccer chief, the outrage arrives in waves
• Tariq Panja In Europe, a bitter battle between clubs and leagues is taking shape
• Tariq Panja In soccer’s biggest elections, accusations are common but challengers are not
• Tariq Panja Powerful Sheikh linked to bribe scheme is still a soccer power
• Tariq Panja Proposal to restructure Champions League leaves out most of Europe
• Tariq Panja Sepp Blatter, who departed FIFA in scandal, wants the watches he left at the office
• Tariq Panja She has friends at FIFA. At home, it’s mostly critics.
• Tariq Panja UEFA investigators set to seek Manchester City’s ban from Champions League
• Martyn Ziegler Europa League final: Azerbaijan, the host country where journalist Rasim Aliyev was killed for criticising Azerbaijan midfielder Javid Huseynov 

Other

• Eyewitness News Kenya drops two female sprinters over testosterone levels
• Nancy Gillen FIVB to refer human rights abuse allegations surrounding Cambodian Volleyball Federation President to ethics panel
• Mark Gleeson South African government instructs athletics body to appeal Semenya decision
• Gerald Imray Defiant Caster Semenya appeals testosterone ruling
• Sean Ingle AIBA threatens to sue IOC if stripped of right to run amateur boxing
• Sean Ingle AIBA stripped of right to run boxing tournament at Tokyo Olympics
• Sean Ingle BeIN Sports chief in World Athletics Championships corruption inquiry
• Sean Ingle Caster Semenya Q&A: The runner’s discrimination case explained
• Sean Ingle Semenya loses landmark legal case against IAAF over testosterone levels
• Sean Ingle Caster Semenya vs. IAAF: The inside story of sporting trial of the century
• Sean Ingle Caster Semenya to run in Doha as Sebastian Coe welcomes CAS ruling
• Duncan Mackay Italian government to sign IOC guarantees for Milan Cortina 2026, including EUR 415 million security budget
• Liam Morgan German athletes group steps up call for increased representation and bigger share of Olympic revenue
• Tariq Panja After Semenya ruling, sports federations ponder what’s next
• Tariq Panja Qatari executive is charged with corruption in IAAF scandal
• Michael Pavitt Bach tells athletes to begin negotiations with NOCs over Rule 40 restrictions
• Michael Pavitt GAISF considers establishing office to lobby European Union and create framework over third-party organisers
• Michael Pavitt UCI President fears ‘serious issue’ after arbitrators asked to choose between working exclusively for CAS or international federations
• Mike Rowbottom Message to the Olympic Movement in the face of new commercial threats – keep the athletes’ eyes on the golden prize
• Mike Rowbottom IOC maintains German athletes’ court decision over Rule 40 is ‘not generally applicable’
• Stephen Wade and Mari Yamaguchi IOC inspectors face report on tough Olympic work conditions
• Martyn Ziegler Sport won’t be overrun by intersex athletes, says Caster Semenya’s expert witness

Academic Materials

Books

•  Johan Lindholm The Court of Arbitration for Sport and its Jurisprudence: An Empirical Inquiry into Lex Sportiva

International Sports Law Journal

• H. Burak Gemalmaz Applicability of Human Rights Standards in Turkish Football Arbitration: The Contribution of the European Court of Human Rights
• Lloyd Freeburn The Fiction of Democracy in FIFA’s Governance of Football and the Case of Football Federation Australia
• Marlaina Lemmon Evening the Playing Field: Women’s Sport as a Vehicle for Human Rights
• Kendra Magraw Separation of Sport and State: Military Salutations at US Major League Soccer Events
• Daniel West Revitalising a Phantom Regime: The Adjudication of Human Rights Complaints in Sport

Other

• April Henning and Paul Dimeo Perceptions of Legitimacy, Attitudes and Buy-in Among Athlete Groups: A Cross-national Qualitative Investigation Providing Practical Solutions
• Seema Patel and Ian Varley Exploring the Regulation of Genetic Testing in Sport

Blog

Asser International Sports Law Blog

• Antoine Duval What Happens in Switzerland Stays in Switzerland: The Striani Judgment of the Brussels Court of Appeals
• Daniela Heerdt Will the World Cup 2022 Expansion Mark the Beginning of the End of FIFA’s Human Rights Journey?
• Thomas Terraz Can European Citizens Participate in National Championships? An Analysis of AG Tanchev’s Opinion in TopFit e.V. Daniele Biffi v Deutscher Leichtathletikverband e.V.
• Thomas Terraz League of Legends European Championships: Challenging the Boundaries of Sport in EU Law
• Marjolaine Viret How Data Protection Crystallises Key Legal Challenges in Anti-Doping

Law in Sport

• Jiri Janak Judicial oversight of sports associations in the Czech Republic – does the new Civil Code strike the right balance between autonomy and intervention?
• Lucio Mazzei The global development of women’s football – a review of the strategies being implemented by FIFA, UEFA and in Italy
• Adam Powell Stadium naming deals: Why clubs and sponsors should always consider their termination rights
• Andrew Reid Football kit supplier deals – lessons for clubs on ‘matching rights’ from the Sports Direct v Rangers FC case
• Celia Rooney Sex on a spectrum in the binary world of sport: The CAS’s decision in the case of Caster Semenya & Ors v the IAAF

Other

• Andy Brown Red herrings, dead cats, apples and oranges: The gender debate
• Steve Cornelius Caster Semenya: The legal and ethical issues that should concern us all
• Sam Knight How Football Leaks is exposing corruption in European soccer
• Steve Magness All of your questions answered on the Caster Semenya controversy
• Despina Mavromati FIM v. KMSC – Arbitration clause in the statutes of a sports federation and Article 75 Swiss Civil Code
• Michael McCann U.S. soccer, Relevent Sports and the legal battle over staging matches on USA soil
• Roger Pielke Jr Caster Semenya ruling: Sports federation is flouting ethics rules
• Roger Pielke Jr. Pielke comments on Semenya/ASA vs. IAAF

Upcoming Events

• 30 June -14 July – CLS Summer School 2019: Global Law of Sport, Patejdlova Bouda, Giant Mountains, Czech Republic
• 30-31 August – Third EU Sports Law and Policy Summer School, Edge Hill University, UK
• 12-13 September – Understand the Rules of the Game 2019: LawInSport Annual Conference, London, UK
• 27-28 September – 8^th International Congress on Football Law, Madrid, Spain
• 13-16 October – Play the Game 2019: Athlete Power on the Rise, Colorado Springs, USA
• 24-25 October – Third Annual International Sports Law Conference of the International Sports Law Journal, T.M.C. Asser Institute, The Hague, Netherlands

Editor’s Note: Saverio Spera is an Italian lawyer and LL.M. graduate in International Business Law at King’s College London. He is currently an intern at the ASSER International Sports Law Centre. 

This blog is a follow up to my previous contribution on the validity of Unilateral Extension Options (hereafter UEOs) under national and European law. It focuses on the different approaches taken to UEOs by the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber (DRC) and the Court of arbitration for sport (CAS). While in general the DRC has adopted a strict approach towards their validity, the CAS has followed a more liberal trend. Nonetheless, the two judicial bodies share a common conclusion: UEOs are not necessarily invalid. In this second blog I will provide an overview of the similarities and differences of the two judicial bodies in tackling UEOs.

The emergence and function of the Portmann criteria

Since their first appearance in a case widely known as the South American Bosman for the impact it had on the whole system of contracts established by the Uruguayan Football Association, the so-called ‘Portmann’ criteria are often referred to in decisions on the validity of UEOs.^[1] In short, these criteria provide that:

1. the potential maximum duration of the employment relationship must not be excessive;
2. the option has to be exercised within an acceptable deadline before the expiry of the current contract;
3. the original contract has to define the salary raise triggered by the extension;
4. the content of the contract must not result in putting one party at the mercy of the other, and;
5. the option has to be clearly emphasized in the original contract so that the player can have full consciousness of it at the moment of signing.^[2]

These five requirements, proposed by Prof Wolfgang Portmann, were meant to represent the standard UEOs had to meet in order to be considered valid and biding upon the players. More precisely, in order not to constitute an excessive self-commitment that would result in a violation of Swiss ordre public.^[3] They emerged in the course of the South American Bosman as Prof. Portmann’s report was presented by Atlético Peñarol in the (unsuccessful) attempt to uphold the validity of the unilateral option the club had used in its employment contracts. From that moment on, the Portmann criteria became a recurrent theme in decisions by the DRC and the CAS. However, these criteria have been used over the years in a rather incoherent fashion and their importance in the assessment of UEOs is not unequivocal.

Thereafter, in its first decision, the DRC used the criteria to assess the validity of an UEO.^[4] But then it drastically drifted away from them. Actually, in the ensuing decisions the DRC did not refer to the five conditions at all. In some instances it limited itself to recall its established jurisprudence finding the validity of UEOs disputable since they give the stronger party in the employment relationship the power to unilaterally extend or terminate the contract.^[5] In another occasion, the DRC expressly dismissed the binding effect of the Portmann report, underlining that it only constitutes a non-binding recommendation.^[6]

Furthermore, interestingly, in the appeal proceedings of the Atlético Peñarol case the CAS did not mention the Portmann report in its evaluation of the UEO. The Panel only referred to it in the part of the award that assessed the question of the applicable law and noted that Prof Portmann’s starting point was radically different from that of the Panel, as he deemed Uruguayan law applicable to the dispute, while the Panel applied Swiss law/the RSTP.^[7] Having said that, the CAS also seems to have departed from its initial approach, but in a rather different way than the DRC. In an early award of 2007, the CAS refused to give too much weight to the Portmann report and focused its reasoning on other circumstances.^[8] Yet, the ensuing awards did not follow suit on this approach. In its more recent awards, the CAS held that the criteria constitute soft guidelines and often de facto relied on them to reach its conclusion on the validity of an option.^[9] In one occasion, the CAS even added to the list of requirements two criteria, “emanating from recent developments in the FIFA DRC and CAS jurisprudence”, namely (i) the proportionality between the extension and the main contract and (ii) the desirable limitation of the number of extensions to one.^[10]

Regarding the relevance of the Portmann criteria, it seems that the only shared trait between the DRC and the CAS is that both have drifted away from their approach. Though, in quite opposite ways. 

Increase in salary as a sine qua non condition for the validity of UEOs

The question of the increase of the player’s salary is considered central, by both the DRC and the CAS, in deciding the validity of UEOs.

In fact, an improvement of the player’s salary is considered by the DRC as a possible ‘validating’ circumstance since the first published decision on the issue.^[11] The FIFA Chamber placed particular emphasis on the necessity to offset the unequal bargaining power that UEOs give to football clubs. To do that, a significant economic gain for the player must be envisaged in the contract as a result of the extension. In the view of the DRC, this is a necessary but sometimes not sufficient condition for the validity of a UEO, since the specification of the financial terms of the renewal in advance “necessarily cannot take into account, neither by the player nor the club, the possible enhancement of the player’s value, and hence earning power, over a two year period”.^[12]

In its awards on the matter, the CAS contends that the player must derive a clear economic advantage from the exercise of the option.^[13] Thus, the increase in salary is the only requirement that is fully embraced by both the DRC and the CAS. It is interesting to note, however, that in only one occasion did the CAS explicitly mentioned that “[e]ven if the financial terms had to be specified in advance, they necessarily take no account of the possible enhancement of a players value – and hence earning power – over a five year period e.g.: if he becomes an international player during that time”.^[14] It is also worth noting that, at least in one award, the CAS concluded that an increase in salary has to be evaluated only in relation to the previous economic conditions of the player’s contract and not in relation to the salary he could earn somewhere else.^[15]

In light of the above, it is safe to conclude that an UEO coming with a substantial increase in salary for the player has good chances to be deemed valid by the DRC and the CAS. To this end, a few additional observations are relevant. Firstly, how much is enough? Unfortunately, no clear guidelines can be derived from the case law. Secondly, it is practically impossible to predict the increase in value of a football player over a long-term period. Consequently, what can be considered a reasonable increase in salary at the signing of the contract might be deemed insufficient a few years later. Lastly, and probably most importantly, this approach might overlook the fact that an increase in salary is not always the only element a footballer takes into account in his career, as sometimes more personal considerations might push a player to move to a different club in another country. For instance family reasons might play a significant role in such a decision. Furthermore, football players might often consider more convenient for the development of their careers to give up on an increase in salary in order to have the chance to move to a club with more playing opportunities. An increase in salary, even substantial, should not be the altar on which a footballer’s fundamental freedom of movement and, ultimately, of choice is sacrificed.

The player’s behaviour

The player’s stance has often been evaluated by the DRC in particular as a concurrent element in determining the validity of an UEO. The main argument is that a certain behaviour of the player, such as keeping training and playing official matches with the club, implies a tacit acceptance of the extension. Once again, the DRC and the CAS are not entirely on the same line. The DRC jurisprudence gives more weight to this aspect, while the CAS has mentioned that particular attention has to be paid to “the player’s conduct during the period leading to the negotiation of the alleged extension clause” only in one single case.^[16]

With regards to the circumstance that the player has played in official matches as a consequence of the extension, the DRC showed a swinging trend. In one instance, it deemed it not relevant.^[17] Yet, in a subsequent decision (the only one by the DRC upholding the validity of an UEO to date), the fact that the player had kept taking part in training sessions and playing official matches for the club after the extension had quite a different impact on the reasoning of the Chamber.^[18] More recently, the DRC stated that the fact that the player trained with the club for a month after the alleged renewal does not imply his tacit acceptance of the unilateral extension.^[19]

The applicable law

As seen in the first part of this blog, each national jurisdiction interprets the validity of UEOs differently. Consequently, the choice of applicable law can play a major role in the outcome of a case, although the issue arises mainly when the dispute is brought before the CAS. The matter is complicated by the fact that CAS panels have a certain degree of discretion in deciding the law applicable to a dispute, and by the circumstance that even when they apply the same law they might reach different conclusions. With regard to the latter point, let us take into consideration two cases in which the CAS has established Greek law as the applicable law. In one occasion the Panel deemed “appropriate to mitigate the letter of Greek law by the spirit of general principles”, as its content concerning UEOs was considered inconsistent with “general principles of labour law”^[20] and consequently dismissed the appeal of the club. In another one, instead, the Panel concluded that the dispute had to be decided according to FIFA Regulations and Swiss law on a subsidiary basis, “with the important exception of any issues related to the Contract […] which shall be decided in accordance with Greek law”.^[21] Therefore, given that in Greece unilateral options allowing clubs to automatically extend employment contracts are legal, the Panel upheld the validity of the clause.^[22]

A radically different approach was taken by the CAS in the Atlético Peñarol case discussed above. In the absence of an express choice of law of the parties, the Panel deemed the FIFA Regulations and, subsidiarily, Swiss Law applicable. It is worth recalling the reasoning of the Panel, as it could pave the way to a reasonable solution for the UEOs issue. The arbitrators noted that the application of art. 187 of the Swiss LDIP gives wide freedom of choice to the parties, who can even require the arbitrators to decide ex aequo et bono, i.e. without any reference to specific State laws. This means that art. 187 LDIP allows, a fortiori, to refer to rules that transcend the particular State laws, such as sports regulations. The Panel stressed that sport is a phenomenon that naturally crosses borders, and thus it is necessary to ensure uniform legal standards. Only if the same terms and conditions apply to everyone who participates in organised sport, is the integrity and equal opportunity of sporting competition guaranteed. In practice, the FIFA Statutes and Regulations provide such uniform rules. Additionally, the arbitrators underlined that the application of Uruguayan law would lead to a result incompatible with the minimum standards of protection of employees provided by Swiss labour law. Hence, the CAS concluded that the Uruguayan system of UEOs is not compatible with the FIFA Regulations. Furthermore, the Panel noted that these options effectively bypass the basic principles of the FIFA regulations, which “very particularly protect the interests of training clubs through training compensation and the solidarity contribution […] It is not possible that this protection of the contents of a contract between clubs and players can be bypassed in order to serve only the interests of one party, in this case the club, which does not itself have to make a commitment. So the Panel considers that the unilateral contract renewal system is not compatible, in its very principle, with the legal framework which the new FIFA rules were designed to introduce”.^[23] In other words, the Uruguayan system seemed to reintroduce, through the backdoor, the system that was abolished with the reforms of the FIFA Regulations 1997, 2001 and 2005.^[24]In such a system the player is bound to a contract negotiated at a moment of his career when he did not have a strong bargaining power. Which is to say, the player is left at the mercy of the club. The arbitrators stressed that only the most talented players can escape this mechanism, when the club receives an important transfer offer for their services.^[25]In that occasion, the player will hardly refuse the transfer knowing that, doing otherwise, he will be bound to the club because of the UEO in his contract.

Conclusions: The way forward

We have seen in part 1 of this blog that we lack a coherent regulatory framework for UEOs at the national level. This second part has also shown that things are not much clearer at the DRC and the CAS, as the two bodies, while agreeing on the existence of certain criteria, take different approaches on the assessment of each of them (except for the increase in salary). Furthermore, the outcome of a case can be heavily dependent on the applicable law. Consequently, the future validity of UEOs is uncertain, given that no uniformity can be found in the CAS jurisprudence.

The uncertainties related to the applicable law issue are manifold. Upholding the validity of national law, although granting some advantages in terms of foreseeability, presents two main drawbacks. First of all for the clubs which draft the contracts and cannot predict to what extent this law will be deemed applicable by the CAS and, consequently, are unable to draft the contract with all the necessary information desirable in respect to UEO clauses.^[26]Secondly, and most importantly, this approach overlooks the fact that football is a global phenomenon, and the transfer market a transnational one, which requires uniform rules at the international level.

The conclusion reached by the Panel in the Atlético Peñarol case is a fair starting point in the quest for more certainty in the matter. The undisputable merit of that award was to clearly highlight (i) the unequal nature of a clause that is accepted by the player at the early stages of his career and (ii) the necessity to have a body of regulations that can be understood and predicted by the entire international football family.[27] Let us conclude, therefore, that only the universal application of a set of regulations, such as the FIFA RSTP, would ensure legal rationality, predictability and, significantly, “the equality of treatment between all the addressees of such regulations, independently of the countries from which they are”.^[28] A fortiori, when at stake is the fundamental freedom of movement and choice of footballers, the need to rely on a uniform body of principles and rules, a lex sportiva, universally applicable without discrimination becomes crucial.

However, applying the FIFA Regulations in a standardised way still leaves a problem unsolved. This body of rules is in fact silent on the very issue of UEOs. FIFA could tackle the issue in a variety of ways, for instance by codifying in the RSTP a revisited version of the Portmann criteria. Suggesting precise reforms to FIFA goes beyond the purpose of this blog, but one thing is sure: in the face of the extreme uncertainty that surrounds the validity of these clauses, having one single body of rules expressly targeting the issue and universally applicable would be of great help to all the parties involved.

[1] The case concerned the contracts of two Uruguayan players, Carlos Heber Bueno Suárez and Christian Gabriel Rodríguez Barotti with the Uruguayan football club Atlético Peñarol. Pursuant to their contracts, the professional services of Bueno and Rodríguez could be extended unilaterally by the club for two years, provided that their salary would increase in accordance with the National Consumer Price Index. At the end of the season, and after being suspended and deprived of the possibility of playing for four months, the players signed for the French club Paris Saint Germain, and refused the club’s unilateral extension. See TAS 2005/A/983 & 984, Club Atlético Peñarol v. Carlos Heber Buen Suárez, Christian Gabriel Rodríguez Barotti & Paris Saint Germain, award of 12 July 2006. In fact, the framework has slightly changed over the last few years in South America. In Argentina, for instance, the 2009 Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) n. 557/09, signed by the Association de Futbol Argentino (AFA) and the Union of Amateur and Professional Football Player provides the current guidelines. In this context, contracts of athletes who have reached the age of 21 can be extended once for one year only, provided that a salary increase of 20% is guaranteed as a consequence of the extension. Extension options for players older than 21 shall be considered null and void, even in the circumstance that AFA has registered the contract, and consequently the player is to be declared a free agent and thus free to sign a contract with another club (see Colucci, Hendricks, Regulating Employment Relationships in Professional Football, A Comparative Analysis, European Sports Law and Policy Bulletin 1/2014, 26). See also Juan de Dios Crespo Pérez’s commentary of the case in A. Wild (ed.) CAS and Football: Landmark Cases (2011), 118. 

[2] F. de Weger, The Jurisprudence of the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber, 169.

[3] Prof Portmann considered South American law the law applicable to the substance of the matter. Nevertheless, according to the author, in order to be considered valid, the option not only had to be consistent with local employment law, Collective Bargaining Agreements and regulations of the relevant national association, but it also had to respect mandatory rules of Swiss law and Swiss ordre public. Although he considered the principle of parity of termination rights not part of ordre public per se (and, therefore, the circumvention of that right that these clauses entail not problematic in itself), he stressed that an excessive self-commitment of one of the parties to a contract could indeed result in an infringement of Swiss and international ordre public.

[4] In the unpublished decision 12 January 2007 (see F. de Weger, The Jurisprudence of the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber, 169), the DRC made reference to the five elements of the Portmann report to conclude that the option was not valid because, among other considerations, the notice period was too short.

[5] See decision 30 November 2007 n. 117707 and decision 7 May 2008 n. 58860.

[6] See decision18 March 2010 n. 310607, where the DRC interestingly pointed out that the inequality derives from the fact that the player, given the circumstances of contractual inferiority existing at the time he signs his first contract, either accepts the contract with the UEO or gives up on playing football with that team.

[7] TAS 2005/A/983 & 984, Club Atlético Peñarol v. Carlos Heber Buen Suárez, Christian Gabriel Rodríguez Barotti & Paris Saint Germain, award of 12 July 2006, para. 66.

[8] CAS 2006/A/1157, Club Atlético Boca Juniors v. Genoa Cricket and Football Club S.p.A., Award of 31 January 2007, para. 16. The Panel had “great difficulty in following Dr Portmann’s reasoning, and in accepting the validity and enforceability of a unilateral option”. The arbitrators deemed more important, instead, to put emphasis on the general assumption that a person, and a fortiori a minor who had just moved with his family to another country, cannot be required to perform a contract for personal services against his or her will.

[9] The CAS held recently that “these criteria may be taken into consideration and are important, but […] they are not absolute rules, the failure of which would determine the absolute invalidity of the option clause”, in CAS 2014/A/3852, Ascoli Calcio 1898 S.p.A. v. Papa Waigo N’diaye & Al Wahda Sprts and Cultural Club, award of 11 January 2016, para. 86.

[10] More precisely, a Panel held “the need to not accord too much weight and value to the Portmann criteria at the expense of the very important specifics and circumstances behind each individual dispute” CAS 2013/A/3260, Grêmio Foot-ball Porto Alegrense v. Maximiliano Gastón López, Award of 4 March 2014, para. 76, see also para. 68-69.

[11] In Decision 22 July 2004, the DRC noted that because the player’s economic conditions remained substantially unaltered in the renewal, the option was invalid.

[12] See Decision 23 March 2006, para 14. In this case, the DRC deemed that a monthly increase of less than € 1.000 of the player’s salary could not be seen as a significant economic gain for the player.

[13] See CAS 2004/A/678, Apollon Kalamarias F.C. v. Oliveira Morais, award of 20 May 2005, para. 21 and TAS 2005/A/983 & 984, Club Atlético Peñarol v. Carlos Heber Buen Suárez, Christian Gabriel Rodríguez Barotti & Paris Saint Germain, award of 12 July 2006, para. 93. See also CAS 2005/A/973, Panathinaikos Football Club v. Sotirios Kyrgiakos, Award of 10 October 2006 and CAS 2013/A/3260, Grêmio Foot-ball Porto Alegrense v. Maximiliano Gastón López, Award of 4 March 2014, para. 77.

[14] CAS 2004/A/678, Apollon Kalamarias F.C. v. Oliveira Morais, award of 20 May 2005, para 21.

[15] See CAS 2005/A/973, Panathinaikos Football Club v. Sotirios Kyrgiakos, Award of 10 October 2006, para. 23. In which the Panel considered inappropriate to compare between the salary of the extended contract from the Greek club and the salary the footballer would have received at a club in the Scottish league (the Rangers FC) since “it is well known that football clubs operating in richer markets are able to offer a higher income to players”.

[16] CAS 2013/A/3260, Grêmio Foot-ball Porto Alegrense v. Maximiliano Gastón López, Award of 4 March 2014, para. 70.

[17] See Decision 13 May 2005. Here the DRC also pointed out the non-decisiveness of the acceptance by the player of a payment of €1,950 after the extension as a result of the new contract.

[18] See Decision 21 February 2006, in which the DRC noted that: (i) the player had waited almost five months after the beginning of the extension to bring the case before the FIFA.

[19] See Decision 31 July 2013.

[20] CAS 2004/A/678, Apollon Kalamarias F.C. v. Oliveira Morais, award of 20 May 2005, para 24. The Panel dismissed the appeal of the club even though its contract with the player seemed to be drafted in conformity with Greek Sports Law, which – pursuant to Law 2725/99 – allows for the unilateral renewal of the contract provided that (i) the overall duration of the contract, including the extensions, does not exceed five years and that (ii) the financial terms are agreed at the signing of the initial contract.

[21] CAS 2005/A/973, Panathinaikos Football Club v. Sotirios Kyrgiakos, Award of 10 October 2006, para.10.

[22] The Panel, which considered “inappropriate to apply substantive Swiss law to the contract as it has no connection whatsoever with Switzerland (para. 8), made reference to the same Law 2725/99.

[23] TAS 2005/A/983 & 984, Club Atlético Peñarol v. Carlos Heber Buen Suárez, Christian Gabriel Rodríguez Barotti & Paris Saint Germain, award of 12 July 2006, paras. 81-83 (the translation is of the author).

[24] Ibid., para. 80.

[25] Ibid., para. 79.

[26] Ibid.

[27] J-S Leuba, R Fox, J de Dios Crespo Pérez, G L Acosta Perez and F m de Weger, ‘Contractual Stability: Unilateral Options’, in A. Wild (ed.) CAS and Football: Landmark Cases (2011), 119.

[28] Ibid.

Editor's note: Faraz Shahlaei is a JSD Candidate at Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. His research and teaching interests are public international law, international sports law, international human rights and dispute resolution.

The issue of international human rights was a central contention in Caster Semenya case ever since the start of her legal battle against the regulations of the IAAF. However, the human rights arguments were poorly considered in the two proceedings related to this case. To put it in perspective, it is like having a key player nailed to the bench throughout the whole game; no coach ever tried to give it a chance while it had the potential to be the game changer for all parties.

In 2019, the Human Rights Council, the inter-governmental human rights body of the UN, expressed concern over issues of discrimination in sports in particular regarding IAAF female classification regulations. In June 2020, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights submitted a report to the United Nations Human Rights Council on the “Intersection of Race and Gender Discrimination in Sport”. The report draws a detailed picture of how human rights in the Semenya case have been violated and also elaborates on the inherent problem of addressing human rights issues in alternative dispute resolution mechanisms favored by the sport governing bodies. However, despite an in-depth discussion of Caster Semenya’s case at both the CAS and then the SFT, the question of human rights, a key concern and a fundamental pillar of the case, hasn’t been adequately answered yet!

The following arguments are intended to discuss how international human rights law, has not been properly examined in Caster Semenya’s case:

1.     CAS arbitral panels are not primarily concerned with the application of international human rights law since sport arbitrations are conducted based on regulations of sport governing bodies, predominantly in the absence of a human rights clause within that framework (OHCHR, para 44). Even if they were, a proper consideration of human rights aspects in any dispute, including whether there is a necessary, proportional and legitimate exception to the human rights rule or whether there are more important rights worthy of protection, needs individuals that are knowledgeable about the international human rights system to carefully scrutinize the issues based on human rights norms. Even if the CAS includes human rights experts in its pool of arbitrators, there are still questions regarding the dependability and the weight of their interpretation of the human rights treaties considering their appointment process by private actors in compare with for example judges in the ICJ, ECtHR or members of the UN treaty bodies.

2.     The Semenya case is a suitable example of this gap. In fact, when it comes to the issue of discrimination and international human rights law, the panel finds the UN amicus curiae and other expert submissions useless (CAS, para 554). The panel argues that the submissions failed to address the three-prong spear of necessity, proportionality and legitimacy and therefore are not helpful for the task in front of the panel. Despite acknowledging the relevancy of some human rights arguments (CAS, para 554), the panel finds a more important value to protect, namely: fairness in sports; and builds up its analysis of necessity, proportionality and legitimacy based on this concept. Whether this assessment is in line with international human rights, remains a question since the issue has not been considered by a panel with adequate human rights expertise. The player is on the bench!

3.     Furthermore, the issue of female athletes’ eligibility is not related only to gender-based discrimination. As the report of the OHCHR makes clear it is also about the right to work and just and favorable working conditions; the right to highest attainable standards of physical and mental health; the right to sexual and reproductive health; prohibition of arbitrary interference with privacy; the right to bodily integrity and the right to human dignity (OHCHR, para 34). None of these rights have been considered in the CAS award and subsequently by the SFT within the international human rights law context.

4.     More importantly, the enforcement of DSD regulations raises questions regarding the prohibition of torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment (OHCHR, para 34(a)). The OHCHR report explains that enforcement of DSD regulations are “medically unnecessary, and potentially harmful” (para. 32), brings the targeted individuals with “shame and ridicule” (para. 33), inflicts physical and psychological harm (para 34(c)) and is a form of forced medical intervention (para 34 (c)) which triggers issues related to article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. This prohibition in most cases trumps any exception or justification. Therefore, Article 7 of the ICCPR on prohibition of torture, cruel, degrading and inhuman treatment, ratified by Monaco in 1997, can be a potentially bigger threat to DSD regulations rather than the issue of non-discrimination.

5.     Challenging an arbitral award in national jurisdictions, other than the public policy grounds, is limited to issues pertinent to procedural matters. Therefore, the scope of reviewing the issues at stake in the arbitral award is very limited and if any of the above rights have not been already scrutinized during the arbitration, they will fall outside the scope of the appeal. For example, the SFT finds that the contradiction of taking oral contraceptives with religious and moral values of the individual is an inadmissible claim since it hasn’t been raised in front of the CAS at the first place (para 10.6).

6.     A fundamental discordance between the human rights framework and the approach adopted by the SFT, emerges when the SFT argues that the non-discrimination principle based on the Swiss Constitution is restricted to the treatment of individuals by public entities not private bodies such as sport organizations (para 9.4). Nevertheless, the SFT observes that sport governing bodies possess a status similar to states (which is in itself an interesting finding and I will touch upon this later in this note) and then deals with public policy grounds. However, the legal protections in international human rights law are of a different nature. Positive obligations of the states in guaranteeing the enforcement of human rights norms within their jurisdiction is an indispensable part of the legal regime created by international human rights law. The UN Human Rights Committee is clear when it states “the positive obligations on States Parties to ensure Covenant rights will only be fully discharged if individuals are protected by the State, not just against violations of Covenant rights by its agents, but also against acts committed by private persons or entities that would impair the enjoyment of Covenant rights in so far as they are amenable to application between private persons or entities”. The practice of international courts and tribunals corroborates this view where in many cases public officials were held accountable for failing to do their due diligence in preventing human rights violations within their jurisdictions (See e.g. Fadeyeva v. Russia, paras 89-93; CCPR Concluding Observations on Germany, para 16).

7.     The SFT delves into the public policy issues and by relying on the findings of the CAS (para 9.8.2; 9.8.3.1) comes to the same conclusion as to the priority and legitimacy of the principle of fairness in sports (para 9.8.3.3, 9.8.3.4) and ultimately finds no breach of public policy (para 10.7). Based on paragraph 1 and 2 of this note, the analysis of the CAS, which the SFT relies upon it, is disputable from the human rights perspective.

8.     The SFT refers to the decision of the ECtHR in FNASS and others v. France and finds the analysis applicable to this case. This seems reasonable as both cases are justifying certain restrictions to protect the rights of third parties. However, the pivotal argument of the ECtHR in FNASS not only mentions the protection of public health (para 165) but also the risks of doping for physical and mental health of the doped athletes (paras 171-173); the SFT’s stance on this topic is in conflict with serious concerns asserted by the OHCHR on how DSD regulations pose a serious risk to the right to health of the individuals requiring them to undergo unnecessary and potentially harmful medical treatment (OHCHR para 32, 33, 34(a), 34(b), 34(c), 34(d)). Additionally, in FNASS the right to privacy is examined in the face of whereabout regulations plus being available for an hour each day for testing purposes; the ECtHR finds that the protection of health, which is the aim of the doping control system, is more important than revealing the whereabout information. However, in the present case reasonable concerns are over endangering the health and safety of individuals rather than disclosing the information about the place of residence. Article 3 of the Additional Protocol to the Oviedo Convention concerning biomedical research can be illuminating in this regard: “The interests and welfare of the human being participating in research shall prevail over the sole interest of society or science”.

9.     At times, the SFT finds itself relying on the notion of consent in relations between athletes and sport governing bodies and employs it as a justifying factor for example for the intrusive examination of athletes’ body that if they object, such examinations would not take place (para 10.2, 11.2). The SFT further points out that athletes’ defective consent to requirements set by the IAAF, justifies taking oral contraceptives and it is not a treatment imposed on an unwilling individual (para 10.2).

• First, the consent in this case is a flawed consent since it leaves “no real choice to the athlete, who has to choose between undergoing these intrusive medically unnecessary assessments and treatments with negative impacts on their health and wellbeing” (See here, p 5). This incomplete consent might survive when tested against imposing the arbitration clause on an athlete (Mutu & Pechestein case) but might fail when tested against more fundamental issues such as prohibition of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, non-discrimination, the right to health, bodily integrity and prohibition of medical intervention without free consent. Furthermore, consent should be considered in the light of the decision of the ECtHR in Chitos v. Greece in which a military staff resignation resulted in imposition of a financial penalty. In Chitos a new law was adopted after the applicant was recruited by the military, changing the conditions of the release of the personnel from the military service. The Court finds that the law pursues a legitimate aim and is proportionate, and it also takes account of the fact that “at the outset … the applicant cannot legitimately maintain that he was unaware of the rationale and scope of the obligations he had entered into” being aware of also the benefits that he would receive from this relation. The question in front of the Court was whether the applicant voluntarily offered himself since he had prior knowledge of rules and possible consequences. The Court maintains that the issue of mental constraint should be considered based on the situation at the time of the entry into force of the new law not at the time when the applicant was first recruited (para 97). Furthermore, in Van Der Mussele v. Belgium regarding the issue of prior consent and the existence of a threat the ECtHR maintains that: “This could be so in the case of a service required in order to gain access to a given profession, if the service imposed a burden which was so excessive or disproportionate to the advantages attached to the future exercise of that profession, [then] … the service could not be treated as having been voluntarily accepted beforehand” (para 37). As explained above an assessment of necessity, proportionality and legitimacy based on international human rights grounds can be different than the conclusions based on the principle of fairness in sports.

• Second, the OHCHR report calls attention to power imbalances in sports which hinges upon the notion of consent in relations between the athletes and sport governing bodies (para 34 (c)). The Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health emphasizes the need for particular measures to protect “vulnerability of certain individuals whose rights are compromised owing to deeply rooted power imbalances and structural inequalities” in particular in clinical practice and medical research. “In sport, such power imbalances are compounded by athletes’ dependency on the sports federations requiring such medical interventions and the frequent absence of adequate and holistic support during the decision-making process” (OHCHR, para 34(c)).

• Third, the issue of consent becomes significantly important with respect to medical intervention in human body. For any type of medical intervention, free and informed consent of the individual is required. Article 5 of the Oviedo Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine provides that any intervention in the health of individual should be conducted with free and informed consent including the consequences and risks involved. The OHCHR report calls attention to the “risk of unethical medical practice, particularly when the informed consent of the person concerned is not required” (OHCHR, para 34(c)). It is uncontested that human dignity and its health has priority over any type of scientific test or research even for the good of society. Article 3 of the Additional Protocol to the Oviedo Convention applies to this argument as well which provides: “The interests and welfare of the human being participating in research shall prevail over the sole interest of society or science”.

• Fourth, individuals have the right to refuse or withdraw consent at any time without being subject to any form of discrimination (Article 5, 16 of Oviedo Convention; Additional Protocol, article 13(3)).

• Fifth, the argument that the CAS is open to future findings of the adverse effects of such treatments which is supported by the SFT (para 9.8.3.5), is in contrast with requirements of medical and biological interventions of human body in international human rights law as it is encouraging unethical and potentially harmful medical experimentation and at the same time overlooks the notion of free and voluntary consent. Any type of medical intervention and research should come with careful consideration of ethical acceptability of such practices including protection of “dignity, rights, safety and well-being of research participants” (Additional protocol to the Oviedo Convention, article 9).

Notwithstanding the above arguments, one of the findings of the SFT can be an interesting line of thought for further research; that the vertical structure of sports and the dominance of sport governing bodies in their realm, puts them in a similar position as states (para 9.4). Traditionally only states and international governmental organizations are direct subjects of public international law and therefore bearers of responsibility under its rules and principles including the responsibility to enforce the human rights standards. The finding of the SFT adds more weight to the argument that sport governing bodies have replaced states in certain functions in a way that states are no longer responsible for those operations. This is one criterion recognized by public international law scholars for recognition of international legal personality. Therefore, it will be interesting to study whether sport governing bodies are in a position to be recognized as de facto states although without a geographical territory.

Finally, what I argued above does not mean that ultimately, once the award of the CAS in Semenya case is scrutinized by a human rights body it will fail. It may or may not; but as long as this evaluation has not been conducted by a competent human rights court, there will always remain questions about the credibility of a CAS award which disregarded most of the human rights concerns touched upon in this blog.

Therefore, a key player in this game is still on the bench!

This is part two of the blog on the Willem II and MVV State Aid decisions. Where part one served as an introduction on the two cases, part two will analyze the compatibility assessment made by the Commission in two decisions.

The compatibility of the aid to MVV and Willem II (re-)assessed

Even though it was the Netherlands’ task to invoke possible grounds of compatibility and to demonstrate that the conditions for such compatibility were met, the aid granted to both Willem II and MVV was never notified. The Netherland’s failure to fulfill its notification obligation, therefore, appears to be at odds with the Commission’s final decision to declare the aid compatible with EU law. Yet, a closer look at the Commission’s decision of 6 March 2013 to launch the formal investigation shows that the Commission was giving the Netherlands a ‘second chance’ to invoke grounds that would lead to a justification of the measures. In paragraph 74, the Commission itself reached the conclusions that the clubs in question faced financial difficulties, consequently indicating that the Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines might apply. In fact, the Commission even suggested possible compensatory measures, which are very much related to “the peculiar nature of professional football”[1]. These suggested compensatory measures included:

- limiting the club’s number of registered players for a season or several seasons;

- accepting a cap on the relation between salaries and turnover;

- banning the payment of transfer fees for a certain period;

- offering additional expenditure on “pro bono” activities to the benefit of the community and training of amateurs.[2]

Furthermore, it invited the Dutch authorities “to provide all useful information allowing the Commission to decide whether the aid measures can be considered compatible with the Guidelines”.[3]

The observations and information submitted by the Netherlands between March 2013 and July 2016 proved more than sufficient for the Commission to carry out its compatibility assessment. As was insinuated in the decision to launch a formal investigation, the Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines proved fundamental to this assessment.  

Willem II and MVV as firms in financial difficulties

This first condition of the Guidelines was easily complied with. As regards Willem II, in the accounting year 2008/2009, it made a loss of €3.9 million on a turnover of €11.4 million. Meanwhile, its own equity decreased from €4.1 million to €200.000. The losses increased to €4.4 million on a turnover of €9.9 million for the 2009/2010 season, while its own equity decreased further from €200.000 to minus €2.1 million.[4]

MVV clearly was financially not doing much better. As the Commission itself summarizes in the MVV decision, “in 2008/2009, MVV made a loss of €1.1 million and its own equity was minus €3.8 million. By March 2010 additional losses amounting to €1.3 million had occurred and the own equity had dropped to minus €5.17 million. In April 2010, MVV was no longer able to pay salaries and other current expenditure and was on the brink of bankruptcy.”[5]

Another consequence of being in financial difficulties relates to the licensing system put in place by the Dutch football federation KNVB. As is explained in paragraph 11 of the decision to open a formal investigation, one of the obligations for clubs under the current system is submitting three financial reports a year to the KNVB. On the basis of these reports clubs are scaled in three categories (I: insufficient, II: sufficient, III: good). Clubs in category I may be obliged to present a plan for improvement in order to reach categories II or III. If the club fails to comply with the plan, sanctions may be imposed by the KNVB, including an official warning, a reduction of competition points and – as ultimate sanction – withdrawal of the licence.[6] At the time the State aid was granted, both Willem II and MVV were scaled in the insufficient category I.  

Willem II and MVV as small enterprises or medium-sized enterprises

This particular assessment is important for the two conditions below, i.e. the introduction of restructuring plans and compensatory measures. Depending on the size of the firm (or enterprise), different conditions apply. Willem II employed 53 people in 2012 and had an annual turnover of €11.4 million in 2008/2009.[7] Pursuant to the Annex of the Commission Recommendation concerning the definition of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises, Willem II just managed to be considered a medium-sized enterprise.[8]

MVV, on the other hand, is considered a small enterprise. In the season 2009/2010 it had 38 employees and in the season 2010/2011 it had 35 employees. Its turnover and balance sheet total remained well below €10 million in both years.[9] 

Restructuring plans

Though not initially communicated to the Commission, both rescue measures were subject to certain restructuring conditions. In principle, these consisted of reducing personnel costs, by introducing new managements, selling players, and signing players free of transfer payments. In the case of Willem II, in the two years following the rescue measure personnel costs were reduced by 30%.[10] The effects of MVV’s restructuring plan were even better, since it managed to book profits for the three seasons following the aid and was scaled in the highest category (III) by the KNVB in the beginning of the season 2011/2012.[11] 

Compensatory measures

For the compensatory measures it is important to take into account point 41 of the Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines. Under this provision, small enterprises, such as MVV, are not required to take compensatory measures. However, this exception did not apply to Willem II. The Commission noted more expenditure of Willem II for public benefit by the training of amateurs and a reduction of the number of registered players from 31 to 27. Similarly, no transfer payments were made during the restructuring period.[12] Potentially as a result of this, Willem II was relegated to the second league in 2011 and again in 2013. In the end, the Commission concluded that “the compensatory measures required by the Guidelines were taken, which had the effect of weakening Willem II's competitive position in professional football”.[13] 

Aid limited to a minimum

Since the aid measures rescued both football clubs from bankruptcy without creating equity surplus, the Commission believed the amount of aid granted limited to what was necessary. Furthermore, the Commission highlighted that the restructuring plans were to a large extent financed by external contributors just as the Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines requested. Private entities had agreed to lend €2.25 million to Willem II for the restructuring, which is well over the 40% of €2.4 million (the total amount of State aid granted) required for medium-sized enterprises under the Guidelines.[14] In the case of MVV, several private creditors decided to waive (part of) their debt, which amounted to €2.25 million. This amount is more than 25% of the €5.8 million granted by the Netherlands, the minimum requirement for a small enterprise like MVV.[15] 

One time, last time

The Commission believes this condition to be fulfilled, as the Netherlands specified that Willem II and MVV did not receive rescue or restructuring aid in the ten years before the aid measures, nor will it award any new rescue or restructuring aid to the clubs during a period of ten years.[16] 

Conclusion

At the time of writing, the non-confidential versions of the positive decisions regarding State aid granted in favour of the Dutch professional football clubs FC Den Bosch and NEC Nijmegen are not published. Nonetheless, this does not prevent us from drawing the following lessons from the Willem II and MVV decisions.

First of all, these decisions show that there is no need to draft sector specific guidelines for State aid to professional football clubs in difficulty. The Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines are all the Commission needs in order to carry out the compatibility assessment. This approach is radically different when compared to the Commission’s decisional practice for the State aid to sport infrastructure cases between 2011 and 2013.[17] Only after the Commission dealt with ten different cases, was its approach (to a large extent) codified in Article 55 of the 2014 General Block Exemption Regulation.[18]

In this regard it is important to highlight that the Commission seems to take into account “the peculiar nature of professional football”[19] when assessing the compatibility of State aid measures under the Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines. For example, it showed demonstrated its awareness of the UEFA Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play Regulations[20] as well as national (KNVB) licensing rules when assessing the compensatory measures taken by Willem II. Moreover, it clearly endorsed the decision taken by the club not to make transfer payments during the restructuring period, since this prevents the club from spending money it might not have, while simultaneously limiting the club’s competitiveness on the field.

A further lesson that can be drawn from these decisions is that, in my opinion, the threshold to ‘pass the compatibility test’ under the Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines is quite low. With regard to the condition that the club needs to be in financial difficulties in order to get the State aid, it is clear that granting State aid to professional football clubs in financial difficulties is one of the most (if not the most) common form of State aid in the sector. This was the case for the five Dutch clubs scrutinized by the Commission, as well as the three clubs from Valencia of which the non-confidential version of the decision still needs to be published. Other clubs like FC Twente and Sporting de Gijón have also received State aid over financial difficulties, even though the Commission did not investigate these measures (yet).[21] In other words, a majority of the cases are assessable under these Guidelines.

The condition that the beneficiary football club needs to stick to a restructuring plan in order to receive the State aid is key. As is elucidated in the two decisions, the restructuring plans consisted of selling players, reducing the costs of wages and not paying transfer fees for new players for a period of three years. In my view, these conditions are rather proportionate when considering that the clubs in question were on the verge of bankruptcy prior to the State aid measures. In fact, one could argue that FIFA’s transfer ban imposed on FC Barcelona for international transfers of minors, or excluding FC Dynamo from the next UEFA club competition for which the club would otherwise qualify in four seasons (i.e. the 2015/16, 2016/17, 2017/18 and 2018/19 seasons) for breaching UEFA’s FFP Regulations,[22] are harsher than the restructuring conditions accepted by the Commission.

The same can be said about the need to take compensatory measures. The measures taken by Willem II (reducing the number of employees and players, and reducing the cost of wages to 48% of the turnover) could be considered a direct consequence of the abovementioned restructuring plans. The only additional compensatory measure taken by Willem II was increasing expenditure of the club for the training of amateurs, though the decision does not specify what this implied in practice.

Perhaps the only condition that could be problematic for some football clubs is the “one time, last time” criterion. Under this condition, the public authorities cannot rescue Willem II and MVV again until at least 2020. Although Willem II and MVV are currently in category III and II on the KNVB’s scale respectively, falling back to category I before 2020 could have dramatic consequences.

Be that as it may, now that the Commission’s approach for the assessment of State aid to professional football clubs in financial difficulties is out in the open, public authorities and football clubs alike should use this knowledge to their own advantage. They should remember that the Commission is willing to accept rescue aid and that the restructuring conditions are far from impossible to match. One can even wonder whether a club like FC Twente would have turned to Doyen when it was facing financial difficulties, if it had been aware of the conditions imposed by the European Commission for receiving compatible State aid under the Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines.

[1] Commission Decision on State Aid SA.40168 of 4 July 2016 implemented by the Netherlands in favour of the professional football club Willem II in Tilburg, para. 50.

[2] Commission Decision SA.33584 of 6 March 2013 – The Netherlands Alleged municipal aid to the Professional Dutch football clubs Vitesse, NEC, Willem II, MVV, PSV and FC Den Bosch in 2008-2011, para. 80.

[3] Ibid, para. 77.

[4] SA.40168, para. 45.

[5] Commission Decision on State Aid SA.41612 of 4 July 2016 implemented by the Netherlands in favour of the professional football club MVV in Maastricht, para. 13.

[6] SA.33584, para. 11.

[7] SA.40168, para. 9.

[8] A firm is not considered a small enterprise i fit has more than 50 employees and an annual turnover of more than €10 million. See footnote 27.

[9] SA.41612, para. 9.

[10] SA.40168, para. 48.

[11] SA.41612, para. 52.

[12] SA.40168, para. 51. Indeed, according to www.transfermarkt.de, Willem II only paid a mere €20.000 for the signing of Kevin Brands in July 2012.

[13] Ibid.

[14] SA.40168, para. 52.

[15] SA.41612, para. 54.

[16] SA.40168, para. 55 and SA.41612, para. 61.

[17] Commission Decision of 9 November 2011, SA.31722 – Hungary - Supporting the Hungarian sport sector via tax benefit scheme; Commission Decision of 2 May 2013, SA.33618 Uppsala arena; Commission Decision of 15 May 2013, SA.33728 Multiarena in Copenhagen; Commission Decision of 20 March 2013, SA.35135 Multifunktionsarena der Stadt Erfurt; Commission Decision of 20 March 2013, SA.35440 Multifunktionsarena der Stadt Jena; Commission Decision of 18 December 2013, SA.35501 Financement de la construction et de la renovation des stades pour l’EURO 2016; Commission Decision of 2 October 2013, SA.36105 Fuβballstadion Chemnitz; Commission Decision of 20 November 2013, SA.37109 Football stadiums in Flanders; Commission Decision of 9 April 2014, SA.37342 Regional Stadia Development in Northern Ireland; and Commission Decision of 13 December 2013, SA.37373 Contribution to the renovation of ice arena Thialf in Heerenveen.

[18] For a deeper analysis of whether sport-specific guidelines are necessary, see Oskar van Maren, “EU State Aid Law and Professional Football: A threat or a Blessing?”, European State Aid Law Quarterly, Volume 15 1/2016, pages 31-46. To find out how sector-specific rules for State aid are usually articulated, see Ben Van Rompuy and Oskar van Maren, “EU Control of State Aid to Professional Sport: Why Now?” In: “The Legacy of Bosman. Revisiting the relationship between EU law and sport”, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2016.

[19] SA.40168, para. 50.

[20] In paragraph 51 of SA.40168, the Commission referred to a UEFA rule, which holds that the cost of salaries should not exceed 70%.

[21] For more information of the precarious financial situation of these two clubs, see our previous blogs: “Unpacking Doyen’s TPO Deals: FC Twente's Game of Maltese Roulette”, and “TPO and Spanish football, friends with(out) benefits?”.

[22] For more information on the FC Dynamo case, see our blog “UEFA’s FFP out in the open: The Dynamo Moscow Case”.