Editor's note: This is the (belated) fifth part/act of our blog series on the Russian eligibility cases at the CAS ad hoc Division in Rio. The other acts are available at:

• Act I: Saved by the Osaka Déjà-Vu
• Act II: On being implicated 
• Act III: On being sufficiently tested
• Act IV: On Bringing a sport into disrepute

Act V: Saving the last (Russian) woman standing: The Klishina miracle 

Darya Klishina is now an Olympic celebrity. She will enter the history books not because she won a gold medal or beat a world record. Instead, her idiosyncrasy lies in her nationality: she was the sole Russian athlete authorized to stand in the athletics competitions at the Rio Olympics. And yet, a few days before the start of the long jumping contest in which she was due to take part, the IAAF surprisingly decided to revoke her eligibility (‘And Then There Were None’). But Klishina appealed the decision to the CAS ad hoc Division and, as all of you well-informed sports lawyers will know, she was allowed to compete at the Olympics and finished at a decent ninth place of the long jump finals.

Two important questions are raised by this case:

• Why did the IAAF changed its mind and decide to retract Klishina’s authorization to participate?
• Why did the CAS overturn this decision?

A.    The IAAF’s second thoughts over the implication of Klishina

What happened between 9 July, when Klishina was first green lighted by the IAAF Doping Review Board (DRB) and 10 August when the DRB revoked its previous decision to let her compete? Basically, the publication of the McLaren Report, and especially evidence showing “that the Applicant had been directly affected and tainted by the State-organised doping scheme described in the IP Report”.[1] More concretely, according to the Report, Klishina was affected in the following three ways:

      i.   “a sample collected on 26 February 2014, yielding a T/E ratio of 8.5, had been subject to a "SAVE" order by the Ministry of Sport on 3 March 2014;

      ii.   a sample collected on 17 October 2014 and subsequently seized by WADA December 2014 was found to bear marks and scratches consistent with the removal of the cap and contained urine from the Applicant but also from another female athlete; and

      iii.  a sample collected on the occasion of the 2013 IAAF World Championships in Moscow was also found to bear marks and scratches consistent with the removal of the cap.”[2]

In its original decision, the DRB had reserved its right “to reconsider the Applicant’s case should information ever be brought to its attention (including but not limited to as a result of the current investigation being conducted by Professor McLaren on behalf of WADA) that the Doping Review Board considers is such as to undermine the basis upon which the application was accepted”.[3] Thus, unsurprisingly, the CAS acknowledged that the DRB had the competence to reconsider the eligibility granted to the athlete. Nonetheless, surprisingly, it found that such reconsideration was not legitimate in light of the new information gathered.

B.    The surprising decision of CAS to let Klishina jump

Klishina won in front of the CAS. From the outset this is a surprising decision, since she was at least as implicated in the IP Report as numerous other Russian athletes who were barred from entering the Games.[4] Indeed, she had clearly profited from being “saved” by the Russian Ministry of Sport. So why on earth would the CAS decide to let her jump?

This decision is intimately linked with the legal basis of the original decision of the DRB. Despite the repeated view of the IOC that the IAAF policy was stricter than its own,[5] the Klishina case demonstrates that this is not universally true in practice. The main point was that the IAAF’s DRB had recognized that since 1 January 2014, Klishina “had been subject to fully compliant drug testing in- and out-of-competition”[6] and therefore fulfilled the criteria enshrined in the IAAF Competition rule 22.1A(b). This was based on the following factual findings:

• “The fact that she had spent 632 days out of Russia, being 86.6% of her time, in the Relevant Period;
• She had relocated permanently to the United States in March 2014 and had been trained under a US coach since October 2013;
• She regularly competes in competitions on the international circuit;
• A total of 11 samples had been collected from the Applicant outside of Russia in the Relevant Period;
• 1 sample had been collected by the IAAF since June 2016 and sent for analysis by a laboratory outside of Russia.”[7]


The question is then whether the new information, indicating that Klishina was implicated and benefitted from the Russian doping scheme, recognized as valid by the Panel[8], could justify revisiting the first decision. In other words, could this new information lead to reconsidering the eligibility of Klishina under the regime of IAAF Competition rule 22.1A(b) on which the original decision was based? To assess this, the Panel starts by pointing out that the rule “is not the same as the decision of the IOC Executive Board made after the publication of the IP Report. (…) As the parties agreed, the IOC Executive Board decision is not in evidence in this case and decisions of the Ad hoc Panel of the CAS for the Games of the XXXI Olympiad in Rio de Janeiro as to the application of, or the terms of, the IOC Executive Board decision are not applicable”.[9]

The CAS Panel insists that the IAAF’s DRB “was comfortably satisfied that during the Relevant Period the Applicant satisfied each of the criteria set out in the Rule for exceptional eligibility, notwithstanding the suspension of the National Federation”.[10] Furthermore, “in making its findings, the DRB was aware of, and took no account of, tests conducted in Russia and that it was cognisant of inadequacies in the system of testing in Russia, for which RusAF had been suspended”.[11] Those are decisive conclusions that will lead to the second decision being set aside. The CAS Panel was of the view “that the conclusion reached in the Second Decision, and the basis for that decision, are not in accordance with the Rule which was purportedly invoked”.[12] It is so, because “the further evidence considered by the DRB for the purposes of the Second Decision did not undermine its finding in the First Decision that the Applicant was eligible to compete by reason of her compliance with the Rule”.[13] This analysis leads to an unfair solution as the undisputed evidence points at Klishina profiting not once but on three occasions from the Russian doping scheme and still this evidence is not considered as relevant to reconsider the IAAF’s original decision to let her jump.

This decision is grounded on the following legal reasoning: the Panel considers that the “implication [of Klishina in the State-doping system] is not relevant to the application of criteria which, if fulfilled, mean that for the purposes of the Rule [22 IAAF], the Applicant is not affected or tainted by the failures of the National Federation”.[14] The CAS Panel is of the view that the IAAF Rule “provides for a mechanism or a basis by which an athlete is granted exceptional eligibility”.[15] And this “mechanism is fulfilment of the two criteria which, for this athlete, was established by the DRB in the First Decision”.[16] Thus, the “fact that the athlete was subjected to or the subject of drug testing that was not fully compliant during the Relevant Period does not derogate from the fact that she was, during the Relevant Period (that is, ‘a sufficiently long period’), subject to fully compliant drug testing in- and out-of- competition by reason of the fact that she was during that time training in and resident in the United States and not in Russia”.[17] Additionally, “there is no evidence to suggest that the testing that she was subject to was other than equivalent in quality to the testing to which her competitors were subject”.[18] In other words, “an athlete may have undergone non-compliant testing while concurrently being subject to fully compliant testing and still fulfil the second criterion”.[19] This is comforted by the fact “that the Rule is addressed to the suspension of any International Federation for failure to put in place an adequate system and the impact on the eligibility of the athlete” and the “criteria are directed to the establishment by an athlete that he or she is outside the country of his or her National Federation during the Relevant Period”.[20] Hence, it “is not addressed to the implication of an athlete in a defective system”.[21] Instead, “it states that an athlete is taken not to be affected or tainted by the action of the National Federation if he or she was subject to other, compliant systems outside of the country”.[22] In a nutshell, for the CAS Panel, the “relevant question is not whether the athlete was affected by the Russian System, or how, or whether she had knowledge of the way in which the system worked”.[23] No, the only question is “whether she fulfilled the criteria of the Rule”.[24] And the answer to that question is: she did early July; and she still does in August!

This case is disconcerting as it contradicts the line of cases regarding the implication of athletes in the IP Report discussed a few days ago. The CAS relied on the ambiguous wording of the IAAF provision to offer an escape route to Klishina. In doing so, it disregarded the spirit and objective of the provision, which was to provide a mechanism for athletes who were not personally tainted by the Russian doping scandal to participate in IAAF competitions. Yet, another aspect of the case is even more bizarre. Why did the IOC not block the eligibility of Klishina on the basis of paragraph 2 of the IOC Decision? She was undoubtedly implicated and benefited from the scheme. In fact, only one of the three sources of implication provided by McLaren should (and would) have been enough for the IOC Review Panel and the CAS arbitrator reviewing her eligibility to discard her from the Olympics. It did not happen, Zeus only knows why…

Epilogue

These five blogs have discussed the awards rendered by the CAS ad hoc Division in Rio involving Russian athletes wishing to compete at the Olympics. In general, the CAS has been willing, with few exceptions (Efimova and Klishina), to approve the ineligibility of Russian athletes. Rightfully, in my view, the CAS has supported the IFs that have opted for a strict approach in dealing with the eligibility of Russian athletes for the Rio Olympics. The CAS has also unsurprisingly rebutted the blunt rule of the IOC excluding Russian athletes who were previously sanctioned for doping. But, it has surprisingly let Klishina jump, in spite of all the factual elements pointing at her being implicated in, and having profited from, the Russian State-doping scheme. Overall, the CAS ad hoc Division has served its purpose as a review instance well, forcing the IFs and the IOC to properly justify their decisions and providing an avenue for the Russian athletes to be heard.

These cases also highlight the variety/plurality of responses to the Russian doping scandal and its impact on the eligibility of Russian athletes for the Rio Olympics. It seems that some IFs have taken WADA’s call for a strong response of the SGBs seriously. Unfortunately, and this is one of the negative consequences of the IOC’s decision to not decide, due to a lack of information, it is impossible to assess the different policies of the IFs which have not faced (due to their reluctance to act or else) a challenge of their eligibility decisions in front of the CAS ad hoc Division. In light of recent revelations concerning the International Swimming Federation (FINA) it is likely that a number of IFs decided to interpret narrowly the IOC criteria and waved through the overwhelming majority of Russian athletes without a proper check.

Finally, the awards show that CAS arbitrators would have been ready to condone a general exclusion of Russian athletes, with a narrow exception for those not tainted by the scandal or who could not benefit from the scheme because they were residing outside of the Russian Federation (this is very much the position adopted in the recent decision of the CAS in the dispute between the Russian Paralympic Committee and the International Paralympic Committee). The CAS recognized the seriousness of the situation and the collective responsibility of Russian sports organizations. It seemed also ready to follow up on this collective responsibility by endorsing collective sanctions that would most likely have been found compatible with the Russian athletes ‘natural rights’. Hence, ultimately, the IOC’s decision to let the Russian athletes compete at the Rio Olympics may have been politically unavoidable, but was certainly not legally mandated. I leave you to appreciate whether this decision is compatible with the IOC’s proclaimed fundamental values and its commitment to enforcing the World Anti-Doping Code. What is certain, however, is that the World Anti-Doping System needs an overhaul (for some reform proposals/directions see here) sooner rather than later.

[1] CAS OG 16/24 Darya Klishina v. IAAF, para. 2.12.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid., para. 2.8.

[4] See Act II of this blog series.

[5] See CAS OG 16/13 Anastasia Karabelshikova and
Ivan Podshivalov v. 
World Rowing Federation (FISA)
and
International Olympic Committee (IOC), para. 7.14 and CAS OG 16/12 Ivan Balandin v. FISA & IOC, para. 7.22.

[6] CAS OG 16/24 Darya Klishina v. IAAF, para. 7.3.

[7] Ibid., para. 7.14.

[8] Ibid., paras 7.40-45.

[9] Ibid., para. 7.24.

[10] Ibid., para. 7.34.

[11] Ibid., para. 7.35.

[12] Ibid., para. 7.46.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid., para. 7.56.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Ibid., para. 7.57.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Ibid., para. 7.58.

[20] Ibid., para. 7.60.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Ibid.

Editor's note: Marine Montejo is a graduate from the College of Europe in Bruges and is currently an intern at the ASSER International Sports Law Centre.

On 3 June 2016, the Landgericht München (“Munich Regional Court”) ordered temporary injunctions against the International Basketball Federation (“FIBA”) and FIBA Europe, prohibiting them from sanctioning clubs who want to participate in competitions organized by Euroleague Commercial Assets (“ECA”). The reasoning of the Court is based on breaches of German and EU competition law provisions. FIBA and FIBA Europe are, according to the judge, abusing their dominant position by excluding or threatening to exclude national teams from their international competitions because of the participation of their clubs in the Euroleague. This decision is the first judicial step taken in the ongoing legal battle between FIBA and ECA over the organization of European basketball competitions.

This judgment raises several interesting points with regard to how the national judge deals with the alleged abuse of a dominant position by European and international federations. A few questions arise regarding the competence of the Munich Regional Court that may be interesting to first look at in the wake of an appeal before examining the substance of the case. 

1. FIBA Europe/FIBA vs Euroleague: the dispute’s background

FIBA and FIBA Europe are involved in a bitter struggle with ECA for the control of the European basketball competitions. The dispute commenced with FIBA Europe (fully supported by FIBA) announcing the creation of a Basketball Champions League starting from the 2016-2017 season at the end of last year. Through the new “official” competition, FIBA intends to reinstate its hold over the organization of European championships. Back in 2001, ECA took over the organization of the European professional clubs’ competition after a harsh row with FIBA. FIBA did not trademark the name “Euroleague”, leaving the organisation without any legal avenues to prevent its use elsewhere. It battled for a year with ECA but finally left the organisation of those competitions to ECA in order to promote uniformity at that level of competition. Since then, Euroleague and Eurocup, the continent’s top two clubs’ competitions, are overseen by ECA, a commercial private body owned by the clubs participating in those tournaments. The status quo has now been challenged by the creation of a FIBA rival competition and the newly created fracture in European professional basketball is showing no signs of letting up, risking the possibility of having two continental leagues in competition with each other as of next season. In response to the creation of the FIBA Champions League, ECA announced its intention not only to maintain its competitions but to evolve toward a closed, franchise-based league. In retaliation, FIBA Europe (publicly backed by FIBA) put pressure on national federations by threatening to withdraw their rights to participate in its international competitions, including EuroBasket 2017, if they would continue allowing their clubs to participate in the ECA competitions (Euroleague and Eurocup). FIBA’s position, in that FIBA Executive Committee decided to fully support FIBA Europe’s decision, has also raised concerns surrounding possible sanctions on national teams for the 2016 Rio Olympic Games.  

At this point the dispute moved away from the basketball court to the legal field. The first shoot out occurred in relation to the Euroleague which, in February, filed a complaint before the European Competition against FIBA for alleged abuses of their dominant position (art. 102 TFEU) by threatening national federations to force their professional clubs and leagues to rescind their participation in the Euroleague competitions. From its back court, FIBA caught the ball and, in April, filed a complaint against FIBA Executive Committee decided to fully support FIBA Europe’s decision. FIBA Executive Committee decided to fully support FIBA Europe’s decision. FIBA Executive Committee decided to fully support FIBA Europe’s decision. ECA before the same EU Commission for the same breaches of EU competition law provisions. Possibly for the first time in EU competition law, we have two undertakings filing two different complaints against the same parties for the same alleged breaches of article 102 TFEU. DG COMP, now in the place of a referee, has to decide whether it will open an investigation into the matter and if it so decides, it probably will have to open two procedures (or at least join both of them). 

2. The procedure and the jurisdiction of the Munich Regional Court 

One could think that it was a tight game in the hands of the Commission, but Euroleague, along with 12 professional basketball clubs, decided to spin dribble and scored a buzzer-beater by asking for preliminary injunctions before the Landgericht München. Preliminary injunctions (einstweilige Verfüngung) are interim remedies, provided by the German Code of Civil Procedure, for exceptional cases in civil and commercial matters. They are granted to secure the enforcement of a final judgement that may be endangered before the rights of the parties have been finally determined. Where the case is urgent, the Court is allowed to make a decision ex parte, namely without giving the respondent an opportunity to be heard and without an oral hearing. In the decision, the judge referred to the provision on urgency (section 937(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure) which implies that he felt the pressure of the run-up to the 2016 Rio Olympic Games and the 2016 Basketball Qualifying Tournament scheduled to take place at the beginning of July. Moreover, in its press release following the judgement, FIBA regretted that it was not invited, along with FIBA Europe, to present their views which tends to confirm that, in this case, the conditions for urgency were met and that both the international and European federations were ex parte in the dispute. 

The territorial jurisdiction of the Munich Regional Court is not of concern for FIBA Europe as it is seated in the same city. However, for FIBA, situated in Mies, Switzerland, the question should be addressed. The Court retained its competence from the Lugano Convention of 2007 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgements in civil and commercial matters to which Germany and Switzerland have signed. It then states that “pursuant to article 6(1) (of the) Lugano Convention, in proceedings against a number of defendants that involve the same matter and that it is expedient to hear together in order to avoid irreconcilable judgments, the proceedings may be heard in the place where one of the defendants is domiciled. In this case, this is Munich”. The Court may be too straightforward in establishing its competence.  

The clause on competence enshrined in Article 6(1) provides that “a person (…) may be sued (…) where he is one of a number of defendants, in the courts for the place where any one of them is domiciled, provided the claims are so closely connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings”. The key legal concept for a national court to derive its competence from the Lugano Convention is whether the claims are so closely connected that a person/entity based in another State (in this case FIBA, Switzerland) may be subject to its scrutiny along with the others defendants (in this case FIBA Europe, Germany). In its decision, the Court enclosed three documents transmitted by the appellants through which the Slovenian, Italian and Hellenic national basketball federations were warned about potential sanctions they were facing due to the actions of their clubs entering into an agreement with ECA. These documents were signed by Kamil Novak, FIBA Europe Executive Director, and referred to FIBA Europe’s Board decision to ban national federations from participating in Senior men’s national team competitions organised by FIBA Europe because their clubs appear to be taking part in ECA competitions. These assumptions were based on press statements about their intention to take part in ECA competitions. The letters are only of relevance to FIBA insofar as a copy of the so-called letter was sent to the international federation. It takes a stretch of the imagination to consider, from these documents only, that the claim against FIBA is closely connected to the one against FIBA Europe.

Moreover, article 2(1) of the Convention provides that “persons domiciled in a State bound by this Convention shall, whatever their nationality, be sued in the Court of that States”. FIBA could argue that this is the case of Swiss Courts. A number of exceptions exist to this general provision. Under article 5(3) “a person domiciled in a State bound by this Convention may, in another State bound by this Convention, be sued (…) in matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict, in the courts for the place where the harmful event occurred or may occur”. In that case, FIBA could be sued in Germany because its decisions may have an effect on German basketball clubs. Unluckily, none of the applicants are German basketball clubs which, again, put the competence of the Munich Regional Court into perspective as, in the case of FIBA, there is no harmful effect yet.

In order to justify the competence of the Munich Court, it may be easier to rely on article 6(1) of the Convention, referred to above. In case C-352/13, Cartel Damage Claims (CDC) Hydrogen Peroxide SA, on the interpretation of article 6(1) of Regulation 44/2001, the wording of which is identical to that of Article 6(1) of the Lugano Convention, the Court states that “it is necessary to ascertain whether, between various claims brought by the same applicant against various defendants, there is a connection of such a kind that it is expedient to determine those actions together in order to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings (…) In that regard, in order for judgments to be regarded as irreconcilable, it is not sufficient that there be a divergence in the outcome of the dispute, but that divergence must also arise in the context of the same situation of fact and law” (p. 20). It is true that FIBA publicly backed FIBA Europe when it threatened to extend the ban to its competitions and participation in the Olympic Games) and that the claim before the European Commission was filed by both international and European federations. It seems that the requirement that the same situation of fact and law must arise is satisfied in those circumstances. Moreover, and the judge refers to it, under FIBA’s General Statutes, national federations have the obligation to ensure that their clubs, leagues and players participate only in official international activities and competitions (art. 9.1) upon the risk of sanctions in the event of non-compliance (art. 12). In that case, and as is often the case for sports governing bodies, national basketball federations must implement the rules and decisions from FIBA and FIBA Europe which confirms that there is a connection between the two entities on this particular case and that the Munich Regional Court is presumably competent; even if, in this case, a more in-depth analysis on the rule of jurisdiction would have been welcome. 

3. Is FIBA Europe abusing its dominant position? 

Given that the Munich Regional Court held that it was competent, it granted preliminary injunctions to FIBA on the ground of an abuse of a dominant position under EU law (art 102 TFEU) and under the corresponding provisions in German law.  

The Court defined two markets where FIBA and FIBA Europe each hold a dominant position. FIBA is dominant on the market for “competitions of the national team”. That dominant position relies, according to the judge, on article 1(2) of FIBA’s Statutes providing that “FIBA is the sole competent authority for basketball throughout the world and is recognised as such by the International Olympic Committee”. A broader market definition for FIBA, as a worldwide basketball regulator, would be the market for basketball competitions. It is not contested that international federations hold a dominant position at the top of a sports organisation nor that they regulate all matters related to their sports with other (continental and national) federations and bodies at lower levels. This position is then secure by the principle of solidarity which, in the case of basketball, can be found in article 1(4), which provides that “all bodies and officials of FIBA must observe the General Statutes, Internal Regulations, other rules and regulations, and decisions of FIBA”, and article 9, which lists the obligations of members. That principle is reinforced with a mechanism of sanctions (articles 10, 11 and 12). However, the market may appear too broad. A narrower market may be the market for international basketball competitions of the national teams excluding continental competitions. This market would specifically target the mission of FIBA as an international competitions organizer for basketball. In particular, FIBA is responsible for the organisation of the FIBA Basketball World Cup and the FIBA Olympic Qualifying Tournament, with both competitions determining which teams will participate in the Olympic Games. While defining a market for “competitions of the national teams”, the judge targeted both of the markets where FIBA holds a dominant position. For FIBA Europe, the judge defined a market for “European competitions of the national teams”. This market covers FIBA Europe’s mission to organise the EuroBasket. The alleged excluding practices are related to the participation in European and international competitions of the national teams, so it seems that both narrower markets are relevant in the case where FIBA and FIBA Europe hold dominant positions.

While defining the relevant markets, the judge only targets competitions for national teams. Does the same still apply for club competitions? The core problem of the dispute is about the organisation of basketball professional club’s European competitions. If one would define a market for the professional basketball clubs’ European competitions that market may exists and ECA, as the sole organiser of Euroleague and Eurocup, is in a dominant position. The creation of the Basketball Champions League is an attempt from FIBA and FIBA Europe to enter that market and challenge that dominant position.  

Holding a dominant position on a market is not contrary to EU competition law provisions, but rather it is the abuse of that dominant position that needs to be examined. In the case of FIBA, the judge considers article 9(1) of FIBA Statutes regarding the obligations of the members, i.e., national federations. Under provision (d), “national member federations must (…) ensure at all times that their leagues, clubs, players and officials participate only in international activities and competitions officially recognised by the respective national member federations and by FIBA”. FIBA Europe sent a letter to three national federations advising them that their right to participate in Eurobasket 2017 had been withdrawn because some of their professional clubs chose to compete in the Euroleague 2016/2017. A copy of this letter was transmitted to FIBA, “which is competent to take any decisions it deems necessary regarding worldwide events”. From these letters, it is clear that FIBA and FIBA Europe used or will use their regulatory power to sanction national federations for a breach of their solidarity obligations. By doing so, national federations are excluded from all European and international competitions. Moreover, the pressure on national federations will probably lead to the exclusion of ECA from the market for professional basketball clubs’ European competitions as none of the clubs will be able to participate in the Euroleague. In that case, article 9(1) can rightly be qualified as an exclusivity clause that leads to an exclusionary abuse by dominant undertakings, and the judge is rightly assessing the situation, FIBA is abusing its dominant position by threatening to exclude national basketball teams from the 2016 Olympic qualifying tournament and, by extension, the 2016 Olympic Games. FIBA Europe is also abusing its dominant position by, in its case, excluding national basketball teams from the Eurobasket 2017. The fact that FIBA/FIBA Europe are creating a new European competition for clubs has nothing to do with their dominance; rather, a competition problem occurs when they use their power to sanction national federations by pressuring them to force their clubs to participate in the “official” competition. Similar situations are arising where international federations are fighting the emergence of “unsanctioned” private leagues by using their sanction powers. The Belgian competition authority already granted interim measures to the Longines Champions League in a dispute where the FEI tried to suspend riders and horses that were participating in the competition. A similar case involving ISU and suspended ice speed skaters is pending before the European Commission.  

Nonetheless, the German Court goes on to mention possible justifications to FIBA/FIBA Europe’s behaviour pertaining to article 101 TFEU. This is rather surprising, even though such a stance is permissible, after it just concluded there had been a breach of article 102 TFEU. If article 101 was to be applied, it could be argued that the fact that FIBA Europe and FIBA are excluding national federations constitutes concerted practices leading to restrictions upon competition on the market for professional basketball clubs’ European competitions. In that case, the analysis could move to article 101§3 and examine proportionate justifications. The judge seems sensible that the outcome of FIBA and FIBA Europe’s practices cannot lead to anything other than undermining the viability of Euroleague competitions by preventing clubs to participate. It does not appear, as such, as a proportionate justification.

However, the judge may, again, be too straightforward in his application of articles 101 and 102 TFEU. FIBA and FIBA Europe may argue that there are justifications for using their sanctions power. The Court of Justice already held that not every sporting rule that is capable of restricting competition infringes articles 101 and 102 TFEU (C-519/04, Meca Medina). In that case, in assessing the compatibility of the obligation for national basketball federations to force their professional clubs to take part in the Basketball Champions League upon sanction by the international and European federations, the judge must take into account the Wouters criteria (C-309/99): (i) the objectives of FIBA and FIBA Europe measure; (ii) whether the consequential effects that restrict competition are inherent in the pursuit of those objectives; and (iii) whether they are proportionate to them. As seen before, the pressure on national federations will probably have an adverse effect on competition, making it impossible for ECA to organise a viable competition as no professional clubs will take part (this doesn’t take into account the third factor – that professional clubs do not have any interest in European and international competitions, and that they are probably better off keeping their players). Nonetheless, FIBA may bring previous case law and article 165 TFEU to the dispute and argue that there is no breach of EU competition law in the sense that restrictive effects on competition are, in this case, inherent and necessary to the organisation of basketball. The specificity of sports organisations, the solidarity mechanisms between different levels of competition and the pyramidal structures have already been recognised. FIBA Europe and FIBA are, here, making sure that national federations comply with article 9(1) of the FIBA Statutes and that professional clubs will participate in its European competitions. FIBA is then meant, as the sole legitimate basketball authority, to apply sanctions if its members do not comply with their obligations. All the reasoning will focus on proving that these effects are proportionate to the legitimate genuine sporting interest pursued. The impact of FIBA Europe’s decision (and FIBA potential decision) is really important, and, it is readily apparent that FIBA should not focus on its commercial exploitation of the Basketball Champions League competition as it has already been decided that rules prohibiting clubs or athletes from participating in competitions other than those organised by sports federations under the threat of penalties do not comply with EU competition law provisions (see for example the FIA Commission decision, IP/01/1523). On the other hand, the Lethonen case on transfer periods (C-176/96) may be useful as a rule whose objective is to ensure the regularity of competitions (competitive balance, functioning of the championships and effective calendar) is more likely to comply with articles 101 and 102 TFEU. Those are just possible justifications and there is sufficient flexibility in articles 101 and 102 TFEU for FIBA and FIBA Europe to justify more proactive behaviours under EU competition law.  

The German judge also disregarded possible objective justifications under article 102 TFEU. In that case, again, the monopolistic pyramid structure of sport may be taken into account.  

The judge goes on to say that FIBA must await the outcome of antitrust proceedings before the Europe Commission regarding whether ECA is also abusing its dominant position. This is, again, really surprising for two reasons. On one hand, the judge does not tackle the behaviour of ECA in his decision. As discussed, ECA enjoyed a monopoly over the organisation of European competitions that FIBA and FIBA Europe wanted to challenge by creating the Basketball Champions League. In that dispute, ECA is also using its monopoly position toward professional clubs and national leagues to consolidate its organisation. On the other hand, filing a complaint before the European Commission does not presume that DG Competition will open an investigation on the matter. DG COMP enjoys a broad discretion with regard to opening an investigation based on the complaint. What will happen to FIBA if the Commission decides to reject the complaint without analysing its substance? Moreover, an in-depth investigation is a (very) long procedure that can take years before the Commission issues a decision. The German judge is putting FIBA and FIBA Europe under a lot of legal uncertainty and, while protecting the rights of Euroleague, threatened the viability of the European Basketball League if, in the end, ECA is also abusing its dominant position. This is probably the most questionable point in this judgement. 

Finally, the judge finds that “the entitlement to take part in Olympic Games should be decided for sports reasons. The decision of certain clubs to take part in a certain club competition has, in terms of sport, nothing whatsoever to do with a national team’s participation in international competitions”. Putting aside the fact that national teams are composed of athletes coming from those clubs and the controversies that already exist about the release of players, it is difficult to understand what the judge meant by this. FIBA is recognised by the IOC as the sole worldwide competent authority for basketball. As such, national federations must respect the rules FIBA sets in order to qualify for the Olympics. Regardless of the contested practices at stakes, FIBA has the power to sanction a federation if the latter does not comply with its regulations and the participation in its competition may be one of the sanctions it can impose.  

As a conclusion, it may be recalled that this judgement is provisional and probably the first of a long series. FIBA has already announced its intention to appeal the judgement, highlighting the fact that the contested sanctions were already withdrawn by FIBA Europe’s Board a few days before the Munich Regional Court released its decision and ECA’s position hasn’t properly been assessed. However, these circumstances and facts should not obfuscate the key legal question here – namely, the assessment under EU competition law of the use by international federation of its regulatory powers to stop the emergence of unsanctioned competitions.

Editor's note: Marjolaine is a researcher and attorney admitted to the Geneva bar (Switzerland) who specialises in sports and life sciences.

On 25 August 2020, the Swiss Supreme Court (Swiss Federal Tribunal, SFT) rendered one of its most eagerly awaited decisions of 2020, in the matter of Caster Semenya versus World Athletics (formerly and as referenced in the decision: IAAF) following an award of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). In short, the issue at stake before the CAS was the validity of the World Athletics eligibility rules for Athletes with Differences of Sex Development (DSD Regulation). After the CAS upheld their validity in an award of 30 April 2019, Caster Semenya and the South African Athletics Federation (jointly: the appellants) filed an application to set aside the award before the Swiss Supreme Court.[1] The SFT decision, which rejects the application, was made public along with a press release on 8 September 2020.

There is no doubt that we can expect contrasted reactions to the decision. Whatever one’s opinion, however, the official press release in English does not do justice to the 28-page long decision in French and the judges’ reasoning. The goal of this short article is therefore primarily to highlight some key extracts of the SFT decision and some features of the case that will be relevant in its further assessment by scholars and the media.[2]

It is apparent from the decision that the SFT was very aware that its decision was going to be scrutinised by an international audience, part of whom may not be familiar with the mechanics of the legal regime applicable to setting aside an international arbitration award in Switzerland.

Thus, the decision includes long introductory statements regarding the status of the Court of Arbitration for Sport, and the role of the Swiss Federal Tribunal in reviewing award issued by panels in international arbitration proceedings. The SFT also referred extensively throughout its decision to jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), rendered in cases related to international sport and the CAS.

1.     Standing to sue before the SFT & admissibility of the challenge

As a preliminary matter, the SFT considered the standing to sue of both Caster Semenya and the South African Athletics Federation. Both were found to have an interest worthy of protection. Caster Semenya was considered to be particularly affected by the CAS award, since the DSD Regulation require her to fulfil certain requirements in order to participate in certain categories of races at international athletics events. As for the South African Athletics Federation, the SFT considered that as a member federation of World Athletics, it has a duty to cooperate with the international sports governing body and to support it in the implementation of the DSD Regulation, including to alert the medical manager in case it has a suspicion that an athlete might be falling within the scope of the DSD Regulation, so that it had an interest worthy of protection separate and distinct from Caster Semenya’s (para. 4.1.2).

The SFT then examined the clause of waiver to appeal CAS awards, enshrined in the DSD Regulation. Based on its jurisprudence originating in the Cañas matter, the SFT confirmed that an athlete cannot, as a rule, validly waive the right to challenge an award in sports arbitration matters before the SFT:

“It is all the more imperious that the will to waive the appeal be not vitiated through any form of constraint, since such waiver would deprive its author from the possibility to challenge any future award, even if the award should breach fundamental principles inherent to a State operating under the rule of law [… ]” (para. 4.2.4).

 Interestingly, the SFT found that its jurisprudence, developed based on the lack of free consent on part of those athletes, can be equally invoked by a national member federation with respect to arbitration clauses contained in the rules of its international governing body (para. 4.2.4).

2.     Independence of the CAS & role of the SFT

Before entering the merits of the case, the SFT stressed that it was essential to delimit the legal framework of the dispute, the role of the SFT when reviewing an appeal in international arbitration matters and the scope of its power of review (para. 5).

Citing its own Latuzina jurisprudence as well as recent ECtHR decisions in Mutu & Pechstein v. Switzerland, and Platini v. Switzerland, the SFT concluded, as to the status of the CAS:

“One must keep in mind that the appellants have been able to bring their dispute against IAAF before CAS, which is not only an independent and impartial court, with full power of review in fact and in law, but also a specialised jurisdiction” (para. 5.1.3).

The SFT then summarised its role and power of review when dealing with an international arbitration award. In particular, the SFT cannot – save in exceptional circumstances – consider issues of fact, and is bound by the facts as set out in the arbitration award. In addition, the SFT only reviews the award from the perspective of a limited set of grounds, listed in Art. 190(2) of the Swiss Private International Law Act (SPILA). The SFT insisted that the ECtHR

“has emphasised that there is a distinct interest in disputes arising within professional sport, in particular those with an international dimension, being submitted to a specialised jurisdiction capable of ruling in a prompt and cost-efficient way” (para. 5.2.4).

According to the SFT judges, State parties to the European Convention on Human Rights enjoy wide discretion as to how to approach alleged breaches of substantive provisions ECHR within proceedings for setting aside awards in international arbitration cases. Citing the example of Art. 8 ECHR and the freedom to exercise a professional activity, the SFT further recalled that a sports association – as a private entity – is not directly subjected to the ECHR. Positive duties of a State party to the ECHR to take action only arise to a certain extent, where necessary to establish a legal framework that appropriately takes into account the various interests at stake (para. 5.2.5).

In the light of these findings, the SFT concluded that the current Swiss legal system whereby review of international arbitration awards is subject to a set of exhaustive grounds, with a review of the merits of the decision essentially limited to breaches of public policy, and with strict requirements on the parties to assert and substantiate these grounds, is compatible with the ECHR.

3.     Breach of public policy

The SFT briefly discussed the two grounds of irregular constitution (art. 190(2)(a) SPILA) and right to be heard (art. 190(2)(d) SPILA) invoked by the appellants, and rejected them.

The SFT then went into what can be viewed as the real core of its decision: the analysis of the ground of breach of substantive public policy (art. 190(2)(e) SPILA). For doing so, it divided the breaches asserted by the Appellants into three limbs: i.) prohibition of discrimination, ii.) personality rights and iii.) human dignity.

The SFT started by recalling the well-established notion of public policy within the context of international arbitration, and its boundaries:

“An award is incompatible with public policy if it disregards essential and widely accepted values which, according to the views prevailing in Switzerland, should constitute the foundation of any legal system” (para. 9.1).

The SFT went on to insist that it is an extremely rare occurrence (“chose rarissime”) for arbitral awards to be set aside on this ground. The concept is more restrictive than arbitrariness, and the award must be incompatible with public policy not only in its reasoning, but also in its outcomes. Also, neither the breach of constitutional rights, nor of ECHR rights, can be invoked directly under this ground, even though principles underpinning the relevant provisions of the ECHR or of the Swiss Constitution can be taken into account to crystallize the concept of public policy (para. 9.2).

Critically, the SFT’s reasoning had to be based on the premises that the CAS award had set, whereby athletes targeted by the DSD Regulation enjoy – due to their levels of testosterone – an advantage over other female competitors that is ‘insurmountable’, in the sense that it would allow them to systematically beat female athletes without DSD (see e.g. para. 9.8.2). The SFT thus worked on the assumption that there were also two groups of interests in conflict, i.e. the ‘protected class’ (“classe protégée”) of the female category versus the class of the athletes with DSD. There are some indications within the decision, however, that the SFT judges probably largely endorsed the CAS findings (e.g. the extract: “the statistics are particularly compelling in this respect”, para. 9.8.3.3.).

Another important aspect of the case is that World Athletics – unlike many international federations – is not based in Switzerland but in Monaco, and is thus not organised as an association of Swiss law. Indeed, as the SFT stressed in several instances (e.g. para. 5.1.1, para. 9.1, para. 9.2), Swiss law was not applicable on the merits of the dispute and the case had no connection to Switzerland other than the seat of the arbitral tribunal that made the challenged award.

i.               Prohibition of discrimination

With respect to the first limb of discrimination, the SFT stressed that the prohibition of discrimination enshrined in art. 8(2) Swiss Constitution – aside from the fact that Swiss constitutional law was not applicable in the case in the first place – could only apply to the relationship between the State and individuals. The provision is aimed at protecting individuals from the State and does not deploy so-called ‘direct horizontal effect’ among private parties.

Thus, the SFT doubted that the prohibition of a discrimination originating from such private party could be characterised as part of the essential values that form public policy. The SFT did, however, find the appellants’ argument relevant whereby the “relationship between an athlete and a global sports federation shows some similarities to those between an individual and a State” (para. 9.4).

In the end, the SFT found that the issue could be left undecided, holding that, in any event, the award did not enshrine any discrimination contrary to public policy.

Indeed, even under Swiss constitution law, a discriminating measure based on one of the enumerated criteria (e.g. sex) can be justified if they rely on biological differences that categorically exclude an identical treatment (para. 9.5). The SFT found that the CAS had – in a 165-page award – conducted a thorough assessment of all arguments brought forward by the parties, dealing both with complex scientific issues and delicate legal questions (para. 9.8.3.1). The outcome reached by the CAS was, to the SFT, not only “not untenable, it was not even unreasonable” (para. 9.8.3.3).

To support its view, the SFT relied heavily on the notion of fairness of sports competition, referring in particular to the ECtHR decision on the whereabouts system (FNASS et al. v. France) in connection with anti-doping regulation. In a somewhat troubling parallel, the SFT summarised this decision as

“confirming thus that the search for a fair sport represents an important goal which is capable of justifying serious encroachments upon sportspeople’s rights” (para. 9.8.3.3).

Stressing that the case before it was not a doping matter (“no one challenges that athletes 46 XY DSD have never cheated”; para. 9.8.3.3), the SFT considered nevertheless that certain biological characteristics can also distort fairness of competition. Any binary division such as the one between male and female in athletics necessarily creates difficulties of classification (para. 9.8.3.3). In the SFT’s eyes, the DSD Regulation were a proportionate way of addressing these difficulties.

ii.              Breach of personality rights

With respect to the breach of an athlete’s personality rights under Art. 27 et seq. of the Swiss Civil Code, the SFT recalled its jurisprudence whereby a breach of personality rights can, in certain circumstances, amount to a breach of public policy – i.e. if there is a clear and severe violation of a fundamental right – but that these circumstances were not realised in casu (para. 10.1).

In particular, the SFT found that the measures provided under the DSD Regulation were not such as to affect the essence of the athlete’s physical integrity: the required examinations were to be conducted by medical professionals and might also be beneficial to the athlete by revealing medical data to those who were unaware that they had DSD, the treatments (oral contraceptives) were not compulsory in the sense that an athlete could not be compelled to take such treatment.

From the viewpoint of economic freedom, the SFT found that the matter was not comparable to the Matuzalem case – nota bene the first matter in which the SFT annulled an arbitral award based on grounds of substantive public policy – since the DSD Regulation could not be considered to make participation in the ‘specified competitions’ impossible, and athletes remain free to participate in races outside those specified categories, including at international level, so that their economic existence was not jeopardised. In addition, the DSD Regulation was to be considered a measure capable of achieving the legitimate goals of fairness in sport and the preservation of the ‘protected class’ of female athletes, and were necessary and proportionate to these goals (para. 10.5).

iii.            Human dignity

Finally, the SFT found that the DSD Regulation were not contrary to human dignity. On the one hand, the SFT considered that the CAS award did not seek to question the female gender of the athletes, nor to assess whether these were ‘female enough’.

“In certain contexts that are as special as competitive sports, one can accept that biological characteristics can, exceptionally and for purposes of fairness and equal opportunities, eclipse legal sex or gender identity of an individual. Otherwise, the sheer notion of a binary division man/woman, which is present in the vast majority of sports, would lose its raison d’être” (para. 11.1). 

On the other hand, with respect to the treatments at stake, the SFT merely reaffirmed that there was no compulsory treatment, in the sense that athletes retained the option to refuse such treatment:

“While it is true that such refusal will result in the impossibility to take part in certain athletic competitions, it cannot be accepted that this consequence could, in and by itself, amount to a violation of an individual’s human dignity” (para. 11.2).

Thus, to the SFT, the appellants’ reference to “humiliating pharmacological experiments” or to the notion of “human guinea pigs” appeared inappropriate.

Having found that the award was not in breach of public policy, the SFT found that the appeal had to be dismissed on this ground also.

Conclusion

Over the next days and weeks, many commentators will dissect the SFT decision. Unsurprisingly, reactions already point at the responsibility of Switzerland for failing to protect sportspeople, and the unsuitability of the current sports dispute resolution system for dealing with human rights issues.

These issues undoubtedly deserve a debate, if decisions rendered in international sports matters are to maintain – or, rather at this point, regain – their credibility.

From the perspective of the current Swiss legal system and international arbitration law, the SFT only had little leeway to navigate the delicate issues before it: the grounds cited in art. 190(2) SPILA – which apply to all international arbitration proceedings in Switzerland, whether commercial or sports-related – are exhaustive, and the SFT has so far systematically refused to broaden the notion of substantive public policy to give it a ‘sports-specific’ meaning for arbitration award rendered by the CAS. Moreover, the SFT cannot question the facts as set forth in an arbitral award. Finally, the SFT was asked to review the decision because of the seat of the CAS in Lausanne, but neither the athlete nor the international federation that had adopted the rules in dispute were based in Switzerland, and Swiss law was not applicable to the merits.

The SFT judges may, however, have missed an opportunity that was available to them de lege lata, in failing to use the ‘escape door’ of the severe breach of personality rights, interpreted as part of public policy. The very broad wording of the SFT jurisprudence in this context leaves a lot of discretion to adapt to individual situations in which the SFT judges may feel that there is something ‘unfair’ at stake. Though the SFT went to great lengths to distinguish the case from the Matuzalem matter, the situation in which athletes subject to the DSD Regulation are placed could arguably have been construed and framed in a way that would have fitted the requirements of this ground, if it had been the SFT’s desire to reach such a conclusion. The general impression, however, is that the SFT judges became genuinely convinced of the justification for the ‘protected’ female category and the fact that competitors subject to the DSD Regulation would enjoy an insurmountable advantage over other female competitors if they were authorised to compete freely in the specified competitions. In any event, it was not within their power of review to question these findings of the CAS award.

It may come as a disappointment to many that these difficult questions raising complex scientific issues could not be addressed in the context of the SFT proceedings. However, it is essential to keep in mind that, like the CAS in its award, the SFT did leave the door open for future challenges:

“That being said, the CAS did emphasise that the DSD Regulations could, at a later point, reveal themselves to be disproportionate in case it should prove impossible or excessively difficult to apply them. One is bound to admit that the CAS did not give validation, once and for all, to the DSD Regulations, but, on the contrary, explicitly reserved the possibility to conduct, as the case may be, a new assessment under the angle of proportionality when applying the regulation to a particular matter” (para. 9.8.3.5).

Thus, regardless of what avenues Caster Semenya may decide to take immediately with respect to the SFT decision, we may soon see new developments and new legal proceedings around the implementation of the DSD Regulation. The jury is still out.

[1] The author was consulted on sports arbitration issues in connection with this application to set aside.

[2] All extracts quoted are private translations by the author of the original decision in French.

Editor's note: In the coming days we will introduce the supporters of our upcoming ISLJ Annual International Sports Law Conference 2018 (also known as #ISLJConf18). To do so, we have sent them a tailored questionnaire aimed at reflecting both their activities and their expectations for the conference. It is a good opportunity for us to thank them for their enthusiastic support and commitment to international sports law research. We are very happy to continue this series of interviews with LawInSport, a knowledge hub and educational platform for the community of people working in or with an interest in sport and the law  (many thanks to LawInSport's CEO Sean Cottrell for kindly responding to our questions).

1. Can you explain to our readers what LawInSport is about?

LawInSport is a knowledge hub, educational platform and global community of people working in or with an interest in sport and the law.

Our objective is to help people ‘understand the rules of the game™’. What does this mean? It means people in sport having access to information that enables them to have a better understanding the rules and regulations that govern the relationships, behaviours and processes within sports. This in turn creates a foundation based on the principles of the rule of law, protecting the rights of everyone working and participating in sport.  

2. What are the challenges and perks of being an international sports law 'reporter’ ?

I do not consider myself a reporter, but as the head of an organisation that has a responsibility to provide the highest quality information on legal issues in sport,  focusing on what is important and not just what is popular, whilst trying to stay free from conflicts of interests. These two issues, popularism and conflict of interest, are the two of the biggest challenges.

Popularism and the drive to win attention is, in my opinion, causing a lack of discipline when it comes to factual and legal accuracy in coverage of sports law issues, which on their own may seem harmless, but can cause harm to organisations and individuals (athletes, employees, etc).

Conflict of interest will obviously arise in such a small sector, however, there is not a commonly agreed standard in internationally, let alone in sports law. Therefore, one needs to be diligent when consuming information to understand why someone may or may not hold a point of view, if they have paid to get it published or has someone paid them to write it. For this reason it can be hard to get a full picture of what is happening in the sector.

In terms of perks, I get to do something that is both challenging and rewarding on a daily basis, and as  a business owner I have the additional benefit of work with colleagues I enjoy working with. I have the privilege of meeting world leaders in their respective fields (law, sport, business, science, education, etc) and gain insights from them about their work and life experiences which is incredibly enriching.  Getting access to speak to the people who are on the front line, either athletes, coaches, lawyers, scientists, rather than from a third party is great as it gives you an unfiltered insight into what is going on.

On the other side of things, we get the opportunity to help people through either having a better understand of the legal and regulatory issues in sports or to understand how to progress themselves towards their goals academically and professionally is probably the most rewarding part of my work. 

3. What are the burning issues in international sports law that you would like to see discussed at the conference?

• The long-term implications of human rights law in sport;
• The importance of meaningful of stakeholder consultation in the creation and drafting of regulations in sport;
• Effective international safeguarding in sport.

4. Why did you decide to support the ISLJ Annual International Sports Law Conference?

We support ISLJ Annual International Sports Law Conference as it is a non-profit conference that’s purpose is to create a space to explore a wide range of legal issues in sport. The conference is an academic conference that does a great job in bringing a diverse range of speakers and delegates. The discussions and debates that take place will benefit the wider sports law community.  Therefore, as LawInSport’s objective is focused on education it was a straight forward decision to support the conferences as it is aligned with our objectives. 

FIFA’s Third-Party Ownership (TPO) ban entered into force on the 1 May 2015[1]. Since then, an academic and practitioner’s debate is raging over its compatibility with EU law, and in particular the EU Free Movement rights and competition rules. 

The European Commission, national courts (and probably in the end the Court of Justice of the EU) and the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) will soon have to propose their interpretations of the impact of EU law on FIFA’s TPO ban. Advised by the world-famous Bosman lawyer, Jean-Louis Dupont, Doyen has decided to wage through a proxy (the Belgian club FC Seraing) a legal war against the ban. The first skirmishes have already taken place in front of the Brussels Court of first instance, which denied in July Seraing’s request for provisional measures. For its part, FIFA has already sanctioned the club for closing a TPO deal with Doyen, thus opening the way to an ultimate appeal to the CAS. In parallel, the Spanish and Portuguese leagues have lodged a complaint with the European Commission arguing that the FIFA ban is contrary to EU competition law. One academic has already published an assessment of the compatibility of the ban with EU law, and many practitioners have offered their take (see here and here for example). It is undeniable that the FIFA ban is per se restrictive of the economic freedoms of investors and can easily be constructed as a restriction on free competition. Yet, the key and core question under an EU law analysis, is not whether the ban is restrictive (any regulation inherently is), but whether it is proportionate, in other words justified.

I will first present the key arguments of the opponents of the ban, before offering my own assessment. As the reader might know, I am no friends of FIFA and a staunch critic of its bad governance syndrome. Although I am convinced that FIFA’s governance deserves a ground-up rebuilt, I also believe that FIFA’s TPO ban is justified.

I.               Antithesis: FIFA’s TPO ban is contrary to EU law 

The legal waters are very much chartered insofar as the question of the application of EU law to FIFA’s TPO ban is concerned.[2] The key legacy of the CJEU’s jurisprudence on sport, starting with the Bosman ruling, is that FIFA’s regulations do not escape the reach of EU law and that they must be subjected to a proportionality control of the restrictions they impose on economic freedoms. The fundamental question with respect to the TPO ban is then whether it will be deemed justified and proportionate by the national courts, the CAS, the European Commission and ultimately the CJEU.

The opponents of the FIFA ban consider first and foremost that the practice of TPO (they usually prefer to refer to as Third-Party Investments or Third-Party Entitlements) is a legitimate financial investment practice, which is needed to sustain and raise the competitiveness of certain clubs. Basically if banks are reluctant to finance those clubs, then less risk-averse investors have to step in. Thus, they support investment in the training capacity of the clubs (especially in South America) and their capacity to take their chances in the most prestigious competitions (for example FC Porto or Atlético Madrid). Hence, TPO can be seen as a legitimate investment practice and its regulation left to the contractual freedom of the parties. Such a radical libertarian view is not often supported nowadays,[3] as the potential integrity risks of TPO are widely acknowledged.[4]

Instead, if the risks connected to TPO are to be tackled, it is argued that TPO should be properly regulated. In EU law jargon, this is labelled a less restrictive alternative.[5] The existence of a less restrictive alternative would point at the disproportionate nature of the FIFA ban. For example, a bundle of regulatory measures are suggested by the Spanish league (La Liga):

·      Prohibition of certain transactions based on the player's age;

·      Maximum percentage of participation in the "economic rights";

·      Quantitative limitations on the maximum number of players per club;

·      Maximum remuneration for the investor;

·      Prohibition of certain clauses that may limit the independence and autonomy of the clubs; and

·      Prohibition of transactions depending on the investor's particular status or business (or participation in the same) such as shareholders, directors and managers of the clubs.

The proposed regulatory changes would undeniably be an improvement with regard to the current situation. However, I do not believe they are sufficiently credible to undermine the legality of FIFA’s TPO ban.

II.             Thesis: FIFA’s TPO ban is compatible with EU law

A.    The necessity to tackle the integrity risks generated by TPO

First, we need to come back to the function and functioning of TPO deals. There is a reason why banks refuse to offer loans to certain clubs. They are often in difficult financial situations, their revenues do not add up with their expenses. Investment funds fill this gap, they replace banks in financially supporting these clubs. In return, they expect a modern version of the “pound of flesh”, a share of the transfer fee attached to a specific player. For a club, the TPO investments will only be fruitful while it is successful on the pitch and lucky in picking the players it recruits. It is a very risky bet on the future. In good times everybody wins, but in bad times the club is in deep trouble (see FC Twente’s fate). The TPO system works as a devil’s circle, the club is drawn into more and more TPO deals to stay financially viable.

Furthermore, TPO deals are not unlike the complex financial instruments that led to the terrible financial crisis of 2008. They give way to similar conflicts of interest. Where banks were selling derivatives based on subprime mortgages to their clients while betting against them at the same time, TPO funds might push their clients to recruit (thanks to loans they have generously provided for high interests) a mediocre player in which they already have a stake. Another option would be for a TPO fund, which is often (if not always) also acting as an agent, to force the departure of a player by triggering an offer which the club cannot refuse (or it would have to buy back the rights which is impossible due to its financial situation). The many hat(s) of TPO investment funds are extremely worrying in terms of conflicts of interest.[6] The most dangerous, though in my view less likely (but see the Tampere case), risk being that TPO investors would use their broad networks of influence to fix games. FIFA’s objective of curbing those risks is clearly a legitimate one.

The heart of the trade of TPO funds is to leverage the hubris of football clubs, to corner them into making a bad financial deal in return for a credible shot at winning a title. But once the high is over, the low starts and the awakening is rather uncomfortable. The high financial risks saddled to the club are sustainable only so long as it is a winner. As soon as its fate on the pitch turns, the bad news accumulates and not unlike a bank run the club crashes, while the investors have more often than not managed to escape before the fall. In short, unless you truly believe in the superpowers of the invisible hand of the market, this practice, as well as the financial practices that led to the financial crisis, deserves either a thorough regulation or an outright ban.

B.    Is there a realistic regulatory alternative to the ban?

The key question for the assessment of the TPO ban under EU law is whether the many negative externalities triggered by the use of TPO could be tackled by the way of a less restrictive encroachment on the economic freedoms of the investors/clubs than the FIFA ban. Critics of the ban have very much insisted on the existence of less restrictive regulatory alternatives and put forward some proposals. Yet, I am of the opinion that these alternatives are generally unworkable in the present context. The main reason being that FIFA is incapable to properly regulate and control the TPO investment market. This is due to the fact that FIFA does not dispose of the legal competence needed to force investment funds to disclose information. To do so, it must be empowered by governments to be able to cease the information wanted, which is unlikely. Some would object, that this could be done via the FIFA TMS system put in place to supervise international transfers. But it would be extremely difficult for FIFA to verify any complex set of contractual information entered into the TMS. The destiny of former article 18 bis of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfers of Players (see the 2014 version here) is there to prove this point. Under article 4.2 of Annexe 3 of the FIFA RSTP 2014, Clubs were already supposed to provide a “Declaration on third-party payments and influence”. Nonetheless, in previous years, FIFA was unable to charge any club (except for Tampere in a match-fixing context and due to a local police investigation) on the ground that an investor was exercising undue influence, mainly because it lacked the knowledge needed to do so. This is exemplified in the case of the ERPA signed by Doyen and FC Twente, which was only partially disclosed to the Dutch Football Association.

If FIFA is powerless, how is it supposed to enforce the ban? Well here lies the crucial difference between a ban and complex regulation. A ban is simpler to enforce, as it is merely a black-or-white matter. FIFA will be able to rely on investigative journalists unearthing investment contracts linked to transfers. The mere existence of a TPO contract will lead to a dissuasive sanction, without the need to get into the nitty-gritty details of each case. It thus makes it easier for FIFA to control the use of TPO and to force investment funds to come out in the open and take charge of the management of a club if they wish to stay active on the transfer market. The higher probability of being caught linked to the use of TPO will most likely work as a strong deterrent for clubs to engage in such a financing practice. This is undeniably a blunt instrument, and in an ideal world a true regulation of the TPO market would be put in place and enforced, but this ideal world is not compatible with the pluralist and complex transnational legal setting in which the transfer system operates. The complex regulatory schemes proposed as substitute to the ban are very well intended, but they do not take into account the extreme difficulty (and costs) linked to their implementation. The fiasco of the old FIFA Players’ Agents Regulations illustrates the practical constraints that burden any regulation of the football transfer market.

C.    TPO is not compatible with the 2001 agreement between the European Commission and FIFA

There is a final argument in favour of the compatibility of the TPO ban with EU law, which is grounded in the 2001 agreement between FIFA, UEFA and the European Commission. As should be obvious by now, the existence of TPO is dependent on the existence of the FIFA transfer system. Such a transfer system is unknown in other industries (though one could very well imagine a transfer system for academics for example). In turn, the FIFA transfer system restricts the economic freedom of both clubs and players. The European Commission highlighted these restrictions during its investigation of the FIFA transfer system in the early 2000s. However, the Commission signed an agreement with FIFA and UEFA signalizing its support for a new (the current) FIFA transfer system in 2001 and put an end to its investigation. This support was conditioned on the idea that a form of transfer system was needed to maintain the contractual stability necessary to the existence of stable and successful teams.[7] This is the fundamental assumption that underlies the compatibility with EU law of the FIFA transfer system, and therefore the sheer existence of TPO. Yet, TPO as a practice is per se promoting contractual instability. Players have to change clubs for TPO investors to cash in on their investments. It is perfectly logical for TPO contracts to include various clauses strongly incentivizing clubs to sell their players. If not, they will have to bear the costs, for example, of paying a fee (usually the invested amount plus a healthy interest) in case the player leaves the club on a free transfer, or forcing the club to buy back at market rate the investors’ shares in the economic right of a player in case of an offer above a minimum price. For a cash-strapped club, e.g. a club that lost access to the banking system and has to turn to TPO investors, this is usually impossible and means that it will be forced to sell-on the player. In a way, TPO is a radical perversion of the deal stroke by FIFA/UEFA and the Commission. The transfer system was meant to ensure that contractual stability is secured in football, not to enhance contractual instability. This contradiction between TPO and the rationale conditioning the legality under EU law of the FIFA transfer system will necessarily bear on the EU Commission’s analysis of FIFA’s TPO ban.

Conclusion: TPO is a symptom, the transfer system is the problem

20 years of the Bosman case oblige, the case has been back in the news cycle this week (see here, here, and here). It is widely credited, or rather blamed, for having changed football for bad, turning it into some kind of commercial monster. I very much doubt this storytelling is right. It is based on a collective misreading of the case. Bosman took stock of a contemporary development in football at that time: the eagerness of the ���football family” to commercialize its activities by primarily selling TV rights in a monopoly position. What Bosman is about, then, it is the regulation of this economic activity. Central questions are: How should the proceeds be distributed and especially who should bear the costs of ensuring competitive balance amongst the teams? Until Bosman the players were the main losers, they could not move freely across Europe and in some countries they could not transfer for free even after the end of their contracts. This situation was deemed an unjustified restriction on the player’s freedom by the Court. Nevertheless, and this is widely forgotten, Bosman is not about dogmatically ensuring that economic freedoms and a deregulated market always prevail. In fact, Advocate General Lenz was advocating as an alternative to the transfer system that the economic revenues derived from TV rights be shared more equally to ensure competitive balance.[8] This is obviously an important restriction on the economic freedom of clubs and leagues, yet the Court endorsed it as viable alternative.[9] Since then, the Court has repeatedly approved various type of sporting regulations restricting the economic freedoms of athletes or clubs.[10] After Bosman, FIFA and UEFA (supported by many clubs) insisted on maintaining a transfer system instead of the alternative suggested by Lenz and the Court. Despite the Commission’s aforementioned challenge of the legality of the FIFA transfer system, FIFA and UEFA were able to marshal the political support of the most influential Member States (France, Germany and the UK) in their bid to save the transfer system.[11] This led to the 2001 agreement and to the survival of the transfer system in its current form.

It is certainly ironical that the transfer system is based on the same legal principles denounced by UEFA and FIFA officials when they talk of slavery regarding TPO. This hypocrisy, rightly pointed out by the critics of the ban,[12] does not entail that the TPO ban is contrary to EU law, as they in turn seem to assume. However, it does imply that TPO as a practice is just the tip of the iceberg. In fact, it is a symptom, as well as the murky world of agents, of a global transfer market gone rogue. This is due mainly to the insistence of FIFA in transforming players into moveable assets included on the balance sheets of clubs. The transfer system is certainly not about contractual stability or the financing of training facilities. Indeed, FIFA is trumpeting the growing number of transfers each year (see this year’s celebratory press release here) and is very much dragging its feet as far as enforcing training compensations and solidarity payments is concerned.[13] Undoubtedly, there is some doublespeak going on. If clubs are forced to turn to TPO investors it is mainly because FIFA and UEFA (and the big clubs) have refused to put in place the necessary redistributive mechanisms to ensure a minimum of competitive balance as was advocated by the CJEU in the Bosman ruling 20 years ago (and by the EU Commission recently). Instead, they have put their faith into a transfer system that is neither correcting competitive imbalances nor guaranteeing contractual stability (a view supported by Stefan Szymanski on behalf of FIFPro). FIFA has lost control over its Frankenstein-like transfer system and it is desperately trying to rein its negative externalities with regulatory patches (e.g. UEFA’s Financial Fair-play Rules or FIFA’s TPO ban). In this regard, the TPO ban is unlikely to contravene EU law, but it is also unlikely to be a solution to the many problems caused by FIFA and UEFA’s handling of the post-Bosman football era.

[1] See FIFA Circular no. 1464 announcing the ban.

[2] This is well done by Johan Lindholm in his article: Can I please have a slice of Ronaldo? The legality of FIFA’s ban on third-party ownership under European union law.

[3] The Spanish Competition Authority comes close to such a view in its advisory opinion criticizing FIFA’s TPO ban. It states at page 6 (in Spanish): “Se ha de partir del hecho de que si el mercado ha facilitado la aparición de estas operaciones es porque una multitud de agentes (tanto clubs como jugadores), actuando de manera descentralizada, han considerado que es lo mejor para sus intereses. Por tanto, la prohibición del TPO resulta en una limitación de la capacidad de obrar y de la libertad de empresa, restringiendo el uso de una conducta que en principio es maximizadora de beneficios (o minimizadora de pérdidas).”

[4] Even though very reluctantly by the Spanish Competition Authority, see p.9-10.

[5] This is also the view of Johan Lindholm, he considers that “regulation is likely a legally more successful response to the perceived ills of TPO”.

[6] This is also true for other types of third party funding, for example in arbitration.

[7] This is in essence the meaning of paragraph 57 of the EU Commission’s rejection decision in the Affaire IV/36 583-SETCA-FGTB/FIFA. The paragraph states : « La protection des contrats pendant une période de durée limitée qui se traduit par des sanctions correspondant notamment à la suspension du joueur pendant une période de 4 mois à 6 mois (dans des cas de récidives) semble indispensable pour garantir la construction d’une équipe. Un club a besoin d’un temps minimum pour construire son équipe. Si un joueur pouvait rompre unilatéralement son contrat dès la première année et être transféré à la fin de la saison vers un autre club, sans aucune sanction autre que la compensation financière, son club d’origine n’aurait pas de possibilité de construire convenablement son équipe. Les sanctions visent donc à démotiver les joueurs de rompre unilatéralement leurs contrats pendant les deux premières années pour permettre l’existence d’équipes stables. En raison des spécificités du secteur en cause la durée de la période protégée et des sanctions semble être proportionnée aux objectifs légitimes quelles visent à atteindre. »

[8] See in particular paragraphs 218-234 of his Opinion.

[9] See para. 110 of the Bosman ruling.

[10] For example: Selection rules in Deliège; Transfer windows in Lehtonen; FIFA’s agent regulation in Piau; Doping sanctions in Meca-Medina; Training compensations in Bernard. The European Commission also recognised the legality of UEFA’s rule limiting the multiple ownership of clubs in ENIC.

[11] On this episode see Borja Garcia’s article, ‘The 2001 informal agreement on the international transfer system’.

[12] In his article Johan Lindholm criticizes this moral posture taken by FIFA and UEFA. He rightly points at its hypocrisy: “[…] a third party owning fifty percent of the economic rights to a player is the very height of moral corruption, but a club owning one hundred percent of the same right is not only perfectly acceptable but also applauded”.

[13] A recent study commissioned by the European Clubs Association (ECA) on the transfer market, shows (at page 88) that the solidarity payments are way below the 5% threshold imposed by the FIFA RSTP (reaching instead only 1,15% of the transfer fees).