Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

Joint Statement from Legal Experts on Genetic Sex Testing in Sport

We, the undersigned legal experts in human rights and sports, issue this statement out of urgent concern about the regressive move toward genetic testing as a precondition of participation in women’s sport. Such eligibility rules, which have already been adopted by several major International Federations—including World Athletics, World Boxing, World Aquatics, and the International Ski and Snowboard Federation—not only conflict with the IOC’s existing guidelines on the matter, but also violate domestic and international laws that protect human rights and regulate the use of genetic testing and genetic information. 


Violations of the IOC Framework

The IOC’s Framework on fairness, inclusion and non-discrimination on the basis of gender identity and sex variationsoutlines fundamental principles to be followed within the Olympic Movement when defining eligibility criteria for the men’s and women’s categories of competition. According to the Framework, any such eligibility criteria should be aimed at ensuring that no athlete has an unfair and disproportionate competitive advantage or at preventing a risk to the physical safety of other athletes. Under the Framework, such an advantage or risk cannot be presumed based on an athlete’s sex variations, physical appearance, or transgender status. It must instead be established based on evidence in the form of robust and peer reviewed research. 

In particular, such evidence should be “based on data collected from a demographic group that is consistent in gender and athletic engagement with the group that the eligibility criteria aim to regulate” and must demonstrate “disproportionate competitive advantage and/or unpreventable risk exists for the specific sport, discipline and event that the eligibility criteria aim to regulate.” Contrary to this evidence-based approach, exclusion based on the presence of the SRY gene constitutes a categorical ban based on a single biological marker, rather than on peer-reviewed research demonstrating that transgender athletes and/or athletes with sex variations have a disproportionate competitive advantage or pose an unpreventable safety risk in specific sporting disciplines.

Moreover, the IOC Framework advises International Federations to prioritize athletes’ health, wellbeing, bodily autonomy, and privacy. Current genetic sex testing rules fail to do so, in violation of numerous domestic and international laws, which we urgently draw attention to below.


Violations of national, regional, and international human rights laws

As several Special Procedures of the UN Human Rights Council have observed, genetic sex testing as a condition of eligibility for women’s sport infringes on athletes’ internationally recognized rights to equality, bodily and psychological integrity, and privacy. 

Further, the IOC, along with the many International Federations based in Europe, must comply with the European Convention on Human Rights. Indeed, the European Court of Human Rights has recognized that the failure of a sport governing body to respect human rights may engage the responsibility of Switzerland under the Convention and, further, that the Swiss Federal Supreme Court must subject female eligibility rules in sport to particularly rigorous review given the seriousness of the personal rights at issue, including privacy, bodily and psychological integrity, economic freedom, and human dignity. 

We consider that mandatory genetic sex testing, and the exclusion of women athletes on this basis, violates Articles 8 (right to respect for private life) and 14 (prohibition of discrimination) of the European Convention. Such violations can only be justified if the eligibility rules are reasonable, necessary, and proportionate, which International Federations bear the burden of proving and which they are currently unable to do. As the European Court of Human Rights recently recognized, the harms of sex testing include the inevitable disclosure of certain athletes’ private and confidential medical information, the potential loss of their livelihoods, and a range of other serious harms. In our view, these consequences—and particularly the social exclusion, psychological distress, physical harm, and material loss that accompany them—cannot be considered reasonable and proportionate to the aim pursued. This is particularly so given the absence of conclusive scientific evidence demonstrating that transgender women athletes or athletes with sex variations have a systematic advantage over other women athletes. 

The exclusion of athletes on the basis of genetic sex testing likewise violates domestic laws, as a Belgian court recently concluded, finding that international cycling regulations barring transgender women were discriminatory, lacking a sound scientific basis, and disproportionate. 


Violations of laws regulating genetic testing and genetic data

Genetic sex testing as a condition of participation in sport also violates numerous national, regional, and international laws, which strictly circumscribe the use of genetic testing and genetic data. 

First, the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, along with the domestic laws of many jurisdictions, prohibit genetic testing unless it serves a health-related purpose, which sex testing rules clearly do not. Some domestic laws place additional restrictions on the range of permissible medical purposes when it comes to minors, however International Federations apply genetic sex testing rules indiscriminately to athletes of all ages. Because of such domestic legal restrictions, athletes in some countries have been pushed to access genetic testing abroad, in less protective jurisdictions.

Second, across jurisdictions, free and informed consent is a fundamental precondition for genetic testing. Not only do individuals below a certain age lack the legal capacity to consent, the consent of an athlete of any age cannot be freely given when it is a condition of sports eligibility. Illustrating this legal principle, the International Declaration on Human Genetic Data specifies that consent to genetic testing is only valid if it is not induced by financial or other personal gain, yet sports eligibility rules do exactly that. While many jurisdictions require the provision of non-directive genetic counselling prior to any testing, this safeguard is nullified by the directive nature of sports eligibility rules. 

Third, domestic and international laws prohibit discrimination based on genetic characteristics, as well as the use of genetic data in ways that stigmatize individuals or groups. Yet genetic sex testing rules do so, first, by targeting only women athletes for testing, and second, by excluding those with a particular genetic trait, resulting in the further stigmatization and marginalization of transgender and intersex people, not only in sport but in society at large.

Fourth, in order to prevent such discrimination, certain jurisdictions specifically prohibit making genetic testing or disclosure of test results a condition of a contract and prohibit anyone other than medical practitioners or researchers, and particularly employers, from requesting or using genetic information. International Federations cannot circumvent these legal restrictions by outsourcing genetic testing to authorities at the national level.

Finally, privacy and data protection laws around the world, including the General Data Protection Regulation(GDPR) afford heightened protection to genetic information. The GDPR prohibits the processing of genetic data, except in very narrow circumstances, such as where the data subject gives explicit, voluntary and informed consent, or where the processing is necessary for and proportionate to reasons of substantial public interest set out in EU or member state law.  Such voluntary and informed consent does not exist for genetic sex testing as athletes are forced to grant consent under the threat of exclusion from sport, and often in circumstances where they are not knowledgeable about the risks of harm that might result from the data processing. There is also no EU or member state law that describes the purported aim of sex testing in sport as a substantial public interest and, even if there was, the data processing in pursuit of that aim would not be necessary and proportionate due to the absence of scientific evidence that women with the SRY gene have a competitive advantage over other women athletes and the significant harms to athletes that can result from genetic sex testing.

The processing of genetic data for sex testing may violate other data protection laws that have been recognized as providing an adequate level of protection similar to the GDPR, such as the data protection laws in Brazil, Canada, Japan, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.


Our Call

We call on the IOC, as it finalises the work to find a “consensus” to “protect the female category”, to reject mandatory genetic testing as a condition of eligibility. We call on International Federations that have already adopted such eligibility rules to withdraw them immediately. And we call on all sport governing bodies to recommit—in practice, not only in policy—to the principles of inclusion and non-discrimination that they have already affirmed.

If international sport governing bodies fail to do so, we call on National Federations to refuse to apply and implement international eligibility rules that violate their respective domestic laws and international legal obligations. Simultaneously, we call on states to urgently review the legality of mandatory genetic sex testing policies that are being applied to athletes and/or at competitions within their jurisdictions. 

We also call on athletes to challenge the national or regional implementation of mandatory genetic sex testing, demanded by the IOC or International Federations, before domestic courts, by invoking national or regional laws protecting human rights, prohibiting anti-discrimination, and regulating the use of genetic testing and genetic data. 

At the same time, we call on courts, particularly the Court of Arbitration for Sport, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court, and ultimately the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union, to uphold their duty to ensure a particularly rigorous review of the rules and decisions of the IOC and International Federations, which is compliant with European human rights law and public policy. 

Mandatory genetic sex testing is a stigmatizing and exclusionary policy that lacks democratic legitimacy, scientific grounding, and proportionality between its harms and its aims. It simply has no place in international sport if sport is to be respectful of the values of human dignity, inclusion, fairness, and non-discrimination.  

 

First signatories:

 

Dr. Antoine Duval, T.M.C. Asser Instituut, The Netherlands

Dr. Michele Krech, Toronto Metropolitan University, Canada 

 

 

Signatories

 

1.     Dr. Cem Abanazir, Manchester Metropolitan University, United Kingdom

2.     Rafia Akram, University of Pretoria, South Africa

3.     Dr. Shreya Atrey, University of Oxford, United Kingdom

4.     Francis Awaritefe, lawyer, Professional Footballers Australia (PFA), Australia

5.     Dr. Mathieu Le Bescond de Coatpont, Université de Lille, France

6.     Manon Beury, Geneva Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Switzerland

7.     Dr. Audrey Boisgontier, Paris Nanterre University, France

8.     Jensen Brehaut, Osgoode Hall Law School - York University, Canada

9.     Prof. Eva Brems, Ghent University, Belgium

10.  Prof. Erin Buzuvis, Western New England University School of Law, USA

11.  Dr Seamus Byrne, Manchester Law School, Manchester Metropolitan University, United Kingdom 

12.  Prof. Gillian Calder, University of Victoria, Faculty of Law, Canada

13.  Dr. Pieter Cannoot, Ghent University, Belgium

14.  Amritananda Chakravorty, Advocate, India

15.  Jonathan Cooper, University of Gloucestershire, United Kingdom 

16.  Prof. Sharon Cowan, University of Edinburgh, United Kingdom 

17.  Dr. Martine Dennie, University of Manitoba, Canada

18.  Moya Dodd, lawyer, Former Matilda (Australian Women’s Football Team), Australia

19.  Nikki Dryden, lawyer, The Right Collective, Australia

20.  Dr Eleanor Drywood, School of Law and Social Justice, University of Liverpool, United Kingdom

21.  Prof. Maria C Dugas, Schulich School of Law, Dalhousie University, Canada

22.  Prof. Ariel Dulitzky, University of Texas at Austin, School of Law, USA

23.  Dr. Hilary Findlay, Brock University (retired), Canada

24.  Deekshitha Ganesan, Human rights lawyer, Germany

25.  Dr. Ryan Gauthier, Thompson Rivers University

26.  Alexandra Gómez Bruinewoud, Director Legal at FIFPro, The Netherlands

27.  Kaushik Gupta, Senior Advocate High Court at Calcutta, India  

28.  Dr Matthew Harvey, Victoria University Melbourne, Australia

29.  Dina Francesca Haynes, Orville H. Schell, Jr. Center for International Human Rights and Yale University, USA

30.  Prof. Kristin Henrard, Brussels School of Governance, Free University Brussels, Belgium

31.  Dr. Daniela Heerdt, T.M.C. Asser Instituut, The Netherlands

32.  Tim Holden, Solicitor admitted in Australia, Australia

33.  Dr. Lena Holzer, University of Cambridge, United Kingdom

34.  Shubham Jain, University of Cambridge, United Kingdom

35.  Timothy Kajja, Advocate of the High Court of Uganda, Uganda

36.  Dr. Ido Katri, York Institute of Science and Technology, Canada

37.  Prof. Bruce Kidd, University of Toronto, Canada

38.  Prof. Jennifer Koshan, Faculty of Law, University of Calgary, Canada

39.  Prof. Mélanie Levy, Health Law Institute - Faculty of Law - University of Neuchâtel, Switzerland

40.  Marcus Mazzucco, University of Toronto, Canada

41.  Dr. Julie Mattiussi, Associate Professor, University of Strasbourg, France

42.  Pedro José Mercado Jaén, European University Instute, Italy

43.  Alice M. Miller, Global Health Justice Partnership of the Yale Law and Public Health Schools, Yale University, USA

44.  Bárbara Monzerrat Meré Carrión, Legal Counsel at FIFPro, The Netherlands

45.  Dr. Tomáš Morochovič, University of Edinburgh, United Kingdom

46.  Prof. Benjamin Moron-Puech, Université Lumière Lyon 2, France

47.  George Newhouse, Human rights lawyer, Australia

48.  Dr. Matt Nichol, Central Queensland University, Australia

49.  Khayran Noor, International Sports Lawyer, Kenya

50.  Dr Catherine Ordway, University of New South Wales, Australia

51.  Prof. David Pavot, Université de Sherbrooke, Canada

52.  Prof. Debra Parkes, Peter A. Allard School of Law, University of British Columbia, Canada

53.  Dr. Seema Patel, Nottingham Law School, University of Nottingham, United Kingdom 

54.  Prof. Carmen Pérez-González, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Spain

55.  Prof. Isabelle Rorive, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium

56.  Mihir Samson, Advocate, India

57.  Dr. Yassine Sangare, King Stage Business School, United Kingdom

58.  Maya Satya Reddy, Former Professional Golfer, founder of the Harvard Law School LGBTQ+ Advocacy Clinic Sports Project, LGBTQ+ Sports Law and Policy Consultant (JD), USA

59.  Kate Scallion, Jones Emery LLP, Canada

60.  Dr. Bérénice K. Schramm, Galatasaray University, Turkey

61.  Jhuma Sen, Advocate, Calcutta High Court, India

62.  Dr. Faraz Shahlaei, LMU Loyola Law School, USA

63.  Dr. Maayan Sudai, University of Haifa, Israel

64.  Prof. Jessica Tueller, University of Oklahoma College of Law, USA

65.  Faranaaz Veriava, University of Pretoria, South Africa

66.  Prof. Ekaterina Yahyaoui Krivenko, University of Galway, Ireland

67.  Dr. Jan Zglinski, LSE Law School, United kingdom

68. Monique Hennessy, ANZLA, Australia

69. Indiradevi Kollipara, Sports and Gaming Lawyer, India

70. David Rutherford, Human rights lawyer, New Zealand 

71. Prof. Alberto Carrio Sampedro, Pompeu Fabra Universiry, Spain

72. Sam Chollet, PhD Candidate, Université de Lausanne, France/Switzerland

73. Daniel Cardona A, Sports lawyer, Colombia

74. Dr. Alice de Jonge, Monash University, InterAction for Health and Human Rights, Australia

75. Dr Aileen Kennedy, UTS Faculty of Law and InterAction for Health and Human Rights, Australia

76. Inês Espinhaço Gomes, Porto Faculty of Law, Universidade Católica Portuguesa, Portugal

77. Dr. Daniel Del Gobbo, Assistant Professor & Chair in Law, Gender, and Sexual Justice, University of Windsor Faculty of Law, Canada

78. Brendan Schwab, Professional Footballers Australia, Australia

79. Dr. Erin C. Tarver, Emory University, Oxford College, USA

80. Dr. Matteo Winkler, HEC Paris, France

81. Isabel Abella Ruiz de Mendoza, Abella Legal, Spain

82. Roland Sètondji Adjovi, UQAM, Canada

83. Prof. Dr. Peter W. Heermann, LL.M, University of Bayreuth, Germany

84. Andrei Kampff de Melo, Lei em Campo, Brazil

85. Megan L. Manion, Yale Law School, USA

86. Dr Andrea Cattaneo, Edge Hill University, United Kingdom

87. Prof. Alessandra Arcuri, Erasmus School of Law, Erasmus University Rotterdam, The Netherlands

88. Gabriel Vieira Terenzi, Centro Universitário Toledo Wyden, Brazil

89. Heather Corkhill, Legal Director, Equality Australia, Australia

90. Carlos J. Zelada, Universidad del Pacífico, Peru

91. Louise Collard, Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières, Canada 

92. Prof. Sarah Joseph, Griffith University, Australia

93. Sven Demeulemeester, Partner, Atfield, Belgium

94. Andrea Florence, Lawyer, Executive Director, Sport & Rights Alliance, Brazil

95. Surbhi Kuwelker, Independent Legal Counsel, Doctoral Candidate, University of Neuchatel, Denmark

96. Prof. Pascal Borry, KU Leuven, Belgium 

97. Clément Lanier, Paris-Nanterre University, France

98. Prof. Machteld Vonk, Faculty of Law, Radboud University, The Netherlands

99. Shoichi Sugiyama, Field-R Law Office / Japan Safe Sport Project, Japan

 

A World Cup Without the World? How Trump’s Travel Ban Contradicts FIFA’s Values - By Rasoul Rahmani

Editor's note: Rasoul Rahmani is a PhD Candidate at the Faculty of Law, University of Turku, Finland. His doctoral research examines sports governance and human rights, with a focus on how EU law, particularly recent CJEU rulings, is reshaping the autonomy of sports governing bodies and the institutional implications of these developments.

 

The Ban and Its Expansion

On 4 June 2025, President Donald Trump imposed sweeping entry restrictions on nationals from 12 countries: Afghanistan, Burma, Chad, Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Haiti, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen. The proclamation made clear that “these restrictions distinguish between, but apply to both, the entry of immigrants and non-immigrants”; including those traveling on visitor visas for business and tourism, precisely the category under which World Cup fans would enter the United States.

The President invoked his Executive Order of 20 January 2025, which declared it “the policy of the United States to protect its citizens from aliens who intend to commit terrorist attacks, threaten our national security, espouse hateful ideology, or otherwise exploit the immigration laws for malevolent purposes.”[1] Alongside these complete bans, he imposed partial restrictions on seven additional countries: Burundi, Cuba, Laos, Sierra Leone, Togo, Turkmenistan, and Venezuela.

The restrictions expanded drastically on 16 December 2025. Five more nations joined the fully banned list; Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, South Sudan, and Syria along with individuals holding Palestinian Authority-issued travel documents. Laos and Sierra Leone were upgraded from partial to full bans. Most significantly, 15 countries were added to the partial restriction category: Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Dominica, Gabon, The Gambia, Malawi, Mauritania, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, Tonga, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

By December 2025, the travel restrictions encompassed 39 countries plus Palestinian Authority passport holders; a staggering expansion of barriers to entry for what is supposed to be a celebration of global unity. 


One Billion People Locked Out

The scale of exclusion is breathtaking. According to the latest population data, the fully banned countries represent 479.3 million people. The partially restricted nations account for another 537.6 million. Combined, over 1.017 billion people, more than one-eighth of the world’s population, face barriers to entering the World Cup’s primary host nation.

This mass exclusion stands in jarring contradiction to FIFA President Gianni Infantino’s repeated promises that 2026 would be “the greatest and most inclusive FIFA World Cup in history”; a World Cup  which is projected to have 6.5 million attendees in the host countries. The tournament expanded from 32 to 48 teams precisely to embrace more of the world. Yet as the field grew more diverse, the host country’s doors slammed shut.

Of the 42 nations already qualified for World Cup 2026, four face direct impact  from Trump’s restrictions. Iran and Haiti, home to 104.1 million people combined, are under full entry bans. Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal, representing 47.9 million people, face partial restrictions. Among the nations competing for the remaining six spots, Iraq (full ban) and DR Congo (partial restriction) could also qualify, potentially raising the total to six affected teams.

The geographic reality compounds the problem. Of the tournament’s 104 matches, the United States will host 78, while Mexico and Canada together host only 26. For fans from banned or restricted countries, only the handful of matches in Toronto, Vancouver, Mexico City, Guadalajara, and Monterrey remain accessible. The vast majority of the World Cup, including likely knockout rounds in American cities, will be beyond their reach.

The ban carves out exemptions for athletes, coaches, and support staff  competing in “major” events like the World Cup and the 2028 Olympics. But fans, athletes’ families, and journalists receive no such consideration. Iranian supporters, who brought 20,000 passionate voices to Qatar 2022, now face a dream deferred. Haiti’s vibrant fan base, a joyful presence at the 2023 Women’s World Cup, finds itself similarly sidelined. The policy creates a two-tier system: the teams can play, but their people cannot watch.


FIFA’s Hollow Response

In a carefully choreographed White House meeting attended by President Donald Trump and FIFA President Gianni Infantino, the U.S. Department of State unveiled the FIFA Priority Appointment Scheduling System, dubbed "FIFA PASS", for World Cup 2026 ticket holders attending matches in the United States. The service promises every fan who purchases a ticket the opportunity to obtain a prioritized visa interview.

Yet this solution is nothing more than window dressing. While expedited interviews may help fans from unrestricted countries navigate bureaucracy more smoothly, it remains fundamentally unclear, and deliberately unaddressed, how the system would function for passport holders from the 39 banned or restricted nations. A faster path to rejection is no path at all.

Contrast FIFA’s tepid response with the International Olympic Committee’s principled stand when faced with a comparable situation (not identical). When Indonesia denied visas to Israeli athletes and officials for the 53rd FIG Artistic Gymnastics World Championships in October 2025, the IOC responded with immediate, forceful condemnation. The organization expressed “great concern” and “regret,” emphasizing that “all eligible athletes, teams and sports officials must be able to participate in international sports competitions and events without any form of discrimination from the host country, in accordance with the Olympic Charter and the fundamental principles of non-discrimination, autonomy and political neutrality.”[2] The message was unambiguous: violate the principles of inclusive access for athletes and support staff, and you forfeit the privilege of hosting.

The comparison to Indonesia is instructive not because the violations are identical-they are not- but because both cases involve host nations imposing discriminatory entry barriers that undermine the inclusive, global nature of international sporting competitions. Indonesia’s complete ban on Israeli participants was more severe in scope; America’s ban affects fans and journalists rather than athletes. Yet both violate the same fundamental principle: that major sporting events should be accessible to all eligible participants and their supporters without discrimination based on nationality.

The IOC treated Indonesia’s violation as a serious breach of Olympic principles requiring immediate consequences. FIFA, by contrast, has treated the U.S. ban as a non-issue warranting no public comment, let alone corrective action. The different responses reveal not different principles, but different calculations about which hosts can be challenged and which cannot.


A Friendship More Valuable Than Principles

FIFA’s paralysis becomes comprehensible when viewed through the lens of Gianni Infantino’s relationship with Donald Trump. Since assuming the FIFA presidency in February 2016, Infantino has cultivated an unusually close bond with the American leader. He has been a frequent White House visitor throughout Trump’s presidencies, their meetings marked by mutual praise and conspicuous displays of camaraderie.

Independent human rights organizations have repeatedly accused Infantino of violating FIFA’s duty of political neutrality. The most egregious example came in December 2025, when FIFA awarded its inaugural Peace Prize to Trump, a sitting political leader presiding over the very policies that exclude a billion people from accessing the World Cup. According to media reports, the FIFA Council was not even consulted on this decision, suggesting it was Infantino’s personal initiative.

Human Rights Watch captured the absurdity with biting clarity: “FIFA’s so-called peace prize is being awarded against a backdrop of violent detentions of immigrants, national guard deployments in U.S. cities, and the obsequious cancellation of FIFA’s own.” anti-racism and anti-discrimination campaigns

That last point deserves emphasis. At the Club World Cup held in the United States in summer 2025, FIFA conspicuously dropped its anti-racism messaging, the very campaigns it had championed at Qatar 2022, where it backed “no discrimination” armbands and introduced enhanced disciplinary codes “to fight racism more efficiently and decisively.” The sudden abandonment of these principles on American soil suggests a troubling calculation: FIFA’s values are negotiable depending on the host’s political sensitivities.

Most damning of all, this close relationship has produced no tangible benefits for the fans Trump’s policies exclude. Both Iran and Haiti, the two fully banned qualified teams, will play all their group stage matches in U.S. cities, not in Canada or Mexico. If Infantino’s friendship with Trump held any real value for the sport, surely it would manifest in exemptions for fans whose teams earned their place on the pitch. Instead, the friendship appears entirely one-directional: FIFA accommodates Trump’s preferences while receiving nothing in return for football’s global community.

The uncomfortable truth is that Infantino seems unwilling to risk his personal relationship with Trump by publicly criticizing policies that fundamentally contradict FIFA’s stated mission. In this calculation, diplomatic access to the White House trumps the organization’s commitment to inclusion, non-discrimination, and the unifying power of football.


Violating FIFA’s Own Statutes

The travel ban does not merely contradict FIFA’s rhetoric; it directly violates the organization’s foundational legal documents. Article 3 of the FIFA Statutes declares: “FIFA is committed to respecting all internationally recognised human rights and shall strive to promote the protection of these rights.” The commitment is absolute, not conditional on political convenience.

Article 4 goes further, stating that “discrimination of any kind against a country, private person or group of people on account of race, skin colour, language, religion, politics, national or social origin, property, birth or any other status is strictly prohibited and punishable by suspension or expulsion.” As pointed out by the HRW, the language could hardly be clearer: discrimination based on national origin is not just discouraged, it is grounds for the most severe penalties FIFA can impose.

Article 2a and 2g establishes FIFA’s fundamental objectives, including promoting football “in the light of its unifying, educational, cultural and humanitarian values” and preventing “all methods or practices which might jeopardise the integrity of matches, competitions, players, officials and member associations”.[3] A World Cup where qualified teams’ players’ families, supporters, and journalists cannot attend matches, as they are not included in U.S. entry exemptions, fundamentally jeopardizes the competition’s integrity in several interconnected ways. Firstly, the absence of supporters and families strips matches of their cultural and emotional meaning, turning them into hollow simulations rather than genuine contests between nations. Secondly, banning some fans while allowing others creates unfair competitive imbalances unrelated to sporting merit. Thirdly, excluding journalists from affected countries undermines transparent coverage. Finally, excluding vast populations from attending erodes the tournament’s moral and symbolic legitimacy.

FIFA’s Human Rights Policy and the FIFA World Cup 2026 Human Rights Framework reinforce these commitments. The Framework explicitly commits all host cities to stage the tournament “guided by the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights” and in line with FIFA’s Human Rights Policy. As mentioned by the Human Rights Watch letter to FIFA, the current United States immigration policies “directly contradict FIFA’s stated values of human rights, inclusion and global participation.”

FIFA itself has stated that “its position on inclusivity and the protection of human rights is unequivocal, and clearly laid out in the FIFA Statutes.” The organization has historically enforced these standards on host nations. During the World Cup 2022, Qatar was subjected to sustained scrutiny and pressure[4] and FIFA ensured the host became fully aware of its responsibility to adhere “to FIFA’s human rights and non-discrimination, equality and neutrality statutes, and committed to do so.” Yet for the United States, a far larger market and a more powerful political entity, FIFA has issued no such reminders, made no such demands, extracted no such commitments.[5] The double standard is glaring. 


The Hypocrisy of Selective Enforcement

FIFA presents itself as a neutral guardian of football’s “fundamental principles,” committed to human rights, unity, and the integrity of the game. Yet its recent decisions reveal a far less principled reality. From the intense moral scrutiny imposed on smaller or geopolitically weaker host nations to the striking restraint shown toward powerful Western states, FIFA’s enforcement of its own standards appears deeply selective. This pattern raises a troubling question: are FIFA’s rules applied universally, or are they calibrated according to political influence, economic power, and market value?

FIFA presents itself as a neutral guardian of football’s “fundamental principles,” committed to human rights, unity, and the integrity of the game. Yet its recent decisions reveal a far less principled reality: a pattern of enforcement that scholars have characterized as operating through “modern human rights frameworks [that are] (largely) Western-led and controlled.”[6] From the intense moral scrutiny imposed on smaller or geopolitically weaker host nations to the striking restraint shown toward powerful Western states, FIFA’s application of its own standards appears calibrated according to political influence rather than universal principles. The contrast between FIFA’s treatment of Qatar 2022 and the United States 2026 exemplifies this troubling inconsistency.

After awarding FIFA World Cup 2022 to Qatar, the Gulf state faced unprecedented international scrutiny. Human rights organizations, media outlets, and civil society groups subjected Qatar to relentless and enormous pressure, focusing on migrant labour conditions, with critics characterizing the kafala system as amounting to forced labour and accusing Qatar of being a slave state,[7] as well as LGBTQ+ rights and restrictions on alcohol consumption. While FIFA initially awarded Qatar the tournament in 2010 without imposing human rights conditions, years of sustained external pressure from the International Labour Organization, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and other actors eventually prompted reforms. Qatar became the first Gulf nation to abolish the kafala system, introduce minimum wages, and permit limited trade union activity.[8]

However, such level of moral examination rarely applied to Western hosts. Much of this criticism was justified, but where is the equivalent systematic pressure on the United States, a nation with its own well-documented issues regarding migrant treatment, labour rights, and systemic discrimination, and recent immigration policies that exclude a billion people from accessing the tournament?

The answer is uncomfortable but obvious: the U.S. market is too valuable to jeopardize. American broadcasting rights, sponsorship revenues, and political influence make confrontation unthinkable for FIFA’s leadership. 

This selectivity extends beyond host nation oversight. When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, FIFA condemnedthe use of force by Russia and any type of violence that same day. Four days later, on 28 February 2022, FIFA and UEFA jointly suspended Russian teams from all competitions. Notably, FIFA framed its justification narrowly, citing force majeure and competition integrity[9] rather than human rights violations or illegal war. The response demonstrated that FIFA possesses the will and the mechanisms to act decisively when a geopolitical crisis threatens football’s integrity and continuity.

No similar urgency has materialized regarding U.S. entry restrictions that exclude fans from qualified and non-qualified teams, despite the direct contradiction with FIFA’s statutory commitments. The inconsistency suggests that FIFA’s enforcement of its principles depends less on their violation than on the violator’s geopolitical influence.

When European football associations and UN experts called for action against Israel over its conduct in Gaza and treatment of Palestinian football, FIFA appealed to vague notions of “unity” and avoided substantive measures: “FIFA cannot solve geopolitical problems.”  In September 2025, the Trump administration, through its Secretary of State intervened directly to prevent Israel’s suspension, with a spokesperson declaring: We will absolutely work “to fully stop any effort to attempt to ban Israel’s national soccer team from the World Cup.”

The message is unmistakable: FIFA’s “fundamental principles” are enforced selectively, calibrated to the political power and market value of the nations involved. Russia can be excluded swiftly; the United States cannot be challenged at all. Smaller nations face stringent human rights requirements; powerful Western states receive diplomatic silence even when their policies directly contradict FIFA’s own statutes.

This pattern raises a fundamental question: is FIFA an independent governing body committed to universal principles, or does it operate within, and defer to, the framework of Western political and economic power? The answer increasingly appears to be the latter.


A Call to Action

This situation demands a response; from FIFA, from fans, and from the global football community. But these responses must take different forms, leveraging different sources of power and accountability. 

  • FIFA’s Institutional Obligations

FIFA must break its silence. The Statutes are not suggestions; they are binding commitments with enforcement mechanisms. FIFA must publicly demand that the United States provide exemptions for World Cup fans especially from all qualified nations, regardless of broader immigration policies. This is defending the integrity of FIFA’s own tournament and honouring commitments made when awarding hosting rights.

The goal is not perfect equality of access; economic disparities will always mean that wealthier fans travel more easily than those with fewer resources. What FIFA must ensure is equality in principle: that fans holding legitimate tickets face no discriminatory barriers based solely on their nationality.

If the United States refuses to provide such exemptions, FIFA must be prepared to impose consequences. At least FIFA could relocate affected teams’ matches to Canadian or Mexican venues, ensuring their supporters can attend. It could reduce the number of matches hosted by U.S. cities that fail to guarantee fan access. At minimum, it must publicly document the violation of hosting commitments and ensure this factors into future hosting decisions.

FIFA must also address a fundamental question for its governance framework: Should nations be awarded hosting rights if their immigration policies preclude the inclusive, non-discriminatory access that FIFA’s own statutes require? The organization needs clear, enforceable criteria that apply equally to all candidates, regardless of their geopolitical power or market value. The current situation demonstrates the dangers of awarding tournaments without such safeguards.

National federations, particularly those from affected countries, should formally petition FIFA to address this access crisis through official channels. Player unions can lend their institutional weight to these demands. Media coverage must continue highlighting the contradiction between FIFA’s rhetoric and its complicity through silence. These institutional pressures, channelled through formal FIFA structures, represent the proper mechanisms for holding the organization accountable to its own rules.

  • Beyond Institutions: A Fan-Led Protest

Yet even as we demand that FIFA fulfil its obligations, we cannot wait passively for institutional action that may never come. Fans themselves possess a powerful tool: visibility.

When Iran, Haiti, Côte d'Ivoire, or Senegal takes the field in American stadiums, supporters of their opponents, and also neutrals who cherish football’s unifying spirit, should leave sections of seats conspicuously empty in solidarity. These vacant seats, broadcast to millions worldwide, would create an undeniable visual reminder of who is missing and why.

This is not a call for general boycott of the tournament, which would harm the very teams whose fans are excluded. Rather, it is a targeted, symbolic action: empty sections during specific matches as visible protest. Supporters’ groups could coordinate which sections to leave vacant, creating clear visual patterns that television cameras cannot ignore. Social media campaigns could explain the protest to global audiences, connecting the empty seats directly to the billion people locked out. It would demonstrate that football’s community rejects discrimination even when football’s governors tolerate it.

  • The Soul of the Game

The beautiful game has always transcended borders and brought together people whom politics seeks to divide. That is its soul, its magic, its moral authority.[10] By allowing Trump’s travel ban to stand unchallenged, FIFA acts in direct contradiction to the values it claims to uphold.

The question is whether those who truly love the game, players, fans, federations, will accept this silence, or whether they will demand that FIFA honour its own principles through every avenue available: formal institutional pressure and visible, grassroots action.

FIFA must use its leverage to ensure equal access in principle. Fans, in turn, must use both their presence and their strategic absence to demand accountability when FIFA fails to act.

The world is watching. The seats are waiting. What will we choose?


[1] Executive Order 14161 “Protecting the United States From Foreign Terrorists and Other National Security and Public Safety Threats”, 20 January 2025. Available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/protecting-the-united-states-from-foreign-terrorists-and-othernational-security-and-public-safety-threats/

 

[2] More importantly, IOC backed its words with action. Its Executive Board ended all dialogue with Indonesia’s National Olympic Committee regarding hosting future events and recommended that International Federations avoid holding competitions or meetings in the country until adequate guarantees were provided.

[3] FIFA Statutes (Edition August 2024), Articles 2a and 2g.

[4] “The many critiques of Qatar were mobilizing a range of rights-claims based in international treaties or conventions… . Simultaneously, similar claims were being advanced against FIFA for failing to abide by its responsibility to respect human rights. Ultimately, this advocacy and public pressure triggered legislative and policy changes in Qatar and at FIFA.” Antoine Duval & Daniela Heerdt, How the FIFA World Cup 2022 Changed Qatar: Playing the Game of Transnational Law on a Global Pitch, 24 German Law Journal 1677 (2023).

[5] “This contrast underscores how FIFA’s claim to neutrality in human rights matters is not a principled stance but a strategically deployed position that aligns with its broader governance model. When financial interests are involved, FIFA does not hesitate to intervene, demonstrating that it possesses the capacity and institutional mechanisms to enforce binding regulations when deemed necessary. Yet, when it comes to human rights, FIFA’s commitments often remain aspirational, non-binding, or selectively enforced.” Pedro José Jaén, Angeliki Bistaraki & Mathias Schubert, The Universal Game? Deconstructing FIFA’s Human Rights Discourse, The International Sports Law Journal (2025).

[6] Shubham Jain, Resistance and Reform as Responses to Human Rights Criticism: Relativism at FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022, 24 Ger. Law J. 1691, 1701 (2023).

[7] “Qatar’s migrant workers were literally put on the world’s agenda overnight. The number of publications mentioning Qatar and“migrant workers” issued by the four organizations shows, first, that Qatar’s migrant workers were of very marginal interest to them before 2010 and, second, that their reporting or advocacy on the issue picked up quickly after the attribution of the FIFA World Cup 2022.” Antoine Duval, Spectacular International Labor Law: Ambush Counter-Marketing In the Spotlight of Qatar’s 2022 FIFA World Cup, 24 German Law Journal 1712 (2023). 

[8] Jain, supra note 6 at 1696.

[9] The bureau pointed out that the participation of the Russian teams in these competitions posed potential disruptions due to the refusals of other national associations to play against them, security concerns, and overall uncertainty related to the conflict. See CAS 25 November 2022, 2022/A/8708 (Football Union of Russia v. Fédération Internationale de Football Association et al). 

*The legal justifications advanced by both FIFA and UEFA for the suspension of Russian teams “did not link the suspensions to the illegality of Russia’s war or the human rights violations committed by Russia’s armed forces.” A. Duval, FIFA and UEFA’s Reaction to Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: How the Neutrality of Sport Survived the War, 3 Voetbal- & Sportjuridische Zaken (2023).

 

[10] David Goldblatt, The Ball Is Round: A Global History of Football 21–22 (2006).

Last Call - ISLJ Conference 2025 - Twenty years of the World Anti-Doping Code in action - Asser Institute - 6-7 November

Dear readers,

You can still join us (in-person or virtually) on Thursday 6 November and Friday 7 November for the 2025 International Sports Law Journal (ISLJ) Conference at the Asser Institute in The Hague. This year's edition of the ISLJ conference will focus on assessing the first 20 years (2004-2024) of operation of the World Anti-Doping Code (WADC) since its entry into force in 2004. It will also discuss its future prospects, in light of the new version of the Code due to be adopted at the Busan Conference in December 2025, and the 10th Conference of the Parties to the International Convention against Doping in Sport, to be held in Paris from 20 to 22 October 2025.

The aim of the ISLJ conference is to take a comprehensive stock of the operation of the private-public transnational regulatory regime which emerged in the wake of the WADC. This regime is structured around a complex network of national and global institutions engaged in anti-doping work (WADA, NADAs, IFs, accredited laboratories) and guided by an equally complex assemblage of norms located at the global (WADC and the WADA Standards), international (UNESCO Convention against Doping in Sport), regional (Council of Europe Anti-Doping Convention), and national (various national anti-doping legislation) level. This makes for a fascinating and convoluted transnational legal construct in need of being studied, analysed and criticised by scholars. 

The conference will start with an opening speech delivered by Travis Tyggart, the CEO of USADA, who is a prominent anti-doping executive, but also a critical observer of the current operation of the world anti-doping system. It will be followed by a range of panels touching on the governance of the World anti-doping regime, the role of national institutions in its operation, the due process rights of athletes in anti-doping proceedings, the boundaries of athlete responsibility in doping cases, the main legal pillars (such as strict liability) underpinning of the WADC, and the enforcement of the WADC.


You will find the latest programme of the conference HERE. 


You can still register for in-person or online participation HERE. 


Call for contributions - Sporting Succession in Selected Jurisdictions - Edited by Jacob Kornbeck and Laura Donnellan - Deadline 1 October 2025

  

Expressions of interest are invited from colleagues who would like to contribute to an edited book on Sporting Succession in Selected Jurisdictions. Interested colleagues are invited to send their abstracts jointly to laura.donnellan@ul.ie and klausjacob.kornbeck@gmail.com. If you are unsure about how your research would fit in, please feel free to reach out to us via email before writing your abstract. Abstracts received will be included into a book proposal to be submitted to a major English-speaking publisher. Colleagues will be notified by us once we have received the reaction of the publisher, at which point we shall decide about further steps to be taken in the process. 

 

The book will be edited by Jacob Kornbeck, BSc, MA, LLM, PhD, DrPhil, Programme Manager in the European Commission (but acting strictly in a private capacity) and external lecturer at the University of Lille, inter alia, and Laura Donnellan, LLB, LLM, PhD, Associate Professor in the School of Law, University of Limerick.

 

The following incorporates the most salient ideas from a presentation made by Jacob Kornbeck at the Sport&EU Conference in Angers (June 2023). 

 

The concept of sporting succession permits making claims against sporting entities which can be considered as sporting successors to previously existing sporting entities, even where the previous entities have been wound up and have been dissolved under normal bankruptcy and succession rules. No fault is required for sporting succession to be invoked and considered, and the concept may even apply in certain cases where the previous entity has not even been dissolved legally (CAS 2023/A/9809 Karpaty FC v. FIFA, Cristóbal Márquez Crespo & FC Karpaty Halych. 18 July 2024). While the implementation of the relevant FIFA rules by national FAs has been documented comprehensively in a recent edited book (Cambreleng Contreras, Samarath & Vandellós Alamilla (eds), Sporting Succession in Football. Salerno, SLPC, 2022), no known book or article addresses the overlap, interplay and potential conflict of norms between the lex sportiva of sporting succession and the public law or successions, etc. 

 

Provisions on sporting succession were first inserted into the FIFA Disciplinary Code 2019 with the effect that, whenever a sporting entity declares bankruptcy or is otherwise wound up, the notion of sporting succession applies to its unpaid financial liabilities and may be imputed to a so-called sporting successor, even if that successor is an entity legally distinct, according to the usual rules under public law, from the previous entity. Article 14 of the FIFA Disciplinary Code 2023 governs ‘failure to respect decisions,’ understood as failure to ‘pay another person (such as a player, a coach or a club) or FIFA a sum of money in full or part, even though instructed to do so by a body, a committee, a subsidiary or an instance of FIFA or a CAS decision (financial decision), or anyone who fails to comply with another final decision (non-financial decision) passed by a body, a committee, a subsidiary or an instance of FIFA, or by CAS.’ Article 21(4) extends the scope of the provision to the ‘sporting successor of a non-compliant party’ who ‘shall also be considered a non-compliant party and thus subject to the obligations under this provision. Criteria to assess whether an entity is to be considered as the sporting successor of another entity are, among others, its headquarters, name, legal form, team colours, players, shareholders or stakeholders or ownership and the category of competition concerned.’ Further provision is made in Article 21(7). In practice, this means that a club which carries on the legacy on a previous club, drawing on its cultural capital, fan base, etc., may be liable to paid unpaid debts of that previous club. These arrangements seem unusual prima facie.

 

Organs of FIFA have power to enforce these rules and to hear appeals against such decisions, while their decisions may be appealed to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) and/or to the Swiss judiciary (see Victor Piţurcă v Romanian Football Federation & U Craiova 1948 SA (CAS 2021/A/8331) (2023) as well as well as the rulings of the Federal Tribunal in the cases Youness Bengelloun (2022) and Júlio César da Silva et Souza (2022) based on Article 190 LDIP (Federal Act on Private International Law). 

 

While the concept of sporting succession offers a striking example of a provision for specificity enshrined in a sporting regulation and applied within the sports community, its pertinence under public law remains largely unaccounted for. With the (apparent) exception of one Swiss PhD thesis (Derungs, 2022), the issues which it raises seem so far to have failed to trigger the scholarship which they might deserve, especially in a comparative legal research perspective. The aim of the envisaged edited book is to explore the issue in a comparative perspective, not only across jurisdictions but also across different branches of the law. We hope in particular to receive abstracts on the following:


  • Examples from the most representative European (and possibly extra-European) countries of overlap, interplay and potential conflict of norms between the lex sportiva of sporting succession and the public law or successions, etc. Ideally, the book should include chapters from and about the biggest European countries which are most relevant to the football industry while, at the same time, it would seem crucial that the most important legal traditions (French and German civil law, common law, Nordic law) should be represented. 
  • Perspectives of players and other stakeholders.
  • Examples from other sports than football, if appropriate.
  • Examples of overlap, interplay and potential conflict of norms between the lex sportiva of sporting succession and other branches of lex sportiva, if applicable.
  • Examples of overlap, interplay and potential conflict of norms between the lex sportiva of sporting succession, on the one hand, and new developments in sports such as AI and esports, on the other.
  • If we have overlooked a meaningful nuance, please feel free to flag this in your submission and make corresponding proposals to us. 

Please send us your abstracts jointly to laura.donnellan@ul.ie and klausjacob.kornbeck@gmail.com no later than 1 October 2025. 

Reflecting on Athletes' Rights on the Road to the Olympic Games: The Unfortunate Story of Nayoka Clunis - By Saverio Paolo Spera and Jacques Blondin

Editor's note: Saverio Paolo Spera is an Italian qualified attorney-at-law. He holds an LL.M. in international business law from King’s College London. He is the co-founder of SP.IN Law, a Zurich based international sports law firm. Jacques Blondin is an Italian qualified attorney, who held different roles at FIFA, including Head of FIFA TMS and Head of FIFA Regulatory Enforcement. He is the co-founder of SP.IN Law. The Authors wish to disclaim that they have represented Ms. Nayoka Clunis before the Court of Arbitration for Sport in Lausanne in the context of the proceedings which led to the Award of 31 July 2024.

 

  

Every four years since more than a century,[1] a spectacular display of sportsmanship takes place over the course of a few weeks during the summer: the Olympic Games.[2]

         For thousands of athletes around the globe, the Olympic Games are “the pinnacle of success and the ultimate goal of athletic competition”.[3] In their quest to compete in the most important stage of their sport, they endure demanding and time-consuming efforts (often including considerable financial sacrifices). These endeavours occasionally lead to everlasting glory (the exploits of athletes of the calibre of Carl Lewis, or more recently, Usain Bolt[4] still resonate among sports’ observers), more often to a shorter gratification. Whether their gestures end up going down the sport’s history books or last the span of a few competitions, athletes are always the key actors of a magnificent event that continues to feed the imagination of generations of sports fans. 

And yet, situations may occur when athletes find themselves at the mercy of their respective federations in the selection process for the Olympic Games and, should the federations fail them (for whatever reason), face an insurmountable jurisdictional obstacle to have their voice heard by the only arbitral tribunal appointed to safeguard their rights in a swift and specialised manner: the Court of Arbitration for Sport (the “CAS”).[5]

This is the story of Nayoka Clunis, a Jamaican world class hammer throw athlete who had qualified for the Olympic Games of Paris 2024 and yet, due to no fault of her own, could not participate in the pinnacle of competitions in her sport. Though eligible in light of her world ranking, she was failed by her own federation[6] [AD1] [SPS2] and ultimately found herself in the unfortunate – but legally unescapable – vacuum whereby neither the CAS Ad Hoc Division in Paris nor the ‘regular’ CAS division in Lausanne had jurisdiction to entertain her claim.  

The aim of this paper is not to discuss whether Ms. Clunis would have had a chance to successfully prove her claims and compete in Paris had her case been heard on the merits, nor to debate about the appropriateness of a national federation’s selection process (also because Ms. Clunis never challenged it, having been eligible ‘from day one’).[7] Retracing the story of a sportswoman’s dramatic misfortune, this paper aims at providing an opportunity to reflect on how effective the safeguard of athletes’ rights in the context of the Olympic Games actually is. More...

Call for Papers - Long-term contracts in sport: The private foundations of sports law and governance - University of Inland Norway - Deadline 15 June

The University of Inland Norway and the Asser International Sports Law Centre invite the submission of abstracts for a workshop in Lillehammer on 4 and 5 December exploring the role of long-term contracts in sport and their characteristics through a variety of theoretical and methodological lenses.

Contracts play a crucial role in the world of sport, particularly long-term contracts. Contractual agreements form the foundation of transnational sports governance, SGBs are all formally the product of a specific time of contract (be it in the form of an association or corporation) often justifying the autonomy of sport and its private governance at a (more or less far) distance from the state.

Moreover, contracts establish long-term commitments between the parties involved, raising a variety of questions regarding the asymmetry in their positions, the scope of party autonomy, contractual mechanisms for addressing uncertainty, and their interaction with domestic and international mandatory regulations, among others. In short, it is impossible to fully understand the operation and limitations of transnational sports law and governance without investigating the many ways in which it is embedded in long-term contracts ruled by a variety of contract laws.

This workshop proposes to explore the role of long-term contracts in sport and their characteristics through a variety of theoretical and methodological lenses.

We welcome proposals touching on the following issues/case studies:

  • The concept of time in sport and the definition of ‘long-term’ in sport-related contracts;
  • The function of long-term contracts in transnational sports governance;
  • The function of long-term contracts in the operation of private dispute resolution mechanisms (CAS, BAT, FIFA DRC);
  • The transactional nature of long-term contracts in sport;
  • The relational nature of long-term contracts in sport;
  • The conflict between private autonomy and long-term contracts in sport;
  • The intersection between private and public in the operation of long-term contracts in sport;
  • Specific contractual arrangements, including:
    • Contracts of association and SGBs
    • Long-term (labour) contracts with athletes and coaches;
    • Contracts related to the organization of mega-sporting events, including host city contracts;
    • TV and media long-term contracts;
    • Sponsorship agreements;
    • and more.

Abstracts must be sent to Yuliya Chernykh (yuliya.chernykh@inn.no) by 15 June. 

New Training - Summer Programme on International sport and human rights - Online - 21-28 May

Since 2022, the T.M.C. Asser Instituut, in collaboration with the Centre for Sport and Human Rights, is organising the first yearly summer course on the intersection of sport and human rights. This 4th edition brings together scholars specialised in the intersection between sport and human rights with professionals working in international sport to ensure respect for human rights. We will explore contemporary human rights challenges in sports, such as the protections of human rights at mega-sporting events, access to remedy in human rights cases within the world of sport, the intersection between human rights and gender rights in international sporting competitions, and many more. 


The programme is designed to provide both deep background knowledge and actionnable insights, which will be relevant to a range of participants committed to defending human rights in international sport, including students, junior researchers, representatives of CSOs, sporting organisations, and athletes. It is structured around half days taking place online meant to accommodate as many participants as possible throughout the world. 


Check out the latest draft programme below and register HERE! 


Call for Papers - 20 Years of the World Anti-Doping Code in Action - ISLJ Conference 2025 - 6 & 7 November 2025


 


Call for papers

20 years of the World Anti-Doping Code in Action

International Sports Law Journal Conference 2025

Asser Institute, The Hague

6 and 7 November 2025

 

The Editors of the International Sports Law Journal (ISLJ), the Asser Institute and the Research Chair on Responsible Sport of the University of Sherbrooke invite you to submit abstracts for the ISLJ Conference on International Sports Law, which will take place on 6 and 7 November 2025 at the Asser Institute in The Hague. The ISLJ, published by Springer and T.M.C. Asser Press, is the leading academic publication in the field of international sports law and governance. The conference is a unique occasion to discuss the main legal issues affecting international sports with academics and practitioners from all around the world. 

 

The 2025 ISLJ Conference will focus on assessing the first 20 years (2004-2024) of operation of the World Anti-Doping Code (WADC) since its entry into force in 2004, while also discussing its future prospects, in light of the new version of the Code due to be adopted at the Busan Conference in December 2025 and the 10th Conference of the Parties to the International Convention against Doping in Sport, to be held in Paris from 20 to 22 October. The aim of the conference will be to take a comprehensive stock of the operation of the private-public transnational regulatory regime which emerged in the wake of the WADC.  This regime is structured around a complex network of national and global institutions engaged in anti-doping work (WADA, NADAs, IFs, accredited laboratories) and guided by an equally complex assemblage of norms located at the global (WADC and the WADA Standards), international (UNESCO Convention against Doping in Sport), regional (Council of Europe Anti-Doping Convention), and national (various national anti-doping legislations) level. This makes for a fascinating and convoluted transnational legal construct in need of being studied, analysed and criticised by scholars. 

 

Reviewing 20 years of implementation of the WADC warrants a special edition of the ISLJ Conference and of the journal, which invites scholars of all disciplines to reflect on the many questions and issues linked with it. We welcome proposals touching on the following subjects (and more): 

  • The governance of the world anti-doping regime
    • The public-private nature of this governance
    • The transparency of this governance
    • The legitimacy of this governance
    • The participatory nature of this governance
    • The role of scientific experts in this governance
  •  The normative content of the WADC and the international standards
    • The strict liability principle 
    • The privacy rights of athletes under the WADC
    • The sanctioning policy under the WADC
    • The role of the international standards in implementing the WADC
    • The compatibility of the WADC with human rights
  • The glocal implementation of the WADC
    • The role of local institutions (NADOs/Labs/NOCs) in the implementation of the WADC
    • The tension between global (WADA) and local (NADOs/Labs/NOCs) in the implementation of the WADC
    • The role of the IFs in the implementation of the WADC
    • The role of the ITA in the implementation of the WADC
    • The role of judicial bodies (national courts, disciplinary committees of IFs, CAS) and their jurisprudence in the implementation of the WADC 
  • The effectiveness of the world anti-doping regime
    • The evaluation and evolution of the effectiveness of the world anti-doping regime in preventing doping
    • The role of the media in unveiling the ineffectiveness of the world anti-doping regime
    • The role of states in hindering the effectiveness of the world anti-doping regime
    • The world anti-doping regime as a regime with a variable geometry of effectiveness
  •  The future of the world anti-doping regime: Revolution, reform or more of the same?
    • Do we need a world anti-doping regime? 
    • If we do, should it be reformed? How? 


Abstracts of 300 words and CVs should be sent no later than 1 June 2025 to a.duval@asser.nl. Selected speakers will be informed by 30 June 2025. The selected participants will be expected to submit a draft paper by 15 October 2025. Papers accepted and presented at the conference are eligible for publication in a special issue of the ISLJ subject to peer-review. The Asser Institute will provide a limited amount of travel and accommodation grants (max. 350€) to early career researchers (doctoral and post-doctoral) in need of financial support. If you wish to be considered for a grant, please indicate it in your submission.  


Zoom-In Webinar - The Aftermath of the Diarra Judgement: Towards a New FIFA Transfer System? - 20 November - 16:00-18:00 CET

On 4 October, the Court of Justice of the European Union shook the world of football with its Diarra ruling. The decision questions the compatibility of a key provision of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (RSTP) with European Union internal market law. The RSTP, and in particular its article 17, are the bedrock of football’s transfer ‘market’ and regulate the conditions for the transnational movement of players between clubs. In 2023, based on FIFA’s numbers, 21 801 players were transferred internationally (of which 3279 with a fee) for transfer fees amounting to USD 9.63 bn. In short, this is a market that affects a considerable number of players and is linked with the movement of large sums of money between clubs and other actors (such as intermediaries).

Register HERE

Join us on 20 November from 16:00 to 18:00 CET to take stock of the ruling's impact and discuss the steps ahead in a free Zoom-In webinar in which there will be time for a Q&A session with the speakers. The ruling has already been much commented on (see here, here, here, and here), and this zoom-in webinar will be an opportunity for participants to engage with two experts on the economic and legal intricacies of the regulation of labour relations in football. We will mostly focus on the aftermath of the judgment and the question, 'what comes next?'

Moderator: Marjolaine Viret (Université de Lausanne)

Speakers: 


Register HERE

Asser International Sports Law Blog | Sport is sailing rudderless into geopolitical storms - Russia and Israel responses show how absence of rules makes FIFA and the IOC tools of the global north - By Nick McGeehan

Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

Sport is sailing rudderless into geopolitical storms - Russia and Israel responses show how absence of rules makes FIFA and the IOC tools of the global north - By Nick McGeehan

Editor's note: Nicholas McGeehan is co-director of human rights research and advocacy group FairSquare, which works among other things on the nexus between sport and authoritarianism. He is a former senior researcher at Human Rights Watch and holds a PhD in international law from the European University Institute in Florence.


Boycotts, divestments and sanctions are each controversial and contentious in their own right, but when combined under the right conditions, they have explosive potential. BBC football presenter Gary Lineker found this out to his cost when he retweeted a call from Palestine’s BDS movement to suspend Israel from FIFA and the International Olympic Committee (IOC)  until such time the Israeli state ends what they called “the crime of genocide it is perpetrating in Gaza” and its occupation of Palestinian territory. Lineker quickly deleted his retweet but not before the UK’s most popular right-wing tabloid newspaper, The Daily Mail, spotted it and renewed their fulminating campaign against Lineker’s support for political causes that run contrary to the Mail’s editorial positions. The Daily Mail does not oppose sporting boycotts, in fact judging from an article by its football columnist, Martin Samuel, it was an ardent supporter of Russia’s ejection from European football in the aftermath of its invasion of Ukraine. “Why should Russian football get to be part of the continent in which it has murdered innocents?,” asked Samuel  and in that regard he was not alone and was echoing views heard across the political divide in the west at the time. 

The west continues to boycott Russia, its companies have divested from Russia, and its governments are sanctioning Russia. This includes in the sporting arena where nobody batted an eyelid when Russian football teams were excluded from FIFA and UEFA competition, and its athletes excluded from IOC competition.  So it seems obvious that it  is not so much BDS tactics that offend people in certain quarters, but rather their target. Russia can be BDS’d until the cows come home, but BDS’ing Israel is beyond the pale. You can see how it might be hard to explain to a child.

Through an examination of the widely divergent responses to Russia’s actions in Ukraine and Israel’s actions in Gaza, this piece argues that FIFA and the IOC have aligned themselves with the political positions of the countries of the global north. With reference to previous sporting boycotts, it demonstrates how an absence of rules has left FIFA and the IOC sailing rudderless into stormy geopolitical waters and argues that they need to institute rules to guide their responses to events of this gravity and magnitude. Dispensing once and for all with the canard that sport and politics can be kept apart would enable sport’s governing bodies to appropriately leverage their political power and not merely act as puppets of the global north.


Russia and a case of force majeure

On 28 February 2022, four days after Russia launched its ground invasion of Ukraine, FIFA and UEFA issued a joint statement suspending all Russian national and club teams from competition. Poland and Sweden had significantly upped the pressure two days earlier when they said they would refuse to play Russia in qualifying matches for the 2022 World Cup, which was scheduled to take place in December of that year. Their message was very clear - it’s them or us.

The Russian football federations took its case to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), arguing that  it had been punished arbitrarily for conduct that is neither mentioned nor proscribed in FIFA’s statutes. FIFA said its response was  “warranted and necessary in the face of the unprecedented and widespread reaction of the international community” and that it had the right to take its decision since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was a case of force majeure (a catastrophic event that could not have been predicted), granting it the right under World Cup regulations to exclude Russia. (It is beyond the scope of this article to examine a similar case that the Russian football federation took against UEFA but detailed analysis of the two cases is available, courtesy of Antoine Duval.)

CAS sided with FIFA, noting that neither FIFA statutes nor the World Cup regulations contained any specific provisions that addressed wars of aggression, but agreeing with FIFA’s position that it had to respond urgently and that “the consequences of the military action were a force majeure event”. The CAS panel also noted that sanctions usually apply to the team who refuses to play but justified its reversal of established rules and precedent, by saying that  “circumstances of this particular case are to date unique.” The CAS panel’s comments on Russia’s argument that FIFA’s actions were inconsistent with its inaction in previous instances of state aggression are worth repeating here in full.

The Panel does not consider it helpful to compare previous global conflicts and the responses of other international sports federations in relation to a particular country’s involvement in those conflicts. The Russian State’s annexation of Crimea or the activities of the Assad regime in Syria, both recent examples of military conflict, have not, for better or for worse, elicited the same global reaction from governments, nongovernmental organisations, international bodies or the wider public (whether or not in the view of some people or entities, it should have). The reality is that this military conflict has elicited an unprecedented global reaction, including amongst the general public, and it was the consequences of that reaction to which FIFA considered it was required to act in order to fulfil its statutory objectives.

CAS offered a frank and pragmatic assessment of the situation, but was mistaken in its view that there was an unprecedented global reaction. On the contrary, many countries in the Global South did not join in universal condemnation of Russia’s actions in Ukraine, in fact 40 member states consistently abstained or voted against resolutions proposed in the UN General Assembly that condemned Russian actions, and 50 member states voted against expelling Russia from the Human Rights Council. These included many African, Asian, Middle Eastern and Latin American countries, who, as noted by Professor Christopher Alden, of the London School of Economics, were in part motivated by their “exasperation at Western hypocrisy towards violations of sovereignty.”

It was political pressure from the Global North, via European football federations, that forced the hand of FIFA.

The International Olympic Committee came under similar pressure. A few days after Russian troops entered Ukraine, the IOC issued a statement saying that it was “united in its sense of fairness not to punish [Russian] athletes for the decisions of their government” but nonetheless recommended that International Sports Federations and sports event organisers not invite or allow the participation of Russian (and Belarusian) athletes. 

In September 2022, two independent UN human rights experts (known as Special Rapporteurs), Professor Alexandra Xanthaki and Professor E. Tendayi Achiume  wrote to IOC President Thomas Bach expressing “serious concern” about the sanctions imposed on athletes. They described the decision to relocate or cancel events in Russia and Belarus and not to play their anthems in sporting events as “ sanctions that can be considered as legitimate, as they directly target these States or their official representations” but said that exclusion of athletes based solely on nationality violated the principle of non-discrimination and was at odds with international human rights law as well as the Olympic Charter. In January 2023, the IOC reversed its decision, under what they called “strict conditions”. Russia and Belarussian athletes could participate in competitions as “neutral athletes” and on the proviso that they “have not acted against the peace mission of the IOC by actively supporting the war in Ukraine.” The following month representatives of 35 governments - 27 of them European - issued a joint statement of concern at the IOC’s decision and expressing their support for a blanket ban. “We have strong concerns on how feasible it is for Russian and Belarusian Olympic athletes to compete as ‘neutrals’ … when they are directly funded and supported by their states (unlike, for example, professional tennis players)”, read the statement, which was also signed by the United States, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Japan. “The strong links and affiliations between Russian athletes and the Russian military are also of clear concern”, it added.

One of the UN Special Rapporteurs, Alexandra Xanthaki, came under fierce criticism online after tweeting about the IOC’s decision to reverse the ban. “If my country did what russia is doing (invading a sovereign country) I would leave and refuse to associate with my national identity until it stopped - they should do the same” wrote one Twitter user. “The US waged an illegal war in 2003. I don’t remember people trying to ban Michael Phelps from swimming”, responded Xanthaki. 

Xanthaki and Achium had made this same point in more formal channels, in their first communication to the IOC the previous year. “Please explain how the Executive Committee of the International Olympic Committee has responded to other instances in which a State has engaged in territorial aggression toward another State. Please clarify whether the committee has banned athletes of other nationalities on the basis of the territorial aggression of the State to which they belong as a citizen previously.” 

In October 2023, the IOC suspended the Russian Olympic Committee for assuming control of regional sports organisations in Ukrainian territory illegally annexed by Russia, arguing that it was a violation of the Olympic Charter, but without providing specific details of the provisions it deemed Russia to have violated. 

The Olympic Charter is replete with references to its contribution to “peaceful societies” and “solidarity” and the “development of humankind” and nobody would contest the fact that Russia’s brutal and bloody war on Ukraine is entirely inconsistent with those values, but one could say the same of numerous conflicts and aggressions that did not stir the IOC to act. If the Olympic Charter contained references to international legal norms - to illegal annexation or violations of jus cogens norms or war crimes or occupation or aggression or crimes against humanity - then a decision to exclude Russia would have a substantive rationale, but it does not. And, as noted by CAS, nor do FIFA’s statutes. 

The responses of FIFA and the IOC to Russia’s actions in Ukraine were not based on rules, they were responses to the political positions of the powerful states of the global north. If there were any doubt about that, the failure of these sporting bodies to respond to Israel’s actions in the aftermath of the Hamas war crimes of October 7 surely provide conclusive evidence. 


To boycott or not to boycott

At the time of writing Israel’s actions in Gaza have resulted in South Africa filing a case against it at the International Court of Justice arguing that it is committing genocide. The ICJ issued provisional measures on Russia in March 2022 and 32 states formally intervened in the case, most of them the very same western states who criticised the IOC’s decision to repeal its blanket ban on Russian athletes. None of those states have intervened in support of the case against Israel despite the compelling evidence presented by South Africa’s legal team. On the contrary, Germany has intervened in support of Israel’s defence. The United States has called the South African submission “meritless, counterproductive and completely without any basis in fact.” The United Kingdom’s foreign secretary called the case “nonsense.” 

Anyone who has even  skimmed through South African’s  84-page submission would have to concede that there is a very strong case to answer and facts listed still jar the senses.

One Palestinian child in Gaza has been killed approximately every 15 minutes since Israel commenced military action in Gaza on 7 October 2023. … 61 hospitals and health care facilities in Gaza have been damaged or destroyed …Babies are dying from preventable causes: in addition to disease and malnutrition, premature babies have died due to lack of fuel to supply hospital generators; others have been found decomposing in their hospital cots…Over 60 per cent of homes in Gaza have been damaged or destroyed. …93 per cent of the population in Gaza is facing crisis levels of hunger, with more than one in four facing “catastrophic conditions” — with death imminent. 

Despite these very well-documented facts, there have been no calls in the west to exclude Israel from FIFA or UEFA competitions, or for its athletes to be disqualified from the Paris 2024 Olympics. As things stand, a hastily-deleted Gary Lineker retweet arguably represents the high-water mark of western support for a boycott of Israeli sporting teams. As noted by Karim Zidan, “This discrepancy in handling international conflicts highlights a concerning double standard that undermines the credibility of these sporting organizations.” It should also be noted that arguments to suspend Israel predate its response to Hamas’s October 7 war crimes. Antoine Duval highlighted Israel as the most obvious example of the double standard inherent in FIFA’s and UEFA’s decisions to exclude Russian football teams from competition in an article published long before October 7. “The FUR is no more directly responsible for the illegal Russian invasion of Ukraine than the IFA for the illegal occupation by the Israeli army of the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Why are other wars not deemed so disruptive that they must lead to the suspension of national teams?”

Outside of the west, a call to suspend Israel from sporting competition is far less controversial and has some clear and obvious precedents. In December 2023, the Jordanian Football Association called for all Israeli sports federations to be suspended from international competition in a move that recalls the 1974 expulsion of Israel from the Asian Football Confederation following a Kuwaiti motion. Israeli’s national team spent two decades in the sporting wilderness until UEFA agreed to allow Israel to be part of the European confederation in the 1990s.

At the time of Israel’s expulsion from the AFC, sporting boycotts were in vogue. FIFA excluded the South African football team from competition in 1961 on account of the state’s apartheid policy, its athletes were excluded from the 1964 Olympic games and South Africa was expelled entirely from the IOC in 1970. South Africa was only readmitted to the IOC and FIFA in 1992, which was the same year that UEFA disqualified Yugoslavia from the European Championships. In this case, UEFA’s hand was forced by international law, more specifically United Nations Security Council issued Resolution 757 , which was issued a few months before the tournament began and among other things called on all states to “take the necessary steps to prevent the participation in sporting events on their territory of persons or groups representing the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).”

In the realm of sporting boycotts, the case of Yugoslavia appears to be one of the few instances where the exclusion of a sporting team - however morally justified - was driven by precise rules and due process. Those rules and processes were that of the UN Security Council, an anachronistic and profoundly anti-democratic body controlled by its five permanent members - Russia, China, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France - none of whom could ever be called peaceniks.


How sport might use its political leverage

Is it possible for sport to safely navigate its way through these choppy and dangerous geopolitical waters? Perhaps not, but it could at least chart a course.

It bears repeating that sport is profoundly political, and international sport is an important actor in geopolitical affairs. Rob Nixon, in his study of the sporting boycott of apartheid-era South Africa, beautifully articulated the point. “International sporting contests serve as a form of national recreation in more than one sense of the phrase. They are exhibitionist events imbued with the authority to recreate or simulate the nation, offering a vigorous display of a proxy body politic.” Exclusion from these events therefore comes at a political cost to the states affected. This means that sport has political power and leverage. Not as much as the United States or Russia or Israel maybe, but some.

The problem is that FIFA and the IOC are using their leverage largely  in the service of the political interests of the global north, excluding some states and turning a blind eye to others. To return to the point of Alexander Xanthaki, if illegal and ruinous wars of aggression were grounds for exclusion, the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 would have resulted in their athletes’ exclusion from the Athens Olympics in 2004. Might all of the UK’s national federations have been excluded from qualifying games for the 2006 men’s World Cup in Germany  for their participation in the Iraq war?  

In all likelihood these glaring double standards are of little concern to FIFA or the IOC, organisations which have grown fat on the billions of dollars in revenue that they generate from selling image and broadcast rights, but they should be of concern to people who genuinely care about the governance of sport. 

So what could progressive governance look like? Should FIFA and the IOC impose rules that provide for national teams to be excluded from competitions on political grounds? Well since they already do exclude teams, and given the leverage that they obviously possess, it would make a lot more sense for them to be proactive and set their own rules, than to be reactive and respond to the political whims of others. As Antoine Duval has argued, it would be preferable if sporting bodies were to “ openly acknowledge the need to take decisions on the basis of political or ethical considerations in certain situations and to introduce proper procedures and rules in their statutes and rulebooks to deal with such cases.”

In terms of what the rules should be, that would be a hotly-debated matter.  The argument that states should be excluded for gross and serious violations of human rights might be seductive to human rights advocates, but in practice it would be entirely unworkable - which violations? Decided by whom? A set of objective and measurable criteria is probably the only way that FIFA and the IOC could exercise their leverage appropriately. For the sake of argument, here are a couple of suggestions.

The ICJ is a highly reputable and well-established court that resolves disputes between states, all of whom accept its jurisdiction. On 26 January it issued a damning assessment of Israel’s conduct in Gaza and ordered it to desist from acts that violate the Genocide Convention. The ICJ issued similar provisional measures calling on Russia to “suspend the military operations that it commenced on 24 February 2022 in the territory of Ukraine” on 16 March 2022 - only a few weeks after the invasion. Russia has refused to abide by the court’s decision. It remains unclear if Israel intends to follow the court’s orders. FIFA and the IOC could fairly easily include a rule excluding teams and athletes from countries that don’t abide by the ICJ’s decisions. 

A second, more radical, suggestion would be to make ratification of critical international treaties that promote international peace and justice a prerequisite for participation in international sporting events. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court , for example, gives the ICC authority to prosecute individuals for the commission of the most serious international crimes and commits the 123 countries that have ratified the treaty of accepting its jurisdiction. The United States, Russia, China, India and Israel are among the states that have not ratified the Rome Statute. 

To reiterate, these are merely suggestions for the types of steps that  progressive sporting bodies might consider, and as one prominent campaigner has noted, “International justice has always fallen flat when it comes to dealing with powerful Western interests”. But consider a world where Israel’s participation in the Paris 2024 Olympics rested on it abiding by the ICJ’s decision. Imagine a situation where the United States, which has provided crucial political, military and financial support for Israel’s actions in Gaza, faced the prospect of hosting the 2026 World Cup without its national team involved unless it agreed to the jurisdiction of the ICC.

We should be clear-eyed about the fact that western support for Israel’s actions in Gaza has left the international rules-based order in tatters. Future generations may spend their lives rebuilding faith in and support for a more equitable and dependable system of global order and peace. Sport, for its part,will always be vulnerable to a battering by geopolitical forces that it cannot counter, but it can at least gird itself with rules that mitigate against it being used as a tool of unaccountable power.

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