Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

Selected procedural issues –and questions– arising out the Caster Semenya Judgment of the Swiss Federal Tribunal - By Despina Mavromati

Editor's note: Dr Despina Mavromati is an attorney specializing in international sports law and arbitration (Sportlegis Lausanne) and a UEFA Appeals Body Member. She teaches sports arbitration and sports contracts at the University of Lausanne, Switzerland

 

As the title indicates, this short note only deals with selected procedural issues and questions arising out of the very lengthy Semenya Judgment. In a nutshell, the SFT dismissed Semenya’s appeal to set aside the CAS Award, which had denied the request of Caster Semenya (Semenya, the Athlete) to declare unlawful the Differences of Sex Development (DSD) Regulations of World Athletics (formerly IAAF).[1]

At the outset, it has to be reminded that the CAS Award dealt with the merits of the Semenya case in a final and binding way by rendering an arbitral award according to Article R59 of the CAS Code (and Article 190 of the Swiss Private International Law Act – PILA). Therefore, the SFT did not act as an appellate court but rather as a cassatory court, entitled to review only whether the exhaustively enumerated grounds for annulment set out in Article 190 (2) PILA were met (and provided that they were properly invoked and substantiated in the motion to set aside said award).More...

Caster Semenya Case Exposes Design Flaws in International Sports Governance - By Roger Pielke Jr.

Editor's note: Roger Pielke Jr. is a professor at the University of Colorado Boulder

 

The decision this week by the Swiss Federal Tribunal not to revisit the arbitral decision of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) in the case of Caster Semenya was not unexpected, but it does help to expose a major design flaw in international sports governance. Specifically, the institutions that collectively comprise, create and enforce “sports law” appear incapable of addressing flawed science and violations of basic principles of medical ethics.

While different people will have different, and legitimate, views on how male-female competition classifications might be regulated, the issues highlighted involving science and ethics are not subjective, and are empirically undeniable. In normal systems of jurisprudence, procedures are in place to right such wrongs, but in sports governance processes in place prevent such course corrections. And that is a problem.

The empirical flaws in the science underpinning the IAAF (now World Athletics) Semenya regulations are by now well understood, and have been accepted by WA in print and before CAS (I was an expert witness for Semenya, and was present when IAAF accepted responsibility for the flawed research). You can read all the details here and in the CAS Semenya decision. I won’t rehash the flawed science here, but the errors are fatal to the research and obvious to see.

One key part of the comprehensive institutional failures here is that the journal which originally published the flawed IAAF research (the British Journal of Sports Medicine, BJSM) has, inexplicably, acted to protect that work from scrutiny, correction and retraction. Normally in the scientific community, when errors of this magnitude are found, the research is retracted. In this case, the BJSM refused to retract the paper, to require its authors to share their data or to publish a critique of the IAAF analysis. Instead, upon learning of the major errors, the BJSM published a rushed, non-peer reviewed letter by IAAF seeking to cover-up the errors. All of this is non-standard, and a scandal in its own right.

The violation of basic principles of medical ethics required by the implementation of the WA Semenya regulations is also not contested. Both WA and the IOC have claimed to uphold the World Medical Association’s Helsinki Declaration on medical and research ethics. Yet, the WMA has openly criticized the WA regulations as unethical and asked doctors not to implement them. In response, WA has stated that it will help athletes who wish to follow the regulations to identify doctors willing to ignore medical ethics guidelines.

Flawed science and ethical violations are obviously issues that go far beyond the case of Caster Semenya, and far beyond sport. In any normal system of jurisprudence such issues would prove readily fatal to regulatory action, either in the first instance of proposed implementation or via review and reconsideration.

Sport governance lacks such processes. At CAS, the panel claimed that matters of scientific integrity and medical ethics were outside their remit. The SFT is allowed to reconsider a CAS decision only on narrow procedural grounds, and thus also cannot consider matters of scientific integrity or medical ethics. So far then, the flaws in the WA regulations – sitting in plain sight and obvious to anyone who looks, have not been correctable.

This leaves the world of sport governance in a compromised position. Some may look past the scientific and ethical issues here, perhaps judging that barring Semenya from sport is far more important that correcting such wrongs. 

Regardless of one’s views on sex and gender classification in sport, the WA regulations and the processes that produced and have challenged them reveal that sports governance has not yet entered the 21st century. Science and ethics matter, and they should matter in sport jurisprudence as well.  It is time to correct this basic design flaw in international sport governance.

Caster Semenya at the SFT – in 10 points - By Jack Anderson

Editor's note: Jack Anderson is Professor and Director of Sports Law Studies at the University of Melbourne

 

1.     Caster Semenya appealed to the Swiss Federal Court (SFT) arguing that World Athletics’ regulations violated human rights principles relating to gender discrimination and human dignity. The Swiss Federal Tribunal (as at CAS) held that World Athletics’ regulations may prima facie breach such human rights principles but were “necessary, reasonable and proportionate” to maintain fairness in women's athletics;


2.     Although in part addressed at the SFT, expect further legal argument on this in the domestic courts of South Africa or at the ECtHR, and in the following ways:

  • Necessity - is the athletic advantage that Caster Semenya has of such a scientifically-measurable extent that it is necessary for World Athletics to intervene in such an invasive manner? In a broader ethical sense, is the incidence of what the World Athletics’ regulations call “difference of sex development” of such prevalence in the general population, and specifically in middle-distance athletics, that, by way of the principle of “sporting beneficence”, intervention is justified. Or, in contrast, is the incidence of DSD not at a level which justifies a departure from the ethical principle of primum non nocere – first, do no harm?
  • Reasonableness - if World Athletics’ regulations are necessary, is the manner of implementation reasonable and in line with the principle of human and bodily integrity? In answering such a question, the focus must be on the fact that in order to continue to compete in her favourite events (such as the 800 metres) Caster Semenya will have to lower her testosterone level through medication;
  • Proportionate - if World Athletics’ regulations are necessary and reasonable is the manner of implementation proportionate? In answering such a question, the focus must be on whether the regulations disproportionately discriminate against a certain, limited group of athletes in a certain, limited number of events and in a certain, limited manner.More...


Chronicle of a Defeat Foretold: Dissecting the Swiss Federal Tribunal’s Semenya Decision - By Marjolaine Viret

Editor's note: Marjolaine is a researcher and attorney admitted to the Geneva bar (Switzerland) who specialises in sports and life sciences.

 

On 25 August 2020, the Swiss Supreme Court (Swiss Federal Tribunal, SFT) rendered one of its most eagerly awaited decisions of 2020, in the matter of Caster Semenya versus World Athletics (formerly and as referenced in the decision: IAAF) following an award of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). In short, the issue at stake before the CAS was the validity of the World Athletics eligibility rules for Athletes with Differences of Sex Development (DSD Regulation). After the CAS upheld their validity in an award of 30 April 2019, Caster Semenya and the South African Athletics Federation (jointly: the appellants) filed an application to set aside the award before the Swiss Supreme Court.[1] The SFT decision, which rejects the application, was made public along with a press release on 8 September 2020.

There is no doubt that we can expect contrasted reactions to the decision. Whatever one’s opinion, however, the official press release in English does not do justice to the 28-page long decision in French and the judges’ reasoning. The goal of this short article is therefore primarily to highlight some key extracts of the SFT decision and some features of the case that will be relevant in its further assessment by scholars and the media.[2]

It is apparent from the decision that the SFT was very aware that its decision was going to be scrutinised by an international audience, part of whom may not be familiar with the mechanics of the legal regime applicable to setting aside an international arbitration award in Switzerland.

Thus, the decision includes long introductory statements regarding the status of the Court of Arbitration for Sport, and the role of the Swiss Federal Tribunal in reviewing award issued by panels in international arbitration proceedings. The SFT also referred extensively throughout its decision to jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), rendered in cases related to international sport and the CAS. More...

New Transnational Sports Law Articles Released on SSRN - Antoine Duval

I have just released on SSRN four of my most recent articles on Lex Sportiva/Transnational Sports Law. The articles are available open access in their final draft forms, the final published version might differ slightly depending on the feedback of the editors. If you wish to cite those articles I (obviously) recommend using the published version.

I hope they will trigger your attention and I look forward to any feedback you may have!

Antoine


Abstract: This chapter focuses on the emergence of a transnational sports law, also known as lex sportiva, ruling international sports. In the transnational law literature, the lex sportiva is often referred to as a key example or case study, but rarely studied in practice. Yet, it constitutes an important playground for transnational legal research and practice, and this chapter aims to show why. The focus of the chapter will first be on the rules of the lex sportiva. Law, even in its transnational form, is still very much connected to written rules against which a specific behaviour or action is measured as legal or illegal. As will be shown, this is also true of the lex sportiva, which is structured around an ensemble of rules produced through a variety of law-making procedures located within different institutions. The second section of this chapter will aim to look beyond the lex sportiva in books to narrate the lex sportiva in action. It asks, what are the institutional mechanisms used to concretize the lex sportiva in a particular context? The aim will be to go beyond the rules in order to identify the processes and institutions making the lex sportiva in its daily practice. Finally, the enmeshment of the lex sportiva with state-based laws and institutions is highlighted. While the lex sportiva is often presented as an autonomous transnational legal construct detached from territorialized legal and political contexts, it is shown that in practice it operates in intimate connection with them. Hence, its transnational operation is much less characterized by full autonomy than assemblage.


Abstract: This chapter aims to show that the work of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (‘CAS’), which is often identified as the institutional centre of the lex sportiva, can be understood as that of a seamstress weaving a plurality of legal inputs into authoritative awards. In other words, the CAS panels are assembling legal material to produce (almost) final decisions that, alongside the administrative practices of sports governing bodies (‘SGBs’), govern international sports. It is argued that, instead of purity and autonomy, the CAS’ judicial practice is best characterised by assemblage and hybridity. This argument will be supported by an empirical study of the use of different legal materials, in particular pertaining to Swiss law, EU law and the European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’), within the case law of the CAS. The chapter is a first attempt at looking at the hermeneutic practice of the CAS from the perspective of a transnational legal pluralism that goes beyond the identification of a plurality of autonomous orders to turn its sights towards the enmeshment and entanglement characterising contemporary legal practice.


Abstract: Has the time come for the Court of Arbitration for Sport to go public? This article argues that after the Pechstein decision of the European Court of Human Rights, CAS appeal arbitration must be understood as forced arbitration and therefore must fully comply with the due process guarantees enshrined in Article 6(1) ECHR. In particular, this entails a strong duty of transparency with regard to the hearings at the CAS and the publication of its awards. This duty is of particular importance since the rationale for supporting the validity of CAS arbitration, if not grounded in the consent of the parties, must be traced back to the public interest in providing for the equality before the (sports) law of international athletes. Thus, the legitimacy and existence of the CAS is linked to its public function, which ought to be matched with the procedural strings usually attached to judicial institutions. In short, if it is to avoid lengthy and costly challenges to its awards, going public is an urgent necessity for the CAS.


Abstract: In 1998 the FIFA welcomed the Palestinian Football Association as part of its members - allegedly, as an attempt by then FIFA President, the Brazilian João Havelange, to showcase football as an instrument of peace between Israeli and Palestinians. Ironically, almost 20 years after Palestine’s anointment into the FIFA family, instead of peace it is the conflict between Israeli and Palestinians that moved to FIFA. In recent years the Palestinian Football Association (PFA) and the Israeli Football Association (IFA) have been at loggerheads inside FIFA over the fate - I will refer to it as the transnational legality – of five (and then six) football clubs affiliated to the IFA which are physically located in the Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT). This chapter chronicles the legal intricacies of this conflict, which will serve as a backdrop to discuss arguments raised regarding the legality of business activities of corporations connected to the Israeli settlements. Indeed, as will be shown in the first part of this chapter, the discussion on the legality of economic activities in the OPT has recently taken a business and human rights turn involving systematic targeting of corporations by activists. Interestingly, we will see that this business and human rights turn also played a role in the conflict between the IFA and the PFA. This case study is therefore an opportunity to examine how the strategy of naming and shaming private corporations, and in our case not-for-profit associations, for their direct or indirect business involvement in the settlements has fared. It is also an occasion to critically assess the strength of the human rights ‘punch’ added to the lex sportiva, by the UNGPs.

International and European Sports Law – Monthly Report – June - August 2020 by Thomas Terraz

Editor's note: This report compiles the most relevant legal news, events and materials on International and European Sports Law based on the daily coverage provided on our twitter feed @Sportslaw_asser. 

 

 

The Headlines

CAS Decision on Manchester City FC Case

After the UEFA’s Adjudicatory Chamber of the Club Financial Control’s (CFCB) decision earlier this year to ban Manchester City FC for two seasons, observers waited impatiently to see the outcome of this high profile dispute. The CFCB’s decision had found that Manchester City FC overstated sponsorship revenues and in its break-even information given to UEFA. While some feared this showdown could lead to the demise of UEFA’s Financial Fair Play (FFP) regulations, the now publicized CAS panel’s decision is more nuanced. The panel’s decision turned on (see analysis here and here) (a) whether the ‘Leaked Emails’ were authentic and could be admissible evidence, (b) whether the ‘CFCB breached its obligations of due process’, (c) whether the conclusions of the 2014 Settlement Agreement prevents the CFCB from charging Manchester City FC, (d) whether the charges are time-barred, (e) the applicable standard of proof, (f) whether Manchester City FC masked equity funding as sponsorship contributions, and (g) whether Manchester City FC failed to cooperate with CFCB. In the end, among other findings, the Panel held that some of the alleged breaches were time-barred but maintained that Manchester City FC had failed to cooperate with CFCB’s investigation. In light of this, the Panel significantly reduced the sanction placed on Manchester City FC by removing the two-season suspension and reducing the sanction from 30 million euros to 10 million euros.

 

Qatar Labour Law Reforms Effectively Abolishes the Kafala System

Just a few days after Human Rights Watch released a lengthy report on abusive practices suffered by migrant workers in Qatar, Qatar adopted a series of laws that effectively gets rid of the Kafala system by no longer requiring migrant workers to obtain a ‘No Objection Certificate’ from their employer in order to start another job. The International Labour Organization declared that this development along with the elimination of the ‘exit permit requirements’ from earlier this year means that the kafala system has been effectively abolished. In addition to these changes, Qatar has also adopted a minimum wage that covers all workers and requires that employers who do not provide food or housing at least give a minimum allowance for both of these living costs. Lastly, the new laws better define the procedure for the termination of employment contracts.

In reaction to these changes, Amnesty International welcomed the reforms and called for them to be ‘swiftly and properly implemented’. Indeed, while these amendments to Qatar’s labour laws are a step in the right direction, Amnesty International also cautions that the minimum wage may still be too low, and in order to be effective, these new laws will have to be followed with ‘strong inspection and complaint mechanisms’.

 

CAS Decision Concerning Keramuddin Karim Abuse Case

In June of last year, Keramuddin Karim, former president of Afghanistan’s soccer federation, was banned by FIFA for life (see the decision of the adjudicatory Chamber of the FIFA Ethics Committee) after reports of sexual and physical abuse that emerged in late 2018. Following a lengthy and tumultuous investigation in Afghanistan, Afghan officials came forward with an arrest warrant for Mr. Karim. Nevertheless, despite attempts to apprehend Mr. Karim, Mr. Karim has still avoided arrest over a year later. Most recently in August, Afghan Special Operation officers attempted to apprehend him but he was not at the residence when they arrived.

Meanwhile, Mr. Karim had appealed FIFA’s lifetime ban to the CAS and the CAS Panel’s decision has recently been released. In its decision, the Panel upheld both the lifetime ban and the 1,000,000 CHF fine, finding that due to the particular egregious nature of Karim’s acts, ‘they warrant the most severe sanction possible available under the FCE’. Since both Karim and his witnesses were unable to be heard, the case raises questions connected to the respect of fundamental procedural rights at the CAS.  More...

International and European Sports Law – Monthly Report – March-May 2020 by Thomas Terraz

Editor's note: This report compiles the most relevant legal news, events and materials on International and European Sports Law based on the daily coverage provided on our twitter feed @Sportslaw_asser. 

 

The Headlines

Coronavirus Pandemic Takes Over Sports

Since the last monthly report, the coronavirus pandemic has completely taken over the headlines and has had enormous impacts on the sports field. The most significant of these impacts so far was the rather slow (see here and here) decision by the IOC to move the Tokyo 2020 Olympic Games to 2021 after a widespread push among athlete stakeholders to do so. Concerns were raised that besides the wellbeing of the participants, athletes under lockdowns would not have the access to the training facilities, meaning preparations for the Games would suffer. The IOC has already started its new planning for Tokyo 2021 and sees this new opportunity to be ‘an Olympic flame’ at the end of a ‘dark tunnel’ for the entire world.

Besides the Olympics, football has also experienced colossal effects as this crisis landed right as leagues were approaching the end of their season. In this context, FIFA has released specific guidelines on player contracts and transfer windows, which has included extending player contracts to the new postponed end of season dates. It has also organized a working group on COVID-19, which has already made recommendations to postpone all men and women’s international matches that were to be played during the June 2020 window. Earlier in March, UEFA had already announced that the EURO 2020 was also postponed by 12 months and has also recently approved guidelines on domestic competitions. These guidelines place emphasis on ‘sporting merit’ and urge ‘National Associations and Leagues to explore all possible options to play all top domestic competitions giving access to UEFA club competitions to their natural conclusion’. Nevertheless, UEFA also emphasizes that the health of all stakeholders must remain the top priority.

In the end, numerous sport federations have also had to amend their calendars due to the pandemic (see UCI and FIBA) and a variety of sport stakeholders have been confronted with immense financial strain (e.g. football, tennis and cycling). For example, UEFA has acted preemptively in releasing club benefit payments to try to alleviate the economic pressure faced by clubs. There have also been efforts to support athletes directly (e.g. FIG and ITF). All in all, the social and economic impacts of the coronavirus pandemic on sport have been unprecedented and will require creative solutions while continuing to place public health as the top priority.

Platini’s ECtHR Appeal Falls Flat

There have also been a few other stories that have (understandably) been overshadowed by the pandemic. One of these include Michel Platini’s unsuccessful appeal to the ECtHR challenging his 2015 football ban. The ECtHR’s decision concerned the admissibility of his appeal and in the end found it to be ‘manifestly ill-founded’. This is because he failed to raise his procedural rights concerns under Article 6 (1) ECHR in his proceedings at the Swiss Federal Tribunal. Besides rejecting his other claims based on Article 7 and 8 ECHR, the ECtHR decision also touched upon the issue of CAS’ procedural and institutional independence. In doing so, it referred to its Pechstein decision and once more affirmed that the CAS is sufficiently independent and impartial (see para 65), further giving credence to this notion from its case law. However, there are still concerns on this matter as was highlighted in the Pechstein dissent. Overall, the decision indicates that the ECtHR is willing to give the CAS the benefit of the doubt so long as it sufficiently takes into account the ECHR in its awards.

Mark Dry – UKAD Dispute

In February, Mark Dry was suspended by UKAD after a decision of the National Anti-Doping Panel (NADP) Appeal Tribunal  for four years after having given a ‘false account’ in order to ‘subvert the Doping Control process’. Specifically, Dry had told anti-doping authorities that he had been out fishing after he had missed a test at his residence. After further investigation, Dry admitted that he had forgotten to update his whereabouts while he was actually visiting his parents in Scotland and in panic, had told anti-doping authorities that he had been out fishing. Following the decision of the NADP Appeal Tribunal, athlete stakeholders have argued the four-year ban was disproportionate in this case. In particular, Global Athlete contended that Whereabouts Anti-Doping Rule Violations only occur in cases where an athlete misses three tests or filing failures within a year. Furthermore, even if Dry had ‘tampered or attempted to tamper’, a four-year sanction is too harsh. Subsequently, UKAD responded with a statement, arguing that ‘deliberately providing false information’ is ‘a serious breach of the rules’ and that the UKAD NADP Appeal Tribunal ‘operates independently’. In light of the mounting pressure, Witold Bańka, WADA President, also responded on Twitter that he is ‘committed to ensuring that athletes’ rights are upheld under the World Anti-Doping Code’. More...

Anti-Doping in Times of COVID-19: A Difficult Balancing Exercise for WADA - By Marjolaine Viret

Editor's note: Marjolaine is a researcher and attorney admitted to the Geneva bar (Switzerland) who specialises in sports and life sciences.


I.               Introduction

The COVID-19 pandemic has shaken the manner in which we approach human interactions that suppose close and prolonged physical contact. Across the world, authorities are having to design ways to resume essential activities without jeopardising participants’ health, all the while guaranteeing that other fundamental rights are paid due respect. The fight against doping is no exception. Anti-doping organizations – whether public or private – have to be held to the same standards, including respect for physical integrity and privacy, and considerate application of the cornerstone principle of proportionality.

Throughout this global crisis, the World Anti-Doping Agency (‘WADA’) has carefully monitored the situation, providing anti-doping organizations and athletes with updates and advice. On 6 May 2020, WADA issued the document called ‘ADO Guidance for Resuming Testing’ (‘COVID Guidance’). A COVID-19 ‘Q&A’ for athletes (‘Athlete Q&A’) is also available on WADA’s website, and has been last updated on 25 May 2020. This article focuses on these two latest documents, and analyses the solutions proposed therein, and their impact on athletes.

Like many public or private recommendations issued for other societal activities, the WADA COVID Guidance is primarily aimed at conducting doping control while limiting the risk of transmission of the virus and ensuing harm to individuals. More specifically, one can identify two situations of interest for athletes that are notified for testing:

  1. The athlete has or suspects that they may have been infected with COVID-19, or has come in close contact with someone having COVID-19;
  2. The athlete fears to be in touch with doping control personnel that may be infected with COVID-19.

Quite obviously, either situation has the potential to create significant challenges when it comes to balancing the interests of anti-doping, with individual rights and data protection concerns. This article summarises how the latest WADA COVID Guidance and Athlete Q&A address both situations. It explores how the solutions suggested fit in with the WADA regulatory framework and how these might be assessed from a legal perspective.

The focus will be on the hypothesis in which international sports federations – i.e. private entities usually organised as associations or similar structures – are asked to implement the COVID Guidance within their sport. National anti-doping organizations are strongly embedded in their national legal system and their status and obligations as public or semi-public organisations are likely to be much more dependent on the legislative landscape put in place to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic in each country. Nevertheless, the general principles described in this article would apply to all anti-doping organizations alike, whether at international or national level. More...



(A)Political Games: A Critical History of Rule 50 of the Olympic Charter - By Thomas Terraz

Editor’s note: Thomas Terraz is a fourth year LL.B. candidate at the International and European Law programme at The Hague University of Applied Sciences with a specialisation in European Law. Currently he is pursuing an internship at the T.M.C. Asser Institute with a focus on International and European Sports Law.

 

Since its inception, the Olympic Movement, and in particular the IOC, has tirelessly endeavored to create a clean bubble around sport events, protecting its hallowed grounds from any perceived impurities. Some of these perceived ‘contaminants’ have eventually been accepted as a necessary part of sport over time (e.g. professionalism in sport),[1] while others are still strictly shunned (e.g. political protest and manifestations) and new ones have gained importance over the years (e.g. protection of intellectual property rights). The IOC has adopted a variety of legal mechanisms and measures to defend this sanitized space.  For instance, the IOC has led massive efforts to protect its and its partners’ intellectual property rights through campaigns against ambush marketing (e.g. ‘clean venues’ and minimizing the athletes’ ability to represent their personal sponsors[2]). Nowadays, the idea of the clean bubble is further reinforced through the colossal security operations created to protect the Olympic sites.

Nevertheless, politics, and in particular political protest, has long been regarded as one of the greatest threats to this sanitized space. More recently, politics has resurfaced in the context of the IOC Athletes’ Commission Rule 50 Guidelines. Although Rule 50 is nothing new, the Guidelines stirred considerable criticism, to which Richard Pound personally responded, arguing that Rule 50 is a rule encouraging ‘mutual respect’ through ‘restraint’ with the aim of using sport ‘to bring people together’.[3] In this regard, the Olympic Charter aims to avoid ‘vengeance, especially misguided vengeance’. These statements seem to endorse a view that one’s expression of their political beliefs at the Games is something that will inherently divide people and damage ‘mutual respect’. Thus, the question naturally arises: can the world only get along if ‘politics, religion, race and sexual orientation are set aside’?[4] Should one’s politics, personal belief and identity be considered so unholy that they must be left at the doorstep of the Games in the name of depoliticization and of the protection of the Games’ sanitized bubble? Moreover, is it even possible to separate politics and sport?  

Even Richard Pound would likely agree that politics and sport are at least to a certain degree bound to be intermingled.[5] However, numerous commentators have gone further and expressed their skepticism to the view that athletes should be limited in their freedom of expression during the Games (see here, here and here). Overall, the arguments made by these commentators have pointed out the hypocrisy that while the Games are bathed in politics, athletes – though without their labor there would be no Games – are severely restrained in expressing their own political beliefs. Additionally, they often bring attention to how some of the most iconic moments in the Games history are those where athletes took a stand on a political issue, often stirring significant controversy at the time. Nevertheless, what has not been fully explored is the relationship between the Olympic Games and politics in terms of the divide between the ideals of international unity enshrined in the Olympic Charter and on the other hand the de facto embrace of country versus country competition in the Olympic Games. While the Olympic Charter frames the Games as ‘competitions between athletes in individual or team events and not between countries’, the reality is far from this ideal.[6] Sport nationalism in this context can be considered as a form of politics because a country’s opportunity to host and perform well at the Games is frequently used to validate its global prowess and stature.

To explore this issue, this first blog will first take a historical approach by investigating the origins of political neutrality in sport followed by an examination of the clash between the ideal of political neutrality and the reality that politics permeate many facets of the Olympic Games. It will be argued that overall there has been a failure to separate politics and the Games but that this failure was inevitable and should not be automatically viewed negatively. The second blog will then dive into the Olympic Charter’s legal mechanisms that attempt to enforce political neutrality and minimize sport nationalism, which also is a form of politics. It will attempt to compare and contrast the IOC’s approach to political expression when exercised by the athletes with its treatment of widespread sport nationalism.More...

International and European Sports Law – Monthly Report – February 2020 - By Thomas Terraz

Editor's note: This report compiles the most relevant legal news, events and materials on International and European Sports Law based on the daily coverage provided on our twitter feed @Sportslaw_asser. 

 

The Headlines

Manchester City sanctioned by UEFA’s Financial Fair Play

Manchester City has been sanctioned under UEFA’s Financial Fair Play (FFP) regulations for two seasons for ‘overstating its sponsorship revenue in its accounts and in the break-even information’ it had provided UEFA. The February 14 decision of the Adjudicatory Chamber of the Club Financial Control Body (CFCB) likely heralds the start of a long and bitter legal war between Manchester City and UEFA, which may end up settling many of the questions surrounding the legality of FFP rules. Since its introduction in 2010, the compatibility of FFP with EU law, especially in terms of free movement and competition law, has been a continued point of contention amongst the parties concerned and commentators (see discussion here, here and here). It was only a matter of time that a case would arise to test this issue and the present circumstances seem to indicate that this may go all the way.                                 

Regardless, the ban will not be enforced this season and in light of the appeal process, it is hard to predict when the CFCB’s decision will have any effect. Indeed, Manchester City has shown an incredible willingness to fighting this out in the courts and shows no signs of backing down. The next stop will be the CAS and perhaps followed by the Swiss Federal Tribunal. It should also be recalled that the CAS has already examined FFP in its Galatasaray award, where it found FFP compatible with EU law (see commentary here). There is even a decent chance that this emerging saga may end up in front of the European Commission and eventually the Court of Justice of the European Union.

Sun Yang CAS award published

After a much-anticipated public hearing, the Panel’s award in the Sun Yang case has finally been published, sanctioning Sun Yang with an eight-year period of ineligibility (see here for a detailed commentary). The decision does not reveal anything groundbreaking in terms of its legal reasoning and in many ways the case will most likely be remembered for its historical significance: the case that jumpstarted a new era of increased public hearings at the CAS.

Perhaps of some interest is the extent to which the panel took into account Sun Yang’s behavior during the proceedings in order to support its assessment of the case. For example, the panel describes how Sun Yang had ignored the procedural rules of the hearing by inviting ‘an unknown and unannounced person from the public gallery to join him at his table and act as an impromptu interpreter’. The Panel interpreted this as Sun Yang attempting ‘to take matters into his own hands’ which it found resembled the athlete’s behavior in the case (see para 358). The Panel also found it ‘striking’ that Sun Yang did not express any remorse concerning his actions during the proceedings. Since the proceedings were held publicly and have been recorded, it is possible to verify the Panel’s assessment in this regard.

In the end, it is possible that Sun Yang may seek to reduce the period of ineligibility once the 2021 WADA Code comes into force (see para 368). For now, Sung Yang may also try to appeal the award to the Swiss Federal Tribunal on procedural grounds, and has already indicated his wish to do so. More...

Asser International Sports Law Blog | The Russian Doping Scandal at the Court of Arbitration for Sport: The IAAF’s Rio Ineligibility of Russian Athletes

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Our International Sports Law Diary
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The Russian Doping Scandal at the Court of Arbitration for Sport: The IAAF’s Rio Ineligibility of Russian Athletes

Since the release of the earth-shattering ARD documentary two years ago, the athletics world has been in a permanent turmoil. The International Athletics Association Federation (IAAF) is faced with both a never-ending corruption scandal (playing out in front of the French police authorities) and the related systematic doping of Russian athletes. The situation escalated in different phases led by the revelations of Russian insiders. First, in December 2014 with the ARD documentary, which demonstrated how widespread (and organized) the recourse to doping was in Russian athletics. It triggered the Pound investigation financed by the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), which led to two damaging reports (available here and here) for the Russian anti-doping system and the IAAF itself. Thereafter, in November 2015, the IAAF had no other choice but to provisionally suspend the Russian athletics federation (ARAF then RusAF) and its members from IAAF competitions. Yet, this was only the beginning as shortly after the former head of Moscow’s anti-doping laboratory provided a detailed sketch to the New York Times of the operation of a general state-led doping scheme in Russia. The system was designed to avert any positive doping tests for top-level Russian sportspeople and was going way beyond athletics. These allegations were later largely confirmed and reinforced by the McLaren investigation initiated by WADA in May 2016, and which published its first report in July 2016 shortly before the Rio Olympics. In June 2016, the IAAF anticipated the conclusions of the report (it had received most of McLaren’s evidence beforehand) and decided to maintain the ineligibility of Russian athletes for IAAF competitions, and for the Rio Olympics. It did, however, foresee a narrow exception for Russian athletes able to show that they were properly tested outside of Russia. Nonetheless, the athletes using this exception were to compete under a neutral flag at the Olympics. Unsurprisingly, Russian athletes led by pole superstar (and now IOC member), Yelena Isinbayeva, and the Russian Olympic Committee decided to challenge this decision in front of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). Interestingly, while the decision was rendered on 21 July 2016, the full text of the award was publically released only on 10 October 2016. In September, I analysed the Rio CAS Ad Hoc Decisions involving Russian athletes aiming to participate to the Olympics. I will now turn to the IAAF decision, which is of great importance to the future of the anti-doping system. Indeed, it lays out the fundamental legal boundaries of the capacity of international federations to impose sanctions on their members (and their members) in order to support the world anti-doping fight.

My blog will provide first a chronological narrative of the decisions taken by the IAAF to sanction the RusAF and its athletes. Thereafter, I will analyse the key aspects of the scope of the review of the IAAF’s ineligibility decision by the CAS.

 

I.              From the ARD documentary to the ineligibility of Russian athletes for the Rio Olympics

The IAAF started acting upon the suspicions of doping in Russian athletics only after the publication of the first part of the Pound report on 9 November 2015. In its first press release after the publication of the report, the president of the IAAF, Sebastian Coe, announced that he had “taken the urgent step of seeking approval from his fellow IAAF Council Members to consider sanctions against the Russian Athletics Federation (ARAF)”. He was considering “provisional and full suspension and the removal of future IAAF events”. This announcement was quickly followed on 13 November 2015 with the provisional suspension of the ARAF by the Council of the IAAF. Consequently, Russian athletes, and athlete support personnel were banned from competing in international competitions including World Athletics Series competitions and the Olympic Games. Furthermore, Russia lost the right to host the 2016 World Race Walking Team Championships (Cheboksary) and 2016 World Junior Championships (Kazan), while ARAF were to delegate the conduct of all outstanding doping cases to CAS. The provisory ban was based on IAAF Constitution Article 6.11(b) and Article 14.7. The ARAF could have challenged the decision of the Council but declined to do so (as is explained in a letter accessible here) and accepted the sanctions. Simultaneously, the decision also included a specific procedure for RusAF to regain IAAF membership. It foresaw that an inspection team led by an Independent Chair, Rune Andersen, would verify whether RusAF complies with a long list of precise criteria.

In early 2016, the IAAF taskforce started its verifications based on the aforementioned criteria. In March 2016, after its first visit to Moscow in January, the taskforce considered that “the Russian delegates have made significant progress towards meeting many of the Verification Criteria established by IAAF Council”. Yet, it also added that “there is significant work still to be done to satisfy the Reinstatement Conditions and so RusAF should not be reinstated to membership at this stage”. However, after the revelations of the New York Times in May 2016, the IAAF taskforce recommended in June that “RusAF should not be reinstated to membership at this stage, because several important Verification Criteria have not been met”. The taskforce considered that:

  • The deep-seated culture of tolerance (or worse) for doping that led to RusAF being suspended in the first place appears not to have changed materially to date.
  • A strong and effective anti-doping infrastructure capable of detecting and deterring doping has still not been created. 
  • There are detailed allegations, which are already partly substantiated, that the Russian authorities, far from supporting the anti-doping effort, have in fact orchestrated systematic doping and the covering up of adverse analytical findings.

This meant “that Russian athletes remain[ed] ineligible under IAAF Rules to compete in International Competitions including the European Championships and the Rio 2016 Olympic Games”. The taskforce also recommended that RusAF remains suspended, i.e. that no “representatives of RusAF (i.e. officials, athlete support personnel, etc.) should take part in International Competition or in the affairs of the IAAF”. The IAAF Council unanimously endorsed the recommendations. At the same meeting, and also upon recommendation of the taskforce, the IAAF Council passed a rule amendment “to the effect that if there are any individual athletes who can clearly and convincingly show that they are not tainted by the Russian system because they have been outside the country, and subject to other, effective anti-doping systems, including effective drug-testing, then they should be able to apply for permission to compete in International Competitions, not for Russia but as a neutral athlete”. These changes were introduced in Rule 22.1A IAAF Competition Rules (Rule 22.1A).[1] Finally, the IAAF also decided to let Yuliya Stepanova compete due to her “extraordinary contribution to the fight against doping in sport”.

On 23 June, the IAAF published a set of guidelines on the basis of which Russian athletes could request a permission to compete in IAAF events (and the Olympics) if they could demonstrate not being tainted by the Russian state doping system as provided under the exception enshrined in Rule 22.1A. However, athletes using this exception would be allowed to compete only as neutral athlete. Stepanova was the first athlete authorized to compete at the Rio Games by the IAAF (ironically, she would later be blocked by the IOC) based on the rule 22.1A. She was joined only by Darya Klishina (the IAAF later rescinded this eligibility in light of her involvement in the McLaren Report, but the CAS decided against all odds to let her compete in Rio).

The IAAF felt comforted in its decisions by the release of the McLaren Report on 18 July. Yet, the Russian athletes and the Russian Olympic Committee were obviously extremely dissatisfied with this outcome. Both sides agreed to submit the matter, through the ordinary arbitral procedure, to the CAS, which held a quick hearing on 19 July.

 

II.            The Key Legal Questions at the CAS

While the decision to reject the demands of the Russian athletes was publicized immediately (on 21 July) on the CAS’ website, it is only three months later that the full text of the award was made available for all to see. For analytical purposes, and following the award’s internal structure, I will deal with the following four key questions:

  1. Does the suspension of the RusAF extend to the eligibility of the Russian athletes?
  2. Is the new IAAF rule 22.1.A a sanction?
  3. Can the ROC nominate athletes to the Olympic Games without the assent of the IAAF?
  4. Will the Russian athletes falling under rule 22.1.A compete as neutral athletes in Rio?


1.     Does the suspension of the RusAF under Rule 22.1(a) extend to the eligibility of the Russian athletes?

The Russian athletes challenged first the application by IAAF of Rule 22.1(a) IAAF Competition rules. The Rule provides for the IAAF-wide ineligibility of “[a]ny athlete, athlete support personnel or other person whose National Federation is currently suspended by the IAAF”. In other words, the claimants “want an exception to the rule for doping cases, so that the ineligibility for the athletes affiliated to a suspended national federation, a member of the IAAF, would not apply if the suspension is imposed for the federation’s failure to ensure an effective doping control system”[2]

i.               Rule 22.1(a) is a valid rule extending the ineligibility of a federation to its athletes

The Panel rejects this challenge.

First, it considers that it is not its duty to rewrite the IAAF’s rules. Instead, the “rule- making power, and the balance to be struck in its exercise between the competing interests involved, is conferred on the competent bodies of the sport entity, which shall exercise it taking into account also the overall legislative framework”[3].

Second, it highlights “that the suspension of the Russian track and field federation is not disputed in this arbitration”[4]. This is due to the fact that ARAF did not contest the original decision of IAAF in November 2015. Consequently, “the dispute heard by the Panel regards only the consequences for the athletes affiliated to the Russian federation of the suspension imposed on their federation and not the reasons for the suspension”[5].

Thirdly, the Panel rejects the view that Rule 22.1(a) is a doping sanction. Rather, “it is a rule which affects the eligibility of athletes to enter into International Competitions and is a consequence of the organizational structure of international sport; national federations are members of international federations, and have the duty to respect the obligations deriving from such membership; athletes participate in organized sport, as controlled by an international federation, only on the basis of their registration with a national federation, which is a member of the international federation in question”[6]. Thus, “Rule 22.1(a) is a rule of general application, not specific to doping cases, and would apply equally to athletes who are members of federations that fail to pay their membership dues as to athletes who are members of federations that engage in other breaches of federation obligations to the IAAF as a member thereof” [7]. The claimants sought to frame Rule 22.1.(a) and Rule 22.1A as a package applying specifically to anti-doping cases. But the Panel disagreed, highlighting instead that “Rule 22.1(a) is not part of a new package of rules”, as it “has existed since at least 2000, whereas Rule 22.1A is a recent amendment”.[8] The Panel sees Rule 22.1(a) as “a necessary consequence of the sanction imposed on RusAF”. [9] In sum, the “athletes are ineligible because RusAF has been sanctioned, and accepted that sanction, not because of what the athletes have done”. [10]

ii.              Rule 22.1(a) is not contrary to the World Anti-Doping Code

The Panel also rejects the argument that Rule 22.1(a) would be contrary to the World Anti-Doping Code (WADC). First, because it is not an additional doping sanction (and therefore is not covered by the Osaka rule jurisprudence of the CAS[11]) and second because it is consistent with the WADC’s mandate to international federations to introduce sanctions in case their members do not comply with the Code.[12] Furthermore, “it is a fundamental principle of the law of associations in all applicable jurisdictions that members of associations have an obligation to satisfy the requirements for membership in the association and if they fail to do so those members may have their association membership adversely affected”[13]. The Panel refuses to “disturb these well-accepted principles” [14].

iii.            IAAF is not estopped to enforce Rule 22.1(a) on the Russian athletes

The Panel further refused to find that the IAAF was estopped from considering the Russian athletes ineligible based on Rule 22.1(a).[15] It is true that some IAAF employees/executives might have been involved in a corruption scheme to cover-up doping cases, however “[t]here is no suggestion that the IAAF officials were involved in the systemic doping of Russian athletes” [16]. Moreover, “none of the Claimant Athletes has argued that they knew about the IAAF’s wrongdoing and relied on it to their detriment, or that they believed that RusAF would not be suspended in the event of misconduct” [17]. The arbitrators also deny that the Rule 22.1(a) was too uncertain. In particular, the fact that the length of the ineligibility is indeterminate is deemed a “simple consequence of the fact that it is contingent on the National Federation (“NF”) being reinstated”.[18]

iv.            The ineligibility of Russian athletes under Rule 22.1(a) is proportionate

Finally, even though it considers that “Rule 22.1(a) is not a sanction”, and, therefore, “it does not have to pass any test of proportionality”[19], the Panel engages in a very interesting exercise to assess its putative proportionality. It finds “that the effect (ineligibility to compete at International Competitions) on the athletes registered with a national federation suspended by IAAF is a proportionate consequence of the national federation’s suspension for its failure to put in place an adequate system to protect and promote clean athletes, fair play and integrity of sport”. [20] In the view of the arbitrators, “eradication of doping in sport, protection and promotion of clean athletes, fair play and integrity are undeniably legitimate objectives of extreme importance for the viability of sport at any level”.[21] In this regard, “the measure taken by IAAF, and the effect it produces, is capable of achieving those objectives, as it prevents athletes under the jurisdiction of the suspended national federation (for having failed to promote a doping-free environment) from competing with athletes registered with federations that have not been the subject of an exclusion”. [22] Furthermore, “the measure taken by IAAF is necessary to reach the envisaged goal: if the IAAF could not take a step having the mentioned effect, the suspension of the Russian federation would have no meaningful impact”. [23] Thus, “the constraints which the affected athletes, including the Claimant Athletes, will suffer as a consequence of the measure are justified by the overall interest to achieve the envisaged goal, which outweighs them, and do not go beyond what is necessary to achieve it”. [24] Finally, the Panel highlight the role played by Rule 22.1A. This provisions shows “that the effect produced by the suspension of a national federation (in force since at least 2000) was recently made more flexible, to take into account individual cases, in a way consistent with the sought purpose of eradication of doping, protection and promotion of clean athletes, fair play and integrity”. [25]

The Panel, thus, concludes “that IAAF Competition Rule 22.1(a) is valid and enforceable in the circumstances of the present dispute”. [26]

 

2.     Is IAAF Competition Rule 22.1A valid and enforceable in the circumstances of the present dispute?

The Claimants were also challenging the validity of Rule 22.1A, as they were constructing the rule as an unforeseeable sanction against athletes who would not comply with the requirements enshrined in it. Yet, the Panel wondered from the outset “what interest the Claimants would have in seeing it set aside, given that it is a rule which allows athletes to be included, not excluded”[27]. Indeed, if the Panel “struck down Rule 22.1A, the only consequence for the Claimants would be that any athlete who made him/herself eligible pursuant to Rule 22.1A would still be ineligible: the Claimant Athletes, on the other hand, would not regain the eligibility denied by Rule 22.1(a)”[28]. The Claimants argued that both rules were intimately connected and amounted to one sanction: if one would be deemed invalid the other would fall too.[29] However, the Panel noted in response to this argument “that (i) the legality of Rule 22.1(a) and its applicability in the present circumstances has already been confirmed, as per the considerations above, [and] (ii) the Claimants’ submissions as to the legality of Rule 22.1A have no merit […]”[30]. Thus, the Panel finds Rule 22.1.A not to be inconsistent with the WADC as it does not constitute a sanction. Similarly, not being a sanction its proportionality is not into doubt, nor does it appear to be discriminatory. The Claimant Athletes could not rely on any legitimate expectations to be eligible if they met the Verification Criteria published on 11 December 2015, as “they would have also known that RusAF would have to be reinstated before they became eligible”[31]. Indeed, “Rule 22.1A did not change the way in which the Claimant Athletes could make themselves eligible”, rather “it provided another route to eligibility, one which could be pursued even though RusAF had not been reinstated in accordance with the Reinstatement Conditions”.[32]

In the end, the Panel only criticized the lack of legal certainty provided by “Rule 22.1A(b), as its terms may appear vague and retroactive in nature”[33]. Nonetheless, “no matter how concerning it may be for the Panel that the vague terms of Rule 22.1A(b) allow for retroactive application, this does not help the Claimants in having the application of this rule set aside in the given case”[34]. Even if “retroactive criteria in general are to be avoided as unfair and contrary to fundamental notions of due process and good sportsmanship” [35], the Panel notes that “Rule 22.1A is an inclusionary rule, and only created an opportunity, not a bar, for the Claimant Athletes”. [36] Hence, disapplying it “would only have the effect of harming any other Russian athlete who satisfied Rule 22.1A(b)”. [37]

 

3.     Can the ROC nominate athletes to the Olympic Games without the assent of the IAAF?

The third question raised by the Claimants was whether the Russian Olympic Committee could bypass the IAAF’s decision and nominate athletes without its approval to participate in the Rio Olympics. Here again the Panel from the outsets finds “that, under the Olympic Charter, the ROC is not entitled to nominate athletes who are not eligible under IAAF Competition Rules 22.1(a) and 22.1A”[38]. To come to this conclusion the Panel focuses on the Olympic Charter, it notes that “Rule 40 of the Olympic Charter restricts participation in the Olympic Games to those who comply with the Olympic Charter and the WADC, including the conditions of participation established by the IOC, “as well as the rules of the relevant IF as approved by the IOC””.[39] It interprets the latter sentence as implying “mandatory compliance with IF rules”[40]. Furthermore, the Panel finds that “the Olympic Charter makes it clear that an NOC shall only enter competitors upon the recommendations for entries given by national federations (Rule 44.4), and that as a condition precedent to participation in the Olympic Games every competitor has to comply not only with the provisions of the Olympic Charter, but also with “the rules of the IF governing his sport” (Bye-law 4 to Rule 44)”[41]. It concluded that “the NOCs can only exercise their right to send personnel to the Olympic Games if they comply with the rules of the relevant International Federation (“IF”) because otherwise they would be contravening Rule 40 of the Olympic Charter.[42] Consequently, “ROC cannot enter into the 2016 Olympic Games athletes who do not comply with the IAAF’s rules, including those athletes who are not eligible under Competition Rules 22.1(a) and 22.1A.” [43] Even in the unlikely event RusAF is deemed not to exist anymore for the purpose of the application of the Olympic Charter, and Bye-law 5 to Rule 44[44] of the Olympic Charter is deemed applicable, “the ROC would need the IAAF’s, and IOC Executive Board’s, approval to send competitors”[45].

Therefore, with or without RusAF, “the ROC cannot enter athletes who are ineligible pursuant to the IAAF’s rules”[46].

 

4.     Will the Russian athletes enjoying the exception enshrined in Rule 22.1A compete as neutral athletes?

Finally, the last interrogation posed by the claimants is whether Russian athletes regaining eligibility through Rule 22.1.A can compete as representatives of Russia. It is the only point on which the claimants are found by the Panel to prevail. Indeed, it finds “that, under the Olympic Charter, if there are any Russian track and field athletes who are eligible to compete at the 2016 Olympic Games under IAAF Competition Rule 22.1A, the ROC is entitled to enter them to compete as representatives of Russia”[47]. In its view, “under the Olympic Charter it is not for an IF to determine whether an athlete, eligible for entry to the Olympic Games, has to compete as a “neutral” athlete, or as an athlete representing the NOC that entered him or her” [48]. In other words, “athletes which are sent to the Olympic Games are not entered as neutrals, but are sent by an NOC” [49]. Moreover, “an athlete does not represent his/her national federation; the federation’s suspension does not prevent an athlete from being entered into the Olympic Games as a representative of his/her NOC” [50].

The Panel does recognize, however, that the fact “that the ROC is entitled, under the Olympic Charter, to enter into the Olympic Games as representatives of Russia any Russian track and field athletes who are eligible to compete under IAAF Competition Rule 22.1A does not mean that the IOC is bound to accept such designation as athletes representing Russia” [51]. In sum, it was not IAAF’s job to declare the athletes neutral but the IOC’s and it declined to do so.

 

Conclusion

The IAAF has faced a hurricane of negative news in the last two years. Its former president, Lamine Diack, is under investigation in France on corruption charges, its internal anti-doping activities have been shown to be at best inefficient and at worse corrupted, and Russia, one of its biggest suppliers of talents and legends, is exposed as engaged in a State sponsored doping programme. The least one can say is that cleaning these ‘Augean Stables’ was, and still is, an awful task. However, unlike the IOC, which has shown little willingness to seriously crack down on Russia after the scandal, the IAAF has adopted a tough line. It sidelined Russia’s athletics federation as soon as the suspicions voiced by whistle-blowers were substantiated. Furthermore, it refused to let Russian athletes participate in the Rio Olympics, thus reinforcing the anti-doping fight with a symbolically important sanction. Indeed, the world anti-doping system will remain a paper tiger if Russia’s systematic breach of anti-doping rules and spirit is not followed by truly deterrent sanctions. Surely, the system as a whole deserves a comprehensive reform addressing the massive deficiencies highlighted by the Russian scandal.

 

In this regard, the lessons from this CAS award rejecting the demands of the Russian athletes are threefold:

  • First, the athlete’s eligibility to international sporting competitions cannot be severed from the status of his or her national federation. In other words, the athletes, as members of a national federation, bear part of the responsibility for a federation���s failure to comply with, for example, its duties under the WADC. This does not preclude the introduction of mechanisms that, as the one introduced by the IAAF, would enable athletes to discharge this responsibility in specific situations.
  • Second, international federations can impose painful sanctions upon their affiliates in case of noncompliance with their duties under the WADC. The CAS recognized that in order to function properly the WADC needs to be supported at the local level, and to be supported at the local level noncompliance must be met with deterrent sanctions that will necessarily extend to the athletes affiliated with the noncompliant local body. Again, the athletes are not passive members of a national federation. They bear a share of the political (and in the end legal responsibility) attached to its governance.
  • Third, and finally, the CAS has demonstrated that there was no fatality in taking a lenient road to deal with the Russian State doping scandal. The Panel even left open the possibility for the IOC to decide that Russian athletes would have to compete under a neutral flag. This is a good reminder that the IOC’s decisions to let the Russians compete at the Rio Olympics, and thus dilute the negative effects of being caught organizing a comprehensive State doping system (as was very recently evidenced by the second McLaren Report) was not a legally mandated decision but a political choice that deserves critical scrutiny. The precedent force of this award is even greater in the light of its endorsement by the Swiss Federal Tribunal, which rejected in early August the Claimants request for provisory measures against it.



[1] The rule reads as follows:

1A. Notwithstanding Rule 22.1(a), upon application, the Council (or its delegate(s)) may exceptionally grant eligibility for some or all International Competitions, under conditions defined by the Council (or its delegate(s)), to an athlete whose National Federation is currently suspended by the IAAF, if (and only if) the athlete is able to demonstrate to the comfortable satisfaction of the Council that:

(a)  the suspension of the National Federation was not due in any way to its failure to protect and promote clean athletes, fair play, and the integrity and authenticity of the sport; or                 

(b)  if the suspension of the National Federation was due in any way to its failure to put in place adequate systems to protect and promote clean athletes, fair play, and the integrity and authenticity of the sport, (i) that failure does not affect or taint the athlete in any way, because he was subject to other, fully adequate, systems outside of the country of the National Federation for a sufficiently long period to provide substantial objective assurance of integrity; and (ii) in particular the athlete has for such period been subject to fully compliant drug-testing in- and out-of-competition equivalent in quality to the testing to which his competitors in the International Competition(s) in question are subject; or

(c)  that the athlete has made a truly exceptional contribution to the protection and promotion of clean athletes, fair play, and the integrity and authenticity of the sport.

The more important the International Competition in question, the more corroborating evidence the athlete must provide in order to be granted special eligibility under this Rule 22.1A. Where such eligibility is granted, the athlete shall not represent the suspended National Federation in the International Competition(s) in question, but rather shall compete in an individual capacity, as a 'Neutral Athlete'.

 

[2] CAS 2016/O/4684 The Russian Olympic Committee (“ROC”) et al v.  The International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF), 21 July 2016, para.115. [where I use Para in the following footnotes I refer to this award]

[3] para.117

[4] Para.118

[5] Ibid.

[6] Para 119.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Para 120.

[9] Para 121.

[10] Ibid.

[11] See CAS 2011/O/2422 United States Olympic Committee (USOC) v. International Olympic Committee (IOC), 4 October 2011.

[12] Para.122-124

[13] Para. 124.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Para.125-127

[16] Para. 126.

[17] Para. 127.

[18] Para.128

[19] Para. 129.

[20] Para. 131.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Para. 132.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Para. 136.

[27] Para.137.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Para.138

[30] Para.140

[31] Para. 151

[32] Para.152

[33] Para.143

[34] Para. 146

[35] Para. 146.

[36] Para. 147.

[37] Ibid.

[38] Para. 155

[39] Para. 157

[40] Para. 157

[41] Para. 158

[42] Para. 159

[43] Para. 161

[44] Stating : “Should there be no national federation for a particular sport in a country which has a recognised NOC, the latter may enter competitors individually in such sport in the Olympic Games subject to the approval of the IOC Executive Board and the IF governing such sport”

[45] para.164

[46] para.165

[47] para.167

[48] para.168

[49] para.170

[50] Ibid.

[51] ibid.

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