Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

Revisiting FIFA’s Training Compensation and Solidarity Mechanism - Part.1: The historical, legal and political foundations - By Rhys Lenarduzzi

Editor’s note: Rhys Lenarduzzi is a final semester Bachelor of Law (LL.B) and Bachelor of Philosophy (B.Phil.) student, at the University of Notre Dame, Sydney, Australia. As a former professional athlete, then international sports agent and consultant, Rhys is interested in international sports law, policy and ethics. He is currently undertaking an internship at the T.M.C. Asser Institute with a focus on Transnational Sports Law.


In 2019, training compensation and solidarity contributions based on FIFA’s Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (RSTP) amounted to US$ 75,5 million. This transfer of wealth from the clubs in the core of the football hierarchy to the clubs where the professional players originated is a peculiar arrangement unknown in other global industries. Beyond briefly pointing out or reminding the reader of how these systems work and the history behind them, this blog series aims to revisit the justifications for FIFA-imposed training compensation and the solidarity mechanism, assess their efficacy and effects through a case study of their operation in the African context, and finally analyse the potential impact of upcoming reforms of the FIFA RSTP in this context.

First, it is important to go back to the roots of this, arguably, strange practice. The current transfer system and the legal mechanisms constituting it were largely the result of a complex negotiation between European football’s main stakeholders and the European Commission dating back to 2001. The conclusion of these negotiations led to a new regulatory system enshrined in Article 20 and Annex 4 of the RSTP in the case of training compensation, and at Article 21 and Annex 5 in the case of the solidarity mechanism. Before paying some attention to the historical influences and how we arrived at these changes, as well as the justifications from the relevant bodies for their existence, let us briefly recall what training compensation and the solidarity mechanisms actually are. More...



Invalidity of forced arbitration clauses in organised sport…Germany strikes back! - By Björn Hessert

Editor's note: Björn Hessert is a research assistant at the University of Zurich and a lawyer admitted to the German bar.

 

The discussion revolving around the invalidity of arbitration clauses in organised sport in favour of national and international sports arbitral tribunals has been at the centre of the discussion in German courtrooms.[1] After the decisions of the German Federal Tribunal[2] (“BGH”) and the European Court of Human Rights[3] (“ECtHR”) in the infamous Pechstein case, this discussion seemed to have finally come to an end. Well…not according to the District Court (LG) of Frankfurt.[4] On 7 October 2020, the District Court rendered a press release in which the court confirmed its jurisdiction due to the invalidity of the arbitration clause contained in the contracts between two beach volleyball players and the German Volleyball Federation[5] (“DVV”) – but one step at a time. More...

International and European Sports Law – Monthly Report – September - October 2020 - By Rhys Lenarduzzi


The Headlines


Human rights and sport  

Caster Semenya

Human rights issues are taking the headlines in the sporting world at present. A short time ago, Caster Semenya’s appeal at the Swiss Federal Tribunal against the CAS decision was dismissed, perhaps raising more questions than answering them. Within the last few days however, the message from the Semenya camp has been that this is not over (see here).  See the contributions from a range of authors at Asser International Sports Law Blog for a comprehensive analysis of the Semenya case(s) to date.

Navid Afkari

As the sporting world heard of the execution of Iranian Wrestler Navid Afkari, a multitude of legal and ethical questions bubbled to the surface. Not least of all and not a new question: what is the responsibility of sport and the governing bodies therein, in the space of human rights?  And, if an athlete is to acquire a high profile through sporting excellence, does that render athletes vulnerable to be made an example of and therefore in need of greater protection than is currently afforded to them? There are differing views on how to proceed. Consider the following from the World Players Association (Navid Afkari: How sport must respond) and that from the IOC (IOC Statement on the execution of wrestler Navid Afkari) which shows no indication through this press releases and other commentary, of undertaking the measures demanded by World Players Association and other socially active organisations. (See also, Benjamin Weinthal - Olympics refuses to discuss Iranian regime’s murder of wrestler).

Yelena Leuchanka

As this is written and relevant to the above, Yelena Leuchanka is behind bars for her participation in protests, resulting in several sporting bodies calling for her immediate release and for reform in the sporting world around how it ought to deal with these issues. As a member of the “Belarus women's national basketball team, a former player at several WNBA clubs in the United States and a two-time Olympian”, Leuchanka has quite the profile and it is alleged that she is being made an example of. (see here)

Uighur Muslims and Beijing Winter Olympics

British Foreign Secretary, Dominic Raab does not rule out Winter Olympics boycott over Uighur Muslims. ‘The foreign secretary said it was his "instinct to separate sport from diplomacy and politics" but that there "comes a point where that might not be possible".’ Though Raab’s comments are fresh, this issue is shaping as a “watch this space” scenario, as other governments might echo a similar sentiment as a result of mounting pressure from human rights activist groups and similar, in lead up to the Winter Games. More...



The Specificity of Sport - Comparing the Case-Law of the European Court of Justice and of the Court of Arbitration for Sport - Part 2 - By Stefano Bastianon

Editor’s note: Stefano Bastianon is Associate Professor in EU Law and EU sports law at the University of Bergamo and lawyer admitted to the Busto Arsizio bar.


1. EU law and the CAS case-law

Bearing in mind these questions, it is possible to affirm that under EU law, the specificity of sport

i) refers to the inherent characteristics of sport that set it apart from other economic and social activities and which have to be taken into account in assessing the compatibility of sporting rules with EU law; and

ii) under EU law these inherent characteristics of sport must be  considered on a case by case  basis, per the Wouters test as developed by the ECJ in the Meca Medina ruling.

Both aspects can be found in the CAS case-law too, although the CAS case-law shows some remarkable differences and peculiarities. From a general point of view, the application of the principle of specificity of sport in the CAS case-law represents an aspect of the more general issue related to the application of EU law by the CAS. However, the purpose of this paper is not to fully examine if and to what extent the CAS arbitrators apply EU law rules on free movement and competition; rather, the aim is to analyse the way the CAS deals with the concept of the specificity of sport, highlighting similarities and differences compared to the ECJ.

Taking for granted that ‘a CAS panel is not only allowed, but also obliged to deal with the issues involving the application of [EU] law’,[1] as far as the compatibility of sporting rules with EU law is concerned the CAS case-law shows different degrees of engagement. For instance, in the ENIC award concerning the so-called UEFA integrity rule, the CAS panel went through a complete competition-law analysis in perfect harmony with the Wouters et al. ruling by the ECJ.[2] On the contrary, in the above-quoted Mutu case, the issue of compatibility of the FIFA’s transfer regulations with EU competition law was analysed in a rather simple way, merely stating that the FIFA rules at stake were not anti-competitive under EU competition law without giving any reason to support this conclusion. More recently, in the Galatasaray and Milan A.C. awards, concerning the UEFA’s financial fair-play regulations, the CAS  applied a detailed analysis of EU competition law. However, in both cases, according to the CAS the proportionate character of sanctions listed in the UEFA’s financial fair-play regulations cannot affect the evaluation of the legitimacy of these regulations under Art. 101 TFEU. This conclusion represents a clear breaking point with respect to the ECJ case-law, according to which the evaluation of the restrictive effects of a rule necessarily presupposes the analysis of the proportionate character of the sanction imposed in the event of a violation of that rule as well.[3]   In regard to EU free movement, the CAS case-law tends to be less analytical in terms of the principle of proportionality. For instance, in the RFC Seraing award  which concerned both EU free movement and competition law, the CAS panel mainly focused on the legitimate objectives of the contested rule (FIFA’s ban on Third-Party Ownership – TPO), merely affirming that the restrictive measures under EU free movement were justified and inherent in the pursuit of those objectives.More...



The Specificity of Sport - Comparing the Case-Law of the European Court of Justice and of the Court of Arbitration for Sport - Part 1 - By Stefano Bastianon

Editor’s note: Stefano Bastianon is Associate Professor in EU Law and EU sports law at the University of Bergamo and lawyer admitted to the Busto Arsizio bar.*

 

1. Introduction.

The so-called specificity of sport represents one of the most debated, if not the most debated, but still undefined issue under European Union (EU) law. A noteworthy peculiarity is that the specificity of sport is frequently mentioned in several legislative and political documents issued by EU institutions, however it is not expressly referred to in any judgment by the European Court of Justice (ECJ).Conversely, the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) case-law on Art. 17 of FIFA Regulations on status and transfer of players (RSTP) has repeatedly and expressly referred to the specificity of sport.[1] Apparently, the concept of specificity of sport has different meanings and purposes in the ECJ and CAS jurisprudence. In this blog (divided in two parts), I will try to analyse those two different meanings and to what extent the CAS case-law is consistent with the concept of specificity of sport as elaborated under EU law. More...

SFT rejects Semenya appeal: nothing changes - By Andy Brown

Editor's note: Andy Brown is a freelance journalist who has been writing about the governance of sport for over 15 years. He is the editor of The Sports Integrity Initiative where this blog appeared first.


For the last three days, I have been struggling with what to write regarding the Swiss Federal Tribunal’s (SFT) Decision to dismiss a challenge from Caster Semenya and Athletics South Africa (ASA) against the Court of Arbitration for Sport’s (CAS) Decision to dismiss a challenge to the Eligibility Regulations for the Female Classification (Athletes with Differences of Sex Development), otherwise known as the DSD Regulations. From reading World Athletics’ statement welcoming the ruling, one could be forgiven for thinking that it had won a major trial. Sports journalists, accustomed to covering events now curtailed by Covid-19, focus on the fact that Semenya has ‘lost’ her case against the DSD Regulations. Neither assertion is strictly accurate.

The SFT’s powers to review the CAS’s ruling are severely limited. It can only consider whether the CAS Decision violates ‘widely recognised principles of public order’ on Swiss public policy grounds. The SFT has only reversed a decision based on a a violation of Swiss public policy once in 30 years.

The SFT didn’t reconsider the evidence put forward to the CAS. ‘For there to be incompatibility with public policy, it is not enough that the evidence has been poorly assessed, that a finding of fact is manifestly false or that a rule of law has been clearly violated’, its Decision reads. ‘The only question to be resolved is in fact whether or not the verdict of the CAS renders the referred award incompatible with substantive public policy’. 

There were questions about whether the appeal from Semenya and ASA qualified to be reviewed by the SFT in the first place. World Athletics is a private organisation headquartered in Monaco, and the SFT was troubled as to whether such a complaint brought by a South African athlete against an overseas private organisation is capable of violating Swiss public policy.

‘It is doubtful whether the prohibition of discriminatory measures falls within the scope of the restrictive concept of public order when the discrimination is committed by a private person and occurs in relations between individuals’, the Decision quotes from its pervious 29 July 2019 Decision, which refused the ASA’s request to provisionally suspend the application of the DSD Regulations. ‘In any event, there is no need to examine this question further here since […] the award under appeal does not in any way establish discrimination which would be contrary to public order’

The SFT ruled that the CAS was correct to uphold conditions of participation for 46 XY DSD athletes in order to guarantee fair competition for certain disciplines in female athletics. In doing so, the SFT was ruling on whether the decision taken by the CAS violates public policy, based only on the complaints brought forward by Semenya and ASA. 

Semenya and the ASA had challenged the CAS Decision based around the idea that the DSD Regulations are discriminatory. The CAS held that they are discriminatory, but agreed with the IAAF (as World Athletics was then named) that such discrimination was necessary to protect its female category. The SFT ruled that even if the discriminatory rules of a private organisation such as the IAAF were considered able to pose a threat to public order, Semenya and the ASA had failed to demonstrate that the CAS Decision was so egregious that it posed such a threat.

‘Caster Semenya essentially alleges a violation of the prohibition of discrimination’, reads the Swiss Federal Supreme Court statement. ‘The CAS has issued a binding decision based on the unanimous opinion of the experts who were consulted that testosterone is the main factor for the different performance levels of the sexes in athletics; according to the CAS, women with the “46 XY DSD” gene variant have a testosterone level comparable to men, which gives them an insurmountable competitive advantage and enables them to beat female athletes without the “46 XY DSD” variant. Based on these findings, the CAS decision cannot be challenged. Fairness in sport is a legitimate concern and forms a central principle of sporting competition. It is one of the pillars on which competition is based. The European Court of Human Rights also attaches particular importance to the aspect of fair competition. In addition to this significant public interest, the CAS rightly considered the other relevant interests, namely the private interests of the female athletes running in the “women” category.’

Such strong support for the principle behind its DSD Regulations was rightly welcomed by World Athletics. Its statement asserted that the SFT ‘acknowledged that innate characteristics can distort the fairness of competitions’. I would argue that the SFT ruling didn’t do this, but rather found that a CAS Decision asserting this didn’t violate Swiss public policy. Semantics, perhaps.

Likewise, when World Athletics quotes the SFT Decision as confirming that ‘It is above all up to the sports federations to determine to what extent a particular physical advantage is likely to distort competition and, if necessary, to introduce legally admissible eligibility rules to remedy this state of affairs’, it is paraphrasing two texts quoted in the SFT Decision. The first is ‘La qualification juridique des rules autonomes des organizations sportive’ by Jérôme Jaquier, 2004. ‘Inborn characteristics specific to athletes in a particular group can also distort the fairness of competition’, the SFT Decision quotes from Jaquier. ‘When they enact regulations, the objective of sports federations is to ensure fair and equitable competition’.

The context of the second quote, from ‘Sportrecht – Berücksichtigung der Interessen des Sports in der Rechtsordnung’ by Martin Kaiser, 2011, is even more interesting. It is preceded with a statement from the Swiss Federal Supreme Court, which reads: ‘It is not for the Federal Court to make, abstractly, comparisons between the disciplines to assess whether a particular athlete has an advantage that makes sporting competition meaningless’

‘It is above all for the sporting federations to determine to what extent a particular physical advantage is liable to distort competition’, the SFT Decision quotes from Kaiser. ‘And, if so, to establish legally admissible eligibility rules to remedy this state of affairs’. 

Again, such details might be considered as semantics. But – I would argue – important semantics. Reading the media maelstrom that has resulted from the SFT Decision, one could be forgiven for assuming that Semenya has lost her case, and has no chance of ever defending her 800m title. However, a statement issued by her lawyers reveals that she intends to challenge the ruling in European and domestic courts.

“I am very disappointed by this ruling, but refuse to let World Athletics drug me or stop me from being who I am”, the statement continues. “Excluding female athletes or endangering our health solely because of our natural abilities puts World Athletics on the wrong side of history. I will continue to fight for the human rights of female athletes, both on the track and off the track, until we can all run free the way we were born. I know what is right and will do all I can to protect basic human rights, for young girls everywhere.” More...



The Semenya Decision of the Swiss Federal Tribunal: Human Rights on the Bench - By Faraz Shahlaei

Editor's note: Faraz Shahlaei is a JSD Candidate at Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. His research and teaching interests are public international law, international sports law, international human rights and dispute resolution.

 

The issue of international human rights was a central contention in Caster Semenya case ever since the start of her legal battle against the regulations of the IAAF. However, the human rights arguments were poorly considered in the two proceedings related to this case. To put it in perspective, it is like having a key player nailed to the bench throughout the whole game; no coach ever tried to give it a chance while it had the potential to be the game changer for all parties.

In 2019, the Human Rights Council, the inter-governmental human rights body of the UN, expressed concern over issues of discrimination in sports in particular regarding IAAF female classification regulations. In June 2020, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights submitted a report to the United Nations Human Rights Council on the “Intersection of Race and Gender Discrimination in Sport”. The report draws a detailed picture of how human rights in the Semenya case have been violated and also elaborates on the inherent problem of addressing human rights issues in alternative dispute resolution mechanisms favored by the sport governing bodies. However, despite an in-depth discussion of Caster Semenya’s case at both the CAS and then the SFT, the question of human rights, a key concern and a fundamental pillar of the case, hasn’t been adequately answered yet! More...


The SFT’s Semenya Decision under European human rights standards: Conflicting considerations and why a recourse could be successful at Strasbourg - By Kevin Gerenni

Editor's note: Kevin Gerenni is Assistant Professor in Public International Law (Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad de Buenos Aires) and LLM Candidate 2021 in Public International Law at the London School of Economics.


Even though the decision rendered by the SFT in the Semenya Case was foreseeable, the Tribunal did put forward some concerning reasoning in terms of public policy (“ordre public”) and human rights. In case Semenya decides to challenge the Swiss state before the ECtHR, one can expect the case to shake some grounds at the ECtHR, which would be faced with the question of the application to sport not of fair trial guarantees (as in Mutu & Pechstein) but of substantial human rights provisions such as the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex (Article 14 ECHR) and the right to private life (Article 8 ECHR).

Under Swiss law, the reasons that may lead to the annulment of an arbitral award are enumerated in art. 190 of the Swiss Private International Law Act (PILA). Semenya’s strongest case relied on art. 190(2)(e): the award’s incompatibility with public policy. Naturally, this point concentrated most of the SFT’s attention. In order to analyze the compatibility of the CAS award with Swiss public policy, the SFT focused on three main potential breaches of human rights: prohibition of discrimination, personality rights, and human dignity. In doing so, it put forward certain observations that differ with European human rights standards and the ECtHR’s jurisprudence. The purpose of this short article is to analyze those discrepancies and, consequently, Semenya’s prospects of success before the Strasbourg Tribunal.More...


Selected procedural issues –and questions– arising out the Caster Semenya Judgment of the Swiss Federal Tribunal - By Despina Mavromati

Editor's note: Dr Despina Mavromati is an attorney specializing in international sports law and arbitration (Sportlegis Lausanne) and a UEFA Appeals Body Member. She teaches sports arbitration and sports contracts at the University of Lausanne, Switzerland

 

As the title indicates, this short note only deals with selected procedural issues and questions arising out of the very lengthy Semenya Judgment. In a nutshell, the SFT dismissed Semenya’s appeal to set aside the CAS Award, which had denied the request of Caster Semenya (Semenya, the Athlete) to declare unlawful the Differences of Sex Development (DSD) Regulations of World Athletics (formerly IAAF).[1]

At the outset, it has to be reminded that the CAS Award dealt with the merits of the Semenya case in a final and binding way by rendering an arbitral award according to Article R59 of the CAS Code (and Article 190 of the Swiss Private International Law Act – PILA). Therefore, the SFT did not act as an appellate court but rather as a cassatory court, entitled to review only whether the exhaustively enumerated grounds for annulment set out in Article 190 (2) PILA were met (and provided that they were properly invoked and substantiated in the motion to set aside said award).More...

Caster Semenya Case Exposes Design Flaws in International Sports Governance - By Roger Pielke Jr.

Editor's note: Roger Pielke Jr. is a professor at the University of Colorado Boulder

 

The decision this week by the Swiss Federal Tribunal not to revisit the arbitral decision of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) in the case of Caster Semenya was not unexpected, but it does help to expose a major design flaw in international sports governance. Specifically, the institutions that collectively comprise, create and enforce “sports law” appear incapable of addressing flawed science and violations of basic principles of medical ethics.

While different people will have different, and legitimate, views on how male-female competition classifications might be regulated, the issues highlighted involving science and ethics are not subjective, and are empirically undeniable. In normal systems of jurisprudence, procedures are in place to right such wrongs, but in sports governance processes in place prevent such course corrections. And that is a problem.

The empirical flaws in the science underpinning the IAAF (now World Athletics) Semenya regulations are by now well understood, and have been accepted by WA in print and before CAS (I was an expert witness for Semenya, and was present when IAAF accepted responsibility for the flawed research). You can read all the details here and in the CAS Semenya decision. I won’t rehash the flawed science here, but the errors are fatal to the research and obvious to see.

One key part of the comprehensive institutional failures here is that the journal which originally published the flawed IAAF research (the British Journal of Sports Medicine, BJSM) has, inexplicably, acted to protect that work from scrutiny, correction and retraction. Normally in the scientific community, when errors of this magnitude are found, the research is retracted. In this case, the BJSM refused to retract the paper, to require its authors to share their data or to publish a critique of the IAAF analysis. Instead, upon learning of the major errors, the BJSM published a rushed, non-peer reviewed letter by IAAF seeking to cover-up the errors. All of this is non-standard, and a scandal in its own right.

The violation of basic principles of medical ethics required by the implementation of the WA Semenya regulations is also not contested. Both WA and the IOC have claimed to uphold the World Medical Association’s Helsinki Declaration on medical and research ethics. Yet, the WMA has openly criticized the WA regulations as unethical and asked doctors not to implement them. In response, WA has stated that it will help athletes who wish to follow the regulations to identify doctors willing to ignore medical ethics guidelines.

Flawed science and ethical violations are obviously issues that go far beyond the case of Caster Semenya, and far beyond sport. In any normal system of jurisprudence such issues would prove readily fatal to regulatory action, either in the first instance of proposed implementation or via review and reconsideration.

Sport governance lacks such processes. At CAS, the panel claimed that matters of scientific integrity and medical ethics were outside their remit. The SFT is allowed to reconsider a CAS decision only on narrow procedural grounds, and thus also cannot consider matters of scientific integrity or medical ethics. So far then, the flaws in the WA regulations – sitting in plain sight and obvious to anyone who looks, have not been correctable.

This leaves the world of sport governance in a compromised position. Some may look past the scientific and ethical issues here, perhaps judging that barring Semenya from sport is far more important that correcting such wrongs. 

Regardless of one’s views on sex and gender classification in sport, the WA regulations and the processes that produced and have challenged them reveal that sports governance has not yet entered the 21st century. Science and ethics matter, and they should matter in sport jurisprudence as well.  It is time to correct this basic design flaw in international sport governance.

Asser International Sports Law Blog | The Russian Ballet at the CAS Ad Hoc Division in Rio - Act III: On being sufficiently tested

Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

The Russian Ballet at the CAS Ad Hoc Division in Rio - Act III: On being sufficiently tested

Editor's note: This is the third part/act of our blog series on the Russian eligibility cases at the CAS ad hoc Division in Rio.


Act III: On being sufficiently tested 

Paragraph 2 of the IOC Decision: “The IFs should carry out an individual analysis of each athlete’s anti-doping record, taking into account only reliable adequate international tests, and the specificities of the athlete’s sport and its rules, in order to ensure a level playing field.”

Daniil Andienko and 16 other members of the Russian rowing team challenged the decision of the World Rowing Federation (FISA) to declare them ineligible for the Rio Olympics. The FISA Executive Committee took the decision on 24 July 2016 because they had not “undergone a minimum of three anti-doping tests analysed by a WADA accredited laboratory other than the Moscow laboratory and registered in ADAMS from 1 January 2015 for an 18 month period”.[1] In their submissions, the Russian applicants did not challenge the IOC Decision, and thus the criteria enshrined in paragraph 2, but only its application by FISA.[2] The Russian athletes argued that FISA’s decision deviated from the IOC Decision in that it was imposing as an additional requirement that rowers must “have undergone a minimum of three anti-doping tests analysed by a WADA accredited laboratory other than the Moscow laboratory and registered in ADAMS from 1 January 2015 for an 18-month period”.[3] The Panel acknowledged that “the IOC Executive Board decision does not refer explicitly to the requirement of three tests or to a period of 18 months”.[4] Nonetheless, it “finds that the Challenged Decision is in line with the criteria established by the IOC Executive Board decision”.[5] Indeed, the IOC’s Decision “provides that in order to examine whether the level playing field is affected or not (when admitting a Russian athlete to the Rio Olympic Games), the federation must look at the athlete's respective anti-doping record, i.e. examine the athlete's anti-doping tests” and that “[i]n doing so, the IOC Executive Board decision specifies that only "reliable adequate international tests" may be taken into account”.[6] In this regard, the Panel, and FISA, share the view that “a reliable adequate international test can only be assumed if the sample has been analyzed in a WADA-accredited laboratory outside Russia”.[7]

Finally, with regard to the need of having three tests, the “relevant paragraph in the IOC Executive Board decision further refers to "adequate international tests" and, consequently, makes it clear that - in principle - a single test is not sufficient to rebut the presumption of “collective responsibility””.[8] This follows “from the word “tests” being used in the plural form, but also from the word "adequate", since a single negative anti-doping test can hardly be adequate to rebut the presumption of “collective responsibility””.[9] The CAS also points out a number of other reasons why three tests is a rational benchmark: 

  • “[…]rowing is at the same time a sport requiring strength and endurance and, thus, is exposed to a significant doping threat”;
  • There is “a history of doping cases in the Russian Rowing Federation”;
  • FISA “took also into consideration WADA's "Guidelines Implementing an Effective TestingProgramme'', which refers to a minimum of three tests per year for Registered Testing Pool athletes”;
  • “FISA also bore in mind that it only provides for a relatively small number of events where tests can be carried out compared to other sports”.[10] 

Hence, “FISA's implementation and application of the criteria listed in the IOC Executive Board decision is consistent and fully compliant with the wording and the spirit of the IOC's decision”.[11] The CAS Panel rejected the pleas brought forward by the athletes on the basis of natural justice and fundamental procedural principles, as they did not challenge the IOC Decision directly but only its implementation.

Surprisingly, FISA was the only Federation (alongside the IAAF), which systematically refused entry to Russian athletes because they were not exposed to proper independent anti-doping testing. It is likely that, had each IF imposed similar standards, few Russian athletes would have been able to participate in the Rio Games. Furthermore, the case also highlights once again that the CAS was ready to endorse a strict standards of eligibility for Russian athletes. Here again, the IOC could very well have decided to impose a similar condition across the board, instead of leaving each federation decide for itself and, thus, indirectly promoting differentiated treatments depending on the sporting discipline.


[1]CAS OG 16/11 Daniil Andrienko et al. v. FISA & IOC, para. 2.6.

[2] Ibid., para. 7.3.

[3] Ibid., para.7.4.

[4] Ibid., para.7.5.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid., para. 7.6.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Ibid., para. 7.7.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid.

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Asser International Sports Law Blog | The new “Arrangement” between the European Commission and UEFA: A political capitulation of the EU

Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

The new “Arrangement” between the European Commission and UEFA: A political capitulation of the EU

Yesterday, the European Commission stunned the European Sports Law world when it announced unexpectedly that it had signed a “partnership agreement with UEFA named (creatively): ‘The Arrangement for Cooperation between the European Commission and the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA)’. The press release indicates that this agreement is to “commit the two institutions to working together regularly in a tangible and constructive way on matters of shared interest”. The agreement was negotiated (as far as we know) secretly with UEFA. Despite recent meetings between EU Commissioner for sport Vassiliou and UEFA President Platini, the eventuality of such an outcome was never evoked. It is very unlikely that third-interested-parties (FIFPro, ECA, Supporters Direct etc.) were consulted in the process of drafting this Arrangement. This surprising move by an outgoing Commission will be analysed in a three-ponged approach. First, we will discuss the substance of the Arrangement (I). Thereafter, we will consider its potential legal value under EU law (II). Finally, and maybe more importantly, we will confront the political relevance of the agreement (III).  


Source: http://ec.europa.eu/avservices/photo/photoDetails.cfm?sitelang=en&ref=026448#13


The substance of the “Arrangement” between UEFA and the European Commission

What’s in the Arrangement? In short, a lot of random considerations, very little concrete commitments, and an administrative structure for future dialogue.

The “basis” for the cooperation between UEFA and the European Commission is a mixed bag of shared concerns and common views. Both institutions are keen on strengthening their dialogue “in the interests of the long-term development and societal role of sport in general and football in particular” (Article 2.1. of the Arrangement), especially in the light of the societal value of sport (Article 2.2.) and the many challenges and risks it is facing (Article 2.3.). Therefore, they “endeavour to strengthen policies designed to encourage the local training and education of athletes” (Article 2.4.). The parties share the view that “appropriate solutions are to be found in order to ensure that athletes are available to play for their national teams” (Article 2.5.), but also that “redistribution mechanisms concerning, for example, audiovisual media revenues and training compensation fees should be recommended” (Article 2.6.). Furthermore, they acknowledge that “[F]inancial stability, transparency and better governance within sport can be pursued through responsible self-regulation”. For example, “measures to encourage greater rationality and discipline in club finances with a focus on the long-term as opposed to the short-term, such as Financial Fair Play initiative, contribute to the sustainable development and healthy growth of sport in Europe” (Article 2.7.).  

The parties also agree that the “health and human dignity of athletes must be protected from abusive and unethical practices”. In this regard, “[I]t is important that […] so-called third-party ownership of the “economic rights” of player, do not threaten the integrity of sporting competition or undermine the relationship of trust and mutual respect that should exist in any relationship of employment” (Article 2.8.). More broadly, the parties recognise the need for social dialogue, protecting fundamental rights, promoting gender equality and to fight all forms of racism, xenophobia, homophobia and discrimination (Article 2.9.). It is recognized that “[t]o improve good governance standards, UEFA can also play a prominent role in seeking appropriate solutions on issues pertaining to players’ transfers and agents at European level” (Article 2.10.). Concerning match-fixing, the parties acknowledge that close cooperation is needed (2.11). 

The Arrangement calls for an “effective protection of intellectual property rights”, as their exploitation “represents an important source of income for professional football” (Article 2.12.). It also favours “the reinforcement of the Council of Europe convention on spectator violence” (Article 2.13.). In a very important holding, arbitration is recognised as “an important voluntary tool for settling disputes in sport and ensuring that sporting rules are applied, interpreted and enforced in an effective and uniform manner, while also ensuring respect of the applicable legal norms and procedural safeguards within and outside of the EU” (Article 2.14.). Finally, “the European Commission and UEFA will collaborate in the context of the planned European Week of Sport, using football to promote healthy physical activity” (Article 2.15).

This collection of, more or less, random thoughts collated in the Arrangement lead to two broad objectives: “to promote cooperation and strengthen relations between the European Commission and UEFA in the interests of the sustainable development of football” (Article 3.1.1.) and “to exchange information, knowledge and good-practice on matters of common interest” (Article 3.1.2). These objectives are to be implemented through a “policy dialogue” between the Secretary General of UEFA and the Director General responsible for Sport in the EC (Article 4.1, 4.2, 4.4, & 4,5). The implementation will also involve “Regular and ad hoc meetings […] between officials of the Sides […]” (Article 4.3.).

The Arrangement will start on the date of the signature [14 October 2014] and is to last until 31 December 2017 (Article 5.1.). The Sides to the Arrangement are free to amend it (Article 5.2). While, each side “can, at any time discontinue the application of this Arrangement, but should endeavour to provide a three-month notice of such discontinuation to the other Side” (Article 5.3.). Finally, both sides acknowledge that the “Arrangement does not create rights or obligations under international, EU or domestic law” (Article 5.4.).   

 

The legal value of the “Arrangement” under EU law

This is not a memorandum of understanding, a gentleman’s agreement between UEFA and the Commission, or a simple political declaration; this Arrangement is formally approved by a binding decision of the European Commission, to which it is attached. This decision could not be based on Article 165 paragraph 4 of the TFEU (the sports legal basis), as it does not confer to the European Commission the power to adopt such a decision. Hence, the Commission needed to rely on its general competence derived from Article 17 TEU.[1] Already, this is cause for legal concern; for example one could question the legitimacy of the circumvention of the limits set expressively in Article 165 TFEU and the recourse to Article 17 TEU to stretch the Commission’s competences. Ultimately, it could lead to a legal challenge against the decision, based on the European Commission’s lack of competence to adopt it. In any way, this is unlikely to happen, as it would require an EU Institution (the Council or the European Parliament), or a Member State to do so. 

What does the fact that the Arrangement is enshrined in a European Commission decision mean in legal terms? As specified in Article 288 TFEU: “A decision shall be binding in its entirety”. This is a legally binding document, in theory reviewable by Courts and potentially capable of generating rights and legitimate expectations for a third party (most probably UEFA). The Commission was apparently very weary of dodging this possibility. Therefore, it kept the wording of its commitments relatively vague and introduced many references to the primacy of EU Competition law and the EU acquis in the text. Moreover, article 5.4 of the Arrangement stipulates that it “does not create rights or obligations under international, EU or domestic law”. This makes it very difficult to envisage a possibility for UEFA to claim that it has concrete legitimate expectations arising from this Arrangement.[2] Consequently, in practice, this Arrangement is very much a soft legal instrument in the guise of hard law administrative decision. Nevertheless, the law is not always only about the law and such soft legal documents might have hard political and legal consequences. 


The hard political (and legal) reality of a soft legal “Arrangement”

The legal theoretical debate over the nature and function of soft law instruments has been on-going for more than 20 years now.[3] But, one thing seems to be more or less certain, soft legal mechanisms matter.[4] They matter politically, as they shape the perception of public opinion and play a role in public discourse. Sometimes they might also matter legally, especially when legal standards based on the substantial balancing of values (or risks) are used, as for example the proportionality principle. Therefore, the European Commission should be very weary of using such soft instruments in a blunt fashion. 

In our view, this Arrangement between UEFA and the European Commission is a misguided soft law instrument. Indeed, despite its willingness not to get into an agreement creating legal rights for UEFA, the European Commission will be haunted (politically and legally) by it for the years to come. For example, it will be very difficult for the European Commission to consider that UEFA’s Financial Fair Play regulations are disproportionate in the sense of the Meca-Medina test, after recognizing that it contributes to “the sustainable development and healthy growth of sport in Europe”. The Commission also adds that this recognition is “subject to compliance with competition law”. Thus, it remains in theory possible for the DG Competition to consider FFP incompatible with EU Competition law. However, one need not be a political wizard to understand the difficulty to do so after having enshrined such a statement in an official decision (UEFA is already claiming that the Commission “fully supports” the “implementation of Financial Fair Play”). UEFA would easily point at the obvious contradiction and the European public would rightly blame the European Commission for its inconsistency.                                                                                            

Unfortunately, this Arrangement is not only about UEFA’s FFP regulations; instead, the European Commission is signing on a set of very controversial statements. Indeed, by qualifying sporting Arbitration as “an important voluntary tool for settling disputes in sport” and “ensuring respect of the applicable legal norms and procedural safeguards within and outside of the EU” it indirectly recognizes the legitimacy of the Court of Arbitration for Sport. This is notwithstanding the very acute doubts about the “voluntary” nature of this arbitration[5], as well as potential concerns related to its independence. In this context, one can only be perplexed by the willingness of the European Commission to throw caution to the wind. The CAS might be a useful tool for sports governing bodies trying to evade the purview of national courts; it might even be necessary to avoid the fragmentation of the global anti-doping regime or to offer a quick and clean dispute resolution mechanisms in certain disciplinary or commercial cases. However, its legitimacy and its capacity to safeguard the fundamental rights of athletes is not a given and the European Commission would have been well advised to show considerable restraint in weighing in on this question. This lack of caution is generally true for other very complex socio-economic issues tackled en passant in the Arrangement, and in which UEFA had a keen (economic) interest to defend: the release of players for the national teams, the intellectual property rights over football and the regulation of the transfer system. 

Finally, UEFA will now enjoy privileged access to the highest level of the EU’s executive branch. This is akin to an ‘all you can eat’ lobbying ticket to defend its interests and views. UEFA may have a central function in the organization of European football, but, it is not the UN, States have no say in its policies, nor have the people which are directly affected by them.[6] There is no good reason to confer a special political status to UEFA, especially taking into account that, as a private government, it refuses to give a real institutional voice to some of its most prominent “citizens”: the players, the clubs or the fans. By doing so, the Commission risks cutting itself from the other legitimate voices of football and losing sights of its duty to defend the European general interest as a whole. 

Did the outgoing European Commission rush to cash-in on a visual accolade from Michel Platini? One is left to wonder. For all these substantial political concessions, the European Commission won only the meagre promise that “UEFA will collaborate in the context of the planned European Week of Sport, using football to promote healthy physical activity”. Such an Arrangement could have potentially made sense, if the European Commission would have imposed in return certain governance standards on UEFA (real stakeholders participation, transparency requirements etc…), or conditioned its signature to the full implementation of the recently agreed (and not even mentioned in the Arrangement) European social dialogue agreement for professional football players. 

In short, with this Arrangement the European Commission capitulated politically in front of UEFA. Such a capitulation need not take a legally binding form; its political meaning is enough. It is a sad day for European Sports Law and for those keen on democratizing the governance of football and on subjecting it to the rule of law. One can only hope that, as it has done in the past, the Court of Justice will be willing to supplant the Commission in defending the European general interest and the rights of athletes.



[1] Article 17(1) TEU reads as follows: “The Commission shall promote the general interest of the Union and take appropriate initiatives to that end. It shall ensure the application of the Treaties, and of measures adopted by the institutions pursuant to them. It shall oversee the application of Union law under the control of the Court of Justice of the European Union. It shall execute the budget and manage programmes. It shall exercise coordinating, executive and management functions, as laid down in the Treaties. With the exception of the common foreign and security policy, and other cases provided for in the Treaties, it shall ensure the Union's external representation. It shall initiate the Union's annual and multiannual programming with a view to achieving interinstitutional agreements.”

[2] On the scope of the notion of « Legitimate expectations » in EU administrative Law, see P. Craig, EU Administrative Law, OUP, 2012, pp. 567-570

[3] For an early discussion of soft law in the framework of EU law see : F. Snyder, ‘The effectiveness of European Community Law : Institutions, Processes, Tools and Techniques’, Modern Law Review, vol.56, 1993, 19-56, p.32-35

[4] L. Senden, Soft law in European Community Law, Hart Publishing, 2004 ; O. Stefan, Soft Law in Court : Competition Law, State Aid and the Court of Justice of the EU, Kluwer, 2013.

[5] The recent Pechstein decision by the Landgericht München highlighted this lack of consent from the part of the athlete. See the decision at www.openjur.de/u/678775.html

[6] On the need to distinguish between its factual capacity to create legal rules and its legitimacy to do so, see A. Duval, ‘Lex Sportiva : A playground for transnational law’ available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2317826

Comments (1) -

  • The Complainant

    10/16/2014 8:43:00 PM |

    Very interesting article. Last attempt by Vassiliou to prevent the new Commission from changing its policy towards UEFA. The cosy relation between UEFA and the EC under Barroso, Vassiliou and Almunia has severely damaged the image of the EU. It is embarrassing that the EU policy in the football market is dictated by a private entity like UEFA. Let's hope that the new Commission will take a different (more impartial and more sensible) approach.

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