Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

Joint Statement from Legal Experts on Genetic Sex Testing in Sport

We, the undersigned legal experts in human rights and sports, issue this statement out of urgent concern about the regressive move toward genetic testing as a precondition of participation in women’s sport. Such eligibility rules, which have already been adopted by several major International Federations—including World Athletics, World Boxing, World Aquatics, and the International Ski and Snowboard Federation—not only conflict with the IOC’s existing guidelines on the matter, but also violate domestic and international laws that protect human rights and regulate the use of genetic testing and genetic information. 


Violations of the IOC Framework

The IOC’s Framework on fairness, inclusion and non-discrimination on the basis of gender identity and sex variationsoutlines fundamental principles to be followed within the Olympic Movement when defining eligibility criteria for the men’s and women’s categories of competition. According to the Framework, any such eligibility criteria should be aimed at ensuring that no athlete has an unfair and disproportionate competitive advantage or at preventing a risk to the physical safety of other athletes. Under the Framework, such an advantage or risk cannot be presumed based on an athlete’s sex variations, physical appearance, or transgender status. It must instead be established based on evidence in the form of robust and peer reviewed research. 

In particular, such evidence should be “based on data collected from a demographic group that is consistent in gender and athletic engagement with the group that the eligibility criteria aim to regulate” and must demonstrate “disproportionate competitive advantage and/or unpreventable risk exists for the specific sport, discipline and event that the eligibility criteria aim to regulate.” Contrary to this evidence-based approach, exclusion based on the presence of the SRY gene constitutes a categorical ban based on a single biological marker, rather than on peer-reviewed research demonstrating that transgender athletes and/or athletes with sex variations have a disproportionate competitive advantage or pose an unpreventable safety risk in specific sporting disciplines.

Moreover, the IOC Framework advises International Federations to prioritize athletes’ health, wellbeing, bodily autonomy, and privacy. Current genetic sex testing rules fail to do so, in violation of numerous domestic and international laws, which we urgently draw attention to below.


Violations of national, regional, and international human rights laws

As several Special Procedures of the UN Human Rights Council have observed, genetic sex testing as a condition of eligibility for women’s sport infringes on athletes’ internationally recognized rights to equality, bodily and psychological integrity, and privacy. 

Further, the IOC, along with the many International Federations based in Europe, must comply with the European Convention on Human Rights. Indeed, the European Court of Human Rights has recognized that the failure of a sport governing body to respect human rights may engage the responsibility of Switzerland under the Convention and, further, that the Swiss Federal Supreme Court must subject female eligibility rules in sport to particularly rigorous review given the seriousness of the personal rights at issue, including privacy, bodily and psychological integrity, economic freedom, and human dignity. 

We consider that mandatory genetic sex testing, and the exclusion of women athletes on this basis, violates Articles 8 (right to respect for private life) and 14 (prohibition of discrimination) of the European Convention. Such violations can only be justified if the eligibility rules are reasonable, necessary, and proportionate, which International Federations bear the burden of proving and which they are currently unable to do. As the European Court of Human Rights recently recognized, the harms of sex testing include the inevitable disclosure of certain athletes’ private and confidential medical information, the potential loss of their livelihoods, and a range of other serious harms. In our view, these consequences—and particularly the social exclusion, psychological distress, physical harm, and material loss that accompany them—cannot be considered reasonable and proportionate to the aim pursued. This is particularly so given the absence of conclusive scientific evidence demonstrating that transgender women athletes or athletes with sex variations have a systematic advantage over other women athletes. 

The exclusion of athletes on the basis of genetic sex testing likewise violates domestic laws, as a Belgian court recently concluded, finding that international cycling regulations barring transgender women were discriminatory, lacking a sound scientific basis, and disproportionate. 


Violations of laws regulating genetic testing and genetic data

Genetic sex testing as a condition of participation in sport also violates numerous national, regional, and international laws, which strictly circumscribe the use of genetic testing and genetic data. 

First, the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, along with the domestic laws of many jurisdictions, prohibit genetic testing unless it serves a health-related purpose, which sex testing rules clearly do not. Some domestic laws place additional restrictions on the range of permissible medical purposes when it comes to minors, however International Federations apply genetic sex testing rules indiscriminately to athletes of all ages. Because of such domestic legal restrictions, athletes in some countries have been pushed to access genetic testing abroad, in less protective jurisdictions.

Second, across jurisdictions, free and informed consent is a fundamental precondition for genetic testing. Not only do individuals below a certain age lack the legal capacity to consent, the consent of an athlete of any age cannot be freely given when it is a condition of sports eligibility. Illustrating this legal principle, the International Declaration on Human Genetic Data specifies that consent to genetic testing is only valid if it is not induced by financial or other personal gain, yet sports eligibility rules do exactly that. While many jurisdictions require the provision of non-directive genetic counselling prior to any testing, this safeguard is nullified by the directive nature of sports eligibility rules. 

Third, domestic and international laws prohibit discrimination based on genetic characteristics, as well as the use of genetic data in ways that stigmatize individuals or groups. Yet genetic sex testing rules do so, first, by targeting only women athletes for testing, and second, by excluding those with a particular genetic trait, resulting in the further stigmatization and marginalization of transgender and intersex people, not only in sport but in society at large.

Fourth, in order to prevent such discrimination, certain jurisdictions specifically prohibit making genetic testing or disclosure of test results a condition of a contract and prohibit anyone other than medical practitioners or researchers, and particularly employers, from requesting or using genetic information. International Federations cannot circumvent these legal restrictions by outsourcing genetic testing to authorities at the national level.

Finally, privacy and data protection laws around the world, including the General Data Protection Regulation(GDPR) afford heightened protection to genetic information. The GDPR prohibits the processing of genetic data, except in very narrow circumstances, such as where the data subject gives explicit, voluntary and informed consent, or where the processing is necessary for and proportionate to reasons of substantial public interest set out in EU or member state law.  Such voluntary and informed consent does not exist for genetic sex testing as athletes are forced to grant consent under the threat of exclusion from sport, and often in circumstances where they are not knowledgeable about the risks of harm that might result from the data processing. There is also no EU or member state law that describes the purported aim of sex testing in sport as a substantial public interest and, even if there was, the data processing in pursuit of that aim would not be necessary and proportionate due to the absence of scientific evidence that women with the SRY gene have a competitive advantage over other women athletes and the significant harms to athletes that can result from genetic sex testing.

The processing of genetic data for sex testing may violate other data protection laws that have been recognized as providing an adequate level of protection similar to the GDPR, such as the data protection laws in Brazil, Canada, Japan, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.


Our Call

We call on the IOC, as it finalises the work to find a “consensus” to “protect the female category”, to reject mandatory genetic testing as a condition of eligibility. We call on International Federations that have already adopted such eligibility rules to withdraw them immediately. And we call on all sport governing bodies to recommit—in practice, not only in policy—to the principles of inclusion and non-discrimination that they have already affirmed.

If international sport governing bodies fail to do so, we call on National Federations to refuse to apply and implement international eligibility rules that violate their respective domestic laws and international legal obligations. Simultaneously, we call on states to urgently review the legality of mandatory genetic sex testing policies that are being applied to athletes and/or at competitions within their jurisdictions. 

We also call on athletes to challenge the national or regional implementation of mandatory genetic sex testing, demanded by the IOC or International Federations, before domestic courts, by invoking national or regional laws protecting human rights, prohibiting anti-discrimination, and regulating the use of genetic testing and genetic data. 

At the same time, we call on courts, particularly the Court of Arbitration for Sport, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court, and ultimately the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union, to uphold their duty to ensure a particularly rigorous review of the rules and decisions of the IOC and International Federations, which is compliant with European human rights law and public policy. 

Mandatory genetic sex testing is a stigmatizing and exclusionary policy that lacks democratic legitimacy, scientific grounding, and proportionality between its harms and its aims. It simply has no place in international sport if sport is to be respectful of the values of human dignity, inclusion, fairness, and non-discrimination.  

 

First signatories:

 

Dr. Antoine Duval, T.M.C. Asser Instituut, The Netherlands

Dr. Michele Krech, Toronto Metropolitan University, Canada 

 

 

Signatories

 

1.     Dr. Cem Abanazir, Manchester Metropolitan University, United Kingdom

2.     Rafia Akram, University of Pretoria, South Africa

3.     Dr. Shreya Atrey, University of Oxford, United Kingdom

4.     Francis Awaritefe, lawyer, Professional Footballers Australia (PFA), Australia

5.     Dr. Mathieu Le Bescond de Coatpont, Université de Lille, France

6.     Manon Beury, Geneva Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Switzerland

7.     Dr. Audrey Boisgontier, Paris Nanterre University, France

8.     Jensen Brehaut, Osgoode Hall Law School - York University, Canada

9.     Prof. Eva Brems, Ghent University, Belgium

10.  Prof. Erin Buzuvis, Western New England University School of Law, USA

11.  Dr Seamus Byrne, Manchester Law School, Manchester Metropolitan University, United Kingdom 

12.  Prof. Gillian Calder, University of Victoria, Faculty of Law, Canada

13.  Dr. Pieter Cannoot, Ghent University, Belgium

14.  Amritananda Chakravorty, Advocate, India

15.  Jonathan Cooper, University of Gloucestershire, United Kingdom 

16.  Prof. Sharon Cowan, University of Edinburgh, United Kingdom 

17.  Dr. Martine Dennie, University of Manitoba, Canada

18.  Moya Dodd, lawyer, Former Matilda (Australian Women’s Football Team), Australia

19.  Nikki Dryden, lawyer, The Right Collective, Australia

20.  Dr Eleanor Drywood, School of Law and Social Justice, University of Liverpool, United Kingdom

21.  Prof. Maria C Dugas, Schulich School of Law, Dalhousie University, Canada

22.  Prof. Ariel Dulitzky, University of Texas at Austin, School of Law, USA

23.  Dr. Hilary Findlay, Brock University (retired), Canada

24.  Deekshitha Ganesan, Human rights lawyer, Germany

25.  Dr. Ryan GauthierThompson Rivers University

26.  Alexandra Gómez Bruinewoud, Director Legal at FIFPro, The Netherlands

27.  Kaushik Gupta, Senior Advocate High Court at Calcutta, India  

28.  Dr Matthew Harvey, Victoria University Melbourne, Australia

29.  Dina Francesca Haynes, Orville H. Schell, Jr. Center for International Human Rights and Yale University, USA

30.  Prof. Kristin Henrard, Brussels School of Governance, Free University Brussels, Belgium

31.  Dr. Daniela Heerdt, T.M.C. Asser Instituut, The Netherlands

32.  Tim Holden, Solicitor admitted in Australia, Australia

33.  Dr. Lena Holzer, University of Cambridge, United Kingdom

34.  Shubham Jain, University of Cambridge, United Kingdom

35.  Timothy Kajja, Advocate of the High Court of Uganda, Uganda

36.  Dr. Ido Katri, York Institute of Science and Technology, Canada

37.  Prof. Bruce Kidd, University of Toronto, Canada

38.  Prof. Jennifer Koshan, Faculty of Law, University of Calgary, Canada

39.  Prof. Mélanie Levy, Health Law Institute - Faculty of Law - University of Neuchâtel, Switzerland

40.  Marcus Mazzucco, University of Toronto, Canada

41.  Dr. Julie Mattiussi, Associate Professor, University of Strasbourg, France

42.  Pedro José Mercado Jaén, European University Instute, Italy

43.  Alice M. Miller, Global Health Justice Partnership of the Yale Law and Public Health Schools, Yale University, USA

44.  Bárbara Monzerrat Meré Carrión, Legal Counsel at FIFPro, The Netherlands

45.  Dr. Tomáš Morochovič, University of Edinburgh, United Kingdom

46.  Prof. Benjamin Moron-Puech, Université Lumière Lyon 2, France

47.  George Newhouse, Human rights lawyer, Australia

48.  Dr. Matt Nichol, Central Queensland University, Australia

49.  Khayran Noor, International Sports Lawyer, Kenya

50.  Dr Catherine Ordway, University of New South Wales, Australia

51.  Prof. David Pavot, Université de Sherbrooke, Canada

52.  Prof. Debra Parkes, Peter A. Allard School of Law, University of British Columbia, Canada

53.  Dr. Seema Patel, Nottingham Law School, University of Nottingham, United Kingdom 

54.  Prof. Carmen Pérez-González, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Spain

55.  Prof. Isabelle Rorive, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium

56.  Mihir Samson, Advocate, India

57.  Dr. Yassine Sangare, King Stage Business School, United Kingdom

58.  Maya Satya Reddy, Former Professional Golfer, founder of the Harvard Law School LGBTQ+ Advocacy Clinic Sports Project, LGBTQ+ Sports Law and Policy Consultant (JD), USA

59.  Kate Scallion, Jones Emery LLP, Canada

60.  Dr. Bérénice K. Schramm, Galatasaray University, Turkey

61.  Jhuma Sen, Advocate, Calcutta High Court, India

62.  Dr. Faraz Shahlaei, LMU Loyola Law School, USA

63.  Dr. Maayan Sudai, University of Haifa, Israel

64.  Prof. Jessica Tueller, University of Oklahoma College of Law, USA

65.  Faranaaz Veriava, University of Pretoria, South Africa

66.  Prof. Ekaterina Yahyaoui Krivenko, University of Galway, Ireland

67.  Dr. Jan Zglinski, LSE Law School, United kingdom

68. Monique Hennessy, ANZLA, Australia

69. Indiradevi Kollipara, Sports and Gaming Lawyer, India

70. David Rutherford, Human rights lawyer, New Zealand 

71. Prof. Alberto Carrio Sampedro, Pompeu Fabra Universiry, Spain

72. Sam Chollet, PhD Candidate, Université de Lausanne, France/Switzerland

73. Daniel Cardona A, Sports lawyer, Colombia

74. Dr. Alice de Jonge, Monash University, InterAction for Health and Human Rights, Australia

75. Dr Aileen Kennedy, UTS Faculty of Law and InterAction for Health and Human Rights, Australia

76. Inês Espinhaço Gomes, Porto Faculty of Law, Universidade Católica Portuguesa, Portugal

77. Dr. Daniel Del Gobbo, Assistant Professor & Chair in Law, Gender, and Sexual Justice, University of Windsor Faculty of Law, Canada

78. Brendan Schwab, Professional Footballers Australia, Australia

79. Dr. Erin C. Tarver, Emory University, Oxford College, USA

80. Dr. Matteo Winkler, HEC Paris, France

81. Isabel Abella Ruiz de Mendoza, Abella Legal, Spain

82. Roland Sètondji Adjovi, UQAM, Canada

83. Prof. Dr. Peter W. Heermann, LL.M, University of Bayreuth, Germany

84. Andrei Kampff de Melo, Lei em Campo, Brazil

85. Megan L. Manion, Yale Law School, USA

86. Dr Andrea Cattaneo, Edge Hill University, United Kingdom

87. Prof. Alessandra Arcuri, Erasmus School of Law, Erasmus University Rotterdam, The Netherlands

88. Gabriel Vieira Terenzi, Centro Universitário Toledo Wyden, Brazil

89. Heather Corkhill, Legal Director, Equality Australia, Australia

90. Carlos J. Zelada, Universidad del Pacífico, Peru

91. Louise Collard, Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières, Canada 

92. Prof. Sarah Joseph, Griffith University, Australia

93. Sven Demeulemeester, Partner, Atfield, Belgium

94. Andrea Florence, Lawyer, Executive Director, Sport & Rights Alliance, Brazil

95. Surbhi Kuwelker, Independent Legal Counsel, Doctoral Candidate, University of Neuchatel, Denmark

96. Prof. Pascal Borry, KU Leuven, Belgium 

97. Clément Lanier, Paris-Nanterre University, France

98. Prof. Machteld Vonk, Faculty of Law, Radboud University, The Netherlands

99. Shoichi Sugiyama, Field-R Law Office / Japan Safe Sport Project, Japan

 

A World Cup Without the World? How Trump’s Travel Ban Contradicts FIFA’s Values - By Rasoul Rahmani

Editor's note: Rasoul Rahmani is a PhD Candidate at the Faculty of Law, University of Turku, Finland. His doctoral research examines sports governance and human rights, with a focus on how EU law, particularly recent CJEU rulings, is reshaping the autonomy of sports governing bodies and the institutional implications of these developments.

 

The Ban and Its Expansion

On 4 June 2025, President Donald Trump imposed sweeping entry restrictions on nationals from 12 countries: Afghanistan, Burma, Chad, Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Haiti, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen. The proclamation made clear that “these restrictions distinguish between, but apply to both, the entry of immigrants and non-immigrants”; including those traveling on visitor visas for business and tourism, precisely the category under which World Cup fans would enter the United States.

The President invoked his Executive Order of 20 January 2025, which declared it “the policy of the United States to protect its citizens from aliens who intend to commit terrorist attacks, threaten our national security, espouse hateful ideology, or otherwise exploit the immigration laws for malevolent purposes.”[1] Alongside these complete bans, he imposed partial restrictions on seven additional countries: Burundi, Cuba, Laos, Sierra Leone, Togo, Turkmenistan, and Venezuela.

The restrictions expanded drastically on 16 December 2025. Five more nations joined the fully banned list; Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, South Sudan, and Syria along with individuals holding Palestinian Authority-issued travel documents. Laos and Sierra Leone were upgraded from partial to full bans. Most significantly, 15 countries were added to the partial restriction category: Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Dominica, Gabon, The Gambia, Malawi, Mauritania, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, Tonga, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

By December 2025, the travel restrictions encompassed 39 countries plus Palestinian Authority passport holders; a staggering expansion of barriers to entry for what is supposed to be a celebration of global unity. 


One Billion People Locked Out

The scale of exclusion is breathtaking. According to the latest population data, the fully banned countries represent 479.3 million people. The partially restricted nations account for another 537.6 million. Combined, over 1.017 billion people, more than one-eighth of the world’s population, face barriers to entering the World Cup’s primary host nation.

This mass exclusion stands in jarring contradiction to FIFA President Gianni Infantino’s repeated promises that 2026 would be “the greatest and most inclusive FIFA World Cup in history”; a World Cup  which is projected to have 6.5 million attendees in the host countries. The tournament expanded from 32 to 48 teams precisely to embrace more of the world. Yet as the field grew more diverse, the host country’s doors slammed shut.

Of the 42 nations already qualified for World Cup 2026, four face direct impact  from Trump’s restrictions. Iran and Haiti, home to 104.1 million people combined, are under full entry bans. Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal, representing 47.9 million people, face partial restrictions. Among the nations competing for the remaining six spots, Iraq (full ban) and DR Congo (partial restriction) could also qualify, potentially raising the total to six affected teams.

The geographic reality compounds the problem. Of the tournament’s 104 matches, the United States will host 78, while Mexico and Canada together host only 26. For fans from banned or restricted countries, only the handful of matches in Toronto, Vancouver, Mexico City, Guadalajara, and Monterrey remain accessible. The vast majority of the World Cup, including likely knockout rounds in American cities, will be beyond their reach.

The ban carves out exemptions for athletes, coaches, and support staff  competing in “major” events like the World Cup and the 2028 Olympics. But fans, athletes’ families, and journalists receive no such consideration. Iranian supporters, who brought 20,000 passionate voices to Qatar 2022, now face a dream deferred. Haiti’s vibrant fan base, a joyful presence at the 2023 Women’s World Cup, finds itself similarly sidelined. The policy creates a two-tier system: the teams can play, but their people cannot watch.


FIFA’s Hollow Response

In a carefully choreographed White House meeting attended by President Donald Trump and FIFA President Gianni Infantino, the U.S. Department of State unveiled the FIFA Priority Appointment Scheduling System, dubbed "FIFA PASS", for World Cup 2026 ticket holders attending matches in the United States. The service promises every fan who purchases a ticket the opportunity to obtain a prioritized visa interview.

Yet this solution is nothing more than window dressing. While expedited interviews may help fans from unrestricted countries navigate bureaucracy more smoothly, it remains fundamentally unclear, and deliberately unaddressed, how the system would function for passport holders from the 39 banned or restricted nations. A faster path to rejection is no path at all.

Contrast FIFA’s tepid response with the International Olympic Committee’s principled stand when faced with a comparable situation (not identical). When Indonesia denied visas to Israeli athletes and officials for the 53rd FIG Artistic Gymnastics World Championships in October 2025, the IOC responded with immediate, forceful condemnation. The organization expressed “great concern” and “regret,” emphasizing that “all eligible athletes, teams and sports officials must be able to participate in international sports competitions and events without any form of discrimination from the host country, in accordance with the Olympic Charter and the fundamental principles of non-discrimination, autonomy and political neutrality.”[2] The message was unambiguous: violate the principles of inclusive access for athletes and support staff, and you forfeit the privilege of hosting.

The comparison to Indonesia is instructive not because the violations are identical-they are not- but because both cases involve host nations imposing discriminatory entry barriers that undermine the inclusive, global nature of international sporting competitions. Indonesia’s complete ban on Israeli participants was more severe in scope; America’s ban affects fans and journalists rather than athletes. Yet both violate the same fundamental principle: that major sporting events should be accessible to all eligible participants and their supporters without discrimination based on nationality.

The IOC treated Indonesia’s violation as a serious breach of Olympic principles requiring immediate consequences. FIFA, by contrast, has treated the U.S. ban as a non-issue warranting no public comment, let alone corrective action. The different responses reveal not different principles, but different calculations about which hosts can be challenged and which cannot.


A Friendship More Valuable Than Principles

FIFA’s paralysis becomes comprehensible when viewed through the lens of Gianni Infantino’s relationship with Donald Trump. Since assuming the FIFA presidency in February 2016, Infantino has cultivated an unusually close bond with the American leader. He has been a frequent White House visitor throughout Trump’s presidencies, their meetings marked by mutual praise and conspicuous displays of camaraderie.

Independent human rights organizations have repeatedly accused Infantino of violating FIFA’s duty of political neutrality. The most egregious example came in December 2025, when FIFA awarded its inaugural Peace Prize to Trump, a sitting political leader presiding over the very policies that exclude a billion people from accessing the World Cup. According to media reports, the FIFA Council was not even consulted on this decision, suggesting it was Infantino’s personal initiative.

Human Rights Watch captured the absurdity with biting clarity: “FIFA’s so-called peace prize is being awarded against a backdrop of violent detentions of immigrants, national guard deployments in U.S. cities, and the obsequious cancellation of FIFA’s own.” anti-racism and anti-discrimination campaigns

That last point deserves emphasis. At the Club World Cup held in the United States in summer 2025, FIFA conspicuously dropped its anti-racism messaging, the very campaigns it had championed at Qatar 2022, where it backed “no discrimination” armbands and introduced enhanced disciplinary codes “to fight racism more efficiently and decisively.” The sudden abandonment of these principles on American soil suggests a troubling calculation: FIFA’s values are negotiable depending on the host’s political sensitivities.

Most damning of all, this close relationship has produced no tangible benefits for the fans Trump’s policies exclude. Both Iran and Haiti, the two fully banned qualified teams, will play all their group stage matches in U.S. cities, not in Canada or Mexico. If Infantino’s friendship with Trump held any real value for the sport, surely it would manifest in exemptions for fans whose teams earned their place on the pitch. Instead, the friendship appears entirely one-directional: FIFA accommodates Trump’s preferences while receiving nothing in return for football’s global community.

The uncomfortable truth is that Infantino seems unwilling to risk his personal relationship with Trump by publicly criticizing policies that fundamentally contradict FIFA’s stated mission. In this calculation, diplomatic access to the White House trumps the organization’s commitment to inclusion, non-discrimination, and the unifying power of football.


Violating FIFA’s Own Statutes

The travel ban does not merely contradict FIFA’s rhetoric; it directly violates the organization’s foundational legal documents. Article 3 of the FIFA Statutes declares: “FIFA is committed to respecting all internationally recognised human rights and shall strive to promote the protection of these rights.” The commitment is absolute, not conditional on political convenience.

Article 4 goes further, stating that “discrimination of any kind against a country, private person or group of people on account of race, skin colour, language, religion, politics, national or social origin, property, birth or any other status is strictly prohibited and punishable by suspension or expulsion.” As pointed out by the HRW, the language could hardly be clearer: discrimination based on national origin is not just discouraged, it is grounds for the most severe penalties FIFA can impose.

Article 2a and 2g establishes FIFA’s fundamental objectives, including promoting football “in the light of its unifying, educational, cultural and humanitarian values” and preventing “all methods or practices which might jeopardise the integrity of matches, competitions, players, officials and member associations”.[3] A World Cup where qualified teams’ players’ families, supporters, and journalists cannot attend matches, as they are not included in U.S. entry exemptions, fundamentally jeopardizes the competition’s integrity in several interconnected ways. Firstly, the absence of supporters and families strips matches of their cultural and emotional meaning, turning them into hollow simulations rather than genuine contests between nations. Secondly, banning some fans while allowing others creates unfair competitive imbalances unrelated to sporting merit. Thirdly, excluding journalists from affected countries undermines transparent coverage. Finally, excluding vast populations from attending erodes the tournament’s moral and symbolic legitimacy.

FIFA’s Human Rights Policy and the FIFA World Cup 2026 Human Rights Framework reinforce these commitments. The Framework explicitly commits all host cities to stage the tournament “guided by the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights” and in line with FIFA’s Human Rights Policy. As mentioned by the Human Rights Watch letter to FIFA, the current United States immigration policies “directly contradict FIFA’s stated values of human rights, inclusion and global participation.”

FIFA itself has stated that “its position on inclusivity and the protection of human rights is unequivocal, and clearly laid out in the FIFA Statutes.” The organization has historically enforced these standards on host nations. During the World Cup 2022, Qatar was subjected to sustained scrutiny and pressure[4] and FIFA ensured the host became fully aware of its responsibility to adhere “to FIFA’s human rights and non-discrimination, equality and neutrality statutes, and committed to do so.” Yet for the United States, a far larger market and a more powerful political entity, FIFA has issued no such reminders, made no such demands, extracted no such commitments.[5] The double standard is glaring. 


The Hypocrisy of Selective Enforcement

FIFA presents itself as a neutral guardian of football’s “fundamental principles,” committed to human rights, unity, and the integrity of the game. Yet its recent decisions reveal a far less principled reality. From the intense moral scrutiny imposed on smaller or geopolitically weaker host nations to the striking restraint shown toward powerful Western states, FIFA’s enforcement of its own standards appears deeply selective. This pattern raises a troubling question: are FIFA’s rules applied universally, or are they calibrated according to political influence, economic power, and market value?

FIFA presents itself as a neutral guardian of football’s “fundamental principles,” committed to human rights, unity, and the integrity of the game. Yet its recent decisions reveal a far less principled reality: a pattern of enforcement that scholars have characterized as operating through “modern human rights frameworks [that are] (largely) Western-led and controlled.”[6] From the intense moral scrutiny imposed on smaller or geopolitically weaker host nations to the striking restraint shown toward powerful Western states, FIFA’s application of its own standards appears calibrated according to political influence rather than universal principles. The contrast between FIFA’s treatment of Qatar 2022 and the United States 2026 exemplifies this troubling inconsistency.

After awarding FIFA World Cup 2022 to Qatar, the Gulf state faced unprecedented international scrutiny. Human rights organizations, media outlets, and civil society groups subjected Qatar to relentless and enormous pressure, focusing on migrant labour conditions, with critics characterizing the kafala system as amounting to forced labour and accusing Qatar of being a slave state,[7] as well as LGBTQ+ rights and restrictions on alcohol consumption. While FIFA initially awarded Qatar the tournament in 2010 without imposing human rights conditions, years of sustained external pressure from the International Labour Organization, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and other actors eventually prompted reforms. Qatar became the first Gulf nation to abolish the kafala system, introduce minimum wages, and permit limited trade union activity.[8]

However, such level of moral examination rarely applied to Western hosts. Much of this criticism was justified, but where is the equivalent systematic pressure on the United States, a nation with its own well-documented issues regarding migrant treatment, labour rights, and systemic discrimination, and recent immigration policies that exclude a billion people from accessing the tournament?

The answer is uncomfortable but obvious: the U.S. market is too valuable to jeopardize. American broadcasting rights, sponsorship revenues, and political influence make confrontation unthinkable for FIFA’s leadership. 

This selectivity extends beyond host nation oversight. When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, FIFA condemnedthe use of force by Russia and any type of violence that same day. Four days later, on 28 February 2022, FIFA and UEFA jointly suspended Russian teams from all competitions. Notably, FIFA framed its justification narrowly, citing force majeure and competition integrity[9] rather than human rights violations or illegal war. The response demonstrated that FIFA possesses the will and the mechanisms to act decisively when a geopolitical crisis threatens football’s integrity and continuity.

No similar urgency has materialized regarding U.S. entry restrictions that exclude fans from qualified and non-qualified teams, despite the direct contradiction with FIFA’s statutory commitments. The inconsistency suggests that FIFA’s enforcement of its principles depends less on their violation than on the violator’s geopolitical influence.

When European football associations and UN experts called for action against Israel over its conduct in Gaza and treatment of Palestinian football, FIFA appealed to vague notions of “unity” and avoided substantive measures: “FIFA cannot solve geopolitical problems.”  In September 2025, the Trump administration, through its Secretary of State intervened directly to prevent Israel’s suspension, with a spokesperson declaring: We will absolutely work “to fully stop any effort to attempt to ban Israel’s national soccer team from the World Cup.”

The message is unmistakable: FIFA’s “fundamental principles” are enforced selectively, calibrated to the political power and market value of the nations involved. Russia can be excluded swiftly; the United States cannot be challenged at all. Smaller nations face stringent human rights requirements; powerful Western states receive diplomatic silence even when their policies directly contradict FIFA’s own statutes.

This pattern raises a fundamental question: is FIFA an independent governing body committed to universal principles, or does it operate within, and defer to, the framework of Western political and economic power? The answer increasingly appears to be the latter.


A Call to Action

This situation demands a response; from FIFA, from fans, and from the global football community. But these responses must take different forms, leveraging different sources of power and accountability. 

  • FIFA’s Institutional Obligations

FIFA must break its silence. The Statutes are not suggestions; they are binding commitments with enforcement mechanisms. FIFA must publicly demand that the United States provide exemptions for World Cup fans especially from all qualified nations, regardless of broader immigration policies. This is defending the integrity of FIFA’s own tournament and honouring commitments made when awarding hosting rights.

The goal is not perfect equality of access; economic disparities will always mean that wealthier fans travel more easily than those with fewer resources. What FIFA must ensure is equality in principle: that fans holding legitimate tickets face no discriminatory barriers based solely on their nationality.

If the United States refuses to provide such exemptions, FIFA must be prepared to impose consequences. At least FIFA could relocate affected teams’ matches to Canadian or Mexican venues, ensuring their supporters can attend. It could reduce the number of matches hosted by U.S. cities that fail to guarantee fan access. At minimum, it must publicly document the violation of hosting commitments and ensure this factors into future hosting decisions.

FIFA must also address a fundamental question for its governance framework: Should nations be awarded hosting rights if their immigration policies preclude the inclusive, non-discriminatory access that FIFA’s own statutes require? The organization needs clear, enforceable criteria that apply equally to all candidates, regardless of their geopolitical power or market value. The current situation demonstrates the dangers of awarding tournaments without such safeguards.

National federations, particularly those from affected countries, should formally petition FIFA to address this access crisis through official channels. Player unions can lend their institutional weight to these demands. Media coverage must continue highlighting the contradiction between FIFA’s rhetoric and its complicity through silence. These institutional pressures, channelled through formal FIFA structures, represent the proper mechanisms for holding the organization accountable to its own rules.

  • Beyond Institutions: A Fan-Led Protest

Yet even as we demand that FIFA fulfil its obligations, we cannot wait passively for institutional action that may never come. Fans themselves possess a powerful tool: visibility.

When Iran, Haiti, Côte d'Ivoire, or Senegal takes the field in American stadiums, supporters of their opponents, and also neutrals who cherish football’s unifying spirit, should leave sections of seats conspicuously empty in solidarity. These vacant seats, broadcast to millions worldwide, would create an undeniable visual reminder of who is missing and why.

This is not a call for general boycott of the tournament, which would harm the very teams whose fans are excluded. Rather, it is a targeted, symbolic action: empty sections during specific matches as visible protest. Supporters’ groups could coordinate which sections to leave vacant, creating clear visual patterns that television cameras cannot ignore. Social media campaigns could explain the protest to global audiences, connecting the empty seats directly to the billion people locked out. It would demonstrate that football’s community rejects discrimination even when football’s governors tolerate it.

  • The Soul of the Game

The beautiful game has always transcended borders and brought together people whom politics seeks to divide. That is its soul, its magic, its moral authority.[10] By allowing Trump’s travel ban to stand unchallenged, FIFA acts in direct contradiction to the values it claims to uphold.

The question is whether those who truly love the game, players, fans, federations, will accept this silence, or whether they will demand that FIFA honour its own principles through every avenue available: formal institutional pressure and visible, grassroots action.

FIFA must use its leverage to ensure equal access in principle. Fans, in turn, must use both their presence and their strategic absence to demand accountability when FIFA fails to act.

The world is watching. The seats are waiting. What will we choose?


[1] Executive Order 14161 “Protecting the United States From Foreign Terrorists and Other National Security and Public Safety Threats”, 20 January 2025. Available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/protecting-the-united-states-from-foreign-terrorists-and-othernational-security-and-public-safety-threats/

 

[2] More importantly, IOC backed its words with action. Its Executive Board ended all dialogue with Indonesia’s National Olympic Committee regarding hosting future events and recommended that International Federations avoid holding competitions or meetings in the country until adequate guarantees were provided.

[3] FIFA Statutes (Edition August 2024), Articles 2a and 2g.

[4] “The many critiques of Qatar were mobilizing a range of rights-claims based in international treaties or conventions… . Simultaneously, similar claims were being advanced against FIFA for failing to abide by its responsibility to respect human rights. Ultimately, this advocacy and public pressure triggered legislative and policy changes in Qatar and at FIFA.” Antoine Duval & Daniela Heerdt, How the FIFA World Cup 2022 Changed Qatar: Playing the Game of Transnational Law on a Global Pitch, 24 German Law Journal 1677 (2023).

[5] “This contrast underscores how FIFA’s claim to neutrality in human rights matters is not a principled stance but a strategically deployed position that aligns with its broader governance model. When financial interests are involved, FIFA does not hesitate to intervene, demonstrating that it possesses the capacity and institutional mechanisms to enforce binding regulations when deemed necessary. Yet, when it comes to human rights, FIFA’s commitments often remain aspirational, non-binding, or selectively enforced.” Pedro José Jaén, Angeliki Bistaraki & Mathias Schubert, The Universal Game? Deconstructing FIFA’s Human Rights Discourse, The International Sports Law Journal (2025).

[6] Shubham Jain, Resistance and Reform as Responses to Human Rights Criticism: Relativism at FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022, 24 Ger. Law J. 1691, 1701 (2023).

[7] “Qatar’s migrant workers were literally put on the world’s agenda overnight. The number of publications mentioning Qatar and“migrant workers” issued by the four organizations shows, first, that Qatar’s migrant workers were of very marginal interest to them before 2010 and, second, that their reporting or advocacy on the issue picked up quickly after the attribution of the FIFA World Cup 2022.” Antoine Duval, Spectacular International Labor Law: Ambush Counter-Marketing In the Spotlight of Qatar’s 2022 FIFA World Cup, 24 German Law Journal 1712 (2023). 

[8] Jain, supra note 6 at 1696.

[9] The bureau pointed out that the participation of the Russian teams in these competitions posed potential disruptions due to the refusals of other national associations to play against them, security concerns, and overall uncertainty related to the conflict. See CAS 25 November 2022, 2022/A/8708 (Football Union of Russia v. Fédération Internationale de Football Association et al). 

*The legal justifications advanced by both FIFA and UEFA for the suspension of Russian teams “did not link the suspensions to the illegality of Russia’s war or the human rights violations committed by Russia’s armed forces.” A. Duval, FIFA and UEFA’s Reaction to Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: How the Neutrality of Sport Survived the War, 3 Voetbal- & Sportjuridische Zaken (2023).

 

[10] David Goldblatt, The Ball Is Round: A Global History of Football 21–22 (2006).

Last Call - ISLJ Conference 2025 - Twenty years of the World Anti-Doping Code in action - Asser Institute - 6-7 November

Dear readers,

You can still join us (in-person or virtually) on Thursday 6 November and Friday 7 November for the 2025 International Sports Law Journal (ISLJ) Conference at the Asser Institute in The Hague. This year's edition of the ISLJ conference will focus on assessing the first 20 years (2004-2024) of operation of the World Anti-Doping Code (WADC) since its entry into force in 2004. It will also discuss its future prospects, in light of the new version of the Code due to be adopted at the Busan Conference in December 2025, and the 10th Conference of the Parties to the International Convention against Doping in Sport, to be held in Paris from 20 to 22 October 2025.

The aim of the ISLJ conference is to take a comprehensive stock of the operation of the private-public transnational regulatory regime which emerged in the wake of the WADC. This regime is structured around a complex network of national and global institutions engaged in anti-doping work (WADA, NADAs, IFs, accredited laboratories) and guided by an equally complex assemblage of norms located at the global (WADC and the WADA Standards), international (UNESCO Convention against Doping in Sport), regional (Council of Europe Anti-Doping Convention), and national (various national anti-doping legislation) level. This makes for a fascinating and convoluted transnational legal construct in need of being studied, analysed and criticised by scholars. 

The conference will start with an opening speech delivered by Travis Tyggart, the CEO of USADA, who is a prominent anti-doping executive, but also a critical observer of the current operation of the world anti-doping system. It will be followed by a range of panels touching on the governance of the World anti-doping regime, the role of national institutions in its operation, the due process rights of athletes in anti-doping proceedings, the boundaries of athlete responsibility in doping cases, the main legal pillars (such as strict liability) underpinning of the WADC, and the enforcement of the WADC.


You will find the latest programme of the conference HERE


You can still register for in-person or online participation HERE


Call for contributions - Sporting Succession in Selected Jurisdictions - Edited by Jacob Kornbeck and Laura Donnellan - Deadline 1 October 2025

  

Expressions of interest are invited from colleagues who would like to contribute to an edited book on Sporting Succession in Selected Jurisdictions. Interested colleagues are invited to send their abstracts jointly to laura.donnellan@ul.ie and klausjacob.kornbeck@gmail.com. If you are unsure about how your research would fit in, please feel free to reach out to us via email before writing your abstract. Abstracts received will be included into a book proposal to be submitted to a major English-speaking publisher. Colleagues will be notified by us once we have received the reaction of the publisher, at which point we shall decide about further steps to be taken in the process. 

 

The book will be edited by Jacob Kornbeck, BSc, MA, LLM, PhD, DrPhil, Programme Manager in the European Commission (but acting strictly in a private capacity) and external lecturer at the University of Lille, inter alia, and Laura Donnellan, LLB, LLM, PhD, Associate Professor in the School of Law, University of Limerick.

 

The following incorporates the most salient ideas from a presentation made by Jacob Kornbeck at the Sport&EU Conference in Angers (June 2023). 

 

The concept of sporting succession permits making claims against sporting entities which can be considered as sporting successors to previously existing sporting entities, even where the previous entities have been wound up and have been dissolved under normal bankruptcy and succession rules. No fault is required for sporting succession to be invoked and considered, and the concept may even apply in certain cases where the previous entity has not even been dissolved legally (CAS 2023/A/9809 Karpaty FC v. FIFA, Cristóbal Márquez Crespo & FC Karpaty Halych. 18 July 2024). While the implementation of the relevant FIFA rules by national FAs has been documented comprehensively in a recent edited book (Cambreleng Contreras, Samarath & Vandellós Alamilla (eds), Sporting Succession in Football. Salerno, SLPC, 2022), no known book or article addresses the overlap, interplay and potential conflict of norms between the lex sportiva of sporting succession and the public law or successions, etc. 

 

Provisions on sporting succession were first inserted into the FIFA Disciplinary Code 2019 with the effect that, whenever a sporting entity declares bankruptcy or is otherwise wound up, the notion of sporting succession applies to its unpaid financial liabilities and may be imputed to a so-called sporting successor, even if that successor is an entity legally distinct, according to the usual rules under public law, from the previous entity. Article 14 of the FIFA Disciplinary Code 2023 governs ‘failure to respect decisions,’ understood as failure to ‘pay another person (such as a player, a coach or a club) or FIFA a sum of money in full or part, even though instructed to do so by a body, a committee, a subsidiary or an instance of FIFA or a CAS decision (financial decision), or anyone who fails to comply with another final decision (non-financial decision) passed by a body, a committee, a subsidiary or an instance of FIFA, or by CAS.’ Article 21(4) extends the scope of the provision to the ‘sporting successor of a non-compliant party’ who ‘shall also be considered a non-compliant party and thus subject to the obligations under this provision. Criteria to assess whether an entity is to be considered as the sporting successor of another entity are, among others, its headquarters, name, legal form, team colours, players, shareholders or stakeholders or ownership and the category of competition concerned.’ Further provision is made in Article 21(7). In practice, this means that a club which carries on the legacy on a previous club, drawing on its cultural capital, fan base, etc., may be liable to paid unpaid debts of that previous club. These arrangements seem unusual prima facie.

 

Organs of FIFA have power to enforce these rules and to hear appeals against such decisions, while their decisions may be appealed to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) and/or to the Swiss judiciary (see Victor Piţurcă v Romanian Football Federation & U Craiova 1948 SA (CAS 2021/A/8331) (2023) as well as well as the rulings of the Federal Tribunal in the cases Youness Bengelloun (2022) and Júlio César da Silva et Souza (2022) based on Article 190 LDIP (Federal Act on Private International Law). 

 

While the concept of sporting succession offers a striking example of a provision for specificity enshrined in a sporting regulation and applied within the sports community, its pertinence under public law remains largely unaccounted for. With the (apparent) exception of one Swiss PhD thesis (Derungs, 2022), the issues which it raises seem so far to have failed to trigger the scholarship which they might deserve, especially in a comparative legal research perspective. The aim of the envisaged edited book is to explore the issue in a comparative perspective, not only across jurisdictions but also across different branches of the law. We hope in particular to receive abstracts on the following:


  • Examples from the most representative European (and possibly extra-European) countries of overlap, interplay and potential conflict of norms between the lex sportiva of sporting succession and the public law or successions, etc. Ideally, the book should include chapters from and about the biggest European countries which are most relevant to the football industry while, at the same time, it would seem crucial that the most important legal traditions (French and German civil law, common law, Nordic law) should be represented. 
  • Perspectives of players and other stakeholders.
  • Examples from other sports than football, if appropriate.
  • Examples of overlap, interplay and potential conflict of norms between the lex sportiva of sporting succession and other branches of lex sportiva, if applicable.
  • Examples of overlap, interplay and potential conflict of norms between the lex sportiva of sporting succession, on the one hand, and new developments in sports such as AI and esports, on the other.
  • If we have overlooked a meaningful nuance, please feel free to flag this in your submission and make corresponding proposals to us. 

Please send us your abstracts jointly to laura.donnellan@ul.ie and klausjacob.kornbeck@gmail.com no later than 1 October 2025. 

Reflecting on Athletes' Rights on the Road to the Olympic Games: The Unfortunate Story of Nayoka Clunis - By Saverio Paolo Spera and Jacques Blondin

Editor's note: Saverio Paolo Spera is an Italian qualified attorney-at-law. He holds an LL.M. in international business law from King’s College London. He is the co-founder of SP.IN Law, a Zurich based international sports law firm. Jacques Blondin is an Italian qualified attorney, who held different roles at FIFA, including Head of FIFA TMS and Head of FIFA Regulatory Enforcement. He is the co-founder of SP.IN Law. The Authors wish to disclaim that they have represented Ms. Nayoka Clunis before the Court of Arbitration for Sport in Lausanne in the context of the proceedings which led to the Award of 31 July 2024.

 

  

Every four years since more than a century,[1] a spectacular display of sportsmanship takes place over the course of a few weeks during the summer: the Olympic Games.[2]

         For thousands of athletes around the globe, the Olympic Games are “the pinnacle of success and the ultimate goal of athletic competition”.[3] In their quest to compete in the most important stage of their sport, they endure demanding and time-consuming efforts (often including considerable financial sacrifices). These endeavours occasionally lead to everlasting glory (the exploits of athletes of the calibre of Carl Lewis, or more recently, Usain Bolt[4] still resonate among sports’ observers), more often to a shorter gratification. Whether their gestures end up going down the sport’s history books or last the span of a few competitions, athletes are always the key actors of a magnificent event that continues to feed the imagination of generations of sports fans. 

And yet, situations may occur when athletes find themselves at the mercy of their respective federations in the selection process for the Olympic Games and, should the federations fail them (for whatever reason), face an insurmountable jurisdictional obstacle to have their voice heard by the only arbitral tribunal appointed to safeguard their rights in a swift and specialised manner: the Court of Arbitration for Sport (the “CAS”).[5]

This is the story of Nayoka Clunis, a Jamaican world class hammer throw athlete who had qualified for the Olympic Games of Paris 2024 and yet, due to no fault of her own, could not participate in the pinnacle of competitions in her sport. Though eligible in light of her world ranking, she was failed by her own federation[6] [AD1] [SPS2] and ultimately found herself in the unfortunate – but legally unescapable – vacuum whereby neither the CAS Ad Hoc Division in Paris nor the ‘regular’ CAS division in Lausanne had jurisdiction to entertain her claim.  

The aim of this paper is not to discuss whether Ms. Clunis would have had a chance to successfully prove her claims and compete in Paris had her case been heard on the merits, nor to debate about the appropriateness of a national federation’s selection process (also because Ms. Clunis never challenged it, having been eligible ‘from day one’).[7] Retracing the story of a sportswoman’s dramatic misfortune, this paper aims at providing an opportunity to reflect on how effective the safeguard of athletes’ rights in the context of the Olympic Games actually is. More...

Call for Papers - Long-term contracts in sport: The private foundations of sports law and governance - University of Inland Norway - Deadline 15 June

The University of Inland Norway and the Asser International Sports Law Centre invite the submission of abstracts for a workshop in Lillehammer on 4 and 5 December exploring the role of long-term contracts in sport and their characteristics through a variety of theoretical and methodological lenses.

Contracts play a crucial role in the world of sport, particularly long-term contracts. Contractual agreements form the foundation of transnational sports governance, SGBs are all formally the product of a specific time of contract (be it in the form of an association or corporation) often justifying the autonomy of sport and its private governance at a (more or less far) distance from the state.

Moreover, contracts establish long-term commitments between the parties involved, raising a variety of questions regarding the asymmetry in their positions, the scope of party autonomy, contractual mechanisms for addressing uncertainty, and their interaction with domestic and international mandatory regulations, among others. In short, it is impossible to fully understand the operation and limitations of transnational sports law and governance without investigating the many ways in which it is embedded in long-term contracts ruled by a variety of contract laws.

This workshop proposes to explore the role of long-term contracts in sport and their characteristics through a variety of theoretical and methodological lenses.

We welcome proposals touching on the following issues/case studies:

  • The concept of time in sport and the definition of ‘long-term’ in sport-related contracts;
  • The function of long-term contracts in transnational sports governance;
  • The function of long-term contracts in the operation of private dispute resolution mechanisms (CAS, BAT, FIFA DRC);
  • The transactional nature of long-term contracts in sport;
  • The relational nature of long-term contracts in sport;
  • The conflict between private autonomy and long-term contracts in sport;
  • The intersection between private and public in the operation of long-term contracts in sport;
  • Specific contractual arrangements, including:
    • Contracts of association and SGBs
    • Long-term (labour) contracts with athletes and coaches;
    • Contracts related to the organization of mega-sporting events, including host city contracts;
    • TV and media long-term contracts;
    • Sponsorship agreements;
    • and more.

Abstracts must be sent to Yuliya Chernykh (yuliya.chernykh@inn.no) by 15 June. 

New Training - Summer Programme on International sport and human rights - Online - 21-28 May

Since 2022, the T.M.C. Asser Instituut, in collaboration with the Centre for Sport and Human Rights, is organising the first yearly summer course on the intersection of sport and human rights. This 4th edition brings together scholars specialised in the intersection between sport and human rights with professionals working in international sport to ensure respect for human rights. We will explore contemporary human rights challenges in sports, such as the protections of human rights at mega-sporting events, access to remedy in human rights cases within the world of sport, the intersection between human rights and gender rights in international sporting competitions, and many more. 


The programme is designed to provide both deep background knowledge and actionnable insights, which will be relevant to a range of participants committed to defending human rights in international sport, including students, junior researchers, representatives of CSOs, sporting organisations, and athletes. It is structured around half days taking place online meant to accommodate as many participants as possible throughout the world. 


Check out the latest draft programme below and register HERE


Call for Papers - 20 Years of the World Anti-Doping Code in Action - ISLJ Conference 2025 - 6 & 7 November 2025


 


Call for papers

20 years of the World Anti-Doping Code in Action

International Sports Law Journal Conference 2025

Asser Institute, The Hague

6 and 7 November 2025

 

The Editors of the International Sports Law Journal (ISLJ), the Asser Institute and the Research Chair on Responsible Sport of the University of Sherbrooke invite you to submit abstracts for the ISLJ Conference on International Sports Law, which will take place on 6 and 7 November 2025 at the Asser Institute in The Hague. The ISLJ, published by Springer and T.M.C. Asser Press, is the leading academic publication in the field of international sports law and governance. The conference is a unique occasion to discuss the main legal issues affecting international sports with academics and practitioners from all around the world. 

 

The 2025 ISLJ Conference will focus on assessing the first 20 years (2004-2024) of operation of the World Anti-Doping Code (WADC) since its entry into force in 2004, while also discussing its future prospects, in light of the new version of the Code due to be adopted at the Busan Conference in December 2025 and the 10th Conference of the Parties to the International Convention against Doping in Sport, to be held in Paris from 20 to 22 October. The aim of the conference will be to take a comprehensive stock of the operation of the private-public transnational regulatory regime which emerged in the wake of the WADC.  This regime is structured around a complex network of national and global institutions engaged in anti-doping work (WADA, NADAs, IFs, accredited laboratories) and guided by an equally complex assemblage of norms located at the global (WADC and the WADA Standards), international (UNESCO Convention against Doping in Sport), regional (Council of Europe Anti-Doping Convention), and national (various national anti-doping legislations) level. This makes for a fascinating and convoluted transnational legal construct in need of being studied, analysed and criticised by scholars. 

 

Reviewing 20 years of implementation of the WADC warrants a special edition of the ISLJ Conference and of the journal, which invites scholars of all disciplines to reflect on the many questions and issues linked with it. We welcome proposals touching on the following subjects (and more): 

  • The governance of the world anti-doping regime
    • The public-private nature of this governance
    • The transparency of this governance
    • The legitimacy of this governance
    • The participatory nature of this governance
    • The role of scientific experts in this governance
  •  The normative content of the WADC and the international standards
    • The strict liability principle 
    • The privacy rights of athletes under the WADC
    • The sanctioning policy under the WADC
    • The role of the international standards in implementing the WADC
    • The compatibility of the WADC with human rights
  • The glocal implementation of the WADC
    • The role of local institutions (NADOs/Labs/NOCs) in the implementation of the WADC
    • The tension between global (WADA) and local (NADOs/Labs/NOCs) in the implementation of the WADC
    • The role of the IFs in the implementation of the WADC
    • The role of the ITA in the implementation of the WADC
    • The role of judicial bodies (national courts, disciplinary committees of IFs, CAS) and their jurisprudence in the implementation of the WADC 
  • The effectiveness of the world anti-doping regime
    • The evaluation and evolution of the effectiveness of the world anti-doping regime in preventing doping
    • The role of the media in unveiling the ineffectiveness of the world anti-doping regime
    • The role of states in hindering the effectiveness of the world anti-doping regime
    • The world anti-doping regime as a regime with a variable geometry of effectiveness
  •  The future of the world anti-doping regime: Revolution, reform or more of the same?
    • Do we need a world anti-doping regime? 
    • If we do, should it be reformed? How? 


Abstracts of 300 words and CVs should be sent no later than 1 June 2025 to a.duval@asser.nl. Selected speakers will be informed by 30 June 2025. The selected participants will be expected to submit a draft paper by 15 October 2025. Papers accepted and presented at the conference are eligible for publication in a special issue of the ISLJ subject to peer-review. The Asser Institute will provide a limited amount of travel and accommodation grants (max. 350€) to early career researchers (doctoral and post-doctoral) in need of financial support. If you wish to be considered for a grant, please indicate it in your submission.  


Zoom-In Webinar - The Aftermath of the Diarra Judgement: Towards a New FIFA Transfer System? - 20 November - 16:00-18:00 CET

On 4 October, the Court of Justice of the European Union shook the world of football with its Diarra ruling. The decision questions the compatibility of a key provision of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (RSTP) with European Union internal market law. The RSTP, and in particular its article 17, are the bedrock of football’s transfer ‘market’ and regulate the conditions for the transnational movement of players between clubs. In 2023, based on FIFA’s numbers, 21 801 players were transferred internationally (of which 3279 with a fee) for transfer fees amounting to USD 9.63 bn. In short, this is a market that affects a considerable number of players and is linked with the movement of large sums of money between clubs and other actors (such as intermediaries).

Register HERE

Join us on 20 November from 16:00 to 18:00 CET to take stock of the ruling's impact and discuss the steps ahead in a free Zoom-In webinar in which there will be time for a Q&A session with the speakers. The ruling has already been much commented on (see hereherehere, and here), and this zoom-in webinar will be an opportunity for participants to engage with two experts on the economic and legal intricacies of the regulation of labour relations in football. We will mostly focus on the aftermath of the judgment and the question, 'what comes next?'

Moderator: Marjolaine Viret (Université de Lausanne)

Speakers: 


Register HERE

Asser International Sports Law Blog | [Video] Diversity at the Court of Arbitration for Sport: Time for a Changing of the Guard? - Zoom In Webinar - 14 October 2021

Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

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Asser International Sports Law Blog | The entitlement to Training Compensation of “previous” clubs under EU Competition Law. By Josep F. Vandellos Alamilla

Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

The entitlement to Training Compensation of “previous” clubs under EU Competition Law. By Josep F. Vandellos Alamilla

Editor’s note: Josep F. Vandellos is an international sports lawyer associated to RH&C (Spain). He is also a member of the Editorial Board of the publication Football Legal and a guest lecturer in the ISDE-FC Barcelona Masters’ Degree in Sports Management and Legal Skills.


Article 6 of Annexe IV (Training compensation) of the FIFA-RSTP (Ed. 2016) contains the so-called “Special Provisions for the EU/EEA” applicable to players moving from one association to another inside the territory of the European Union (EU) or the European Economic Area (EEA).
The provisions regarding training compensation result from the understanding reached between FIFA and UEFA with the European Union in March 2001[1], and subsequent modifications introduced in the FIFA-RSTP revised version of 2005 to ensure the compatibility of the transfer system with EU law.[2]
This blog will focus on the exception contained in article 6(3) Annexe IV of the FIFA-RSTP. According to this article, when “the former club” fails to offer a contract to the player, it loses its right to claim training compensation from the players’ new club, unless it can justify that it is entitled to such compensation. Instead, the right of “previous clubs” to training compensation is fully preserved irrespective of their behaviour with the player.[3] From a legal standpoint, such discrimination between the “former club” and the “previous clubs” raises some questions that I will try to address in this paper.
For that purpose, the author will depart from the restrictive interpretation of article 6(3) adopted by the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber (DRC) and continue with a substantive assessment of the rule, firstly by looking at its purposive aim and secondly, by evidencing the potential negative impact on players’ mobility and its inherent anticompetitive effects. 

A. Article 6(3) Annexe IV of the FIFA-RSTP (Ed. 2016)

Article 6(3) of the FIFA-RSTP reads as follows: “3. If the former club does not offer the player a contract, no training compensation is payable unless the former club can justify that it is entitled to such compensation. The former club must offer the player a contract in writing via registered post at least 60 days before the expiry of his current contract. Such an offer shall furthermore be at least of an equivalent value to the current contract. This provision is without prejudice to the right to training compensation of the player’s previous club(s).”[4]
In summary, as a general rule, the former club of the player loses its right to claim training compensation if it fails to offer the player a contract in the terms described by the article, or cannot demonstrate a legitimate interest.
So far, the DRC has been consistent in interpreting that the obligation to offer the player a contract lies exclusively with the former club of the player as opposed to the previous clubs. In other words, the previous club is entitled to ask for training compensation when the player signs the first professional contract[5] no matter whether they offered the player a contract or showed bona fide interest in retaining him.
At first glance, this rigid interpretation might appear controversial in light of the more pragmatic approach towards the formal requirements of article 6(3) adopted in the CAS award 2009/A/1757 between MTK Budapest v. FC Internazionale Milano SpA[6]. In this case, in order to conclude that MTK Budapest was still entitled to request training compensation despite not having offered the player a contract in the terms indicated in the regulation, the adjudicating Panel emphasized that “[the] aims of sporting justice shall not be defeated by an overly formalistic interpretation of the FIFA Regulations which would deviate from their original intended purpose”.[7]
The DRC has thus systematically admitted claims of previous clubs against clubs that have registered professional players for the first time (e.g. DRC decision of 17 May 2016[8]) without delving into whether such clubs are indeed entitled to training compensation or not.
In an attempt to defy such dogmatic approach to the issue, I question whether the different references made in Annexe IV of the FIFA RSTP to the “former club[9] could and should instead be interpreted more extensively, so as to include all former clubs (thus including previous clubs) where a player has been registered. Firstly, by having a look at the systematic context of the rule and its purposive interpretation[10], and secondly, by taking into consideration the potential competitive disadvantages between European clubs resulting from the regulation.
As to the rationale of the rule, the FIFA DRC jurisprudence (vid. e.g. DRC Decision of 27 April 2006 ref. no. 461185[11]) indicates that “the spirit of and purpose of article 6 para 3 of Annexe 4 of the RSTP, 2016 edition, is to penalise clubs which are obviously not interested in the players’ services as a professional, no matter if the club would have to offer the player an employment contract for the first time or a renewal due to the expiry of an already existing contract.”[12]
It appears therefore, contrary to the spirit of the rule that a club that has shown no interest in keeping the player as a professional, a roster or for its academy, can at a later stage request to be rewarded for the training of that player, irrespective of whether it was the former club, strictly speaking, or the former former club, so to speak (i.e. the previous club in the RSTP exact wording).
One could easily argue at this point, and I would subscribe to it, that at very young ages it is either legally prohibited for training clubs to offer a contract, or unreasonable to require clubs to offer contracts to all its players in order to safeguard their potential right to training compensation.  This was highlighted by the CAS Panel in the CAS award 2006/A/1152 ADO Den Haag v. Newcastle United FC[13] which was the appeal against the above cited DRC Decision of 27 April 2006.
However, nothing prevents training clubs to at least show a genuine interest in retaining the player as an amateur by formally offering him to continue training with them or even through a simple positive evaluation of the player. In order to alleviate the unreasonable burden that such obligation would suppose on training clubs, a solution could be to require the genuine interest at least, for players as from the season of their 16th birthday. This would coincide with the age when in most EU countries players are legally allowed to sign employment contracts, and form a strict sportive perspective, the age from when training compensation is calculated in full according to article 5(3) of Annexe IV.
The final reference in article 6(3) (i.e. “This provision is without prejudice to the right to training compensation of the players’ previous club(s)”) helps to ground this interpretation. It is difficult to justify from a legal standpoint, why previous clubs should be exempted (as they, in fact, are) from observing the same rules and obligations as the former clubs, especially considering the principle of free movement of workers in the EU. The right to claim training compensation is, being redundant, “without prejudice to the right (…) of the players’ previous club(s)”. Previous clubs should therefore, demonstrate as well their entitlement to training compensation by evidencing a genuine interest in the player, such as former clubs do. 
To illustrate the situation, consider the case were an EU football club omits to offer one of its players (e.g. 18 years old) a professional contract in the terms of article 6(3) of Annexe IV, and that player further registers as an amateur with another EU club for one season. That second club also fails to offer the player (now 19 years old) a professional contract. After two seasons as an amateur, the player, finally signs a professional contract with a third EU club at the age of 20 years. The current interpretation of the exception leads to conclude that the first club, which failed to offer the player a professional contract, perhaps because he was simply not sufficiently interesting to retain, would now be reinstated in the right to claim training compensation, while the former club, under identical circumstances and reasons would be deprived from it.
Within those parameters, de lege ferenda the exception of article 6(3) could reasonably be extended to those previous clubs that failed to show the so-called bona fide interest. This way, by failing to show real interest in keeping a player, the previous clubs would be also prevented from asking training compensation upon the first registration of the player as a professional, to the same extend as the former club when it fails to offer the player a contract, in the terms indicated by the exception.
Turning now the attention, to EU law, the conclusions on why article 6(3) Annexe 4 current interpretation seems unfair and should be reformulated, point towards the same direction. 
 

B. Article 6(3) Annexe IV of the FIFA RSTP and EU competition law

The Bosman ruling and its most recent successor, the Bernard ruling, stand out as constant reminders that EU Law applies to the realm of European club football insofar as it constitutes an economic activity in the sense of Article 2 of the Treaty.[14] It is nowadays unarguable that football is a real economic activity and that the regulations adopted by its governing bodies must respect EU Law as long as they apply in the territory of the EU, or in case the player concerned has a European passport and is transferring to an EU Member State. Only rules which are “inherent to sport” such as the rules of the game, and other “practices likely to be exempted” meaning, those activities not necessarily linked to sport but which are worth of protection, could potentially fall outside the remit of EU competition law (the sporting exception) as pointed out by the “Helsinki Report on Sport” in 1999. However, the decision in the Meca-Medina case went even further, overcoming the traditional distinction between rules of purely sporting nature from others, to determine that rules cannot be of purely sporting nature when they have economic repercussions, and consequently, making it possible to explore new legal avenues to test regulations that in principle may seem outside the scope of EU competition law (such as the doping regulations in Meca-Medina).
According to Bosman[15] and Bernard, training compensation is a practice worth of protection, but it is undeniable that its rules have strong economic implications, for they are expressly meant to financially reward[16] football clubs involved in the training and education of players when these move to other clubs. For that reason, they fall under the remit of EU Law.
The legitimate aim of the training compensation system is also embraced by legal scholars. For example, while delving into the aftermath of the Bosman case and the agreement reached between FIFA and the EU Commission in 2001, S. Weatherill remarked that “(…). Sport has special features that deserve respect. In accordance with Bosman, it should be regarded as legally permissible for football to devise an internal taxation system to transfer money into the hands of nursery clubs, as part of a scheme for sustaining a larger number of clubs than would survive in ‘pure’ market conditions and to diminish gaps in economic strength between clubs.”[17]
However, it is my firm belief that Annexe IV of the FIFA RSTP has in many ways gone beyond the indications in Bosman, the Helsinki Report[18] and later in Bernard. In this last case, the Court referred to a system meant to compensate[19] and not reward training; and it is precisely that difference regarding the foundations of the system implemented by FIFA that leads to disproportionate results when the amounts to pay as training compensation are superior to the real costs incurred by the training clubs.[20]
All these issues jeopardize free mobility within the EU[21], for they restrict the chances of clubs to recruit players, and have an impact on the commercial relations between clubs and players in the sense of Article 101. By way of example, a Romanian football club registering a 21-year old player trained in Romania as a professional for the first time, would end up paying the training club a significantly lower amount of training compensation than a Hungarian club of the same category, wishing to sign that same player. The reason for that is that whilst in the first scenario the Romanian club would be subject to the internal training compensation mechanism; in the second scenario, the Hungarian club would be subject to the FIFA regulations that impose higher training compensations.
With these premises in mind, the testing of article 6(3) Annexe IV of the FIFA RSTP under EU competition law seems appropriate, although the application of EU competition law in this type of cases will probably remain an exception.[22]
In short, Article 101 TFEU[23] prohibits agreements, decisions of associations and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion within the internal market.[24] Saskia King, explaining the so-called “objective criterion”[25], has highlighted that “when determining whether an agreement restricts competition under Article 101(1) TFEU, ‘object’ expresses a true alternative to ‘effect’ and as such requires separate consideration”. Therefore, if the object of the agreement is anticompetitive, there is no need to look behind the effects.
A primary aspect of competition law is the identification of the relevant market where a possible anticompetitive practice takes place. In the present context, the relevant market is the transfer market of football players, that is, the market on which the offer and supply of players meets and clubs compete against each other to recruit the best players.[26] Geographically speaking, the market is limited to the territory of the Member States of the EU.
Assuming also, that the FIFA RSTP (ed. 2016) qualifies as a “decision by an association of undertakings[27] and that the rules of training compensation have an appreciable affect in trade between Member States[28] since any change of clubs for players under the age of 23 requires the payment of a training compensation[29]; the questions left to answer are therefore, whether or not article 6(3) of Annexe IV of the FIFA-RSTP (Ed. 2016), in its current formulation is (1) likely to prevent, restrict or distort competition in the EU transfer market of football players under Article 101(1) TFEU and more importantly, (2) whether the restrictive effects are proportionate and “[reasonably] necessary for the organization and proper conduct of sport?”[30]
As to the first question, it is my view that both the object and the effects produced by, article 6(3) restrict and distort competition between clubs, for they discriminate former clubs vis-à-vis previous clubs with regard to their right to claim training compensation. Additionally, the compensation limits the ability of clubs to take on players acting as free agent.
As to the second question, the Meca-Medina case –though in a different context[31]- offered valuable guidance to test the compatibility of rules of sports associations with EU competition law: “42. Not every agreement between undertakings or every decision of an association of undertakings which restricts the freedom of action of the parties or of one of them necessarily falls within the prohibition laid down in Article 81(1) EC. For the purposes of application of that provision to a particular case, account must first of all be taken of the overall context in which the decision of the association of undertakings was taken or produces its effects and, more specifically, of its objectives. It has then to be considered whether the consequential effects restrictive of competition are inherent in the pursuit of those objectives (Wouters and Others, paragraph 97) and are proportionate to them.”
Following the Meca-Medina reasoning, and focusing on the rationale behind article 6(3) Annexe IV, in the CAS award 2006/A/1152 ADO Den Haag v. Newcastle United FC, the CAS Panel corrected the view of the original DRC decision of 27 April 2006. Specifically, it remarked that the aim of the rule is “to ensure that no player, whether amateur or professional, in whom the training club has no interest, is impeded to accept the offer of another club because he carries some sort of ‘compensation price tag”[32] rather than to penalize clubs failing to offer a contract to their amateur players. The unquestionably legitimate goal of “the exception to the exception” - as the Panel calls article 6(3) - is thus to limit the obstacles to the free mobility of players aforementioned.
However, as to “whether the consequential effects restrictive of competition are inherent in the pursuit of those objectives and are proportionate to them” there cannot be a positive answer. To me it is doubtful whether the anticompetitive effects produced by establishing different conditions between former clubs and previous clubs are inherent or a necessary consequence to ensure the objective of rule (i.e. contributing to free mobility). I believe the contrary to be true. (i.e. uently,conditions ctive of the rule, tt of EU Law. by scholars.r compensation. in the application of such principle. nsatI bI be The effects generated by the current interpretation of article 6(3) collide with the aim of the rule (i.e. protecting free mobility), for reinstating previous clubs in their rights to claim training compensation irrespective of their behaviour vis-à-vis the player, compromises free movement within the EU and creates unfair competitive advantages for previous clubs.
In conclusion, my suggestion is to rethink, the current formulation of article 6(3) (if not the entire training compensation system) and correct its detrimental effects by preventing all previous clubs that fail to offer players a professional contract or to show bona fide interest as from the season in which a player turns 16 years old from requesting training compensation. It is certainly not the role of the CAS to do so, but the responsibility of the EU Commission to take an active lead to ensure full compliance of football regulations with EU law. 



[1] See FIFA Executive Committee, “Commentary on the Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players”, Annex 4 (29 June 2005) at page 124.

[2] European Commission Press Release of 5 March 2001, “Outcome of discussions between the Commission and FIFA/UEFA on FIFA Regulations on international football transfers”.

[3] A bona fide and genuine interest in keeping the player must be demonstrated before the DRC cf. Arbitration CAS award 2009/A/1757 MTK Budapest v. FC Internazionale Milano S.p.A., award of 30 July 2009.

[4] FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, article 6(3) Annexe IV.

[5] In cases of subsequent transfer, the club entitled to claim training compensation will always be the “former club”.

[6]“17. As noted earlier, it is the 2005 Regulations which apply in the present case. At the same time, however, FIFA itself has clarified that the aim of the revisions introduced in 2005 was simply to “facilitate the evidence of a contract offer being made”. In its Decision, the DRC stated that “...when revising the Regulations it was decided to integrate in the 2005 edition of the Regulations some formal preconditions in order to facilitate the evidence that a contract offer was effectively made...This is the actual aim of the relevant formalities”. Consequently, the Panel does not interpret the 2005 revisions to the Regulations as constituting a substantive or material alteration to the 2001 regulatory regime because, as FIFA has said, the changes introduced related only to matters of form, and not of substance.”

[7] See para. 31 of the award. Although, the transfer structure used in this case could qualify as a bridge transfer used for the purpose of circumventing the FIFA regulations on transfer compensation.

[8] Decision of the Single Judge of the Sub-committee of the DRC case Budapest Honved FC (Hungary) v. AFC ASA 2013 Targu Mures (Romania) ref. TMS 243. Unpublished.

[9] See also FIFA RSTP, article 2 para. 2 of Annex IV.

[10] See the CAS award 2007/A/1363 TTF Liebherr Ochsenhausen v/ETTU, award of 5 October 2007 para 12 page 8: “10. By interpreting rules and regulations of associations, the starting point and the predominant element of construction is the wording (literal interpretation). Other elements such as the systematic context, the purpose and the history of the rule may contribute to the correct understanding of the meaning of the rule. This principle is accepted in both civil and common law and it has been constantly applied by CAS panels. It is also embedded in the law of Luxembourg (see, e.g., Art. 1156 of the Code Civil of Luxembourg) and the parties have not argued otherwise.” Emphasis added.

[11] Decision not published.

[12] De Weger, The Jurisprudence of the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber, Asser Press, 2nd Edition, 2016. Page 401.

[13] See para. 22 of the CAS award 2006/A/1152 ADO Den Haag v. Newcastle United FC, award of 7 February 2007.

[14] See also Case 36/74, Walrave and Koch v UCI, ECLI:EU:C:1974:140.

[15] Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association and Others v Bosman and Others, ECLI:EU:C:1995:463, paras. 106-110.

[16] See FIFA Executive Committee, “Commentary on the Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players”, article 1(2) and Annex 4 para. 1 (Objectives), page 112.

[17] S. Weatherill, European Sports Law Collected Papers, Asser Press, 2nd Edition (2014), pages 218 and 219.

[18] See Report from the Commission to the European Council of 10 December 1999 with a view to safeguarding current sports structures and maintaining the social function of sport within the Community framework – The Helsinki Report on Sport - para. 4.2.1.3: The Report refers to a system of objectively calculated payments that are related to the costs of training.

[19] Case C-325/08, Olympique Lyonnais SASP v Olivier Bernard and Newcastle UFC, ECLI:EU:C:2010:143, paras. 44 and 45.

[20] As an example of this disproportionality, a simple comparison between the training costs established for Cat. III UEFA clubs (30.000 Euro per) with the training costs established for internal transfers by the Romanian Football Football Federation (5.000 RON per year equivalent to 1.107 Euro).

[21] Training compensation rules were recently tested against EU law, and in particular with regard to the freedom of movement of workers, by TAS-CAS in the Riverola case (CAS award 2014/A/Bologna FC 1909 SpA v. FC Barcelona). The award is not public, but a full comment and legal analysis is published in: Luca Smacchia, “The Riverola case: how the enforcement of FIFA rules may restrict the freedom of movement for workers within the EU”, Football Legal, #5 (June 2016), pages 20-24.

[22] See e.g. Ben Van Rompuy, “Sport and EU Competition Law: New developments and unfinished business”, Asser International Sports Law Blog (22 May 2015).

[23] Article 101 TFEU: “The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market: all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market, and in particular those which: (…) (d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;”

[24]The distinction between "restrictions by object" and "restrictions by effect" arises from the fact that certain forms of collusion between undertakings can be regarded, by their very nature, as being injurious to the proper functioning of normal competition.” - Commission Staff Working Document of 25 June 2014, Guidance on restrictions of competition “by object” for the purpose of defining which agreements may benefit from the De Minimis Notice, page 3.

[25] Saskia King, “Agreements that restrict competition by object under Article 101 (1) TFEU: Past, present and future”, PhD Thesis – The London School of Economics and Political Science (2015), Page 28.

[26] “The combined investment of summer and winter transfer windows in the top five European leagues was almost €3.4 billion. That was up by 29 per cent versus last season and again a record high ever.” - Soccerex Transfer Review Winter Edition 2016, Prime Time Sport, page 4.

[27] See, for example, Case T-193/02, Piau v. Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2005:22, para. 69: “As regards, first, the concept of an association of undertakings, and without it being necessary to rule on the admissibility of the arguments put forward by an intervener which go against the claims made by the party in support of which it is intervening, it is common ground that FIFA's members are national associations, which are groupings of football clubs for which the practice of football is an economic activity. These football clubs are therefore undertakings within the meaning of Article 81 EC and the national associations grouping them together are associations of undertakings within the meaning of that provision.”

[28] For an in-depth economic data analysis see, e.g., FIFA T.M.S., Global Transfer Market 2012 Highlights, pages 14 and 15 – Overall Market Activity - and pages 23 and 24 - Player Age.

[29] David Nilsson, “The Revised FIFA Regulations for the Status and Transfers of Players’ Compatibility with EU competition law – the Transfer System revised”. Master Thesis. Faculty of Law - University of Lund, (September 2006).

[30] Supra, 30.

[31] Doping rules under EU competition law.

[32] See para. 20 page 7 of the award: The Panel does not share the DRC’s view that the purpose of the first sentence of Article 6 para. 3 is to penalise clubs which do not offer professional terms to their amateur players. Rather, in the Panel’s opinion, the purpose of the above provision is to ensure that no player, whether amateur or professional, in whom the training club has no interest is impeded to accept the offer of another club because he carries some sort of “compensation price tag”.

 

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