Editor's note: Laura Donnellan is a lecturer at University of Limerick. You can find her latest publications here.

Introduction

On Tuesday the 12^th of April, João Carvalho passed away in the Beaumont Hospital after sustaining serious injuries from a mixed martial arts (MMA) event in Dublin on the previous Saturday. The fighter was knocked out in the third round of a welterweight fight against Charlie Ward. Aside from the tragic loss of life, the death of Carvalho raises a number of interesting legal issues. This opinion piece will discuss the possible civil and criminal liability that may result from the untimely death of the Portuguese fighter.

It is important to note at the outset that MMA has few rules and permits wrestling holds, punching, marital arts throws and kicking. MMA appears to have little regulation and a lack of universally accepted, standardised rules. There is no international federation or governing body that regulates MMA. It is largely self-regulated. MMA is not recognised under the sports and governing bodies listed by Sport Ireland, the statutory body established by the Sport Ireland Act 2015 which replaced the Irish Sports Council. MMA is considered a properly constituted sport so long as the rules and regulations are adhered to, there are appropriate safety procedures, the rules are enforced by independent referees, and it appropriately administered.

The Acting Minister for Sport, Michael Ring, has called for the regulation of MMA. Currently there are no minimum requirements when it comes to medical personnel; nor are there any particular requirements as to training of medical personnel. The promoter decides how many doctors and paramedics are to be stationed at events. In February 2014 Minister Ring wrote to 17 MMA promoters in Ireland requesting that they implement safety precautions in line with those used by other sports including boxing and rugby.

Despite this lack of regulation, this does not exempt MMA from legal liability as the discussion below demonstrates.

Legal Issues-Civil Liability

The death of Carvalho may expose those involved in the event and the organisation of the sport to liability for lack of due care. Although case law is limited in Ireland, English case law has demonstrated that sports governing bodies, referees and coaches may incur civil liability. The referee in the fight involving Carvalho and Ward could be subject to civil liability if it is found that he failed to stop the fight at the appropriate time, a claim that the referee vehemently refutes. Referees have been held to owe a duty of care to participants. The role of the referee is not just to enforce the rules of the game to ensure fair play but also to ensure that the sport is played according to the rules for the safety of the participants. In the case of English case of Smolden v Whitworth and Nolan ([1997] E.L.R. 249  [1997] P.I.Q.R. P133), the plaintiff successfully sued the referee for injuries sustained as a result of a collapsed scrum in game involving underage rugby players.

With regard to governing bodies, a court may find them liable for negligence due to the fact that they have advance planning for events or the organisation of a sport. Under the “deep pocket theory”, the governing body will be viewed as the more attractive target for a claim of negligence as it will have more money to pay in damages. Total Extreme Fighting organises events in order to promote amateur and professional MMA in Ireland. The Irish Amateur Pankration Association (IAPA), a body established in 2014, is the Irish body that is affiliated to the International Mixed Martial Arts Federation. The IAPA is also affiliated to the Irish Amateur Wrestling Association (IAWA) (which according to the IAPA Facebook page, is affiliated “for its lighter Amateur training and activities (Pankration), which form part of its progressional pathway for participants”). However, the IAWA is a recognised sports governing body and receives direct from the Department of Transport, Tourism and Sport and indirect state funding through the auspices of Sport Ireland.  Sport Ireland exercises quasi-governmental regulation. It provides funding and support to recognised sports governing bodies.

A case that is instructive is the English case of Watson v British Boxing Board of Control ([2001] 2 WLR 1256), the British Boxing Board of Control (BBBC) was held liable for the injuries sustained by Michael Watson.  The referee stopped the fight in the final round when Watson appeared to be unable to defend himself. Watson had sustained a brain haemorrhage and, after returning to his corner, he lapsed into unconsciousness on his stool. Disorder among the crowd ensured and Watson’s trainer suddenly realised that he was unconscious. It took seven minutes for the doctor to arrive to the ring and a further 25-30 minutes before Watson arrived at the hospital. By the time Watson arrived at the hospital, he had sustained serious brain damage. He suffered a subdural haemorrhage which left him paralysed down the left side and with other physical and mental disability. The BBBC argued that it did not owe Watson a duty of care. The BBBC further argued that had the necessary medical equipment and personnel been there on time it would not have made any difference given the nature of the injuries sustained. The BBBC is a limited liability company and is the sole controlling body that regulates boxing in the UK.  All fighters, clubs, agents, match-makers and any person involved in the sport of boxing must obtain a licence from the BBBC. Although the BBBC was not directly involved in the fight (i.e. there was no contractual involvement), it was held to be negligent in not providing immediate resuscitation at the ring side. As the BBBC had sanctioned the fight, the court held that to be sufficient proximity between Watson and the BBBC. In drawing parallels between IAPA, Total Extreme Fighting and the BBBC, a claim for negligence could arise.

In addition to potential liability for a lack of due care, there is a possibility of criminal liability arising. When an individual plays a contact sport, it is reasonable foreseeable that he or she will sustain an injury, as contact sports by their very nature involve contact between the players. Individuals consent to inherent risks that are associated with the sport. However, there are limits to what an individual can consent to. If a sports person deliberately and recklessly disregards the rules of the sport and intentionally goes beyond the limits of that sport, the criminal law may be invoked. A sports person may be charged with manslaughter if the opponent dies as a result of their actions. It would be very unlikely that a sportsperson would be charged with murder as it would require premeditation. Even in a sport like MMA, a participant consents to injuries that are within the rules of the sport, that incidental to the playing of the game by the rules and those which are part of the playing culture, something outside the rules but it has become an accepted part of the sport. If the injuries sustained go beyond what the participant consented to, the opponent could be charged with assault. It is to the issue of criminal liability that the opinion piece now turns.

Legal Issues-Criminal Liability

In Ireland, the Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act 1997 governs assault. Section 2 defines assault as the actual carrying out or threat of reckless or intentional, direct or indirect application of force or causes an impact on the body of another without the consent of the person. Section 3 concerns “assault causing harm” with consent being absent. Section 4 relates to assault “causing serious harm”. Serious harm is defined as “injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious disfigurement or substantial loss or impairment of the mobility of the body as a whole or of the function of any particular bodily member or organ” (section 1). Section 4 does not include the provision consent being absent as it does under sections 2 and 3. However, it is extremely doubtful that the defence of consent could be invoked under Section 4 as the offender, if found guilty of the offence, could face life imprisonment. Section 22 (1) provides the following: “the provisions of this Act have effect subject to any enactment or rule of law providing a defence, or providing lawful authority, justification or excuse for an act or omission”. Section 22 retains the basic common law rule that consent cannot be an absolute defence to all forms of assault (F McAuley, P McCutcheon, Criminal Liability (Dublin: Round Hall Sweet & Maxwell, 2000), 533).

Mixed Martial Arts are in a precarious legal position. While there are MMA clubs in Ireland, these clubs are not illegal per se, but they derive their legal status from boxing, which is defined in negative terms. Boxing is legal because it is not prize-fighting as prize-fighting caused a breach of the peace. In order to understand the contemporary position of boxing and by extension MMA, it is necessary to examine its origins. Prize fighting and bare-knuckle fighting were not devoid of rules but lacked a uniform set of principles (A formal roped-off section was rarely used, often the ground would be marked with chalk, there was no such thing as rounds and there was no limit on the duration of the fight. See J Anderson, The Legality of Boxing: A Punch Drunk Love (OXON: Birkbridge Law Press, 2007), 15). Prize fighting, as the name suggests, concerned a pecuniary reward to the fighter who had physically overcome his opponent. In 1743 the Broughton Rules were introduced, which became the sport’s first uniform set of rules. The Broughton Rules, while welcomed at first, proved to be inadequate. In 1865 the Queensbury Rules were introduced by the eighth Marquis of Queensbury. Under these rules there would be no wresting or hugging permitted, rounds would be three minutes in length, and one minute’s time between rounds, the ring would be twenty-four feet, gloves of the best quality would be worn and if a glove burst or came off it would be replaced to the referee’s satisfaction (Anderson, 28) Gunn and Ormerod (‘The Legality of Boxing’ in Greenfield and Osborn (eds) Law and Sport in Contemporary Society (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 23) refer to the legal recognition of boxing as being by “default rather than design”. In the nineteenth century, prize fighting became increasingly associated with breaches of the peace. A number of cases came before the courts, which presented the courts with an opportunity to outlaw prize fighting. While prize fighting was banned, a tamer version of the sport, namely boxing, gained judicial acceptance. Boxers differed from their prize fighting counterparts as boxers wore padded gloves and the fight was held in private.

As prize fighters began to wear gloves, the distinction between boxing (sparring) and prize fighting became quite blurred. The courts distinguished between sparring matches and prize fighting on the basis of the likelihood of one of the fighters suffering serious injury (Gunn and Ormerod, at p.24). The courts, finding it difficult to distinguish the two, decided to leave the issue to the jury. In R v Orton (14 Cox CC 226; (1878) 39 LT 293), the court held (at 294) if a fight were a mere exhibition of skill in sparring it was not unlawful, however, if the combatants had met intending to fight until one gave into exhaustion or injury he had received it was a breach of the peace and thus unlawful irrespective of whether the fighters wore gloves.  In R v Young (8 C. & P. 644; (1866) 10 Cox CC 371), a boxer faced charges for the manslaughter of an opponent during an indoor sparring match. Bramwell J (at 373) instructed the jury as follows: “If a death ensued from a fight, independently of it taking place for money, it would be manslaughter, because a fight was a dangerous thing and likely to kill; but the medical witness here stated that this sparring was not dangerous, and not a thing likely to kill”.

In the leading case of R v Coney ((1882) 8 QBD 534), the court established that prize fighting was illegal as it caused a breach of peace. The court did not hold boxing or sparring legal, but declared prize fighting illegal.  The Court of Appeal declared prize fighting illegal as it encouraged a breach of the peace and gambling. The dangerous nature of the sport seemed to be secondary consideration. Judges Stephen and Matthew were the only judges that seemed concerned about the degree of harm inflicted on a combatant during a fight. Stephen J (at 549) held prize fighting to be not only injurious to the public but also the fighters themselves. 

Boxing is a legal and recognised sport.  As a recognised sport, the law provides it with significant protection. If a fight took place in the street, it would be considered illegal as a breach of the peace and charges under the Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act, 1997 may ensue.  In the fight that takes place on the street, the combatants could be consenting, they are both adults with capacity to consent, yet their actions are deemed illegal. However, an organised boxing match is legal because boxing is a recognised sport.  The fight in the street would be deemed to cause a breach of the peace. The national governing body for amateur boxing in Ireland is the Irish Amateur Boxing Association (IABA). All local boxing clubs are affiliated to the IABA. Professional boxing is regulated by the Professional Boxing Union of Ireland, which is affiliated to the European Boxing Union, the World Boxing Union and the World Boxing Association.  What distinguishes the example of the two consenting adults settling their differences by fighting out in the street is the fact that a recognised boxing match has rules which must be followed. There is a referee, there are safety measures in place, and the pugilists wear padded gloves.  Rules are devised for sports to ensure fairness and uniformity but they also are devised in a way to ensure that the likelihood of participants being injured is minimised. However, the legality of boxing has long been debated. Over the years there have been calls to declare it illegal. Boxing remains a sport due to its popularity and there is a public interest in it continuing as a lawful sport.

The Law Reform Commission Report on Non-Fatal Offences and its application to Sport

The 1997 Act was largely based on the recommendations of a Law Reform Commission (LRC) Report from 1994 (LRC-45–1994). The Report examined the position of contact sport in Chapter 9. The 1997 Act did not include any of the recommendations relation to sport. The Report acknowledged that contact sports, by their very nature, entail violent conduct. In a fast paced match tempers rise and subsequently rules are broken (para.9.148, at p.272). In professional sports violent conduct is often penalised in the form of a fine or suspension. For the most part, the civil law will provide an injured player with compensation. Quoting from the Canadian Law Reform Commission’s Working Paper, the LRC proposed that the criminal law should be used as a “policeman” of last resort or as an “enforcer” (para.9.148, at p.272) The LRC recommended that no general exemption should be given to contact sports where the victim does not expressly or impliedly consent to the infliction of injury (para.9.149, at p.271).

The LRC summarised the situations in which a person is said to have consented in a contact sport: 

1.              to any contact within the rules of the game;

2.              to any contact of an accidental nature arising from incidentally in the course of it; and

3.              to incidental pain to the risk of hurt or injury from such contact (para.9.152, at p.273). 

In giving the example of a footballer, a footballer impliedly consents to be tackled, to being kicked accidentally and to the risk of being injured, but a footballer does not consent to being punched or kicked (para. 9.153, at p.273). As most sports do not authorise intentional or reckless tackles or injury, there should be no exemption given to contact sports. If a player does not have the requisite intent or recklessness and the contact is within the rules of the sport, it is irrelevant that the force used was likely to cause injury.

The LRC acknowledged that it is very difficult if not impossible to ascertain whether a contact is intentional or reckless. The courts, when faced with a sporting case, often refer to the standards of the particular sport in deciding whether or not the conduct is acceptable (para.9.154, at p.274). Such an approach is understandable given that “sports produce valuable social benefits through the practice and example of fair play within an agreed set of rules” (para.9.154, at p.274).

In reference to the amateur nature of Irish sport, the LRC noted that rules of most sports place reasonable limits on the degree of violence which may be consented. Consequently, the LRC concluded that no specific penalties should be devised for sporting violence (para.9.157, at p.274).

It was also concluded that boxing should not be signalled out for exemption. The LRC proffered that any proposed changes to the rules of the sport is a matter for the relevant regulatory sports body in according with public debate and medical evidence (para.9.157, at p.274).

In the absence of any statutory intervention, the LRC concluded that the criminal law would continue to apply in situations where the rules of the sport are breached. It did, however, note its limitations (para.9.158, at pp.275-275). At the time of the LRC Report MMA had just been resurrected by the Ultimate Fighting Championship (UFC) which was founded in 1993. It is interesting that the LRC referred to martial arts which are lawfully recognised sports. The LRC gave the following example: In some martial arts, a serious injury may result from a kick which is within the rules of the sport. Failure to prosecute and attempts to prosecute would both attract public debate. It would seem unjust to hold the opponent criminally liable for conduct that is part of the rules of the sport. The victim had also consented to the risk. Public opinion may call for sports that can cause serious injury, including professional boxing, to be declared unlawful. The LRC recommended that a specific provision be made for consent to injuries inflicted in the course of, and in accordance with the rules of a lawful sporting activity. It summed up its position as follows:               

“Every person is protected from criminal responsibility for causing harm or serious harm to another where such harm is inflicted during the course of, and in accordance with the rules of any bona fide sporting activity” (para.9.159, at p.275)

The above summation could be applied to Charlie Ward, who won the fight against Carvalho. Another factor to consider is that Carvalho consented to the risk of being seriously injured or to a substantial risk of death as defined by section 4 of the Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act 1997.

The Legality of Mixed Martial Arts

Mixed martial arts (MMA) are hybrid sports in that they combine traditional martial arts sports with non-traditional ones. MMA is an ancient sport, however, its modern inception dates back to 1993 when the Ultimate Fighting Championship (UFC) was founded. As noted above, MMA is largely self-regulated and it has no international federation or governing body that regulates the sport.

In Ireland, the traditional martial arts (including Aikido, Kickboxing, Tae Kwon Do, Karate, Sumo, Kung Fu, Jiu Jitsu, Tai Chi, Muaythai, Ninjitsu and Bujitsu) are governed by the Irish Martial Arts Commission (IMAC). IMAC, as a recognised national governing body, receives funding from Sport Ireland. MMA is not recognised under the sports and governing bodies listed by Sport Ireland. MMA is considered a properly constituted sport so long as the rules and regulations are adhered to, there are appropriate safety procedures, the rules are enforced by independent referees, and it appropriately administered. If these criteria are followed, then MMA will be “at least as safe as boxing as it places so much less emphasis on blows to the head that so concern the British Medical Association” (M James, Sports Law (2^nd ed.) (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013), 155).

Concluding Remarks

The death of João Carvalho has brought to the fore a plethora of legal issues. The Acting Minister for Sport, Michael Ring, has called for the regulation of MMA. It has taken a fatality for the state to intervene. Currently there are no minimum requirements when it comes to medical personnel present at events nor are there any particular requirements as to training of medical personnel. The promoter decides how many doctors and paramedics are to be stationed at events but that can vary from one to three. While some have called for the banning of MMA, this may only serve to send the sport underground and have even less safety precautions than present. Also, the issue of consent must be considered. If consenting adults decide to partake in such a sport and are aware of the dangers, then arguably on the grounds of civil liberties such individuals should be permitted to engage in MMA. The most prudent action at the moment would be to reform the sport and for the state to require high standards of health and safety at events.

While MMA could be referred to as a form of licenced thuggery, MMA is legal due to its association with boxing and other lawfully recognised fighting sports. It is now accepted as a mainstream sport. Its legality is somewhat dubious as it derives its legality from boxing. Boxing is legal because it is not prize fighting. Prize fighting was declared illegal as it caused a breach of peace. The death of Carvalho may well change the legal landscape of MMA. It is doubtful it will be banned but it may well be subject to the rigours of the law in criminal or civil proceedings.

Star Lawyer Jean-Louis Dupont is almost a monopolist as far as high profile EU law and football cases are concerned. This year, besides a mediatised challenge against UEFA’s FFP regulations, he is going after FIFA’s TPO ban on behalf of the Spanish and Portuguese leagues in front of the EU Commission, but also before the Brussels First Instance Court defending the infamous Malta-based football investment firm Doyen Sport. FIFA and UEFA’s archenemy, probably electrified by the 20 years of the Bosman ruling, is emphatically trying to reproduce his world-famous legal prowess. Despite a first spark at a success in the FFP case against UEFA with the Court of first instance of Brussels sending a preliminary reference to the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU), this has proven to be a mirage as the CJEU refused, as foretold, to answer the questions of the Brussels Court, while the provisory measures ordered by the judge have been suspended due to UEFA’s appeal. But, there was still hope, the case against FIFA’s TPO ban, also involving UEFA and the Belgium federation, was pending in front of the same Brussels Court of First Instance, which had proven to be very willing to block UEFA’s FFP regulations. Yet, the final ruling is another disappointment for Dupont (and good news for FIFA). The Court refused to give way to Doyen’s demands for provisional measures and a preliminary reference. The likelihood of a timely Bosman bis repetita is fading away. Fortunately, we got hold of the judgment of the Brussels court and it is certainly of interest to all those eagerly awaiting to know whether FIFA’s TPO ban will be deemed compatible or not with EU law.

I.               Facts and Procedure

The case was introduced in March 2015 by Doyen Sports Investments Limited, the Maltese investment fund specialised in football and an obscure Belgium football club, the RFC Seresien/Seraing United, against the Belgium federation (URBSFA), FIFA and UEFA. For its part, FIFPro decided to voluntarily intervene in the debates.

Seraing United plays in the Proximus League, the Belgium Second Division, and signed a specific collaboration contract with Doyen Sports on 30 January 2015. This collaboration contract foresees that Doyen and Seraing United will collaborate to select at least two players in each summer transfer window to be recruited by Seraing via a TPI (Third-Party Investment). In return, Doyen will contribute 300 000€ for the 2015/2016 season to Seraing’s budget and own 30% of rights of the players it has picked. For example, during this summer’s transfer window Seraing and Doyen have concluded a TPI contract to finance the recruitment of Ferraz Pereira. It is this contract that led to the present dispute. Indeed, as Seraing indicated in its filing for registration that Ferraz Perreira was recruited via a TPI contract, the URBSFA decided to block the registration of the player in the FIFA TMS system. The procedure regarding the release of an International Transfer Certificate is still on-going in front of FIFA’s internal bodies.

The claimants demanded that the judge blocked any attempt of FIFA, UEFA and the Belgium federation to implement the TPO ban (in the form of FIFA Circular 1464) and, if necessary, to send a preliminary reference to the CJEU.

II.             Jurisdiction of the Brussels Court

The first key question, as in the FFP case, was whether the Brussels Court had jurisdiction over the matter. This was unproblematic as far as the demands against the Belgium federation are concerned, as it is seated in Belgium and a potential arbitration clause does not hinder the demand of provisory measures to the national judge under Belgium law.

As far as UEFA and FIFA are concerned, however, the question is more complex. The Brussels Court quickly side-lined the objection based on a putative CAS arbitration clause, but it went into greater details concerning its international jurisdiction on the basis of the Lugano Convention. Under article 6 par. 1 of the Lugano Convention a defendant can be sued in the court of a place where one of the defendants is domiciled if “the claims are so closely connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings”. In the FFP case, it is this close connection between the claims raised against UEFA and the Belgium Federation that could not be decisively proven and that led the Court to declare itself incompetent to deal with the matter. In the present case, the Court clearly distinguishes between FIFA and UEFA.

Concerning the claims raised against FIFA, the Court considers that:

“The relations between FIFA and the URBSFA are characterized by the fact that FIFA is the association adopting the international regulations which national federations, members of FIFA, including the URBSFA, have the duty to respect and enforce against their own members, i.e. the football clubs.” (para.42 of the judgment)

It deduces from this consideration that the URBSFA will have to implement FIFA’s TPO ban. However, this close connection exists only insofar as the claims raised are connected with provisory measures to be applied on the Belgian territory. In the eyes of the Court, FIFA’s objections to its jurisdiction based on article 22.2 of the Lugano Convention are not relevant, insofar that the case does not involve primarily a question of company or association law. The Court, contrary to the FFP case against UEFA, concludes that it has jurisdiction to deal with the claims raised against FIFA. This is a first, clear, legal victory for Jean-Louis Dupont. Yet this does not apply to UEFA as it did not adopt the regulations challenged, nor is the Belgium federation implementing its rules when enforcing the TPO ban. Thus, a close link in the sense of article 6 par. 1 of the Lugano Convention is missing[1]. Neither is article 31 of the Lugano Convention suitable to ground the Court’s jurisdiction against UEFA[2]. Hence, the Court declares itself incompetent to deal with the claims raised against UEFA.

The Court’s recognition that it has jurisdiction to deal with the claims directed against FIFA’s TPO ban insofar as FIFA’s rules have to be implemented by the URBSFA on the Belgium territory meant that this time Dupont could hope for a viable preliminary reference. Yet, as we will see, this did not lead to the award of the provisory measures hoped by the claimants.

III.           The conditions for awarding provisory measures under Belgium law

Under Belgium law two main conditions need to be fulfilled to lead to the granting of provisory measures: there need to be urgency and “appearance of right” (condition de l’apparence), which is analogous to the likelihood to prevail. There is urgency when it is feared that harm of certain intensity, or the likelihood of a serious inconvenience, make an immediate decision preferable. In the present case, the Court considers that Doyen is necessarily negatively affected by the TPO ban, as it is unable to exercise its economic activity[3]. The ban prejudices also Seraing United, which is deprived of an opportunity to finance its activities in a difficult context (URBSFA’s new regulations restricting the conditions to be considered a professional club). Thus, the Court finds that the urgency of the matter is given.

However, and this is the crux of the case, the judge refuses to consider that there is an appearance of right. In other words, he denied that the claimants are likely to prevail on the substance of the application of EU competition law. This is the most important part of the judgment, as it is the first time that a judicial authority adopts a legally binding (though provisional) opinion on the potential compatibility of the TPO ban with EU competition law (the much-cited Spanish’s Competition Authority opinion is advisory and does not cover the application of EU competition law). The claimants argued that the TPO ban is contrary to EU competition law (Article 101 and 102 TFEU) and to the EU free movement rights (Article 63, 56 and 45 TFEU). While, FIFPro, to which the Court recognized the privilege of expressing the collective opinion of professional players, FIFA and UEFA considered that it is compatible with EU law. 

The Court, first, refers to the Piau ruling of the CJEU to affirm that FIFA has a dominant position on the market for the services of players’ agents[4]. This is not surprising. In fact the judge insists that the key legal question is whether there is an abuse of this dominant position. In this regard it considers that both abuses of dominant position under article 102 TFEU and restrictions on free competition under article 101 par. 1 TFEU must be analysed with due consideration to the specific sector in which FIFA is active and to the legitimate objectives it claims to pursue.[5] Subsequently, the judgment lists a number of factors highlighted by FIFA and FIFPro underlying the legitimate objectives of the ban:

·      These practices are mainly the deed of investment firms

·      From which we do not know the shareholders

·      Which conclude contracts with different clubs, potentially directly competing against each other on the field

·      These contracts are opaque as they are not registered

·      They can be easily transferred

·      The third-party investors are interested in the players’ quick transfers, in short sequences, as they will then reap their benefits

·      This is contradictory with the objective of contractual stability during the players contract with their club

·      If the transfer is not effectuated before the end of the employment contract (knowing that at this time the player recovers his full contractual freedom), the clubs are due to pay compensation […].[6]

The Court concludes that it is likely that third-party investors/owners will be in a conflict of interest, with equally important risks of manipulations and match-fixing arising, all of this in a totally opaque environment. Thus, though the TPI/TPO practice is apparently of financial nature, it is deemed to have important sporting consequences. Moreover, the Court remarks that the ban on the influence of third parties on clubs introduced by FIFA a few years ago via article 18 bis of the FIFA RSTP has proven ineffective. This hints at the necessity of a total ban. Additionally, it referred to the legitimate objectives of the ban invoked by FIFPro as representative of the point of view of the players.

In fine, the Court concluded that the likelihood that FIFA’s TPO ban would fail the tests of proportionality and necessity is not proven “with the force necessary” to warrant awarding provisional measures and, subsequently, rejects the demands of the claimants.

Conclusion: EU law is no magic bullet against FIFA’s regulations

Jean-Louis Dupont lost a new battle, but as far as FIFA’s TPO ban is concerned it is only the beginning of a long legal war. He still has a case to defend in the main proceedings and the opening of an investigation of the EU Commission to hope for (as well as a potential appeal to the CJEU in case the complaint on behalf of Doyen and the Iberian leagues is rejected). Nevertheless, this decision is no good omen for the future of his case. It is a worthy reminder that EU law is no magic bullets against the regulations of Sports Governing Bodies (SGBs), and FIFA in particular. The Meca-Medina/Wouters inherency test prevailing in competition cases and the similar proportionality test applied in the context of free movement rights ensure that the legitimate objectives of the regulatory practices of the SGBs are duly taken into account in the judicial or administrative review process. In fact, despite the recurrent complaints voiced by SGBs against EU law’s deregulatory bias and insensitivity to sports’ specificity, in reality the case law of the CJEU and the decisional practice of the Commission has been rather (too?) accommodating with sport’s specificities, regulatory needs and ideals. What EU law imposes is a duty to properly justify private regulations that find no sufficient legitimacy, to say the least, in the democratic nature of their legislative process[7]. Yet, especially when the diverse set of stakeholders active in a specific sporting field converge in favour of a particular policy orientation, as is the case with the TPO ban, which is supported by ECA and FIFPro, there is a strong presumption that the regulations concerned will be deemed proportionate and in the general interest. The implicit presumption of legitimacy and necessity of FIFA’s TPO ban can only be rebutted with extremely thorough arguments from the part of the claimants and will probably require that they convincingly demonstrate the easy availability of a less restrictive alternative system to deal with the perceived risks resulting from the widespread recourse to TPO/TPI agreements. As the Belgium Court aptly put it, the EU free movement rights are not absolute; if necessary they can, and will, be restricted in the name of the general interest[8].

[1] Ordinance, Brussels Court of First Instance, n°15/67/C, 24.07.2015, para.53-54

[2] Ibid, para. 55-57

[3] Ibid, para. 87.

[4] Ibid, para.94

[5]« L’existence d’un éventuel abus de position dominante (article 102 TUE) mais également celle d’une éventuelle restriction de la concurrence (article 101.1 TUE) sont notamment analysées au regard du secteur spécifique dans lequel la Fifa est active et des objectifs légitimes qui sous-tendent l’interdictiom nouvelle des TPI/TPO », Ibid, para.95.

[6] My translation of the bullet points included at para.95 of the decision.

[7] On this important role of EU law, see B. Van Rompuy, ‘The Role of EU Competition Law in Tackling Abuse of Regulatory Power by Sports Associations’, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, Vol.22, Issue 2, 2015 pp.179-208.

[8] « Ces droits ne sont pas absolus, mais peuvent connaître des limites nécessitées par l’intérêt général ». Para.99 of the decision.

Editor's note: This is the third part/act of our blog series on the Russian eligibility cases at the CAS ad hoc Division in Rio.

• Act I: Saved by the Osaka Déjà-Vu
• Act II: On being implicated 

Act III: On being sufficiently tested 

Paragraph 2 of the IOC Decision: “The IFs should carry out an individual analysis of each athlete’s anti-doping record, taking into account only reliable adequate international tests, and the specificities of the athlete’s sport and its rules, in order to ensure a level playing field.”

Daniil Andienko and 16 other members of the Russian rowing team challenged the decision of the World Rowing Federation (FISA) to declare them ineligible for the Rio Olympics. The FISA Executive Committee took the decision on 24 July 2016 because they had not “undergone a minimum of three anti-doping tests analysed by a WADA accredited laboratory other than the Moscow laboratory and registered in ADAMS from 1 January 2015 for an 18 month period”.[1] In their submissions, the Russian applicants did not challenge the IOC Decision, and thus the criteria enshrined in paragraph 2, but only its application by FISA.[2] The Russian athletes argued that FISA’s decision deviated from the IOC Decision in that it was imposing as an additional requirement that rowers must “have undergone a minimum of three anti-doping tests analysed by a WADA accredited laboratory other than the Moscow laboratory and registered in ADAMS from 1 January 2015 for an 18-month period”.[3] The Panel acknowledged that “the IOC Executive Board decision does not refer explicitly to the requirement of three tests or to a period of 18 months”.[4] Nonetheless, it “finds that the Challenged Decision is in line with the criteria established by the IOC Executive Board decision”.[5] Indeed, the IOC’s Decision “provides that in order to examine whether the level playing field is affected or not (when admitting a Russian athlete to the Rio Olympic Games), the federation must look at the athlete's respective anti-doping record, i.e. examine the athlete's anti-doping tests” and that “[i]n doing so, the IOC Executive Board decision specifies that only "reliable adequate international tests" may be taken into account”.[6] In this regard, the Panel, and FISA, share the view that “a reliable adequate international test can only be assumed if the sample has been analyzed in a WADA-accredited laboratory outside Russia”.[7]

Finally, with regard to the need of having three tests, the “relevant paragraph in the IOC Executive Board decision further refers to "adequate international tests" and, consequently, makes it clear that - in principle - a single test is not sufficient to rebut the presumption of “collective responsibility””.[8] This follows “from the word “tests” being used in the plural form, but also from the word "adequate", since a single negative anti-doping test can hardly be adequate to rebut the presumption of “collective responsibility””.[9] The CAS also points out a number of other reasons why three tests is a rational benchmark: 

• “[…]rowing is at the same time a sport requiring strength and endurance and, thus, is exposed to a significant doping threat”;
• There is “a history of doping cases in the Russian Rowing Federation”;
• FISA “took also into consideration WADA's "Guidelines Implementing an Effective TestingProgramme'', which refers to a minimum of three tests per year for Registered Testing Pool athletes”;
• “FISA also bore in mind that it only provides for a relatively small number of events where tests can be carried out compared to other sports”.[10] 

Hence, “FISA's implementation and application of the criteria listed in the IOC Executive Board decision is consistent and fully compliant with the wording and the spirit of the IOC's decision”.[11] The CAS Panel rejected the pleas brought forward by the athletes on the basis of natural justice and fundamental procedural principles, as they did not challenge the IOC Decision directly but only its implementation.

Surprisingly, FISA was the only Federation (alongside the IAAF), which systematically refused entry to Russian athletes because they were not exposed to proper independent anti-doping testing. It is likely that, had each IF imposed similar standards, few Russian athletes would have been able to participate in the Rio Games. Furthermore, the case also highlights once again that the CAS was ready to endorse a strict standards of eligibility for Russian athletes. Here again, the IOC could very well have decided to impose a similar condition across the board, instead of leaving each federation decide for itself and, thus, indirectly promoting differentiated treatments depending on the sporting discipline.

[1]CAS OG 16/11 Daniil Andrienko et al. v. FISA & IOC, para. 2.6.

[2] Ibid., para. 7.3.

[3] Ibid., para.7.4.

[4] Ibid., para.7.5.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid., para. 7.6.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Ibid., para. 7.7.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid.

Due to the legitimate excitement over the recent Pechstein ruling, many have overlooked a previous German decision rendered in the Wilhelmshaven SV case (the German press did report on the decision here and here). The few academic commentaries (see here and here) focused on the fact that the German Court had not recognized the res judicata effect of a CAS award. Thus, it placed Germany at the spearhead of a mounting rebellion against the legitimacy of the CAS and the validity of its awards. None of the commentators weighed in on the substance of the decision, however. Contrary to the Court in Pechstein, the judges decided to evaluate the compatibility of the FIFA rules on training compensations with the EU free movement rights. To properly report on the decision and assess the threat it may constitute for the FIFA training compensation system, we will first summarize the facts of the case (I), briefly explicate the mode of functioning of the FIFA training compensation system (II), and finally reconstruct the reasoning of the Court on the compatibility of the FIFA rules with EU law (III).

I.               The complex facts of the case 

In a nutshell, the case concerns the move of an Argentinean player, with an Italian passport (as probably two-third of Argentina), to SV Wilhelmshaven and the training compensation due to its former youth clubs back in Argentina. The player, born in 1987, was an amateur player with an Argentinean club called Excursionistas from 20 March 1998 to 7 March 2005 and with River Plate from 8 March 2005 until 7 February 2007. From 8 February 2007 to 30 June 2007 he signed a fixed-term professional contract with SV Wilhelmshaven, which was later extended for one more season. 

In 2007 SV Wilhelmshaven was playing in the Regional League Nord (fourth tier of German football) and was therefore considered as a club of category 3 for the purpose of the FIFA Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players (RSTP). In June 2007, Excursionistas and River Plate initiated proceedings with the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereafter DRC) claiming €100,000 and €60,000 respectively in training compensation. These demands were partially granted  by the DRC (River Plate obtained “only” €57,500) in two concomitant decisions (available here and here) on 5 December 2008. 

SV Wilhelmshaven decided to appeal the DRC’s decisions to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). A hearing in front of a sole arbitrator was held on 26 August 2009 and the award rendered on 5 October 2009. The arbitrator confirmed the decision of the DRC awarding the claimed compensations to both Argentinean clubs and rejected all the objections raised by SV Wilhelsmshaven.

The club, however, continued stubbornly to refuse to pay the training compensations. On 13 September 2011, FIFA’s disciplinary Committee sanctioned SV Wilhelmshaven with additional fines and imposed a payment deadline of 30 days. If the club would not respect the deadline, its first team would face a six-point penalty. In light of non-compliance with this decision, FIFA called on the DFB (German FA) to enforce the sanction and secure the payment of the fines. The DFB dutifully implemented the order: six points were deducted and the club’s financial account with the DFB was debited from the requested €21,150. However, SV Wilhelmshaven is a tough nut to crack. Despite the confirmation of the sanctions by the DFB’s internal tribunal it kept on refusing to pay the training compensations awarded by the DRC and CAS. On 15 August 2012, the FIFA asked the DFB to deduct six more points. Given that, in the meantime, the club had been relegated to a lower league, the Norddeutscher Fussball Verband was competent to implement the latest sanction instead of the DFB. It did so on 23 August 2012 and the internal tribunal of the association later confirmed the validity of this decision. In May 2013, the club decided to challenge the point deduction in front of the German courts. Meanwhile, on 5 October 2012, a new decision of FIFA’s Disciplinary Committee imposed the relegation of the club. The SV Wilhelmshaven appealed the decision to the CAS, which confirmed FIFA’s disciplinary decision on 24 October 2013 (unfortunately the relevant CAS award has not been published). Hence, FIFA asked the DFB to implement this decision. The forced relegation was definitely ratified by the board of the Norddeutscher Fussball Verband on 7 December 2013 and validated by the internal tribunal on 20 February 2014. 

The club was challenging both the six-point deduction and the forced relegation in front of the regional Court of Bremen. In first instance, the tribunal simply rejected the claims of the club and considered that the CAS award, not challenged by the club in front of the Swiss Federal tribunal, was a valid legal basis for the sanctions. The club appealed the decision to the Highest Regional Court, which in its ruling of 30 December 2014 overruled the first instance Court. Indeed, it held that the CAS award was contrary to EU law and, therefore, could not be relied upon by the Norddeutscher Fussball Verband to sanction the club (more on this arbitration dimension of the case here and here). Combined with the Pechstein ruling, this case constitutes a powerful challenge to the CAS, but it is also a challenge to FIFA’s training compensation mechanisms. It is on this latter aspect that we will focus in this blog.

II.             The FIFA RSTP’s Training Compensation System 

Let us first take a close look at FIFA’s training compensation regime enshrined in Article 20 of the latest FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (RSTP). It must be highlighted that the FIFA Regulations were adopted after nearly two years of negotiations between the European Commission, UEFA, FIFA and FIFPro.[1] The negotiations ended with the adoption of a set of principles as a basis for the new FIFA transfer regulation. Concerning the training compensations, the principles stipulated that “in the case of players aged under 23, a system of training compensation should be in place to encourage and reward the training effort of clubs, in particular small clubs”. 

Article 20 of the FIFA RSTP transposing this principle reads as follows:

“Training compensation shall be paid to a player’s training club(s): (1) when a player signs his first contract as a professional, and (2) each time a professional is transferred until the end of the season of his 23rd birthday. The obligation to pay training compensation arises whether the transfer takes place during or at the end of the player’s contract. The provisions concerning training compensation are set out in Annexe 4 of these regulations.”

Hence, Article 20 establishes two situations giving rise to a right to obtain a training compensation: the signing of a first professional contract and each transfer until the end of the season of the player’s 23rd birthday. The key to understanding how this duty to pay a training compensation operates in practice can only be found in the Annex 4 of the RSTP. Article 1 paragraph 1 of Annex 4 qualifies the scope of the obligation to pay a training compensation. It states that: 

“A player’s training and education takes place between the ages of 12 and 23. Training compensation shall be payable, as a general rule, up to the age of 23 for training incurred up to the age of 21, unless it is evident that a player has already terminated his training period before the age of 21. In the latter case, training compensation shall be payable until the end of the season in which the player reaches the age of 23, but the calculation of the amount payable shall be based on the years between the age of 12 and the age when it is established that the player actually completed his training.”

Pursuant to article 2 paragraph 2 of Annex 4, a training compensation is not due when “the former club terminates the player’s contract without just cause (without prejudice to the rights of the previous clubs) “, or “the player is transferred to a category 4 club”, or “a professional reacquires amateur status on being transferred”. 

To calculate the amount of training compensation due, every association member of FIFA is “to divide their clubs into a maximum of four categories in accordance with the clubs’ financial investment in training players”.[2] For each category the training costs are equivalent “to the amount needed to train one player for one year multiplied by an average “player factor”, which is the ratio of players who need to be trained to produce one professional player”.[3] The current training costs as defined by each football association for 2014 are available here. The training compensation is meant to cover “the costs that would have been incurred by the new club if it had trained the player itself”.[4] Thus it is calculated “by taking the training costs of the new club multiplied by the number of years of training, in principle from the season of the player’s 12th birthday to the season of his 21st birthday”.[5] The training costs for players for the seasons between their 12^th and 15^th birthdays, however, are always based “on the training and education costs of category 4 clubs”.[6]

Following the negotiations with the European Commission, FIFA carved out a specific provision for players moving from one association to another inside the territory of the EU (including also the EEA). This provision stipulates that “[i]f the player moves from a lower to a higher category club, the calculation shall be based on the average training costs of the two clubs”.[7] If the player moves from a higher to a lower category, “the calculation shall be based on the training costs of the lower category club”.[8] Moreover, “the final season of training [in the sense of article 1 paragraph 1 Annex 4] may occur before the season of the player’s 21st birthday if it is established that the player completed his training before that time” .[9] Finally, and maybe most importantly, “[i]f the former club does not offer the player a contract, no training compensation is payable unless the former club can justify that it is entitled
to such compensation”.[10] 

The FIFA framework applicable to training compensations is not easy to navigate and many of its provisions have been refined by the jurisprudence of the CAS and the DRC (see this blog for a synthetic assessment).[11] The compatibility of this complex regulatory construction with EU law has never been tested in front of courts (be it national or European). This makes this lawsuit so decisive. 

III.           The SV Wilhelmshaven case and the compatibility of FIFA’s training compensation system with EU law

In its Bosman ruling, the Court of Justice (hereafter CJ) held that the aim of “encouraging the recruitment and training of young players must be accepted as legitimate”.[12] It added “that the prospect of receiving transfer, development or training fees is indeed likely to encourage football clubs to seek new talent and train young players” .[13] Nevertheless, it concluded that “because it is impossible to predict the sporting future of young players with any certainty and because only a limited number of such players go on to play professionally, those fees are by nature contingent and uncertain and are in any event unrelated to the actual cost borne by clubs of training both future professional players and those who will never play professionally”.[14] Hence, receiving such fees could not be “a decisive factor in encouraging recruitment and training of young players or an adequate means of financing such activities, particularly in the case of smaller clubs”.[15] As a final nail into the coffin of training compensations, at least it was thought at that time, the Court followed its Advocate General in holding that “the same aims can be achieved at least as efficiently by other means which do not impede freedom of movement for workers”.[16] 

The FIFA training compensation system as it stands nowadays is a rebuttal to the Bosman ruling. Indeed, it pretends to do the impossible in the eyes of the Court: calculating realistically the costs of training a player in a specific club in order to offer an objective benchmark for the training compensations. Moreover, FIFA simply disregarded the proposals made by Advocate General Lenz, who suggested potential alternative financing mechanisms to support the training of players.[17] FIFA’s rules, endorsed by the EU Commission, have never been tested in front of the CJ, though it came close to it in the relatively recent Olympique Lyonnais case. Here, the Court reaffirmed that “the objective of encouraging the recruitment and training of young players must be accepted as legitimate”.[18] It also recognized that “the clubs which provided the training could be discouraged from investing in the training of young players if they could not obtain reimbursement of the amounts spent for that purpose where, at the end of his training, a player enters into a professional contract with another club”.[19] Thus, it held “that a scheme providing for the payment of compensation for training where a young player, at the end of his training, signs a professional contract with a club other than the one which trained him can, in principle, be justified by the objective of encouraging the recruitment and training of young players”.[20] However, to be proportionate, the scheme must be “taking due account of the costs borne by the clubs in training both future professional players and those who will never play professionally” .[21] In the Olympique Lyonnais case, the French system in place at the time of the dispute, and since then replaced, was deemed incompatible with EU law as the amount of the compensation was not directly correlated with the costs of training the player. Nonetheless, UEFA and FIFA were prompt to see in this judgment a “significant step forward” [22] for the compatibility of the FIFA system with EU law. The present SV Wilhelmshaven case is a good opportunity to test this assumption.

SV Wilhelmshaven had argued in front of the CAS that the FIFA RSTP was contrary to the right to free movement of workers under EU law. However, the single arbitrator rejected the applicability of EU law. Instead, relying on previous CAS awards, it held that “such argument would have been available to the individual Player, not to the Appellant”.[23] This interpretation contradicts the well-established case law of the CJ[24], as noted by the Bremen Court.[25] Moreover, the CAS also declined to recognize the applicability to the case at hand of Article 6 of the Annex 4 to the FIFA RSTP. It considered that “[t]he title of this provision clearly suggests that its scope is narrowly circumscribed within a limited geographic area, i.e. the EU/EEA territory”.[26] Furthermore, “it appears that article 6 of Annex 4 to the FIFA Regulations is nothing more than the codification of the system agreed upon by the European authorities and put into place to govern the transfer of a player moving from one association to another inside the territory of the EU/EEA”.[27] Thus, the panel sees “no reason to depart from the unambiguous wording of article 6 of Annex 4 to the FIFA Regulations, which is obviously not applicable in the case of a player moving from a country outside the EU/EEA to a country within the EU/EEA”.[28] On this exact point, the Bremen Court begged to differ. 

The Bremen Court was not convinced by the distinction between intra-EU and extra-EU transfers made in article 6 Annex 4. The right to free movement of workers extends also to EU citizens moving from a non-EU country to an EU Member state. Therefore, not only could the club legitimately invoke the right to free movement of its player, but it was also right to consider that article 6 annex 4 should have been applicable to an EU citizen moving from Argentina to Germany. Consequently, the German judges considered that the non-application of article 6 and the imposition of the calculation method foreseen in article 4 and 5 of the Annex 4 were contrary to the player’s free movement rights under EU law.[29] Nonetheless, it also acknowledged that the FIFA training compensation rules were supporting “the objective of encouraging the recruitment and training of young players”.[30] Furthermore, Article 6 of the Annex 4 is deemed suitable to attain this objective and compatible with EU law.[31] The key point being for training compensations to cover only the real costs endured to train the player[32], this is what the CAS and the DRC have failed to take in account in the SV Wilhelmshaven case.[33]

Conclusion 

The SV Wilhelmshaven case has potentially damaging consequences for the Court of Arbitration for sport. It intrudes into the system of private enforcement of the CAS awards by forcing the sporting association to consider whether the awards are compatible with German public policy, and especially with EU law before enforcing disciplinary measures based on them. We have deliberately ignored this aspect of the case, as it will be the object of a future blog post. Instead, we decided to focus on FIFA’s training compensation system and its compatibility with EU law.

The Bremen Court’s ruling highlighted the substantial shortcomings of the CAS in dealing with EU law. A long-standing CAS jurisprudence was shown fundamentally flawed and overtly contradictory to the CJ’s interpretation of EU law. Moreover, the FIFA training compensation system as it stands was considered incompatible with EU law in the context of a transfer of an EU citizen from Argentina to an EU Member state. This is not a remote scenario especially when South-American players are involved. However, there is also some good news for FIFA, as the Court found that the FIFA intra-EU training compensation rule is in line with EU law. The case is now at the Bundesgerichtshof (BGH), the highest German civil Court. With this case and the Pechstein case on its plate, the BGH will fundamentally shape the future of sport’s private dispute resolution mechanisms and governance structure. If it is asked to do so or ex officio if it feels the need, the BGH could refer a preliminary question to Luxembourg on the compatibility of the FIFA training compensation system with EU free movement rights. This would be the best way to finally settle a question which has been left wide open since the Bosman ruling, now 20 years ago.

[1] See B. Garcia, ‘The 2001 informal agreement on the international transfer system’, European Sports Law and Policy Bulletin, I-2011, pp.17-29.

[2] Article 4 paragraph 1 of Annex 4.

[3] Article 4 paragraph 1 of Annex 4

[4] Article 5 paragraph 1 of Annex 4

[5] Article 5 paragraph 2 of Annex 4

[6] Article 5 paragraph 3 of Annex 4

[7] Article 6 paragraph 1 a) of Annex 4

[8] Article 6 paragraph 1 b) of Annex 4

[9] Article 6 paragraph 2 of Annex 4

[10] Article 6 paragraph 3 of Annex 4

[11] See F. de Weger, The jurisprudence of the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber, ASSER press, 2008, pp. 117-133.

[12]Case C-415/93 Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association and Others v Bosman and Others [1995] ECR I-4921, paragraph 106.

[13] Ibid, paragraph 108.

[14] Ibid, paragraph 109.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Ibid, paragraph 110.

[17] AG Lenz in Case C-415/93 Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association and Others v Bosman and Others, [1995] ECR I-4921, paragraph 239

[18] C-325/08 Olympique Lyonnais SASP v Olivier Bernard [2010], paragraph 39.

[19] Ibid, paragraph 44.

[20] Ibid, paragraph 45.

[21] Ibid.

[22] J. Zylberstein, ‘The Olivier Bernard Judgment : A Significant step forward for the training of players’, in M. Colucci, European Sports Law and Policy Bulletin 1/2010

[23] CAS 2009/A/1810 & 1811 SV Wilhelmshaven v. Club Atlético Excursionistas & Club Atlético River Plate, award of 5 October 2009, paragraph.42. Referring to CAS 2004/A/794 and CAS 2006/A/1027.

[24] « Whilst the rights deriving from Article 48 of the Treaty are undoubtedly enjoyed by those directly referred to - namely, workers - there is nothing in the wording of that article to indicate that they may not be relied upon by others, in particular employers. » C-350/96 Clean Car Autoservice Gmbh v Landeshauptmann von Wien [1998] ECR I-2521, paragraph 19.

[25] OLG Bremen, 30.12.2014, 2 U 67/14

[26] CAS 2009/A/1810 & 1811 SV Wilhelmshaven v. Club Atlético Excursionistas & Club Atlético River Plate, award of 5 October 2009, paragraph 46.

[27] Ibid, paragraph 49

[28] Ibid.

[29] OLG Bremen, 30.12.2014, 2 U 67/14, p.22-25.

[30] „Daraus folgt, dass eine Regelung wie im vorliegenden Fall, die eine Ausbildungsentschädigung für den Fall vorsieht, dass ein Nachwuchsspieler nach Abschluss seiner Ausbildung einen Vertrag als Berufsspieler mit einem anderen Verein als dem abschließt, der ihn ausgebildet hat, grundsätzlich durch den Zweck gerechtfertigt werden kann, die Anwerbung und Ausbildung von Nachwuchsspielern zu fördern“. Ibid, p.22.

[31] „Soweit in Art.6 Ziff. 1.b) bei einem Wechsel des Spielers von einem Verein der höheren in eine niedrigere Kategorie die Entschädigung gemäss den Trainingskosten des Vereins der tieferen Kategorie bemessen wird, handelt es sich um eine Regelung, die zu einer Erleichterung des Vereinswechsels führt, also gegenüber der an sich erforderlichen Orientierung an den Kosten des ausbildenden Vereins im Hinblick auf Art.45 AEUV eine Besserstellung des Spielers enthält und daher insoweit unbedenklich ist.“ Ibid, p.25.

[32] « Transferentschädigungen erfüllen mithin die Funktion des Ersatzes von Ausbildungskosten nur dann, wenn sie sich an den tatsächlichen angefallenen Ausbildungskosten orientieren und nicht am Marktwert des fertigen Spielers ». Ibid, p.23.

[33] « Die hier vorgenommene Entschädigung orientiert sich somit nicht an den für die Ausbildung bei den argentinischen Vereinen angefallenen Kosten, sondern nimmt einen Ausgleich in Höhe des pauschal eingeschätzten Aufwands vor, der dem übernehmenden Verein im Hinblick auf diesen Spieler erspart worden ist. » Ibid, p.24.