The upcoming 2022 FIFA World Cup in Qatar and its links to human rights violations has been the subject of many debates in the media and beyond. In particular, the respect of migrant workers’ labour rights was at the forefront of much public criticisms directed against FIFA. Similarly, past Olympics in Rio, Sochi or Beijing have also been in the limelight for various human rights issues, such as the lack of freedom of the press, systematic discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or forced evictions. These controversies have led sports governing bodies (SGBs) to slowly embrace human rights as an integral part of their core values and policies. Leading to an increased expectation for SGBs to put their (private) diplomatic capital at the service of human rights by using their leverage vis-à-vis host countries of their mega-sporting events (MSEs). In turn, this also raises the question of the need for the EU to accompany this change by putting human rights at the heart of its own sports diplomacy.

Research collective 
This Multiplier Sporting Event, organised in the framework of the transnational project on ‘Promoting a Strategic Approach to EU Sports Diplomacy’ funded by the Erasmus + Programme, aims to trigger discussions on the role of an EU sports diplomacy in strengthening respect for human rights in the context of MSEs both at home and abroad. It will feature two roundtables focused on the one hand on the diplomatic power and capacity of SGBs to fend for human rights during MSEs and on the other on the EU’s integration of human rights considerations linked to MSEs in its own sports diplomacy.

Programme

13:20 – 14:00 – Welcome and opening speech –Antoine Duval (Asser Institute)
14:00 - 15:30 - Panel 1: Leveraging the Diplomatic Power of the Sports Governing Bodies for Human Rights

• Lucy Amis (Unicef UK/Institute for Human Rights and Business)
• Guido Battaglia (Centre for Sport and Human Rights)
• Florian Kirschner (World Players Association/UNI Global Union)
• Claire Jenkin (University of Hertfordshire)

15:30 – 16:00 - Coffee Break

16:00 - 17:30 - Panel 2: A Human Rights Dimension for the EU’s Sports Diplomacy?

• Arnout Geeraert (Utrecht University)
• Agata Dziarnowska (European Commission)
• Alexandre Mestre (Sport and Citizenship)
• Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport (TBC)

17:30 - Reception

Editor’s note: Serhat Yilmaz (@serhat_yilmaz) is a lecturer in sports law in Loughborough University. His research focuses on the regulatory framework applicable to intermediaries. Antoine Duval (@Ant1Duval) is the head of the Asser International Sports Law Centre.

Last week, while FIFA was firing the heads of its Ethics and Governance committees, the press was overwhelmed with ‘breaking news’ on the most expensive transfer in history, the come back of Paul Pogba from Juventus F.C. to Manchester United. Indeed, Politiken (a Danish newspaper) and Mediapart (a French website specialized in investigative journalism) had jointly discovered in the seemingly endless footballleaks files that Pogba’s agent, Mino Raiola, was involved (and financially interested) with all three sides (Juventus, Manchester United and Pogba) of the transfer. In fine, Raiola earned a grand total of € 49,000,000 out of the deal, a shocking headline number almost as high as Pogba’s total salary at Manchester, without ever putting a foot on a pitch. This raised eyebrows, especially that an on-going investigation by FIFA into the transfer was mentioned, but in the media the sketching of the legal situation was very often extremely confusing and weak. Is this type of three-way representation legal under current rules? Could Mino Raiola, Manchester United, Juventus or Paul Pogba face any sanctions because of it? What does this say about the effectiveness of FIFA’s Regulations on Working with Intermediaries? All these questions deserve thorough answers in light of the publicity of this case, which we ambition to provide in this blog.

Paul Pogba: From Manchester to Juventus…and back 

On 3 August 2012, 19 years old Paul Pogba moved from Manchester United to Juventus on a free transfer. Four years later, his comeback to Manchester United was the most expensive transaction that the history of football ever recorded. Interestingly (and controversially), the latter transfer involved only one agent, Carmine “Mino” Raiola, acting on behalf of the three parties involved in the transaction. Indeed, on 20 July 2016, Raiola signed an agreement with Juventus stipulating that one of his companies, Topscore Sports Ltd, was contracted to find a suitable acquirer for the player before 31 August 2016 in return of a hefty commission payable by Juventus if Pogba was transferred for a minimum fee of €90,000,000 below which the club was not prepared to sell the player and the company was not entitled to any remuneration. A year before, one of Raiola’s many companies, Topscore Sports Ltd, had already been appointed by Juventus as of 1 March 2015 to facilitate the transfer of Pogba. The 2016 contract acknowledged that Topscore Sports Ltd succeeded in “creating hype around the future transfer” and triggered “a bidding war” to recruit the player. Hence, pursuant to the 2016 agreement, if Topscore managed to secure a transfer above the minimum fee, Juventus would pay to Raiola’s company €18,000,000. Furthermore, Raiola would earn €3,000,000 more for each €5,000,000 increase above the minimum fee of the final amount.

Simultaneously, on 27 July 2016, Mino Raiola signed a representation contract with the player through the Monaco based company Uuniqq Srl. The contract provided for a commission “amounting to 5% of the Player’s Basic Gross Income as result of any employment contract negotiated or renegotiated by the Intermediary”. While, on 8 August 2016, Raiola concluded, again through Uuniqq Srl, an agreement with Manchester United. On 9 August 2016, Juventus and Manchester United agreed to the transfer of Pogba for a compensation of €105,000,000. Pogba obtained a salary of €10,200,000 in 2016/2017, reaching €13,800,000 in 2017/2018. On top of that, he also secured a €2,200,000 bonus every time Manchester United qualifies for the Champions League and a €1,160,000 one in case he wins the ballon d’or. According to the agreement with Manchester United, the agent would be paid for his intermediary services five installments of €3,883,658 each, payable every 30 September from 2017 to 2020. In addition to that, Manchester United was undertaking the duty to pay the player’s fee to the agent. Consequently, Uuniqq Srl was also due to receive five installments of €516,342 each, payable on the same dates.

To sum up, as a consequence of Pogba’s transfer from Juventus to Manchester United, Topscore Sports Ltd collected a total commission of €27,000,000 from Juventus, consisting of the agreed minimum of €18,000,000 plus an additional €9,000,000 for overshooting his targeted transfer fee. Uuniqq Srl got a total commission of €22,000,000, resulting from the €19,420,000 (5 instalments of €3,883,658 each) paid by Manchester United as “club services” and €2,580,000 (5 instalments of €516,342 each) paid by the club as “player’s services” on behalf of Pogba. This is the contractual set-up leading to the headline number of € 49,000,000, but is it actually legal?  

Three key questions on the legality of Mino Raiola’s role in Pogba’s transfer

There is a tremendous amount of confusion in the press regarding the legality of the above-explained contractual arrangements. For example, FIFA might be investigating the transfer, but in practice it is not in a position of enforcing any direct sanctions, besides a fine for any misleading declarations of Manchester United or Juventus to the FIFA TMS, against the clubs, the player or the intermediary. Indeed, since the entry into force of the new FIFA Regulations on Working with Intermediaries (RWI) in 2015, the responsibility to police intermediaries has been delegated to national federations, in the present case the English FA and the Italian FIGC. It means in practice that the key question is whether Raiola, the clubs or the player complied with the obligations enshrined in the federations’ regulations. The Italian FIGC has not fulfilled its basic transparency obligations under the new FIFA rules, and should be sanctioned by FIFA for not doing so, thus it is impossible to assess whether Raiola and Juventus have complied with the FIGC’s rules. However, the FA has done his regulatory homework well and we believe that the case will raise numerous questions with regard to the compatibility of the behaviour of the parties with the FA’s Regulations on Working with Intermediaries (FA RWI).

• Is Mino Raiola's total fee/commission in breach of the FA RWI?

The fees payable to Mino Raiola by all parties involved in the transfer (Manchester United as “the registering club”, Juventus as “the former club” and Pogba as “the player”) seems to be the most controversial, and peculiar, aspect of the transfer. Mino Raiola is to receive almost 38% of the total value of Pogba’s contract from Manchester United and only 5% from Pogba directly. Despite the fact that the amount of these fees seems excessive in comparison to market standards under which the level of intermediary commission varies between 5% to 10% and in some of the most extreme cases 20% (see here and here), they do not as such breach the FA RWI. The English FA regulates remuneration payable to intermediaries under section C of its regulations and the indicative level of commission is at 3% (regulation C11). However, this is only a “recommendation” and is aimed at providing guidance to the market and not at constituting an absolute requirement. The non-binding nature of this restriction on the level of commission means that the parties to the transfer are free to negotiate a higher level of commission and this seems to be the case for the representation contracts between Manchester United, Pogba, and Mino Raiola. Additionally, the level of commission, if payable by the player, is to be calculated in accordance with the player’s gross annual income for the entire duration of the relevant employment contract (Article C11.a) whereas the Club’s fee is either based on the player’s gross annual income for the entire duration of the relevant employment contract (Article C11.b) or on the transfer compensation (transfer fee) paid in connection with the transfer (Article C11.c). Both the club and the player are entitled to make the payments to the intermediary in a lump sum or periodic instalments (Article C3 and C7). The club can also make the payments to the intermediary on behalf of the player, if a written request made by the player to do so, and periodic deductions from player’s salary can be made by the club to sanction those payments (Article C2.b). In the light of these provisions of the FA RWI,  the representation contracts published by the Danish news outlet, Politiken (see here) clearly prescribe the remunerations and payment schedules to Mino Raiola by both Manchester United and Pogba  and these contractual arrangements seem to be in compliance with the regulations.

• Can Mino Raiola represent all parties to the transfer?

The other controversial aspect of the transfer is the representation arrangements by Mino Raiola in respect of Manchester United, Pogba and Juventus. According to the documents published by Politiken and Mediapart, Mino Raiola represented both Manchester United and Pogba under the same transaction. At this point, distinction needs to be made between the dual representation (the intermediary represents the player and either the registering or the former club) and the multiple representation (the intermediary representing the player, the registering club and the former club) as the FA RWI uses both terminologies interchangeably. However, the distinction between the dual and the multiple representation becomes clear under the Intermediary Declaration Form IM1 (see here), the document that must be completed by all parties to the transfer and lodged with the English FA. The document clearly outlines declaration requirements in respect of representation of the player, the registering club and the former club. The representation arrangements between Manchester United, Pogba and Mino Raiola is a dual representation, which is clearly acknowledged by the English FA in its annual disclosure of individual transactions registered, where Mino Raiola and his company, Uuniqq Srl, are listed as the representative of both the Club and the Player (see here). Additionally, as mentioned above, Mino Raiola had also a representation contract with Juventus for the sale of the player. Under the circumstances, it seems the representation contract with Juventus adds another layer to the representation arrangements and constitutes the element of multiple representation with regards to the FA RWI. These arrangements clearly raise the possibility of a conflict of interest, therefore, the English FA allow dual/multiple representation only if the intermediary and the other relevant parties to the transfer strictly comply with the consent requirements of its regulations (Article E1). Otherwise the intermediary may only act for one party to the transfer (Article E1) and cannot receive any remuneration from other parties (Article E3).

Firstly, if the intermediary has a pre-existing representation contract with one party (“the first party”) to the transfer, then that contract should be lodged with the English FA (Article E2.a). In this case, the extracts of representation contract refer to “the player representation contract” between Pogba and Mino Raiola which seems to indicate the existence of a representation contract prior to the multiple representation arrangements. Therefore, it is safe to assume that Pogba could be “the first party” to the transaction and the existing representation contract can constitute a pre-existing representation contract under the FA RWI which should have been lodged with the English FA prior to the other representation arrangements. Secondly, the intermediary should obtain all parties’ (emphasis added) prior written consent to provide services to any other party to the transaction (“the other party(ies)”) (Article E2.b) meaning that Mino Raiola should have obtained the consent of Manchester United, Pogba and Juventus to enter into the multiple representation arrangements. Then, once the intermediary and the other party(ies) agree on the terms of representation, prior to entering into actual representation contracts, the intermediary must inform all parties of the full details regarding the proposed fee to be paid by all parties to the intermediary (Article E2.c). Mino Raiola, should not only have sought the consent of all parties to the multiple representation but also disclosed them the level of fees payable to him by each party. Finally, all parties to the transfer should be given opportunity to seek independent legal advice on the proposed arrangements and provide their written consent for the intermediary to enter into dual/ multiple representation arrangements with other parties (Article E2.d, E2.e).

 As a result, the key focus of the investigation initiated by FIFA but which will inevitably move to the English FA seems to be whether Mino Raiola complied with the regulatory requirements imposing written consent prior to entering into the multiple representation arrangements. Due to the involvement of different companies located in multiple jurisdictions, it is particularly important that the representation contract with Juventus was disclosed to other parties of the transfer, i.e., Manchester United and Pogba and included under the IM1 form. A potential non-compliance with these requirements would constitute a regulatory breach. The omission of information under the relevant paperwork by the parties might be considered as the concealment or misrepresentation of reality and/or substance of any matters in relation to the transaction which is also regulatory breach (Article A3). Any regulatory breach shall be misconduct and sanctioned accordingly (Article F1). All parties involved have potentially, if a multiple representation agreement was not disclosed to the FA, breached the FA rules. However, only Juventus and Raiola knew with certainty about this multiple heads. It is doubtful that the FA could sanction Juventus, which is out of its jurisdictional reach (one could potentially envisage a transfer ban to the FA). Yet, Raiola’s multiple companies must be registered with the FA to conclude transfers with Premier League clubs, thus if he fails to demonstrate that he obtained prior written consent from all the parties to the multiple representation, one could envisage that the FA would suspend their registrations.

• Who has authority to investigate and sanction Mino Raiola for regulatory breaches (if there is any)?

The final central question is: which governing body, in this case either the English FA, the Italian FIGC or FIFA, has the authority to investigate and sanction potential regulatory breaches in the transfer? The jurisdictional nexus derives from the international dimension of a transfer involving two different associations, (English FA and Italian FIGC) and the application of FIFA Regulations on Status and Transfer of Players (FIFA RSTP). It gets even more complicated if Raiola’s original intermediary registration with the Dutch FA is taken into consideration. Against this background, the FIFA Regulations on Working with Intermediaries (FIFA RWI)’s fundamental aim was to bring some transparency in an opaque market and Article 9.1 FIFA RWI authorises associations to hand out sanctions on any party under their jurisdiction that commits regulatory breach of FIFA regulations as well as their statutes or regulations. The article implies therefore that either the English FA or the Italian FIGC (or the Dutch KNVB) may have the authority to sanction Raiola if he falls under their jurisdiction. In the case of intermediaries, the jurisdiction is generally inferred by the registration and the English FA obliges any applicants to submit to its jurisdiction through the declaration under its intermediary registration process. A close scrutiny of the English FA’s intermediary disclosures reveals Mino Raiola’s intermediary registration as natural person (see here). He has also registered his five companies as legal persons including Uuniqq Srl (see here) which is the one used for the transfer of Pogba with the English FA. These registrations could provide the English FA with jurisdiction over Mino Raiola to investigate the transaction and, if any regulatory breach is proven, to impose any sanctions. The investigative power of the English FA over Minor Raiola also derives directly from his registration under which he consented to communicate to the English FA , for the purposes of investigation, all contracts, agreements and records in connection with his activities as an intermediary. Moreover, if for any reason Mino Raiola gets eventually sanctioned by the English FA, FIFA would have the authority to extend the sanction worldwide (Article 9.2 of FIFA RWI). 

Conclusion: Regulating intermediaries without FIFA 

What are the broader lessons we can learn from this case?

• First, the transfer market remains, despite the recent TPO ban and FIFA RWI, an opaque market on which conflicts of interest are routine. In this regard, FIFA’s decision to retreat from any direct involvement in the regulation of intermediaries, despite the obvious shortcomings of the old licensing system, has proven to be a relatively poor and to some extent incoherent choice. The legitimate objectives invoked to ban TPO are in turn betrayed by the decision to let go of any supervision of intermediaries. In general, the cognitive dissonance of FIFA vis-à-vis the transfer system is striking, it attacks on the one hand (rightly in the view of one of us) the financiarization of football through TPO, but supports it on the other by maintaining in place a system that transforms players into speculative assets.

• Second, the scope of regulation of intermediaries is now exclusively dependent on the decisions of national federations. If the English FA decides to crack down on conflicts of interest in the transfer market, it will have a tremendous impact on the way intermediaries operate. The English market represents a huge share of the whole transfer market and is hardly avoidable for major intermediaries. Further, if the federations of the so-called big five (England, France, Italy, Germany, Spain) leagues would accept to coordinate their intermediaries’ regulations, they would have such a dominant market position that in practice they would very much define how the transfer market operates. In this regard, the Pogba case will be decisive (and symbolic) to determine whether the English FA is ready to lead the way down a stricter regulatory road.

• Third, fans (and their clubs) are the ultimate losers of this state of play, they should rebel! The intermediaries’ fees are a consequence of the structural lack of competition and transparency in the transfer market. In the end, those who are going to the stadium every week or have an expensive subscription to watch the Premier League are paying the intermediaries. We the consumers of football are the ones on the losing end of this masquerade of a market. If clubs are unwilling to assert their contractual rights against ruthless intermediaries, it is unlikely for example that Manchester United will ask compensation from Mino Raiola if he omitted to inform them of the obvious conflicts of interest in the Pogba transfer, their supporters (and shareholders) should try to force them to do so.

Editor's note: Prof. Dr. Ekşi is a full-time lecturer and chair of Department of Private International Law at Özyeğin University Faculty of Law. Prof. Ekşi is the founder and also editor in chief of the Istanbul Journal of Sports Law which has been in publication since 2019.

While Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’) secures the right to freedom of expression, Rule 50 of the Olympic Charter of 17 July 2020 (‘Olympic Charter’) restricts this freedom. Following the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) relating to sports, national and international sports federations have incorporated human rights-related provisions into their statutes and regulations. They also emphasized respect for human rights. For example, Article 3 of the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (‘FIFA’) Statutes, September 2020 edition, provides that “FIFA is committed to respecting all internationally recognised human rights and shall strive to promote the protection of these rights”. Likewise, the Fundamental Principles of Olympism which are listed after the Preamble of the of the Olympic Charter 2020 also contains human rights related provisions. Paragraph 4 of Fundamental Principles of Olympism provides that the practice of sport is a human right. Paragraph 6 forbids discrimination of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, sexual orientation, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. In addition, the International Olympic Committee (‘IOC’) inserted human rights obligations in the 2024 and 2028 Host City Contract.[1] The IOC Athletes’ Rights and Responsibilities Declaration even goes further and aspires to promote the ability and opportunity of athletes to practise sport and compete without being subject to discrimination. Fair and equal gender representation, privacy including protection of personal information, freedom of expression, due process including the right to a fair hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial panel, the right to request a public hearing and the right to an effective remedy are the other human rights and principles stated in the IOC Athletes’ Rights and Responsibilities Declaration. Despite sports federations’ clear commitment to the protection of human rights, it is arguable that their statutes and regulations contain restrictions on athletes and sports governing bodies exercising their human rights during competitions or in the field. In this regard, particular attention should be given to the right to freedom of expression on which certain restrictions are imposed by the federations even if it done with good intentions and with the aim of raising awareness.

The provisions prohibiting propaganda and political demonstrations are enshrined in the statutes and regulations of international and national federations. For example, International Football Association Board (‘IFAB’) Laws of the Game 2020/2021 states that players must not reveal undergarments that display any political, religious, personal slogans, statements or images, or advertising other than the manufacturer’s logo.[2] As with any offence, the player and/or the team will be sanctioned by the competition organiser, national football association or by FIFA. On the one hand, freedom of expression is listed among the rights of athletes in Paragraph 11 of the IOC Athletes’ Rights and Responsibilities Declaration[3], on the other hand, Rule 50(2) of the Olympic Charter restricts demonstrations or political, religious or racial propaganda, which may adversely affect freedom of expression. The propaganda ban was first introduced by the 1967 Olympic Charter.[4] This ban has been retained in later versions with minor modifications. Under the title of “propaganda advertising, demonstration”, Rule 50(2) of the current version of the Olympic Charter[5] provides that “no kind of demonstration or political, religious or racial propaganda is permitted in any Olympic sites, venues or other areas”. The aim of Rule 50(2) of the Olympic Charter in prohibiting political statements is to maintain the neutrality of sport.[6] Rule 50(2) is only applicable in Olympic venues, namely on the field of play, in the Olympic Village, during Olympic medal ceremonies or during the opening, closing and other official ceremonies.[7] Displaying any political messaging, including signs or armbands, gestures of a political nature, like a hand gesture or kneeling, and refusal to follow the ceremonies protocol are some examples of what would constitute a protest, as opposed to expressing views non-exhaustingly indicated in Rule 50 Guidelines Developed by the IOC Athletes’ Commission.[8]

A disciplinary sanction can be applied against an athlete who has breached Rule 50(2) of the Olympic Charter. This sanction can be reviewed by the ad hoc division of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (‘CAS’) established for the Olympic Games.[9] An arbitral award of CAS can be challenged before the Swiss Federal Court on the grounds listed in Article 190 of the Swiss Private International Law including public policy.[10] Since freedom of expression is among the fundamental human rights guaranteed by Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the Swiss Federal Tribunal may rule that a CAS arbitral award is incompatible with public policy. The limitations set out in the statutes and regulations of the national and international sports federations pertaining to the freedom of expression are aimed to protect the neutrality of sport and separate it from political, religious or any other type of interference; however, one cannot exclude potential challenges to be filed against Switzerland before the ECtHR. As in the Pechstein and Mutu cases, the sports community, including CAS, anxiously awaited what the ECtHR would decide. The judgements of the ECtHR have been taken into consideration and respect for human rights has been integrated in the statutes of some SGBs, including the IOC Charter.

Although the IOC is established as an association under the Swiss Association Law, the rules of its Charter may adversely affect the enjoyment of certain human rights. Freedom of expression is enshrined not only in Article 10 of the ECHR but also in other international human rights legislative instruments, including Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, Article 11 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, Article 17(1) of Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence, Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Article 10 of the ECHR covers not only the disclosure of political ideas, but also the freedom to disclose any literary, commercial and other ideas. The freedom of expression protected under Article 10 of the ECHR is not limited to words, written or spoken, but it extends to pictures and images including tv or radio broadcasts, films as well as electronic information etc.[11] The right to freedom of expression can be restricted in certain circumstances provided in the provisions of the human rights instruments. Although these instruments are hard law for the Member States, statutes and regulations of the international or national SGBs contain restrictions as to the right to freedom of expression. International or national SGBs are mostly established as associations.[12] The problem so far has arisen as to how national or international sports federations can restrict the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the national constitutions and international conventions.

Article 10 of the ECHR can also be applied in the field of sports because athletes can address a wide public during the competitions and may protest human rights violations or political events in their own country or elsewhere. Human rights violations including the right to freedom of expression may also occur in countries where the Olympic Games are held.[13] Generally, the IOC and its international federations take the necessary measures to ensure that athletes do not make political statements during competition. In fact, in 1967 famous boxer Mohammad Ali refused to fight in Vietnam to protest racial segregation.[14] During the 1968 Mexico City Summer Olympics, after winning the gold and the bronze medal in the 200-meter sprint, American athletes Tommie Smith and John Carlos stepped onto the podium barefoot, shared a pair of black gloves and raised their fists in the air when the national anthem played to protest against black poverty and lynching.[15] The IOC reacted swiftly and harshly to this 1968 black power salute, immediately suspending the athletes.[16] The history of sports has recorded various examples of athletes who were sanctioned or ostracized because they had exercised their freedom of expression. Colin Kaepernick and Eric Reid kneeled or sat on the bench while the national anthem was played as a protest against racial discrimination and police brutality against people of colour in the United States.[17] Both players were not contracted in the NFL in the subsequent season.[18] Czech national gymnast Vera Caslayska’s career ended as she protested against Soviet hegemony in her country during a medal ceremony in Mexico in 1968.[19] John Carlos and Tommie Smith were suspended immediately from the United States Olympic Team as a result of the black power salute.  FIFA fined the England Football Association because its members displayed poppies, a symbol of National Armistice Day, during the World Cup qualifier against Scotland. Likewise, Scottish and Irish clubs were fined for flying the Palestinian flag in stadiums.[20] “During the Sochi Games, the IOC even reprimanded athletes for placing small stickers on their helmets in memory of deceased freestyle skier Sarah Burke, calling the gesture political”.[21]

Sometimes an athlete makes futile efforts to obtain permission to protest the situation in their countries. The request by Ukrainian athletes to wear a black headband to remember those who died during the political demonstrations in Kiev was rejected by the IOC as political propaganda. However, protests or demonstrations by athletes may not always contain political content. For example, Cheryl Maas, a Dutch and gay skier, wanted to wear rainbow gloves to protest Russia’s anti-gay legislation, but he was not allowed.  

As there is no judgment of the ECtHR to confirm whether or not Rule 50(2) of the Olympic Charter complies with Article 10 of the ECHR, various arguments have been put forward by academics. Dhonchak thinks the rule set out in Rule 50(2) of the Olympic Charter must be struck down at the earliest.[22] However, Faut puts forward two solutions which could increase compliance with Article 10 of the ECHR. “The first one lies in more transparent and less excessive sanction mechanisms. A second option would be a laxer prohibition on political statements in the Olympic Charter, covering a smaller range of incidents”.[23] Anmol believes that IOC could also re-assess its position and come-up with fresh guidelines that uphold a balanced political speech before the Tokyo Olympics 2021.[24] For example, the IOC could allow the disciplinary body to assess the speech by examining its content and core intentions in accordance with the Fundamental Principles of Olympism set out in the Olympic Charter. Shahlaei states that “perhaps the solution lies somewhere in the middle. To maintain their general political objectivity, sports organizations could continue to prohibit purely domestic political gestures, such as flying a banner in support of a preferred presidential candidate. At the same time, they could allow athletes to express support for human rights, such as racial equality”.[25]

However, it should be noted that Rule 50 of the Olympic Charter in no way eliminates freedom of expression. In accordance with the Rule 50 Guidelines developed by the IOC Athletes’ Commission, outside the Olympic venues athletes have the opportunity to express their opinions during press conferences and interviews or at team meetings or on digital or traditional media, or on other platforms. Any protest or demonstration outside Olympic venues must obviously comply with local legislation wherever local law prohibits such actions.[26] Nonetheless, this discussion will surely continue until the ECtHR will shed light on the application of Article 10 of the ECHR to Rule 50(2) of the Olympic Charter.

[1] Although certain steps have been taken on human rights by IOC since Sochi Olympics, they are found by Grell unsatisfactory and creates uncertainty in several ways. For more information see Tomáš GRELL, The International Olympic Committee and Human Rights Reforms: Game Changer or Mere Window Dressing?, 17(2018) International Sports Law Journal, p. 161 et seq.

[2] IFAB Laws of the Game 2020/2021, The Players’ Equipment, p. 60: https://resources.fifa.com/image/upload/ifab-laws-of-the-game-2020-21.pdf?cloudid=d6g1medsi8jrrd3e4imp (accessed 17.5.2021).

[3] https://olympics.com/athlete365/who-we-are/athletes-declaration/(accessed 18.4.2021).

[4] FAUT, 254-255. For the text of the Olympic Charter of 1967 see http://www.olympic.org/Documents/Olympic%20Charter/Olympic_Charter_through_time/1967-Olympic_Charter.pdf. (accessed 20.4.2021).

[5] Olympic Charter in force as from 17 July 2020 © International Olympic Committee, Lausanne, 2020.

[6] Rule 50 Guidelines Developed by the IOC Athletes’ Commission: http://stillmedab.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/News/2020/01/Rule-50-Guidelines-Tokyo-2020.pdf

[7] Rule 50 Guidelines Developed by the IOC Athletes’ Commission.

[8] Rule 50 Guidelines Developed by the IOC Athletes’ Commission: http://stillmedab.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/News/2020/01/Rule-50-Guidelines-Tokyo-2020.pdf (accessed 17.4.2021).

[9] Johan LINDHOLM, From Carlos to Kaepernick and beyond: Athletes’ Right to Freedom of Expression, 17(2017)1-3 International Sports Law Journal, p. 2.

[10] LINDHOLM, 2.

[11] Frédérique FAUT, The Prohibition of Political Statements by Athletes and its Consistency with Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights: Speech is Silver, Silence is Gold?, 14(2014) International Sports Law Journal, p. 257; Monica MACOVEI, Freedom of Expression Human Rights Handbooks, No. 2 A guide to the Implementation of Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, 2^nd edition, January 2004, p. 7.

[12] For the criticisms about the extraordinary autonomy that sports governing bodies enjoy under Swiss law see Margareta BADDELEY, The Extraordinary Autonomy of Sports Bodies under Swiss Law: Lesson to be Drawn, 20(2020) International Sports Law Journal, p. 3-17.

[13] For the human rights violations occurred in China during Beijing Olympic Games see Bruce KIDD, Human Rights and Olympic Movement after Beijing, 13(2010) Sports in Society, p. 901-909.

[14] Faraz SHAHLAEI, When Sports Stand Against Human Rights: Regulating Restrictions on Athlete Speech in the Global Sports Arena, 38(2017)1 Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review, p.100.

[15] ANMOL, 67; SHAHLAEI, 101.

[16] SHAHLAEI, 101.

[17] ANMOL, 66; Brendan SCHWAB, Celebrate Humanity: Reconciling Sport and Human Rights through Athlete Activism, 28(2018)1 Journal of Legal Aspects of Sport, p. 170-171.

[18] SCHWAB, 171 footnote 2.

[19] SCHWAB, 171 footnote 6; ANMOL, 66.

[20] SHAHLAEI, 108.

[21] SHAHLAEI, 108-109.

[22] Dhananjay DHONCHAK, Rule 50 of the Olympic Charter-Protesting Racial Inequality, 04.09.20: https://opiniojuris.org/2020/09/04/rule-50-of-the-olympic-charter-protesting-racial-inequality  (accessed 17.4.2021).

[23] FAUT, 262.

[24] Jain ANMOL, Political Speech in Sports: A Case for Non-Prohibition, 2(2020)1 Journal for Sports Law, Policy and Governance, p. 73.

[25] SHAHLAEI, 116.

[26] Rule 50 Guidelines Developed by the IOC Athletes’ Commission.

On 15 April 2014, the Cairo Economic Court (the “Court") issued a seminal judgment declaring the broadcasting of a football match a sovereign act of State.[1]

Background

In Al-Jazeera v. the Minister of Culture, Minister of Information, and the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Radio and Television Union, a case registered under 819/5JY, the Al-Jazeera TV Network (the “Plaintiff” or “Al-Jazeera”) sued the Egyptian Radio and Television Union (“ERTU” or the “Union”) et al. (collectively, the “Respondents”) seeking compensation for material and moral damages amounting to three (3) million USD, in addition to interest, for their alleged breach of the Plaintiff’s exclusive right to broadcast a World Cup-qualification match in Egypt.  Al-Jazeera obtained such exclusive right through an agreement it signed with Sportfive, a sports marketing company that had acquired the right to broadcast Confederation of African Football (“CAF”) World Cup-qualification matches.

ERTU reportedly broadcasted the much-anticipated match between Egypt and Ghana live on 15 October 2013 without obtaining Al-Jazeera’s written approval, in violation of the Plaintiff’s intellectual property rights.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff’s Position

The Plaintiff explained that its right was protected by various provisions of Law No. 82/2002 on the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights (the “IP Law”). Most notably, the Plaintiff referred to Article 139, which provides for copyright protection for both Egyptians and citizens of World Trade Organization member States, and Article 149, which grants copyright owners the right to transfer, in writing, all or some of their rights in the copyrighted content to third parties.

In addition, the Plaintiff stated that Articles 157, 158 and 159 of the IP Law gave it exclusive economic rights in the content it owned or acquired, which precludes the exploitation of broadcasting the match in any manner (including its reproduction and communication to the public) by a third party without its prior written authorization.

By broadcasting the match live on Egyptian channels without obtaining the Al-Jazeera’s prior written authorization, ERTU - the Plaintiff argued - breached the Plaintiff’s intellectual property rights that are protected under Egyptian and international law.  

Respondents’ Position

The Respondents emphasized the political nature of the decision to broadcast the match. They argued that Egypt’s executive branch of government was entitled to take decisions respecting the broadcasting of the match in the interest of Egypt, and its peace and security, without incurring any penalty or enduring judicial scrutiny.  The Respondents added that broadcasting the match was an activity that took place entirely within Egypt pursuant to an executive decision and, as such, was an act of State that was immune to judicial scrutiny. Accordingly, broadcasting the match did not violate any laws or agreements. 

Judgment on Jurisdiction

The Court began its assessment of the case by examining its jurisdiction in accordance with Article 109 of the Code of Civil and Commercial Procedures, which grants courts the power to rule on their own jurisdiction in any case before them.  Then, it consulted Law No. 13 /1979 relating to the Egyptian Radio and Television Union, as amended (the “ERTU Law”), which provided for the establishment of a national authority under the name of “Egyptian Radio and Television Union”.  Among other things, the ERTU Law states that the Union is (i) deemed a national authority that assumes all the functions and duties associated with audio-visual media and broadcasting services in Egypt; (ii) shall have a separate juridical personality; and (iii) shall be subordinated to the Minister of Information.

The Court established that the decision to broadcast this match was issued by ERTU, a national authority entitled to broadcast audio-visual media in Egypt for the purpose of achieving national interests and services, and ensuring collective interest in all aspects including sports.

Against this background, the Court concluded that the Union’s decision to broadcast the match fell within the Union’s mandate, which was to be exercised on Egyptian territory and without interfering with the sovereignty or law of another state.  Therefore, the decision to broadcast the game was, in the opinion of the Court, an act of sovereignty that may not be the subject of litigation; and the executive authority was permitted to take all necessary measures in Egypt’s interests, while enjoying immunity against court supervision.  

Finding that it lacked jurisdiction, the Court did not address the Plaintiff’s claims relating to its intellectual property rights.

Lessons Learned and Next Steps

The judgment raises several questions regarding the scope of sovereign powers that can be exercised by a State.  Most importantly, it provides a novel interpretation of what constitutes an act of State. Furthermore, the decision will likely push companies entering into broadcasting agreements with the Union to take various precautions, such as  subjecting potential disputes to international arbitration, as opposed to the supervision of local courts. 

The judgment comes as another blow to Al-Jazeera in Egypt, which saw three of its journalists sentenced by an Egyptian court to prison terms ranging from seven (7) to ten (10) years for charges that included spreading false news. One of the journalists, Peter Greste, has already been deported to his native Australia pursuant to a decree law that allows the deportation of foreigners to their home countries to stand trial or serve the remainder of their sentence.  The other journalists have been released on bail and are currently awaiting their retrial after the Court of Cassation, Egypt’s highest court, quashed their sentence.

On 11 June 2014, Al-Jazeera appealed the Court’s decision to the Court of Cassation, explaining that a sovereign act of State can be easily distinguished from regular administrative activities such as the ones typically performed by the Union.  According to Al-Jazeera, an act of State covers high political considerations, such as the protection of national interests, upholding the terms and principles of the Constitution, and overseeing Egypt’s relations with other States to ensure domestic and international peace and security. A football match does not meet any of these criteria.

It is likely that the Court of Cassation will overturn the Court’s judgment in light of Egypt’s IP Law and the fact that broadcasting and licensing agreements are a regular business activity.  It is also important to observe how the Court of Cassation will address the lower Court’s novel interpretation of the act of State doctrine. While soccer is the most popular sport in Egypt, it is unclear how broadcasting a match can be linked to a State’s higher political interests.

Equally unclear is how Al-Jazeera will react should the Court of Cassation uphold the judgment, and whether it will consider resorting to international arbitration given that Egypt and Qatar signed a bilateral investment treaty in 1999 that protects investors’ intellectual property rights, among other things.

[1] Tarek Badawy (tarek.badawy@shahidlaw.com), Inji Fathalla (inji.fathalla@shahidlaw.com), and Nadim Magdy (nadim.magdy@shahidlaw.com) are Attorneys-at-Law at Sarwat A. Shahid Law Firm (“Shahid Law”) in Cairo, Egypt.  The views expressed in this articles are those of the authors and do not constitute legal advice.