The main lesson of this year’s transfer window is that UEFA’s Financial Fair Play (FFP) rules have a true bite (no pun intended). Surely, the transfer fees have reached usual highs with Suarez’s move to FC Barcelona and Rodriguez’s transfer from AS Monaco to Real Madrid and overall spending are roughly equal to 2013 (or go beyond as in the UK). But clubs sanctioned under the FFP rules (prominently PSG and Manchester City) have seemingly complied with the settlements reached with UEFA capping their transfer spending and wages.

FFP's Transfer Diet

PSG’s summer of impuissance

It was widely expected, and trumpeted, that PSG and Manchester City would disregard the transfer restrictions imposed on them. Besides all the talking and the costly recruitment of David Luiz for nearly 50M€ earlier this summer, PSG’s transfer activity was limited to Serge Aurier’s arrival on loan from modest Toulouse. Moreover, the talks over Di Maria’s move to PSG faltered over the inability of the French club to pay a transfer fee due to the FFP constraints. Thus, PSG was forced into relative thrift by the FFP rules, a remarkable achievement in itself. This has recently triggered widespread critique against UEFA and FFP by PSG officials.

Manchester City overtaken by Manchester United

Even though Manchester City has largely dominated the transfer contest against its arch-rival over the latest years, this balance has dramatically tilted during this summer. United was able to attract a number of high-ranked and expensive players, most notably Di Maria for the total sum of 66M€ (more than City’s total spending). In a final transfer twist, United was even able to snap away Falcao from City apparently due to FFP concerns.  City did not engage in the usual frenzy spending spree of the previous years. It did spend around 60 M€ (and racked in 25M€ in transfer fees), but this number pales in regard to the 116M€ spent in 2013. Here again, despite talks to the contrary and vouching to disregard UEFA’s FFP rules, one cannot ignore the toll taken by them on the capacity of Manchester City to outrageously dominate the UK transfer market.

The general timidity of FFP culprits

This is not an isolated development. Other clubs concerned by FFP settlements have followed a similar path (see graph below). In general, clubs sanctioned under FFP rules have reduced their transfer spending in comparison to previous years. More surprisingly, big players like PSG and Manchester City have complied with the net transfer limit of 49M€ imposed on them in the settlement. This points at an apparent success of the FFP regulations, which have not materialised, as many feared, as a public relations exercised in the guise of a toothless regulation. The rules have a real-world impact, and in spite of the high profiles of certain clubs concerned those have felt the urge to internalize them reinforcing UEFA’s claim that FFP is a serious regulation. As will be shown below, however, this also supports the claims that FFP regulations constitute a restriction on competition in need of adequate justification.

New strategies to bypass FFP rules 

This development has also led clubs to devise bypassing strategies to the FFP rules. The first strategy is to use loans as temporary or differed transfers by including a mandatory transfer clause in the contract. This is the solution adopted by PSG in the transfer of Serge Aurier from Toulouse. In a way there is no reason why this should not be considered as a new liability for accounting purposes, as it is akin to a delayed payment but not to a delayed transfer. Finally, there is the possibility of using affiliated clubs to store the long-term liabilities (wages and fees), while getting a player on short-term loans. This is likely the strategy used by Manchester City in the now infamous recruitment of Frank Lampard from its sister club New York City FC. Hence, one should not underestimate the ability of clubs to sidestep the FFP rules, albeit a way more difficult and protracted transfer game as before.

FFP’s compatibility with EU competition law still a threat

Does this real-world efficacy change anything to the assessment of FFP’s compatibility with EU competition law? Not really. On the one hand, it is all the more evident that the FFP rules have a restraining effect on free competition; certain economic actors are undoubtedly not free to invest their money, as they would see fit. On the other hand, the real test for evaluating the FFP’s compatibility with EU law is the Wouters/Meca-Medina proportionality test developed by the EU Court. First of all UEFA will have to identify the legitimate objective it intends to pursue with these regulations. This is likely to be good corporate governance, as one cannot consider that FFP rules improve the competitive balance by reducing the inequality between clubs in the absence of any redistributive effects. Actually, FFP will most likely sclerotize the pre-existing hierarchies. If good corporate governance in football is deemed a worthy objective (it probably will), the next question will be: are these regulations a proportionate mean to achieve it? At this stage UEFA will need to explain why the existing national bankruptcy frameworks are inadequate for this purpose (due, for example, to the political influence of clubs like in Spain, or to the particular feature of football competition that cannot tolerate the vagaries of a normal bankruptcy process), but also why the existing debt stock is not taken into account by the rules. Here, the brunt of the socio-political debate on the need of FFP will unfold.

As UEFA’s FFP rules strengthen their grip over clubs, they will be more and more incentivized to contest the rules in front of the EU Commission (PSG and Manchester City fans have recently submitted a complaint) or national tribunals. Thus, these questions will not remain hypothetical and will have to be met by UEFA with hard facts and convincing arguments. If not the FFP rules will be remembered as an ephemeral, though remarkable, interlude of the summer 2014.

 Data from transfermarkt.com

‎Editor's Note: Ryan is Assistant Professor at Thompson Rivers University, he defended his PhD at Erasmus University Rotterdam in December 2015. His dissertation examined human rights violations caused by international sporting events, and how international sporting organisations may be held accountable for these violations.

Introduction

On Sunday, August 21, the 2016 Summer Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro will end. The spotlight will dim not only on the athletes who return to their home countries to ply their trade in relative obscurity, but also on the country of Brazil.[1] Once the Games have ended, life will go ‘back to normal’, although for many residents of Rio de Janeiro, what is ‘normal’ is anything but.

Watching the opening ceremonies from the favelas – Andrej Isakovic via Getty Images

“A New World” for Favela Residents

While the world has been preoccupied with Zika, the Brazilian corruption crisis, the cesspool that is Guanabara Bay, and the worrying state of some of the sporting venues, the displacement of persons is perhaps the largest problem not only facing the Games, but is the largest one caused (or at least exacerbated) by the Games themselves. Since Rio de Janeiro was selected to be the host of the Olympic Games in 2009, over 77,000 individuals (22,000 families) have been evicted from their homes. Most, if not all, of these individuals were evicted from their homes in the favelas, or slums, communities that began to appear in earnest in the 1970s as Brazil, and Rio de Janeiro in particular, began to urbanize. Currently, favelas are home to 1.4 million people, or about 22% of Rio’s population. It is very likely that not all of these evictions were related to the Games directly. City officials have stated that only Vila Autodromo was directly-affected by the Games, as this particular favela was turned into a parking lot for the Olympic Park and twenty homes for those who refused to leave (Reuters provides a good before/after comparison).

Vila Autodromo (Olympic Park under construction) - Genilson Araújo / Parceiro/O Globo

However, seemingly taking their cue from Rio 2016’s slogan, “Um mundo novo” (“A New World”), city officials have used the Olympic Games as an excuse to ‘re-imagine’ the city on a broader scale. In a 2012 interview, the mayor of Rio stated that “The Olympics pretext is awesome; I need to use it as an excuse for everything…Now all that I need to do, I will do for the Olympics. Some things could be really related to the Games, others have nothing to do with them.” As such, people from favelas that have nothing to do with the Games have been evicted from their homes, with the Games creating the pseudo-state of ‘emergency’ that has, in other cities that have hosted the Games, been used as an excuse to bypass normal procedures and do away with normal protections, in the mold of Naomi Klein’s “shock capitalism”.

The Rio government has claimed to offer financial packages and resettlement options for those who were displaced. These compensation packages were imperfect, as the government offered less than market value for the homes, and those who were relocated may have been relocated anywhere from several to dozens of kilometers away from their former residence, uprooting their businesses or employment, and their social and family lives. However, the relocation policy appears to be the velvet glove concealing the iron fist. For those who resisted relocation, the city cut off their water, and halted garbage pickup and postal service, while violent clashes between residents and police have also been reported. While not directly-related to evictions, but closely related to conditions in the favelas, there has been a reported spike in police killings of street children to “clean the streets” ahead of the Games. While new housing is being built in Rio, much of it is set to be high-end condos, not affordable housing.

International Standards Regarding Housing

The focus of this particular blog post is not the legality of the displacement, per se. That is an issue best addressed by Brazilian lawyers. However, there are international standards that Brazil should live up to. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognises a right to own property, and prohibits the arbitrary deprivation of property. Another international instrument of wide application, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), recognises a right to an adequate standard of living. The ICESCR Committee, in its General Comments in 1991 and 1997, has interpreted this standard to include a right against forced evictions. If an eviction does occur, rights to information and participation by those who are affected arise. Finally, when an eviction does take place, a right to compensation and adequate resettlement attaches.

The case of Rio seems to suggest that forced evictions have likely occurred, based on the sheer scale of those who were evicted. Given the timeline of preparing for the Games, provisions on notice and information appear to have been curtailed or cancelled altogether, given that the city went to work on evicting persons immediately after Rio was awarded the right to host the Games in 2009. While some residents, particularly of Vila Autodromo, received compensation and alternative housing, in many cases there appears to be disagreement as to whether compensation has been offered at all with locals saying they have not received compensation, while city authorities deny evicting families without compensation. Actions such as police raids, and cutting off public services also suggest the evictions approach the threshold of ‘forced’ rather than voluntary/negotiated. Regardless of whether the letter of these international standards has been violated, the scope and pace of the evictions is of great concern.

IOC Stance Regarding Displacement

In particular, it should be distressing to readers to see the International Olympic Committee (IOC) seemingly stand by while these evictions occur in the name of the Games. And it is not as if the IOC has no clue that evictions take place due to the Games. For many Games, at least some displacement occurs to make way for infrastructure, while the 2008 Beijing Games saw an estimated 1.25 million people evicted due to Olympic-related projects.

The IOC has responded to the problems of displacement, pledging in 2009 to intervene with the Organising Committee for the Olympic Games (the OCOG – the actual body that is responsible for Games’ preparations) in situations where people who were displaced due to Olympic venue construction were ‘mistreated’. However, the IOC has not said anything publicly in regards to the evictions, and there is no public information regarding any IOC intervention.

Following the IOC’s Agenda 2020, and its recommendations on ‘social sustainability’, the IOC now requires cities bidding to host the Olympics to identify projects that may require displacement of existing communities, and to confirm that the procedures used to displace persons will conform to national and/or international standards. However, promises made by host cities are not always lived up to, as can be seen by Rio’s failed promises to treat 80% of the water flowing into Guanabara Bay, and treating only 21% on the eve of the Games. Rio is apparently also able to get away with such failed promises consequence-free, despite the risk of harm to athletes competing in and around the waters.

The Games Cannot Fix All Ills, But They Should Avoid Creating New Ones…

Ultimately, the largest problem with the Olympic Games is a lack of accountability. The IOC, an organisation based in Switzerland, holds the rights to the Games and selects the host city, but does not actually organise the Games. As such, the IOC often appears to act as though what happens ‘on the ground’ is neither its concern nor its responsibility. Those who actually organise the Games, particularly the OCOG and Host City (the National Olympic Committee of the host country also participates, but is not relevant here), often have limited accountability to those who are harmed by the Games. The OCOG disbands shortly after the Games are over, leaving the Host City holding the bag. The Host City’s accountability is entirely dependent on the political and legal structures of the country, and in countries like Russia (Sochi 2014, World Cup 2018), China (Beijing 2008, Beijing 2022), but even in more established democracies, Host City officials may have limited accountability.

Now is the time that commentators jump up-and-down to shout that hosting the Olympic Games in a single site would fix all of the problems. By placing the Games in Athens (no permanent Winter Games host is ever suggested), there wouldn’t be a need to host the Games in countries with questionable human rights records, or to watch as every single Olympic Games goes over-budget. However, rarely are suggestions made as to who will pay for the infrastructure, which will likely need to be periodically updated (it might be a bit hard for the Greek government to afford it at this point), cope with the criticism that the Games would be cemented as a Euro-centric enterprise, or the other problems that would arise with a permanent host. The Olympic Games are going to continue to be held in countries with imperfect human rights records (which would be pretty much all of them), and in countries with poor human rights records.

All of this is to say that the IOC needs to begin to actually enforce its ideals, and its own mandate of ensuring an Olympic Games that is socially sustainable. The IOC and the Olympic Games should not be the solution to human rights problems in a host country, for they cannot be. However, the IOC does have a minimum moral responsibility to ensure that the Olympic Games themselves are prepared for with the utmost consideration for human rights. And the IOC already has the powers to enforce this mandate through the Host City Contract, whether by withholding money from the Host City, or at the most extreme end, by removing the Games altogether. The IOC has also arguably set a precedent of withholding its support for a country to host future sporting events as a result of the Russian doping scandal, and it could do the same for Olympic host cities that engage in practices that violate human rights in the name of the Games. Of course, this is ultimately up to the IOC itself, barring pressure from states or sponsors.

The Olympic Games were never going to fix Brazil’s or Rio’s problems. Many of Rio’s problems, including Zika, ongoing sanitation issues, corruption, and political and economic instability, have little to no connection to the Games, and were certainly not caused by the Games. In that vein, it is naïve to believe that the Games could be anything more than a temporary papering-over of the deep divisions in Brazilian society (for more on this point, I suggest reading Dave Zirin’s book, Brazil’s Dance with the Devil). What the Olympic Games can do is serve as an example of how to carry out a socially-sustainable project in an emerging market economy. This applies not only to the displacement of persons, but also to the treatment of those who work on construction projects related to the Games (as opposed to the forced labour used in Beijing and Sochi), the environmental sustainability of the Games, and governmental policies and procedures that enhance accountability. While the IOC has made tentative steps to address these issues, as I have addressed before in this space, it is insufficient. The IOC cannot solve all the world’s ills, but it can at least ensure that the Games, carried out under its name, live up to its own standards.  The Rio Olympic Games could have served as an example of how to carry out a socially-sustainable project in an emerging market economy.

[1] Although the Paralympics will arrive on 7 September, and while London 2012 did an excellent job of promoting those Games it remains to be seen if Rio will follow suit.