Asser International Sports Law Blog

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The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

The legality of surety undertakings in relation to minor football players: the Lokilo case. By Adriaan Wijckmans

Editor's note: Adriaan Wijckmans is an associate specialized in sports law at the Belgium law firm Altius.

In a recent judgment, the Brussels Court of First Instance confirmed the legality of a so-called surety undertaking, i.e. an agreement in which the parents of a minor playing football guarantee that their child will sign a professional contract with a football club as soon as the child reaches the legal age of majority.

This long-awaited ruling was hailed, on the one hand, by clubs as a much needed and eagerly anticipated confirmation of a long-standing practice in Belgian football[1] and, on the other hand, criticised by FIFPro, the international player’s trade union, in a scathing press release.

Background

Jason Eyenga-Lokilo (“Jason Lokilo”), born on 17 September 1998, joined the youth academy at Belgian top club, RSC Anderlecht (“Anderlecht”), in the spring of 2007. Anderlecht had set up a specific youth academy a couple of months earlier, which combined school education and football training for young football players.

As Jason Lokilo was one of the youth academy’s more promising prospects, Anderlecht and Lokilo’s parents entered into an agreement in which the parents, in exchange for a payment of 75,000 EUR (paid in instalments), guaranteed Anderlecht that their son was going to sign his first professional contract with the club upon turning 16, i.e. the minimum age in Belgium for signing a player contract. This same agreement stipulated that the parents were liable to pay Anderlecht a lump sum of 450,000 EUR in damages, if their son did not sign such a player contract.

When, in 2013, Aston Villa made a request to Anderlecht to give Jason Lokilo a trial when he was 15 years of age, Anderlecht refused, citing the player’s training obligations and the existing surety undertaking. Jason Lokilo’s father, a football agent, then told Anderlecht that he wanted to revise the terms of the surety undertaking, given the fact that a number of European football ‘powerhouses’ wanted to sign his son. Anderlecht refused his demand.

In June 2014, Jason Lokilo and his parents sent a letter to Anderlecht arguing that the surety undertaking was unlawful and hence null and void. Jason Lokilo alleged that unacceptable coercion had been put on him to sign his first contract with Anderlecht, which the player and his advisers considered was contrary to public policy. Anderlecht replied that it considered the surety undertaking to be perfectly valid since the surety did not prevent the player from signing his first professional contract with another club.

By the end of July of 2014, the gridlock between both parties ended with Jason Lokilo leaving Anderlecht and the latter club starting court proceedings against Jason Lokilo’s parents for a damages claim of 450,000 EUR.

Jason Lokilo eventually signed a contract with Crystal Palace in the summer of 2015.[2]

The Brussels Court of First Instance ruling

In its 22 November 2016 judgment, the Brussels Court of First Instance (“CFI”) confirmed the principle of this surety undertaking in the context of professional football.

The CFI referred to Article 1120 of the Belgian Civil Code that expressly allows the principle of a surety undertaking. A surety undertaking under Belgian civil law can be defined as an agreement in which one party promises another party regarding what a third party (who is either absent or legally not competent) will do, give or refrain from doing. The third party retains the freedom not to commit himself, since he, as a third party, is not bound by the agreement. However, the contracting party that made the promise will in that case be liable to pay the contractually foreseen damages if this third party eventually does not commit himself.

The main question the court had to decide was to determine whether the surety undertaking had a valid object and cause.

Jason Lokilo’s parents first argued that the contract was contrary to public policy legislation, considering the contract violated the freedom of association principle enshrined in the Convention on the Rights of the Child (“UNCRC”), the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) and the European Social Charter (“ESC”). The CFI did not follow this reasoning, simply stating that the surety undertaking did not bind Jason Lokilo and did not prevent him from signing a contract with another club.[3]

Lokilo’s parents also invoked an alleged violation of Belgian federal legislation, which prohibits player contracts below the minimum age requirement. This argument was cast aside by the court since at no point in time was a player contract signed below the legal minimum age of 16.

Furthermore, Lokilo’s parents argued that the contract breached a (regional) decree guaranteeing an amateur sportsperson the right to leave their club free-of-charge at the end of each sporting season. The CFI repeated that Lokilo was not bound by the surety undertaking and could still freely leave Anderlecht, stating that this outcome was, moreover, exactly what Lokilo did in 2014. An aggravating circumstance for the CFI was the fact that Lokilo’s father had indicated to Anderlecht that Aston Villa in 2013 was willing to cover the 450,000 EUR in damages, as a result of which the CFI considered these damages were ‘clearly not an obstacle for Jason Lokilo to leave Anderlecht’.

The argument invoked by Lokilo’s parents under EU law (free movement) was also dismissed by the CFI ‘for lack of a cross-border EU element[4].

In the end, the CFI granted damages to Anderlecht but limited the amount payable by the parents, on the one hand, based on the grounds that Jason Lokilo’s mother was not an agent (and hence not professionally active in football) and, on the other hand, because 450,000 clearly exceeded the actual damages suffered by Anderlecht. The CFI set the damages ex aequo et bono at 140,000 EUR instead.

Some considerations

The Lokilo case echoes the Spanish Baena case,[5] although the latter concerned a slightly different situation and had a clearly different outcome.

Where the Spanish Supreme Court in its 5 February 2013 ruling considered a pre-contractual agreement concluded on behalf of a minor football player at odds with the minor’s best interests and therefore contrary to public policy, the CFI adopted a rather strict ‘pacta sunt servanda’ approach.

The CFI considered that the surety undertaking did not prevent Lokilo from signing a contract with a club other than Anderlecht. This finding may be correct from a strictly legal perspective, but ignores the reality that a child may not want to pursue his or her career at another club if he realises that, by doing so, his or her parents will be liable to pay damages. Moreover, under Belgian law, while a minor is indeed of legal age to sign his or her first professional contract when turning 16, the minor in principle still needs parental authorisation to do so until reaching 18 years of age. Parents might of course not be very inclined to agree to their child signing his or her first professional contract elsewhere, and therefore not provide the necessary parental authorisation, if doing so triggers important financial liabilities for them…

The surety undertaking seems also incompatible with regional decrees guaranteeing amateur sportsmen the right to leave their club free-of-charge at the end of each sporting season. These decrees are considered to have a public policy character by the case law, and disallow any hindrance, financial or otherwise, when moving to another sports club.[6] The fact that the surety undertaking related to a switch from an amateur to a professional contract,[7] did not alter the fact that the player was not free to leave for another amateur club when turning 16 either, since he was forced to sign a professional contract with Anderlecht when turning 16 or see his parents face the prospect of paying hefty compensation.

Arguments regarding the fundamental rights of the minor were either not invoked or not upheld by the CFI. The CFI stated that the matter concerned a contract between the parents and the club and not between the player and the club, as a result of which the minor’s fundamental rights were not jeopardised.

This argument is frankly unconvincing.

It should be noted that the UNCRC[8] recognises the right of a child to freedom of association[9] and the right to participate freely in cultural life.[10] The UNCRC furthermore protects children from economic exploitation.[11] The UNCRC provides also that “in all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.”

The UNCRC is often labeled as ‘soft’ law,[12] with Belgian case law even considering most of its provisions lacking a self-sufficient or self-executing character;[13] yet, the UNCRC remains a treaty with clear moral authority. Moreover, a number of its provisions do have direct effect, especially when read in combination with other international legal sources, such as the ECHR and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. The obligation to consider the best interests of the child is expressly incorporated in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.[14] Even though the obligation to observe the child’s best interests is not expressly laid down under the ECHR, the ECtHR incorporates this obligation also in its case law.[15] One could further argue that the surety undertaking disproportionally affects the career development and perspectives of a player who is a minor, and so violates that player’s proprietary rights[16] and the right to family life that both the player and the player’s family enjoy.[17]

In addition, both the Belgian Constitution[18] and the Belgian Economic Code[19] protect the freedom for each individual to freely choose his or her occupation. This freedom can only be curtailed through or by law.[20] An agreement jeopardising one’s freedom to freely choose one’s occupation, has an unlawful causa and is null and void.[21]

The statement made by the CFI that the EU internal market law does not apply due to a lack of cross-border effect is at odds with the fact that Lokilo clearly intended to join a club outside Belgium, within the EEA (as shown by Aston Villa’s interest and his eventual signing with Crystal Palace), a fact that was not contested by Anderlecht. As Anderlecht is a Belgian football ‘powerhouse’, and clearly one of the top clubs in Belgium (if not the top club), a player aiming higher than Anderlecht would necessarily have to look at opportunities abroad.

If EU law is deemed to apply, then the guiding principles of the Bernard case must be observed. The CJEU, in its Bernard ruling,[22] recalled that an obstacle to the freedom of movement of workers can be accepted only if it pursues a legitimate aim and is justified by overriding reasons in the public interest. The CJEU clearly accepted recruitment and training of players as a legitimate aim. Even where that is so, that measure’s application still must be such as to ensure the objective’s achievement and not go beyond what is necessary for that purpose. In considering whether a system restricts the freedom of movement, the specific characteristics of sport, and of football in particular, their social and educational function, should be taken into account. One may even take into account the costs of training other players that do not succeed at establishing a professional career (the player factor).[23]

This being said, the surety undertaking mechanism in this case seems overly restrictive for the player. Although, again, a surety undertaking binds the parents and not the player, and damages can only be claimed from the parents, the surety undertaking obviously ultimately serves to discourage a player from exercising his or her right of free movement. Moreover, the player already suffers a restriction upon his or her free movement, following the training compensation mechanism in place under FIFA regulations, which is criticisable in its own right.[24] The surety undertaking constitutes an additional burden on the player’s free movement. In Bernard, although the CJEU seemed to accept the principle of training compensation, the CJEU dismissed the French arrangements governing young players (‘joueurs espoirs’) since they did not involve compensation for real training costs incurred, but rather were damages for breach of contractual obligations calculated with reference to the total loss suffered by the club. And taking into account the actual loss suffered by Anderlecht is exactly what the CFI has done. To the extent a surety undertaking goes beyond what is necessary to encourage the recruitment and training of minors (and funds those activities), a violation of the EU internal market law seems given.

Conclusion

In conclusion, based on the considerations set out above, it can certainly not be excluded that the ruling will be overturned on appeal. Such an appeal, which would bring the case before the Brussels Court of Appeal, is being considered by the player’s parents, but has not yet been lodged.

Apart from the doubt around their enforceability, it should be noted that payments under surety undertakings may in addition give rise to (social) tax issues, if they are not structured correctly.[25] [26]

The problem with the surety undertaking in the Lokilo case predominantly lies with the surety undertaking’s disproportionate character in the specific case at hand. Less restrictive solutions could, in the author’s view, be envisaged, although exploring such alternatives would exceed the scope of this article.



[1] Surety undertakings, together with money lending contracts (loan to parents pledging that their child will sign first professional contract, non-reimbursable if child effectively signs contract), are common practice with Belgian top level teams.

[2] Jason Lokilo is still a member of the Crystal Palace Academy. Crystal Palace offered Anderlecht compensation for an approximate amount of 45,000 EUR, which Anderlecht refused.

[3](…), la convention de porte-fort litigieuse n’engageait que les parents de Jason vis-à-vis du club et ne créait aucune obligation pour lui

[4]Or, contrairement à l’arrêt Bernard qu’ils invoquent (arrêt du 16 mars 2010 – pièce 3 de leur dossier), M. et Mme Lokilo ne démontrent pas, dans le cas present, l’existence d’un élément d’extranéité.

[5] Sentencia de 5 de febrero de 2013. STS 229/2013. Tribunal Supremo. Sala de lo Civil. http://www.iurismuga.org/es/bases-de-datos/jurisprudencia/144-jurisprudencia-derecho-espanol/8153-sts-n-de-resolucion-26-2013-de-05-02-2013-sentencia-baena. The case was invoked by the parents before the CFI but considered irrelevant because, according to the CFI, the contract between Baena and Barcelona was entered into by (on behalf of) the minor player.

[6] Vred. Ghent 16 September 2013, role n° 130318.

[7] The relevant decrees apply to amateur sports, not professional sports.

[8] http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CRC.aspx

[9] Article 15 UNCRC

[10] Article 31 UNCRC

[11] Article 32 and 36 UNCRC. One may argue that, in the end, a child is used to generate money through (later) transfers and sponsorship deals.

[12] H. Stalford, Children and the European Union: Rights, Welfare and Accountability, Hart Publishing, [2012], 34.

[13] Belgian case law has been reluctant to grant direct effect to the UNCRC: cf. Cass. 11 June 2010, obs. S. Van Drooghenbroeck, Le droit international et européen des droits de l’homme devant le juge national, Larcier, [2014], 196 and following.

[14] Article 24 (2) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights

[15] Handbook on European law relating to the rights of the child, European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 75.

[16] Article 1 of ECHR First Protocol: “Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. (…)”.

[17] Article 8 ECHR

[18] Article 23 Constitution

[19] Article II.9 of the Economic Code. This is one of the oldest Belgian public policy principles, previously laid down in the famous Decree D'Allarde of 2 - 17 March 1791

[20] C.E. 12 July 1993, JLMB [1993], 1442, note J.F. NEURAY

[21] Cass. 29 September 2008, C.06.443.F, JTT [2008] 464.

[22] CJEU 16 March 2010, Olympique Lyonnais v Olivier Bernard and Newcastle United.

[23] i.e. the ratio of players who need to be trained to produce one professional player.

[24] S. Weatherill, European Sports Law, T.M.C. Asser Press [2014], 485 and following.

[25] The tax and social security authorities may e.g. argue that these payments relate to the (future) employment contract of the player.

[26] The surety undertaking’s ‘nephew’, the money lending contracts, in addition pose problems under Belgian finance law since clubs as a rule do not possess the necessary licences or authorisations.


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Asser International Sports Law Blog | WISLaw Blog Symposium - Freedom of Expression in Article 10 of the ECHR and Rule 50 of the IOC Charter: Are these polar opposites? - By Nuray Ekşi

Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

WISLaw Blog Symposium - Freedom of Expression in Article 10 of the ECHR and Rule 50 of the IOC Charter: Are these polar opposites? - By Nuray Ekşi

Editor's note: Prof. Dr. Ekşi is a full-time lecturer and chair of Department of Private International Law at Özyeğin University Faculty of Law. Prof. Ekşi is the founder and also editor in chief of the Istanbul Journal of Sports Law which has been in publication since 2019.


While Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’) secures the right to freedom of expression, Rule 50 of the Olympic Charter of 17 July 2020 (‘Olympic Charter’) restricts this freedom. Following the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) relating to sports, national and international sports federations have incorporated human rights-related provisions into their statutes and regulations. They also emphasized respect for human rights. For example, Article 3 of the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (‘FIFA’) Statutes, September 2020 edition, provides that “FIFA is committed to respecting all internationally recognised human rights and shall strive to promote the protection of these rights”. Likewise, the Fundamental Principles of Olympism which are listed after the Preamble of the of the Olympic Charter 2020 also contains human rights related provisions. Paragraph 4 of Fundamental Principles of Olympism provides that the practice of sport is a human right. Paragraph 6 forbids discrimination of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, sexual orientation, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. In addition, the International Olympic Committee (‘IOC’) inserted human rights obligations in the 2024 and 2028 Host City Contract.[1] The IOC Athletes’ Rights and Responsibilities Declaration even goes further and aspires to promote the ability and opportunity of athletes to practise sport and compete without being subject to discrimination. Fair and equal gender representation, privacy including protection of personal information, freedom of expression, due process including the right to a fair hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial panel, the right to request a public hearing and the right to an effective remedy are the other human rights and principles stated in the IOC Athletes’ Rights and Responsibilities Declaration. Despite sports federations’ clear commitment to the protection of human rights, it is arguable that their statutes and regulations contain restrictions on athletes and sports governing bodies exercising their human rights during competitions or in the field. In this regard, particular attention should be given to the right to freedom of expression on which certain restrictions are imposed by the federations even if it done with good intentions and with the aim of raising awareness.

 

The provisions prohibiting propaganda and political demonstrations are enshrined in the statutes and regulations of international and national federations. For example, International Football Association Board (‘IFAB’) Laws of the Game 2020/2021 states that players must not reveal undergarments that display any political, religious, personal slogans, statements or images, or advertising other than the manufacturer’s logo.[2] As with any offence, the player and/or the team will be sanctioned by the competition organiser, national football association or by FIFA. On the one hand, freedom of expression is listed among the rights of athletes in Paragraph 11 of the IOC Athletes’ Rights and Responsibilities Declaration[3], on the other hand, Rule 50(2) of the Olympic Charter restricts demonstrations or political, religious or racial propaganda, which may adversely affect freedom of expression. The propaganda ban was first introduced by the 1967 Olympic Charter.[4] This ban has been retained in later versions with minor modifications. Under the title of “propaganda advertising, demonstration”, Rule 50(2) of the current version of the Olympic Charter[5] provides that “no kind of demonstration or political, religious or racial propaganda is permitted in any Olympic sites, venues or other areas”. The aim of Rule 50(2) of the Olympic Charter in prohibiting political statements is to maintain the neutrality of sport.[6] Rule 50(2) is only applicable in Olympic venues, namely on the field of play, in the Olympic Village, during Olympic medal ceremonies or during the opening, closing and other official ceremonies.[7] Displaying any political messaging, including signs or armbands, gestures of a political nature, like a hand gesture or kneeling, and refusal to follow the ceremonies protocol are some examples of what would constitute a protest, as opposed to expressing views non-exhaustingly indicated in Rule 50 Guidelines Developed by the IOC Athletes’ Commission.[8]

 

A disciplinary sanction can be applied against an athlete who has breached Rule 50(2) of the Olympic Charter. This sanction can be reviewed by the ad hoc division of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (‘CAS’) established for the Olympic Games.[9] An arbitral award of CAS can be challenged before the Swiss Federal Court on the grounds listed in Article 190 of the Swiss Private International Law including public policy.[10] Since freedom of expression is among the fundamental human rights guaranteed by Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the Swiss Federal Tribunal may rule that a CAS arbitral award is incompatible with public policy. The limitations set out in the statutes and regulations of the national and international sports federations pertaining to the freedom of expression are aimed to protect the neutrality of sport and separate it from political, religious or any other type of interference; however, one cannot exclude potential challenges to be filed against Switzerland before the ECtHR. As in the Pechstein and Mutu cases, the sports community, including CAS, anxiously awaited what the ECtHR would decide. The judgements of the ECtHR have been taken into consideration and respect for human rights has been integrated in the statutes of some SGBs, including the IOC Charter.

 

Although the IOC is established as an association under the Swiss Association Law, the rules of its Charter may adversely affect the enjoyment of certain human rights. Freedom of expression is enshrined not only in Article 10 of the ECHR but also in other international human rights legislative instruments, including Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, Article 11 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, Article 17(1) of Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence, Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Article 10 of the ECHR covers not only the disclosure of political ideas, but also the freedom to disclose any literary, commercial and other ideas. The freedom of expression protected under Article 10 of the ECHR is not limited to words, written or spoken, but it extends to pictures and images including tv or radio broadcasts, films as well as electronic information etc.[11] The right to freedom of expression can be restricted in certain circumstances provided in the provisions of the human rights instruments. Although these instruments are hard law for the Member States, statutes and regulations of the international or national SGBs contain restrictions as to the right to freedom of expression. International or national SGBs are mostly established as associations.[12] The problem so far has arisen as to how national or international sports federations can restrict the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the national constitutions and international conventions.

 

Article 10 of the ECHR can also be applied in the field of sports because athletes can address a wide public during the competitions and may protest human rights violations or political events in their own country or elsewhere. Human rights violations including the right to freedom of expression may also occur in countries where the Olympic Games are held.[13] Generally, the IOC and its international federations take the necessary measures to ensure that athletes do not make political statements during competition. In fact, in 1967 famous boxer Mohammad Ali refused to fight in Vietnam to protest racial segregation.[14] During the 1968 Mexico City Summer Olympics, after winning the gold and the bronze medal in the 200-meter sprint, American athletes Tommie Smith and John Carlos stepped onto the podium barefoot, shared a pair of black gloves and raised their fists in the air when the national anthem played to protest against black poverty and lynching.[15] The IOC reacted swiftly and harshly to this 1968 black power salute, immediately suspending the athletes.[16] The history of sports has recorded various examples of athletes who were sanctioned or ostracized because they had exercised their freedom of expression. Colin Kaepernick and Eric Reid kneeled or sat on the bench while the national anthem was played as a protest against racial discrimination and police brutality against people of colour in the United States.[17] Both players were not contracted in the NFL in the subsequent season.[18] Czech national gymnast Vera Caslayska’s career ended as she protested against Soviet hegemony in her country during a medal ceremony in Mexico in 1968.[19] John Carlos and Tommie Smith were suspended immediately from the United States Olympic Team as a result of the black power salute.  FIFA fined the England Football Association because its members displayed poppies, a symbol of National Armistice Day, during the World Cup qualifier against Scotland. Likewise, Scottish and Irish clubs were fined for flying the Palestinian flag in stadiums.[20] “During the Sochi Games, the IOC even reprimanded athletes for placing small stickers on their helmets in memory of deceased freestyle skier Sarah Burke, calling the gesture political”.[21]

 

Sometimes an athlete makes futile efforts to obtain permission to protest the situation in their countries. The request by Ukrainian athletes to wear a black headband to remember those who died during the political demonstrations in Kiev was rejected by the IOC as political propaganda. However, protests or demonstrations by athletes may not always contain political content. For example, Cheryl Maas, a Dutch and gay skier, wanted to wear rainbow gloves to protest Russia’s anti-gay legislation, but he was not allowed.  

 

As there is no judgment of the ECtHR to confirm whether or not Rule 50(2) of the Olympic Charter complies with Article 10 of the ECHR, various arguments have been put forward by academics. Dhonchak thinks the rule set out in Rule 50(2) of the Olympic Charter must be struck down at the earliest.[22] However, Faut puts forward two solutions which could increase compliance with Article 10 of the ECHR. “The first one lies in more transparent and less excessive sanction mechanisms. A second option would be a laxer prohibition on political statements in the Olympic Charter, covering a smaller range of incidents”.[23] Anmol believes that IOC could also re-assess its position and come-up with fresh guidelines that uphold a balanced political speech before the Tokyo Olympics 2021.[24] For example, the IOC could allow the disciplinary body to assess the speech by examining its content and core intentions in accordance with the Fundamental Principles of Olympism set out in the Olympic Charter. Shahlaei states that “perhaps the solution lies somewhere in the middle. To maintain their general political objectivity, sports organizations could continue to prohibit purely domestic political gestures, such as flying a banner in support of a preferred presidential candidate. At the same time, they could allow athletes to express support for human rights, such as racial equality”.[25]

 

However, it should be noted that Rule 50 of the Olympic Charter in no way eliminates freedom of expression. In accordance with the Rule 50 Guidelines developed by the IOC Athletes’ Commission, outside the Olympic venues athletes have the opportunity to express their opinions during press conferences and interviews or at team meetings or on digital or traditional media, or on other platforms. Any protest or demonstration outside Olympic venues must obviously comply with local legislation wherever local law prohibits such actions.[26] Nonetheless, this discussion will surely continue until the ECtHR will shed light on the application of Article 10 of the ECHR to Rule 50(2) of the Olympic Charter.


[1] Although certain steps have been taken on human rights by IOC since Sochi Olympics, they are found by Grell unsatisfactory and creates uncertainty in several ways. For more information see Tomáš GRELL, The International Olympic Committee and Human Rights Reforms: Game Changer or Mere Window Dressing?, 17(2018) International Sports Law Journal, p. 161 et seq.

[2] IFAB Laws of the Game 2020/2021, The Players’ Equipment, p. 60: https://resources.fifa.com/image/upload/ifab-laws-of-the-game-2020-21.pdf?cloudid=d6g1medsi8jrrd3e4imp (accessed 17.5.2021).

[3] https://olympics.com/athlete365/who-we-are/athletes-declaration/(accessed 18.4.2021).

[4] FAUT, 254-255. For the text of the Olympic Charter of 1967 see http://www.olympic.org/Documents/Olympic%20Charter/Olympic_Charter_through_time/1967-Olympic_Charter.pdf. (accessed 20.4.2021).

[5] Olympic Charter in force as from 17 July 2020 © International Olympic Committee, Lausanne, 2020.

[6] Rule 50 Guidelines Developed by the IOC Athletes’ Commission: http://stillmedab.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/News/2020/01/Rule-50-Guidelines-Tokyo-2020.pdf

[7] Rule 50 Guidelines Developed by the IOC Athletes’ Commission.

[8] Rule 50 Guidelines Developed by the IOC Athletes’ Commission: http://stillmedab.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/News/2020/01/Rule-50-Guidelines-Tokyo-2020.pdf (accessed 17.4.2021).

[9] Johan LINDHOLM, From Carlos to Kaepernick and beyond: Athletes’ Right to Freedom of Expression, 17(2017)1-3 International Sports Law Journal, p. 2.

[10] LINDHOLM, 2.

[11] Frédérique FAUT, The Prohibition of Political Statements by Athletes and its Consistency with Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights: Speech is Silver, Silence is Gold?, 14(2014) International Sports Law Journal, p. 257; Monica MACOVEI, Freedom of Expression Human Rights Handbooks, No. 2 A guide to the Implementation of Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, 2nd edition, January 2004, p. 7.

[12] For the criticisms about the extraordinary autonomy that sports governing bodies enjoy under Swiss law see Margareta BADDELEY, The Extraordinary Autonomy of Sports Bodies under Swiss Law: Lesson to be Drawn, 20(2020) International Sports Law Journal, p. 3-17.

[13] For the human rights violations occurred in China during Beijing Olympic Games see Bruce KIDD, Human Rights and Olympic Movement after Beijing, 13(2010) Sports in Society, p. 901-909.

[14] Faraz SHAHLAEI, When Sports Stand Against Human Rights: Regulating Restrictions on Athlete Speech in the Global Sports Arena, 38(2017)1 Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review, p.100.

[15] ANMOL, 67; SHAHLAEI, 101.

[16] SHAHLAEI, 101.

[17] ANMOL, 66; Brendan SCHWAB, Celebrate Humanity: Reconciling Sport and Human Rights through Athlete Activism, 28(2018)1 Journal of Legal Aspects of Sport, p. 170-171.

[18] SCHWAB, 171 footnote 2.

[19] SCHWAB, 171 footnote 6; ANMOL, 66.

[20] SHAHLAEI, 108.

[21] SHAHLAEI, 108-109.

[22] Dhananjay DHONCHAK, Rule 50 of the Olympic Charter-Protesting Racial Inequality, 04.09.20: https://opiniojuris.org/2020/09/04/rule-50-of-the-olympic-charter-protesting-racial-inequality  (accessed 17.4.2021).

[23] FAUT, 262.

[24] Jain ANMOL, Political Speech in Sports: A Case for Non-Prohibition, 2(2020)1 Journal for Sports Law, Policy and Governance, p. 73.

[25] SHAHLAEI, 116.

[26] Rule 50 Guidelines Developed by the IOC Athletes’ Commission.


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