After the success of this year’s World Cup in Brazil, FIFA President Sepp Blatter can start concentrating on his Presidential campaign for next June’s FIFA elections. Even though the 78-year old Swiss is not officially a candidate yet, he is still very popular in large parts of the world, and therefore the favourite to win the race. Nonetheless, even for the highly experienced Mr. Blatter these elections will be different. All candidates will have to respect the newly introduced Electoral Regulations for the FIFA Presidency. 

The Electoral Regulations are the latest addition to the reform process FIFA initiated more than two years ago following the controversial awarding of the 2018 and 2022 World Cups to Russia and Qatar. The stated aim of the Regulation is to make the elections more transparent, democratic and to prevent possible corruption accusations.[1] Its legal basis is found in Article 24(4) of the 2013 FIFA Statutes and reads as follows:

“The conditions to be observed during a candidature for the office of President are stipulated in the Electoral Regulations for the FIFA Presidency. These regulations shall be issued by the Executive Committee.”

Earlier editions of the FIFA Statutes did not include a reference to electoral regulations. In comparing the 2013 Statutes with the 2010 Statutes used for the previous elections one can witness the extent of this dramatic change. Pursuant to Article 24 of the 2010 edition, “only the Members[2] may propose candidatures for the office of FIFA President. Members shall notify the FIFA general secretariat in writing in the name of a candidate for the FIFA presidency at least two months before the date of the Congress.” Furthermore, “the general secretariat shall notify the Members of the names of proposed candidates at least one month before the date of the Congress.” Other criteria regarding the eligibility of candidates were not included.

The first fundamental change to take place at the 2015 election will be the setting up of an Ad-hoc electoral Committee pursuant to Article 7(1) Electoral Regulations. The Ad-hoc Electoral Committee shall be composed of the chairman of the FIFA Disciplinary Committee, the chairman of the FIFA Appeal Committee and the chairman of the FIFA Audit and Compliance Committee[3] and shall assess whether a candidate meets the profile specifications provided for by the eligibility criteria stipulated in Article 13 of the Electoral Regulations and Article 24 of the FIFA Statutes.[4]

The second fundamental change is that, in accordance with article 13(1), Candidates for the office of President must meet the following requirements:

1. The candidate shall have played an active role in association football (as a board member, committee member, referee and assistant referee, coach, trainer and any other person responsible for technical, medical or administrative matters in FIFA, a Confederation, Association, League or Club or as a player) for two of the last five years before being proposed as a candidate (cf. art. 24 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes).

2. The candidate shall have been proposed by a member association in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes.

3.  The candidate shall present declarations of support from at least five member associations (cf. art. 24 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes). Being proposed as a candidate by a member association shall be understood as a declaration of support. Each member may only present a declaration of support for one person. If a member association presents declarations of support for more than one person, all its declarations shall become invalid.

The flowchart below summarises the key procedural steps set out in the Electoral Regulations:

Has the Presidential campaign already begun?

The Presidential campaign has already started due to the fact that one person has declared himself a candidate. This person is neither Mr. Blatter nor “Europe’s favourite” Michel Platini, but former FIFA official Jérôme Champagne. Mr. Champagne, who is personally funding his own campaign, has stated that he has received the support of at least five Member Associations and that the FIFA general secretariat has been notified of his candidature. Details on which Member Associations support the Frenchman remain undisclosed.

During the last FIFA Congress that took place in Sao Paulo in June this year, the Ad-Hoc Electoral Committee was also set up consisting of Mr. Domenico Scala (ltaly), chairman of the FIFA Audit and Compliance Committee, Mr. Claudio Sulser (Switzerland), chairman of the FIFA Disciplinary Committee, and Mr. Larry Mussenden (Bermuda), chairman of the FIFA Appeal Committee. The next step would be for the Ad-hoc Electoral Committee to forward the proposed candidature of Jérôme Champagne to the Ethics Committee pursuant Article 15(10) of the Electoral Regulations.

As stated above, Sepp Blatter is not yet a candidate, but it is expected that he will run for a fifth consecutive term in office. Interestingly enough, in accordance with Article 2(2) of the Electoral Regulations, “if a person engages in campaign or similar activities that give the appearance that he is a candidate, the Ad-hoc Electoral Committee or, if the Ad-hoc Electoral Committee has not yet been constituted, the FIFA Secretary general, shall give him a deadline of ten days to formally state his intention of becoming a candidate. This shall also apply for the incumbent FIFA President. Blatter hinted several times this year that he is thinking about running for President again. Nonetheless, it appears that the rule stipulated in Article 2(2) has not been applied to him (yet). With regard to the possible third candidate, Michel Platini has said that he is considering becoming a candidate and promised to make a decision by the draw for the Champions League on 28 August. 

Could the new Election Regulations jeopardise Mr. Blatter’s possible re-election ambitions?

Given that Blatter still enjoys widespread support in the “football family”, he should have no problem securing the declarations of support from five different Members. As regards the integrity check, it is worth noting that Sepp Blatter has never been personally accused of corruption. True, there has been a lot of controversies at FIFA under his watch (Qatar2022 is the latest and most acute one) and questions can be raised whether an 80-year old is the ideal candidate to run one of the world’s most important Sporting Governing Bodies for the next four years.  

Conclusion

Whether the new Election Regulations will make next year’s election more transparent and democratic will mostly depend on how they will be applied during the unfolding campaign and elections. Will Blatter’s double game as a candidate and FIFA President be closely scrutinized? On what basis and to which extent will the Ethics Committee review the candidatures? Even if the electoral regulations appear to have some teeth in practice, further reforms will still be necessary to improve FIFA’s legitimacy. One can, and Jérôme Champagne has in fact suggested it, imagine public debates between the candidates to be broadcasted worldwide. Furthermore, one should envisage that the vote must be held publically and that the number of terms as FIFA president must be restricted. There is a lot to do before FIFA could be considered, as far as it is even possible, a “democratic” organisation, but the sheer fact of having electoral regulations is already a step in the right direction.

P.S. At the beginning of July Jérôme Champagne visited the Asser institute and presented his program for the upcoming FIFA Presidential elections 2015. The video is available at:

[1] http://www.insideworldfootball.com/fifa/15040-fifa-lays-out-rules-of-engagement-in-the-battle-for-the-presidency.

[2] Member: an Association which is responsible for organising and supervising football in all of its forms in its Country that has been admitted into membership of FIFA by the Congress.

[3] Electoral Regulations for the FIFA Presidency, Article 7(2)

[4] Electoral Regulations for the FIFA Presidency, Article 8(1)d)

The world of professional cycling and doping have been closely intertwined for many years. Cycling’s International governing Body, Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI), is currently trying to clean up the image of the sport and strengthen its credibility. In order to achieve this goal, in January 2014 the UCI established the Cycling Independent Reform Commission (CIRC) “to conduct a wide ranging independent investigation into the causes of the pattern of doping that developed within cycling and allegations which implicate the UCI and other governing bodies and officials over ineffective investigation of such doping practices.”[1] The final report was submitted to the UCI President on 26 February 2015 and published on the UCI website on 9 March 2015. The report outlines the history of the relationship between cycling and doping throughout the years. Furthermore, it scrutinizes the role of the UCI during the years in which doping usage was at its maximum and addresses the allegations made against the UCI, including allegations of corruption, bad governance, as well as failure to apply or enforce its own anti-doping rules. Finally, the report turns to the state of doping in cycling today, before listing some of the key practical recommendations.[2]

Since the day of publication, articles and commentaries (here and here) on the report have been burgeoning and many of the stakeholders have expressed their views (here and here). However, given the fact that the report is over 200 pages long, commentators could only focus on a limited number of aspects of the report, or only take into account the position of a few stakeholders. In the following two blogs we will try to give a comprehensive overview of the report in a synthetic fashion.

This first blogpost will focus on the relevant findings and recommendations of the report. In continuation, a second blogpost will address the reforms engaged by the UCI and other long and short term consequences the report could have on professional cycling. Will the recommendations lead to a different governing structure within the UCI, or will the report fundamentally change the way the UCI and other sport governing bodies deal with the doping problem? 

Relevant findings

Different forms of doping have been around since the earliest days of cycling (1890’s), but it was the introduction of Erythropoietin, or EPO, in the professional peloton that brought the problem of doping to new levels. Taking it enabled an athlete to gain a significant competitive advantage that could range between 10 and 15%.By using EPO, a rider is able to increase the blood’s oxygen carrying capacity, to stimulate muscle growth and aid muscle recovery.[3] However, the use of EPO thickens the blood, and race dehydration concentrates the blood further, which can cause clotting, stroke or heart failure.[4] In fact, there is widespread suspicion that EPO caused the deaths of up to 20 cyclists between 1987 and 1990. Even though cyclists started using forms of EPO as far back as the 1980’s, it was not until 2001 that a reliable detection test for EPO was developed. This meant that professional cyclists were able to use EPO for over a decade with very little chance of getting caught. The exact percentage of professional cyclist using EPO remains unknown, but it is very likely that this figure was well above 50%. “Doping became the norm in the peloton, not only to increase performance but also just to keep up with the rest of the peloton”.[5]

One of the main findings of the report is the revelation that the UCI’s past policy regarding anti-doping was primarily aimed at protecting the health and safety of the riders and not trying to curtail the use of doping all together from (professional) cycling. This is especially evident from the way it chose to combat EPO. In 1997, UCI introduced the “No Start Rule”. Under the rule, the UCI carried out blood tests before and during competition and any rider with a haematocrit reading higher than 50% (when natural levels are normally between 40 and 45%) was deemed unfit for competition and prevented from competing for 15 days from the date of the test.[6] The UCI stated that the purpose of this rule was to protect riders’ health and safety and to prevent further deaths from EPO. It was not an anti-doping rule, but a health and safety measure. However, the problem with this measure is that it allowed the use of EPO, and therefore doping, to a certain extent. Furthermore, given that the advantage gained from EPO was so significant, the riders were in fact obliged to use EPO simply to keep up, let alone to win.

In order to understand the UCI’s position in this matter, the report explains in full detail the facts that led up to this situation. In doing so, it also addressed the questions whether UCI officials directly contributed to the development of a culture of doping in cycling.[7] It has to be borne in mind that as an umbrella sporting organisation, the UCI was for many years an institution with a minimal structure and no real power. When Hein Verbruggen became president of the UCI in 1991, the UCI had less than 15 employees and very little revenue. The UCI itself does not organise the major cycling event such as the Tour de France. In fact, the organisation that organises the Tour (Amaury Sport Organization) enjoys a dominant position and is economically much more powerful than UCI.[8]

With the inclusion of professional cycling in the Olympic games of 1996, revenue redistributed by the IOC became substantial, while the proceeds derived from TV rights increased dramatically for the UCI. To further boost its revenues, the UCI needed a “big star” to attract broadcasters and sponsors.[9] Lance Armstrong, being outspoken, charismatic and, above all, a cancer survivor, was exactly the type of “big star” it was looking for. The timing of Armstrong’s comeback in professional cycling (1998/99) could not have been better, since the image of cycling and its main event, the Tour de France, were at an all-time low after the “Festina affair” of 1998.[10]

The report shows well the UCI’s conflict of interest during the Tour de France of 1999: On the one hand, it wanted to eliminate doping from the sport, especially after the “Festina affair” a year earlier; on the other hand, it wanted to make the sport more appealing to the public and for that it required the presence and victory of a hero: Lance Armstrong. The practical meaning of this conflict of interest became apparent during that same Tour. Armstrong was tested positive four times for corticosteroids that was forbidden under the UCI Anti-Doping Rules.[11] Armstrong justified the positive tests by submitting a medical certificate that was provided after the tests. According to the UCI’s own rules, the medical certificates should have been handed in prior to the tests. Had the UCI applied its rules, Armstrong would have received a sanction for violating anti-doping rules, which would have resulted in him not being allowed to win the Tour of 1999, the first of his seven Tour victories. [12]  

Apart from UCI decisions concerning Armstrong, it becomes evident from the report that the UCI took a number of controversial decisions regarding doping violations which, in hindsight, should have been dealt with differently. However, to answer the question why the UCI made these decisions, it is necessary to understand how the UCI made these decisions. As mentioned above, it is clear that the conflict of interest regarding the UCI’s objectives was a prime factor in the choices made. However, it was also the UCI’s governing structure that allowed for such decisions, especially the way the UCI dealt with its anti-doping policy.

In 1992, the UCI set up an Anti-Doping Commission (ADC). The ADC was headed originally by a lawyer, Werner Goehner. He was succeeded by the ADC’s first Vice-president, Lon Schattenberg, an occupational therapist, in 2003. It has been reported that Schattenberg de facto ran the ADC from the start. Furthermore, even though the ADC was composed of three members in total, it was Schattenberg who effectively ran the whole Commission. The conflict of interest is further substantiated in the report when it stresses that the focus of Schattenberg’s work was on health concerns rather than on disciplinary aspects of doping. His view was that trying to catch the doped cyclists amounted to a witch hunt.[13] In other words, between 1992 and 2006, most, if not all, of the Anti-Doping Commission’s decisions were taken by one man whose primary aim was to protect the riders’ health rather than catching and sanctioning the doped cyclists.

Similarly, the report emphasised the prime role of the UCI President Hein Verbruggen (1991-2005) as regards the UCI’s governance structure. Due to the passive nature of the large majority of the UCI’s governing bodies, the president had a wide range of executive powers. In the CIRC’s view this led to serious problems of governance and deficiencies in internal control processes. By way of example, Verbruggen, with the agreement of the majority of his colleagues on the Management Committee, chose his successor (Pat McQuaid) and managed to secure his election.[14] Moreover, even though Schattenberg’s ADC was formally considered independent, Hein Verbruggen was not only informed of all relevant anti-doping matters, he also interfered in the decision-making of the anti-doping Commission. As is stated in the KPMG report on UCI Governance and Independence Assessment (2013), “(t)he President has taken many decisions alone or based on external advice during critical times…Critically important matters…are taken solely by the President.”[15] 

The report further notes that Mr. Verbruggen was constantly in conflict with WADA and its leadership. The importance of these conflicts when answering the question how the UCI made its decisions should not be underestimated. The first WADA Code, implemented in 2004, included the standard sanction of two years of ineligibility in case of a first Anti-Doping violation. Nonetheless, the UCI (read: Verbruggen) opposed the standard sanction and lobbied for much lower sanctions. It should be noted that, as the “new kid on the block”, the role and power of WADA in relation to sports federations in general and the UCI in particular was unclear. According to the UCI, WADA’s function was to assist sports federations, but not to interfere with internal matters or criticise their governance or anti-doping policy. Any interference or criticism by WADA in relation to UCI’s anti-doping policy was perceived by the UCI leadership as completely unacceptable and seemed to have been interpreted as a personal attack.[16]  

Conclusion

The goal of this report was to investigate the causes of the pattern of doping that developed within professional cycling over the last decades, especially taking into account the role of the UCI, and to recommend better ways of tackling doping problems in the future.

According to the report, the UCI’s role in the widespread use of doping in cycling was fundamental in several ways. Firstly, during the heydays of EPO the UCI was primarily focused on protecting the health and safety of the riders, rather than trying to eliminate the use EPO in the peloton. Secondly, the UCI’s objective of forming professional cycling into a global money-making sport had an impact on enforcing anti-doping rules. This became especially evident after Lance Armstrong’s comeback. Even though Armstrong took forbidden substances during the Tour de France of 1999, the UCI decided not to sanction him. Armstrong was the “big star” the UCI needed to further increase revenues, and a sanction would have been counterproductive in this regard. A third major element that allowed for doping to flourish was the UCI’s governing structure. The executive dominance of the UCI President Hein Verbruggen caused great deficiencies in the UCI’s internal control process. Moreover, the lack of collaboration with WADA was instrumental in delaying the full implementation of the WADA Code. 

The Report is in interesting plunge in the world of cycling at the turn of the century. It highlights the systematic failure of sports organisation to truly engage in the fight against doping. Indeed, both the fundamental objectives and the basic governance structure of the UCI seem to have run counter any attempt to deal efficiently with the recourse to doping of the cycling stars. This is a potent lesson, for doping seems to be as much a product of the institutional and economical system in place in a particular sport as of the malign intentions of the athletes. 

Having deciphered the main reasons that caused the pattern of doping, the report consequently outlined a set of recommendations. An analysis of these recommendation as well as the reforms the UCI has already undertaken shall be discussed in a second blog.

[1] CIRC Report to the President of the UCI, page 6

[2] Ibid

[3] CIRC Report to the President of the UCI, page 57

[4] Ibid, page 33

[5] Ibid, page 41

[6] Ibid, page 35-36, a haematocrit reading measures the percentage of red blood cells in blood. As EPO stimulates the production of red blood cells, an elevated haematocrit reading above 50% is “a strong indication of EPO use”.

[7] Ibid, page 90

[8] Ibid, page 91

[9] Ibid, page 91-92

[10] The affair concerned a large haul of doping products found in a car of the Festina cycling team just before the start of the Tour de France of 1998. The investigation revealed systematic doping, and suspicion was raised that there may have been a widespread network of doping involving many teams of the Tour de France.

[11] These rules state that “the use of corticosteroids is prohibited, except when used for topical application (auricular, opthmalogical or dermatological) inhalations (asthma and allergic rhinitis) and local or intra-articular injections. Such forms of utilisations can be proved with a medical prescription”.

[12] CIRC Report to the President of the UCI, page 171-173

[13] Ibid, pages 98-100

[14] Ibid, page 97

[15] Ibid, pages 104-105

[16] Ibid, page 108