Introduction[1]

The Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) registers approximately 300 cases every year. Recently, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court – which is the sole judicial authority to review arbitral awards rendered in Switzerland – reminded in the Matuzalém Case (Case 4A_558/2011) that CAS awards may be enforced in other States that are parties to the New York Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.

However, in that case, the Federal Court failed to recognize the main intent of FIFA, which is to avoid foreign State courts’ interference – even to the detriment of a plaintiff’s right of having the option to challenge a CAS award in a non-Swiss jurisdiction. Article 67(2-3) FIFA Statutes requires that provision shall be made to CAS arbitration and prohibits FIFA members to have recourse to courts of law unless provided for by FIFA regulations. Member associations must accordingly insert an arbitral agreement in their statutes on the recognition of CAS to resolve disputes under Article 10(4)(c) FIFA Statutes. Regarding labour-related disputes, Article 22 FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players in conjunction with Article 5 FIFA Statutes 2003 has carved out an exception to the aforesaid FIFA ‘exclusion’ and ‘allows’ FIFA members to seek redress before civil courts. Nonetheless, FIFA could still use its disciplinary power to enforce decisions (e.g. CAS awards). In addition, Article 64(1) FIFA Disciplinary Code explicitly stipulates that ‘[a]nyone who fails to pay another person […] or FIFA … money…, even though instructed to do so by … a subsequent CAS appeal decision …, or anyone who fails to comply with another [CAS appeal] decision …’, will be disciplinary sanctioned (e.g., fine, ban on any football-related activities, expulsion (member association), relegation (club) and transfer ban (club)). This is a typical case of so-called ‘arbitration with a reduced consensual character’ (Steingruber 2012), which is contrary to the consensual spirit that underlies private arbitration.

It should also be noted that in the Cañas case (Case 4P.172.2006, par. 4.3.2.2) the Swiss Federal Supreme Court recognized and tolerated the athlete’s reduced consent to arbitration (under Article 2 of the Player's Consent and Agreement to ATP Official Rulebook) in order to be able to practice tennis as a professional. It is moreover ‘based on the continuing possibility of an appeal acting as a counterbalance to the “benevolence” with which it is necessary to examine the consensual nature of recourse to arbitration where sporting matters are concerned’ (Case 4P.172.2006, para. 4.3.2.3). In other words, the application of ex post reviews of CAS awards by the Federal Court is a sine qua non to its acceptance of an athlete’s reduced consent to arbitration.

CAS awards could be challenged before courts, however, if they are incompatible with public policy (of Switzerland or EU Member States et cetera). 

CAS awards – Swiss notion of substantive public policy

As far as arbitration is concerned, national courts generally adopt a deferent attitude to arbitration, mainly reviewing the due process components and only entering substantial matters if they are incompatible with substantive public policy. Accordingly, the parties involved can only challenge arbitral awards on substantive grounds if they contravene the national notion of substantive public policy.

The Swiss Federal Supreme Court has only once annulled an international arbitral award rendered in Switzerland for being incompatible with substantive public policy. Interestingly, the case concerns a CAS (appeal) award.

It should be noted that the national notion of public policy may vary per jurisdiction. Accordingly, enforcing arbitral awards that have been annulled at the seat of arbitration – e.g. the Matuzalém case – could still be enforced in e.g. Austria, Croatia, Denmark, France[2], Ireland, Luxembourg, The Netherlands[3], Poland and Spain.[4] However, arbitral awards that have been set aside at the seat of arbitration are likely to be refused enforcement in e.g. Germany, Hungary, Italy and the United Kingdom.[5] 

CAS awards – EU notion of substantive public policy

From an EU law perspective, it must be taken into consideration that enforcing arbitral awards like, e.g., CAS awards by Member States’ courts may affect the internal market. The Court of Justice already dealt with this topic and introduced a broad notion of public policy in the Eco Swiss Case (Case C-126/97) by ruling that Article 101 TFEU may be regarded as a public policy matter in the sense of Article V(2)(b) of the New York convention. In the Manfredi Case (Joined cases C-295/04 to C-298/04), the Court further stated (para. 31): ’Articles … [101-102 TFEU] are a matter of public policy which must be automatically applied by national courts …’. In other words, national courts do have an ex officio duty to exercise control during inter alia enforcement proceedings of arbitral awards. In the Nordsee Case (C-102/81), the Court further stressed the importance of ex post reviews of arbitral awards by national courts.

The latter is especially relevant in reference to their obligation to ensure the uniform application of EU law. The Court stated (para 13) that private arbitral tribunals are not to be considered as ‘any court or tribunal’ under Article 267 TFEU and therefore are not allowed to directly submit an application for a preliminary ruling on EU law. However, in case an arbitral tribunal is, inter alia, established by law, permanent, independent, has a compulsory jurisdiction, its procedure is inter partes and it applies rules of law, the Court of Justice recently (Case C‑555/13) characterised it as ‘any court or tribunal’. Consequently, a mandatory arbitral tribunal established in a Member State may refer questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling.

As regards to doping-related disputes, the WADA Code is mandatory in substance and must be followed by signatories like, e.g., National Anti-Doping Organizations. Moreover, all Member States have designated a National Anti-Doping Organization (Appendix 1 WADA Code) as the primary authority to adopt and implement inter alia anti-doping measures at the national level. In addition, Article 23.2.2 in conjunction with Article 13.2.1 WADA Code refers inter alia to the exclusive jurisdiction of the CAS Appeal Arbitration, which means that CAS has been recognized by all Member States as a mandatory arbitral tribunal (established in Switzerland) with regard to doping-related disputes. However, as opposed to the regulations of sports governing bodies like FIFA, the WADA Code explicitly mentions the application of ex post reviews of CAS awards by national courts.                                                       

According to the Court, reviewing arbitral awards should be limited in scope and refusing to enforce foreign arbitral awards (i.e. CAS awards) by national courts should only be possible in exceptional circumstances, both in the interest of efficient arbitral proceedings. As previously mentioned, national courts are generally deferent towards arbitral awards. Moreover, they do not review the way the law is applied by the arbitrators. A national court’s review is confined to the nature and impact of the decision and its procedural aspects. Accordingly, the Court accepted the national courts’ limited scope of review in reference to the principle of procedural autonomy to implement and enforce national and EU law. Moreover, in the interest of good administration, fundamental principles of procedure recognized by all Member States must prevail. This procedural autonomy finds its limit in the need to warranty the effet utile of EU competition law as fully as other public policy matters (i.e. principle of equivalence). Moreover, according to the Court, EU competition law is a fundamental provision for the realisation of the internal market and must therefore be regarded as a public policy matter by national courts when enforcing arbitral awards. Thus, the Court ruled that a national court’s limited review of arbitral awards must extend to EU competition law, which should be integrated in the Member State’s national notion of public policy in order to ensure that EU law actually takes effect (principle of effectiveness).

The Court furthermore stated that reviewing an arbitral award for being incompatible with public policy should only occur under exceptional circumstances. Only if the effects of enforcing an arbitral award by a national court contravene the most fundamental principles of law in the respective jurisdiction, it may be denied recognition and enforcement for being incompatible with public policy. In order to qualify as such, a competition law violation must therefore be regarded as very serious, e.g. a complete disregard of an obvious and serious violation such as a cartel. In addition, the Court especially referred to the prohibition laid down in Article 101(1) TFEU, which is primarily a matter of substance. In reference to the national courts’ limited scope of review, one can therefore argue that infringements to EU competition law may be regarded as substantive public policy violations during inter alia enforcement proceedings of arbitral awards.

Finally, competition law is not the internal market’s only fundamental provision. It could be extrapolated that the Court relied on a wide notion of public policy in Eco Swiss. For instance, the fundamental provisions of free movement may be applicable in a CAS award’s enforcement proceedings and could, in principle, qualify as public policy matters in exceptional circumstances. If, e.g., enforcement proceedings of the Matuzalém CAS award were sought before Member States’ courts, a violation of the freedom of workers (he played for Lazio Roma between 2008 and 2013) or service providers (e.g., personal sponsorship or endorsement deals) could be invoked to bar the recognition and enforcement of the award.

Conclusion

CAS awards are potentially fragile at the enforcement stage as they may contradict national States’ understanding of the public policy exception. This is even more so if one characterises EU competition law and EU free movement rights as public policy concerns. However, in practice the enforcement of CAS awards is very rarely used[6]. Sport governing bodies can rely on their contractual disciplinary power to ban athletes from the competition they organize and thus do not rely on national courts to enforce CAS awards. Nevertheless, banned athletes could initiate action for damages against sports governing bodies and force them to ask for the recognition and enforcement of the award in their defence plea. Thus, there is a very indirect (and protracted) way to challenge CAS award on the basis of EU public policy, but it is a windy and rocky legal path.

Epilogue

A personal message to Claudia Pechstein - German Speedskater and Olympic Champion (five gold, two silver and two bronze): Pursuant to Article 25(6) of the ISU Constitution, the ISU is also complicit and the respective CAS awards could accordingly be challenged for being incompatible with substantive public policy if they were to be enforced in a Member State …

[1] Notes are mostly ommitted. A comprehensive article will be published in 2014.

[2] E.g., Cour de cassation, 23 March 1994, Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, Vol XX (1995), p. 663.

[3] E.g., Amsterdam Court of Appeal, Case No. 200.005.269/01, April 28, 2009; Amsterdam Court of Appeal, Case No. 200.100.508/01, September 18, 2012.

[4] ICC Guide to national procedures for the recognition and enforcement of awards under the New York convention, ICC Court of Arbitration Bulletin (Vol 23, Special Supplement) 2012, p. 20.

[5] Ibid.

[6] It should be noted that, as far as we know, only one CAS ordinary award has actually been enforced in a Member State: IMFC Licensing B.V. v. R.C.D. Espanyol de Barcelona, Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Catalunya, 30 May 2012 (IMFC Licensing, B.V. v. R.C.D. Espanyol de Barcelona, S.A.D.) Yearbook XXXVIII (2013) pp. 462-464.

Editor's note: This is a short introduction written for the special Issue of the Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law celebrating the 20 years of the Bosman ruling and dedicated to the new frontiers of EU law and Sport (the articles are available here). For those willing to gain a deeper insight into the content of the Issue we organize (in collaboration with Maastricht University and the Maastricht Journal) a launching event with many of the authors in Brussels tomorrow (More info here).

 20 Years After Bosman - The New Frontiers of EU Law and Sport

By Antoine Duval

The Bosman ruling is not just another ruling of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU), it is by far the most well-known decision of the Court outside of the Euro-bubble.[1] In the UK the phrase ‘a Bosman’ is commonly used to qualify the free move of a football player to a new club at the end of his contract. Beyond its anchoring in the English idiom, Bosman stands out as a shared European reference. However, it is often – misleadingly - credited for all the ills and wrongs of football. In any case, it is part and parcel of the European (even worldwide) public debate on football and its regulation. If a European public sphere is to emerge at some point, the heated public discussion that was triggered in Europe by Bosman is probably an avant-goût of it. Therefore, 20 years after the ruling, the least a European sports lawyer and academic can do, is to acknowledge ones indebtedness and, to some extent, gratitude for this ruling.

One aspect that needs to be emphasized is that Bosman is not an instrument with the paramount objective to deregulate the football market or the world of sport in general. It is not, as many on the side of the Sports Governing Bodies (SGBs), and FIFA and UEFA in particular, have portrayed it, a decision aimed at destroying the transnational legal system (also known as lex sportiva) they had put in place to coordinate the organization and unfolding of transnational sporting competitions. On the contrary, SGBs have the possibility to justify their rules and regulations. As Stephen Weatherill rightly pointed out long ago, the only requirement SGBs have to fulfil to ensure that their regulations comply with EU law is to explain convincingly why they are needed.[2] Thus, a constructive (and positive) perspective on Bosman stresses its constitutional over its deregulatory function. Private regulations adopted by private powers, which are not particularly renowned for the quality of their governance, need to be subject to checks and balances. After Bosman, the EU free movement rights and competition law have impersonated such a check on (or counter-power to) the rules privately adopted and enforced by SGBs. In fact, it is here that the true, long-lasting legacy of Bosman lies.

This issue brings together a mixed line-up of both young and established scholars, sports law experts and EU law specialists, to discuss the legacy of Bosman and the future of the relationship between EU law and sport. Besides the synthetic and comprehensive introductory piece of Stefaan Van Den Bogaert that brings us back to the original crusade of Mr Bosman, all the contributions are geared towards the recent and future legacies of the ruling. A broad range of legal problems raised by the interaction of EU law and sport is touched upon. 

In the first article, Ben Van Rompuy builds on Advocate General Lenz’s conclusions in Bosman, the following practice adopted by the EU Commission as well as on the case law of the CJEU on competition law and sport to argue that competition law can be a powerful tool to impose a legal check on the regulatory practices of SGBs.

In the second piece, Phedon Nicolaides analyses a relatively new front line between EU law and sport: state aid. Although not directly connected to Bosman, state aid cases are taking a prominent place in the practice of the EU Commission in the field of sport. In fact, state aid law has become a useful legal proxy to control the way public authorities decide to support economically sporting organizations and their events.

The third piece by the editor of this issue is dedicated to the interaction between the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) and EU law. Indeed, the emergence of the CAS is probably the most important institutional legacy of Bosman, and EU law now has a role to play in exercising a form of ‘Solange’ control over CAS’s judicial activity.

In the fourth article, which follows most clearly into the footpath of Bosman, Richard Parrish discusses the compatibility of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfers of Players (RSTP) with EU law. He suggests that the RSTP as it stands can be deemed contrary to EU law.

The fifth article of the issue by Jacob Kornbeck, a former member of the sports unit of the European Commission, analyses the role of the Commission in the drafting process of the new World Anti-Doping Code recently adopted by the World Anti-Doping Agency. He highlights that the ethos of Bosman spread to other spheres of action of the EU in sport and shows concretely in what way it influenced the position of the EU in the negotiations over the new Code that entered into force in January 2015. Finally, Anna Sabrina Wollmann, Olivier Vonk and Gerard-René de Groot look at the growing problem of nationality requirements in sports. If Bosman stands more particularly for an Europeanization of football, globalization and the ease of cross-border movement for professional sportspeople have heightened the question of the sporting nationality of athletes worldwide. This contribution critically analyses the many calls for a separate sporting nationality and proposes an alternative path.

[1] Case C-415/93 Union royale belge des sociétés de football association ASBL v. Jean-Marc Bosman, Royal club liégeois SA v. Jean-Marc Bosman and others and Union des associations européennes de football (UEFA) v. Jean-Marc Bosman, EU:C:1995:463.

[2] ‘The ECJ has collapsed the idea that there are purely sporting practices unaffected by EC law despite their economic effect, but it has not refused to accept that sport is special. Its message to governing bodies – explain how!’, S. Weatherill, European Sports Law (T.M.C. Asser Press, 2007), p. 353.

On 29 May 2015, the Brussels Court of First Instance delivered its highly anticipated judgment on the challenge brought by football players’ agent Daniel Striani (and others) against UEFA’s Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play Regulations (FFP). In media reports,[1] the judgment was generally portrayed as a significant initial victory for the opponents of FFP. The Brussels Court not only made a reference for a preliminary ruling to the European Court of Justice (CJEU) but also imposed an interim order blocking UEFA from implementing the second phase of the FFP that involves reducing the permitted deficit for clubs.

A careful reading of the judgment, however, challenges the widespread expectation that the CJEU will now pronounce itself on the compatibility of the FFP with EU law. 

Background: the proceedings before the Commission

In May 2013, Daniel Striani, a Belgian football agent licensed by the Royal Belgian Football Association, lodged a complaint with the European Commission against UEFA. He requested the Commission to launch an investigation into the break-even requirement contained in Articles 58 to 63 of the FFP. According to Striani, the break-even requirement infringes the European antitrust rules (Article 101 and 102 TFEU) and the free movement rules.

The complaint put the Commission in a difficult position. It had repeatedly expressed political support for the principles underlying the UEFA FFP. In 2009, for instance, the Commission organized a conference on the subject matter and in 2012 then Commissioner for Competition Almunia issued a joint statement with UEFA president Michel Platini stressing that the FFP are “consistent with the aims and objectives of European Union policy in the field of State Aid”. Although the vague statements were carefully drafted to prejudice a proper legal assessment, the withdrawal of the Commission’s support would have been politically embarrassing.

The Commission, however, is not obliged to carry out an investigation on the basis of every complaint brought before it. Given its limited resources, the Commission uses prioritization criteria, set out in its Notice on the handling of complaints, to determine whether there is sufficient Union interest in pursuing a complaint.

In April 2014, the Commission informed Striani, pursuant to Article 7(1) of Regulation 773/2004, of its intention to reject his complaint. The Commission put forward three grounds for rejecting the complaint. First, the Commission considered that Striani lacked a legitimate interest to lodge a complaint. Only natural and legal persons that can demonstrate that they are “directly and adversely affected” by the alleged infringement are entitled to lodge a complaint.[2] Second, the Commission argued that Striani could secure the protection of his rights before a national court. Third, the Commission stressed that it had received only one complaint regarding the FFP.

Striani’s legal counsel, Jean-Louis Dupont, challenged the first and third grounds for rejecting the complaint. He reiterated the argument that the FFP directly affects football player’s agents. In response to the third ground, he submitted three further complaints on behalf of individual football fans, a players’ agent and the Manchester City FC Supporters Club. Evidently, the fact that only two months after lodging his complaint, Striani brought a civil action before the Brussels Court of First Instance (developing virtually similar arguments as set out in the complaint) made it difficult to counter the argument that the complainant could seek relief before national courts.

The European Commission eventually opted for the easiest way out. In October 2014, it formally rejected Striani’s complaint on the sole ground that “the Brussels Court is well-placed to handle the matters raised in your complaint. This is because your rights will be protected by that court in a satisfactory manner”. Hold that thought.

The civil action before the Brussels Court

While the complaint was unsuccessful, the proceedings before the Commission did make clear that Striani needed stronger arguments to demonstrate that he has standing to complain about the FFP’s compatibility with EU (competition) law. 

Striani essentially argues that the FFP break-even rule, by reducing the number of transfers, the level of the transfer fees and the players’ salaries, has a deflationary effect on the revenue of players’ agents. Since agents are thus only indirectly affected, substantial changes were made to the original claim to buttress the legitimate interest of the original claimant.

First, when Striani commenced his civil action before the Brussels Court in June 2013, he only sought one symbolic euro as compensation for the material damage that he had allegedly suffered. In September 2014, the amount of relief sought by Striani was changed to EUR 69.750 per year since the introduction of the break-even rule.

Second, a number of other claimants later joined the same proceeding. The Brussels court admitted the voluntary intervention of: (1) Dejan Mitrovic, a players’ agent domiciled in Belgium but licensed by the Serbian Football Association; (2) RFC Sérésien, a Belgian Second Division football club (now competing as Serain United); and (3) a total of 53 football fans (i.e. supporters of Paris Saint-Germain and Manchester City) domiciled in France and the United Kingdom. 

The judgment of the Brussels Court: an example of legal fiction

In its ruling of 29 May 2015, the Brussels Court declared itself incompetent to deal with Striani’s case because it has no jurisdiction.

Since UEFA challenged its competence when the litigation was initiated, the Court had to establish whether the requirements of international jurisdiction are satisfied. When an EU competition law action is brought against an undertaking having its seat in Switzerland, the jurisdiction of Member States’ courts is determined in relation to the Lugano II Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Lugano Convention).[3] The fundamental principle laid down in Article 2 is that the defendant should be sued where it is domiciled. Since the FFP were adopted by UEFA, the place of the event giving rise to the damage must be regarded as having taken place within Switzerland. Hence, in principle, only the Swiss courts have jurisdiction over the recovery of damages suffered by the alleged anti-competitive nature of the FFP.

Only by way of derogation, Article 5(3) of the Lugano Convention, applicable to torts (delict or quasi-delict), grants special territorial jurisdiction also to the courts where “the harmful event occurred or may occur”. This covers both place where the damage occurred (Belgium) and the place of the event giving rise to it (Switzerland).[4] It follows that the defendant may be sued, at the option of the applicant, in the courts of either of those places. According to settled case law, however, this exceptional attribution of jurisdiction requires the existence of “particularly close connecting factors” between the dispute and the courts of the place where the harmful event occurred or may occur.[5]

The Brussels Court disagreed with UEFA that the damage pleaded by Striani is speculative and purely hypothetical.[6] At the same time, it stressed that this damage is no more than the indirect consequence of the harm initially suffered by the clubs (participating in UEFA’s Champions’ League and Europa League competitions): “Neither the players nor the players’ agents are addresses of the FFP. Subsequently, players could only suffer indirect harm and agents only ‘very indirect’ harm”.[7] Given that jurisdiction by virtue of Article 5(3) of the Lugano Convention depends on the identification of direct harm, the Court concluded that the necessary connecting factors based on the defendant’s act are absent. In other words, because the FFP do not adversely affect Striani directly, he lacks standing to bring a damages action for breach of EU (competition) law before a Member State’s court.[8] This restrictive interpretation of Article 5(3) of the Lugano Convention is in line with the case law of the CJEU.[9] The Court did not discuss the standing of the other claimants that joined the proceedings.

Albeit having established that only the Swiss courts are competent as to the substance of the dispute, the Brussels Court decided to grant Striani the requested provisional measure, namely blocking UEFA from implementing the next phase of the FFP implementation (i.e. the reduction of the so-called “acceptable deviation” from EUR 45m to 30m). In a surprising move, the Court invoked Article 31 of the Lugano Convention for this purpose, which stipulates that:

“Application may be made to the courts of a State bound by (the Lugano) Convention for such provisional, including protective, measures as may be available under the law of that State, even if, under this Convention, the courts of another State bound by this Convention have jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter”.

The Court did not indicate why the urgency of the situation or the need to safeguard the legal and factual situation of Striani warranted this provisional measure (whose geographical reach is limited to the Belgian territory).[10] Instead, the Court decided to make a preliminary reference to the CJEU to reach a decision on the validity of the prescribed measure. The preliminary reference, another request of Striani when initiating litigation, essentially asks whether the FFP break-even requirement is compatible with Articles 63, 45, 56, 101 and 102 TFEU.

So in the end, the Brussels Court did not send Striani home empty-handed. Yet it would seem that his victory is merely a pyrrhic one. Since UEFA decided to appeal the judgment, both the provisional measure and the preliminary reference are suspended. Hence, UEFA can proceed with the next phase of implementation of the FFP as planned. Moreover, it is unlikely that the Brussels Court of Appeal would uphold the first instance decision. First, the use of Article 31 of the Lugano Convention to trigger a preliminary reference on the substance of the case – by a court that is incompetent to deal with it - is arguably a circumvention of the requirements for international jurisdiction (and thus a perforation of the general scheme and objectives of the Lugano Convention). Second, the granting of provisional measures on the basis of Article 31 is conditional on the existence of a connecting link between the subject matter of the measure and the territorial jurisdiction of the court ordering the measure.[11] In the absence of an alternative explanation, the Court thus contradicts itself because it found that particularly close connecting factors to take jurisdiction were absent.

Back to the European Commission?

The judgment of the Brussels Court puts the European Commission in an awkward position. Evidently, the Court was incapable of adequately protecting the rights of the complainant, as the Commission had argued when rejecting his complaint.

If Striani were to re-submit his complaint, it would be difficult for the Commission to argue once again that there is insufficient Union interest to conduct an investigation. It still could argue that Striani lacks legitimate interest because he is not directly affected by the alleged infringement. The fact that the Commission ultimately refrained from using this argument the first time may prove useful if a second rejection decision would be appealed before the General Court.

In any event, an authoritative assessment of the compatibility of the FFP with EU (competition) law is unfortunately not yet on the cards. Last week UEFA soothed several embittered clubs by deciding to relax some of the FFP rules. And it would be shocking if the action brought by Paris Saint-Germain fans and – this is not a joke – the ‘Association of Angry Fans against Financial Fair Play’ before the Paris High Court would overcome the jurisdictional obstacle that caused Striani to bite the dust.

[1] See e.g. The Guardian; Daily Mail; and The Independent.

[2] Commission Regulation (EC) No 773/2004 of 7 April 2004 relating to the conduct of proceedings by the Commission pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty [2004] OJ L 123/18, Article 5(1).

[3] The Lugano Convention unified the rules on jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters and expanded the applicability of the Brussels I regulation (Council Regulation 44/2001) to the relations between Member States of the EU on the one hand and Norway, Iceland and Switzerland on the other.

[4] See e.g. Case C-352/13, Cartel Damage Claims (CDC) Hydrogen Peroxide SA v Akzo Nobel NV and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2015:335, para. 38.

[5] Idem, para. 39; Case C-228/11, Melzer v MF Global UK Ltd., ECLI:EU:C:2013:305, para. 26.

[6] Tribunal de première instance francophone de Bruxelles, Section Civile – 2013/11524/A – pp. 18, 21-22.

[7] Tribunal de première instance francophone de Bruxelles, Section Civile – 2013/11524/A – p. 18 («Que ni les joueurs, ni les agents de joueurs se sont donc vis��s. Que par conséquent, le préjudice qui pourrait en subir les joueurs ne peut être qu’indirect, et celui des agents de joueurs en quelque sorte ‘doublement’ indirect»).

[8] Tribunal de première instance francophone de Bruxelles, Section Civile – 2013/11524/A – p. 18 («Que par conséquent encore, l’article 5.3 ne peut fonder la compétences des juridictions belges et qu’il faut s’en tenir à la règle générale de l’article 2.1 qui renvoie aux tribunaux de l’Etat du défendeur, soit en l’espèce les juridictions suisses, pour juger du fond de l’affaire»).

[9] See e.g. Case 220/88, Dumez France SA and Tracoba SARL v Hessische Landesbank and others, ECLI:EU:C:1990:8; Case C-228/11, Melzer v MF Global UK Ltd., ECLI:EU:C:2013:305; Case C-352/13, Cartel Damage Claims (CDC) Hydrogen Peroxide SA v Akzo Nobel NV and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2015:335. Although CJEU only gives binding advice on the Brussels Convention and Brussels I and I bis Regulations, the case law is analogously applicable to the Lugano Convention (and is also taken into consideration when applying the Lugano Convention).

[10] C-261/90, Mario Reichert, Hans-Heinz Reichert and Ingeborg Kockler v Dresdner Bank AG, para. 34 (“The expression ‘provisional, including protective, measures’ … must therefore be understood as referring to measures which, in matters within the scope of the Convention, are intended to preserve a factual or legal situation so as to safeguard rights the recognition of which is sought elsewhere from the court having jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter”); Case C-391-95, Van Uden Maritime BV, trading as Van Uden Africa Line v Kommanditgesellschaft in Firma Deco-Line and Another, ECLI:EU:C:1998:543, para. 38 (“The granting of this type of measure requires particular care on the part of the court in question and detailed knowledge of the actual circumstances in which the measures sought are to take effect”).

[11] C-391/95, Van Uden Maritime BV, trading as Van Uden Africa Line v Kommanditgesellschaft in Firma Deco-Line and Another, ECLI:EU:C:1998:543, para. 40.

Introduction
The first part of the present blog article provided a general introduction to the compatibility of fixed-term contracts in football with Directive 1999/70/EC[1] (Directive). However, as the Member States of the European Union enjoy a considerable discretion in the implementation of a directive, grasping the impact of the Directive on the world of football would not be possible without considering the national context. The recent ruling of the Arbeitsgericht Mainz (the lowest German labour court; hereinafter the Court) in proceedings brought by a German footballer Heinz Müller provides an important example in this regard. This second part of the blog on the legality of fixed-term contract in football is devoted to presenting and assessing the Court’s decision.

I. Facts and Procedure
Heinz Müller, the main protagonist of this case, was a goalkeeper playing for 1.FSV Mainz 05 a club partaking to the German Bundesliga. He was employed by the club as a licensed football player since 1 July 2009. His first 3-year contract ended on 1 July 2012 and was renewed for two years until 30 June 2014. It included an option for a one-year extension if the player took part in a minimum of 23 Bundesliga fixtures in the 2013/2014 season. Despite a good start of his last season (he participated in 10 out of the first 11 games), Heinz Müller got injured and was then set aside from the professional team and relegated to the reserve team. He attributed this relegation to the despotism of his manager and the fall-out in their professional relationship. Due to this relegation to the reserve team, he was unable to attain the 23 Bundesliga games necessary for a one-year prolongation of his contract, which ended on 30 June 2014. Thus the player decided to bring 1.FSV Mainz 05 to court claiming both the payment of the bonuses he would have obtained if he had been allowed to continue playing with the Bundesliga team and the establishment by the tribunal that his employment contract was an indefinite contract and, therefore, still valid.

In its ruling,[2] the Arbeitsgericht Mainz gave way to his demand that the contract should be qualified as an indefinite contract, though it refused to award him the lost bonuses. The decision was widely commented in the mainstream German press (here, here and here), including the biggest German tabloid Bild which featured a report on the case. Fears of a new “Bosman” started to spread in the German football community. The reactions have ranged from utter incredulity from the part of the clubs, to calls for a true collective bargaining agreement from the side of the players’ union. The ruling was immediately appealed and it is likely that the appeal court will nuance the decision rendered in first instance. Yet, this remains an important case highlighting the relevance of the European rules regarding fixed-term contracts in the realm of football. As we will see, it offers a suitable legal blueprint to assess the potential impact of the EU directive on fixed-term work on professional football.

II. Decision of the Court
The Court scrutinized the validity of the subsequent fixed-term contract concluded between the club and the player against the Part-Time and Fixed-Term Employment Act (TzBfG),[3] the national law implementing the Directive, and in particular, Section 14(1) thereof which provides that, in principle, contracts for a definite period are allowed only when justified by an objective reason. Section 14(2) TzBfG, however, stipulates that objective reasons are not required for fixed-term contracts the duration of which does not exceed two years. After finding that the said exception no longer applies to the contract concluded between Müller and the club, the Court focused on Section 14(1) TzBfG which provides that an objective reasons exist ‘in particular’ when i) the employer’s need is temporary; ii) the definite period of contract is to facilitate the employee's entry into subsequent employment following a training or study; iii) the employee substitutes another employee; iv) the nature of the work justifies the fixed-term of the contract; v) the definite period is to serve testing the employee; vi) when grounds related to the employee himself or herself justify a fixed-term contract; vii) the employee is to be paid from the budget intended for fixed-term employment and he/she is employed on that basis; or viii) the definite term of the contract is based on an amicable settlement before a court. In this respect, the Court referred to both the Directive’s aim of limiting recourse to fixed-term contracts, and the interpretation of clause 5 of the Directive adopted by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in Angelidaki[4]. Subsequently, the Court turned to the assessment of the validity of the contract at dispute. Here, it first focused on the grounds related to the employee’s personal status, and the nature of the work as provided under Section 14(1) TzBfG.

A. The personal status
Concerning the former, the Court indicated that neither the age of the employee, nor his wish to conclude a contract for a definite period could constitute personal grounds in the case at hand.[5] Moreover, as the argument relating to the age of the player was brought up by the Court and not the club itself,[6] the Court elaborated only on the latter claim. In this regard, it provided that a genuine interest in concluding a fixed-term contract exists when the employee is offered a choice between a contract for a definite and indefinite term and choses the former.[7] According to the Court, the player’s wish to prolong his contract could not be considered as pointing at the existence of such a genuine interest.[8] In addition, the Court stated that Müller’s alleged interest in the flexibility of his engagement by concluding a fixed-term contract could not constitute a valid argument due to the fact that employees in general are not prohibited from terminating indefinite employment contracts.[9]

B. The nature of the work
Next, the Court decided that the subsequent fixed-term contract between Müller and the club may not be justified on the basis of an objective reason relating to the nature of the work. The Court referred to literature arguing, first, that it is necessary for coaches to implement their vision through the choice of adequate athletes which in turn requires flexibility in replacing players, and second, that contracts for a definite period are needed due to the progressive decline of employees’ (players) ability to perform at a certain level throughout their careers.[10] In this respect, the Court did not really address the first limb of the argument and focused on the latter. Here, the Court referred to the established jurisprudence according to which fixed-term contracts for coaches are permissible due to the risk of degradation of the relationship between coaches and athletes.[11] Only in such a situation, according to the Court, can a fixed-term contract be properly justified. Yet, the decline caused by the long-term exercise of a profession was not regarded by the Court as a factor specific to football.[12] Furthermore, the Court provided that, pursuant to both national and European law, contracts for an indefinite period are the general form of employment, and that specific interests of sports clubs, unlike those of broadcasters, press and artists, have not been granted a protected status under the German Constitution.[13] By referring to the prohibition of discrimination based on age the Court also declined to accept the club’s argument concerning age-related uncertainty as to the quality of the work performed by the player.[14] 

C. Other objective reasons
Lastly, the Court addressed the arguments concerning the customary nature of fixed-term contracts in sports, the need to satisfy fans by changing the composition of teams, the level of footballers’ remuneration, and the impossibility to dismiss a player on a fixed-term contract. The custom of signing players for a definite term contract was not deemed by the Court a valid justification pursuant to Section 14 TzBfG.[15] Changing the composition of teams according to the needs of supporters was regarded as of minor importance, in comparison to the need to safeguard the interests of employees.[16] Also, high wages were not identified as a proper justification for the recourse to fixed-term contracts since Section 14 TzBfG does not provide for such an exception, and the higher level of remuneration is not capable of alleviating the negative consequences connected to a lack of employment security.[17] Lastly, the Court declined to accept the argument that the fixed-term period of the employment agreement could be justified by the fact that the contract cannot be terminated. According to the Court, the argument not only fails to fall within the scope of Section 14 TzBfG, but also the impossibility for the employer to terminate the contract does not provide an adequate counterweight to the employee’s interest for continued employment.[18] Based on all of the above the Court decided that the contract is of an indeterminate nature, and therefore still valid.

III. A critical analysis of the judgment
The Court’s ruling is not entirely convincing. This concerns, in particular, the Court’s failure to consider a number of factors which lay at the core of football and are inherent to this particular activity.

A. The personal status
The rejection of the argument concerning the personal grounds connected to the alleged wish of the player to conclude a fixed-term contract does not seem to be controversial. An extensive interpretation of Section 14 TzBfG in this regard could potentially be liable of considerably limiting the protection afforded to fixed-term workers under European and national law. Moreover, in its ruling the Court relied on previous case-law which indicates that for the exception to apply it must be established that the employee concerned, when granted a choice between a fixed-term and a permanent contract, would have chosen the former.[19] Therefore, the Court’s findings that, first, the player wished to prolong his employment relation with the club, and second, that his interest in maintaining flexibility could have been safeguarded under a contract for an indefinite period, seem to exclude the possibility of applying the exception.

B. The nature of the work
The Court’s assessment of the existence of an objective reason stemming from the nature of the work of a professional footballer is less convincing. First, the Court failed to address the argument concerning the necessity of maintaining flexibility as to the choice of players included in the squad. Indeed, this flexibility is needed for a coach to be able to adapt and modify its strategy over the years. In case of a change of the coach, a permanent pool of players would necessarily drastically reduce the potential for variations in the team’s strategy. This concerns not only the characteristics of footballers in terms of their physical attributes and skills, but also their ability to perform in several competitions which often requires playing a number of games every week. Introducing contracts which would bind clubs to their players for an indefinite period could thus be liable of ‘freezing’ football as a result of the coaches’ limited abilities to experiment, adjust and improve line-ups, and to implement new tactics. This situation should be considered analogical to the one concerning artists and comedians. In this regard, the competent national court indicated that fixed-term contracts for comedians and actors were necessary to enable theatre directors to be flexible with regard to their program.[20]

Second, by stating that work-related decline in output cannot justify recourse to fixed-term contracts as it does not constitute a feature specific to football, the Court explicitly aligned professional football players with workers in other professions. The Court’s reasoning in this regard, together with the Court’s findings that age-related uncertainty as to the quality of work may not be relied upon as a justification for fixed-term contracts as it constitutes discrimination on the basis of age, are problematic. In order to exercise their profession football players, and sportspeople in general, are required to maintain the highest level of physical fitness, a factor which does not play a key role in many sectors or industries. It is common knowledge that physical capabilities deteriorate with age, making it gradually more difficult and challenging for athletes not only to preserve a high level of performance but also, as mentioned above, to compete in several sporting competitions. One should also mention that employers outside the sporting world are usually keener on hiring individuals with considerable experience acquired during their professional careers. However, the situation in the football industry is opposite. While footballers improve their skills and broaden their experience with time, aging is the very cause that undermines their ability to perform at the highest level. This explains why football players over the age of thirty are often considered as ‘old’, and provides the underlying rationale for granting shorter contracts to such players. If deterioration due to age does not constitute a relevant factor, why would clubs consciously decide to deprive themselves of the possibility of securing long-term services of top thirty-plus footballers by offering them contracts for periods shorter than those given to younger players, and additionally, undermine their own ability to secure a future transfer fee? The answers is simple: age-related physical decline constitutes a specific factor inherent to the exercise of football, and disproportionately important in comparison to other professions, which influences the capabilities of players to perform, and thus, should not be disregarded as a specific justification for the recourse to fixed-term contracts.

Third, and considering the above, the nature of the industry requires an influx of young talents.[21] In this regard, introducing permanent contracts as a standard would diminish the possibility of young players having a chance to enter the market. Indeed, one has to keep in mind that the football labour market is closed, with a strictly limited number of employees due to the pre-defined number of professional teams active on this market. Thus, the use of indeterminate contracts would have the consequence of freezing the labour market and drastically reduce the incentive to train young players and to improve the squads.

Fourth, providing players with contracts for an indefinite period would also entail the possibility for footballers to terminate their employment agreements pursuant to statutory notice periods. Such an eventuality would affect the stability of contracts between professionals and club, with negative effects on clubs’ planning security in both sporting and financial matters.[22]

Fifth, the fact that contracts for an indefinite period are regarded as the general form of employment and that interests of sport clubs have not been granted protection under the German Constitution should not constitute a reason for precluding the application of Section 14 TzBfG. In this respect, the social partners indicated that ‘fixed-term contracts are a feature of employment in certain sectors, occupations and activities which can suit both employers and workers’.[23] Also, the national implementing measure do not make reliance on Section 14 TzBfG conditional upon the employer falling within one of the sectors protected under the German Constitution. On the contrary, the exception established pursuant to national law seems rather broad. It refers to, inter alia, the nature of the work and the list of objective grounds does not seem to be exhaustive.[24]

Sixth, the rejection by the Court of the argument concerning the customary nature of the recourse to fixed-term contracts in football is not surprising. However, the fact that the needs of the public (supporters) were regarded as being of minor relevance is more questionable. The need to replace players is based not only on the reasons mentioned above, but also necessary from the perspective of maintaining a stable fan base and attracting new supporters by, inter alia, increasing clubs’ competitiveness. Allowing flexibility in signing new players, and conversely in parting with those footballers who are no longer (effectively) able to contribute to the team effort, enables clubs to, at least, increase their chances of success, and thus, fulfils the desires of the supporters. In this respect, the Court mentioned itself that popularity of clubs depends on sporting success. Therefore, it is unfortunate that the Court did not hesitate to disregard this particular factor and failed to scrutinize it in more detail.

C. Other objective reasons
Arguments relating to high wages that professional footballers receive, or the fact that an employment agreement between a club and a player concluded for a definite period may not be dissolved have not been accepted by the Court as constituting objective grounds justifying successive fixed-term contracts. In this regard, it is difficult to criticize the Court. The Court correctly pointed out that these arguments find no support in grounds explicitly mentioned in Section 14 TzBfG. And even though the national law implementing the Directive indicates that successive fixed-term contracts may be justified based on ‘in particular’ the grounds enumerated in Section 14 TzBfG (which might be interpreted as not fully meeting the criteria established in the CJEU’s case-law),[25] thus leaving a possibility for employers to argue the existence of justifications not covered by the provision, accepting such arguments could not only threaten workers’ employment stability, but would also be liable of undermining the system established for the purpose of preventing abuse stemming from recourse to successive fixed-term contracts.

Concluding remarks
The ruling in the Müller case clearly illustrates that for the purpose of evaluating the compatibility of fixed-term contracts in football with the Directive it is absolutely necessary to assess its practical implementation at the national level. In this regard, the focus of the legal debate, which the present blog aspires to spark, has to be placed on the issue of successive fixed-term contracts in football being capable of falling under the objective reasons justification. It cannot be denied that a number of arguments pertaining, in particular, to the specific nature of football as an economic activity may constitute basis for retaining the current system. However, recourse to such arguments will only be possible where national implementing measures allow for it, which therefore implies a specific assessment of the situation in each Member State. Moreover, in those Member States in which national laws prevent objective reason justifications from being relied upon in the professional football sector, successive fixed-term contracts could only be valid through the introduction of amendments to national legislation, (broad) interpretation of the applicable rules by national courts, or by providing room for social partners to agree on a specific status of sports regarding fixed-term contracts. The Müller case has undoubtedly kick-started a much-needed legal discussion. Nevertheless, its intensity will probably depend on the substance of the appeal decision in the Müller case, and whether or not similar cases will appear before national courts outside of Germany.

[1] Council Directive 1999/70/EC concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP [1999] OJ L 175/43 (Directive)

[2] ArbG Mainz, AZ: 3 CA 1197/14, 13.03.2015 (Heinz Müller Judgment)

[3] The German text of the Teilzeit- und Befristungsgesetz is available in full at https://dejure.org/gesetze/TzBfG

[4] Joined cases C-378/07 to C-380/07 Kiriaki Angelidaki and Others v Organismos Nomarchiakis Autodioikisis Rethymnis, Charikleia Giannoudi v Dimos Geropotamou and Georgios Karabousanos and Sofoklis Michopoulos v Dimos Geropotamou [2009] ECR I-3071

[5] Heinz Müller Judgment, para 3.1.

[6] Ibidem

[7] Ibidem

[8] Ibidem

[9] Ibidem

[10] Ibidem, para 3.2.1.

[11] Ibidem

[12] Ibidem

[13] Ibidem, para 3.2.2.

[14] Ibidem

[15] Ibidem, para 3.2.3.

[16] Ibidem

[17] Ibidem

[18] Ibidem, para 3.3.

[19] BAG 19.01.2005, 7 AZR 115/04

[20] BAG 02.07.2003, AP BGB §611 Nr.39. See also BeckOK TzBfG §14 at Rn. 55

[21] The CJEU held that considering the social importance of sporting activities, and especially football, in the European Union the objective of encouraging the recruitment and training of young players must be accepted as legitimate and thus capable of justifying restrictions on free movement of workers. See Case C-415/93 Union royale belge des sociétés de football association ASBL v Jean-Marc Bosman, Royal club liégeois SA v Jean-Marc Bosman and others and Union des associations européennes de football (UEFA) v Jean-Marc Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921, para 106; Case C-325/08 Olympique Lyonnais SASP v Olivier Bernard and Newcastle UFC [2010] ECR I-2177, para 39

[22] Diego F. R. Compaire, Gerardo Planás R. A., Stefan-Eric Wildemann, ‘Contractual Stability in Professional Football: Recommendations for Clubs in a Context of International Mobility’, July 2009. http://www.lawinsport.com/pdf/ContStabinProfFoot.pdf. Accessed 17 July 2015; also FIFA regulations provide for rules introduced for the purpose of facilitating contractual stability between clubs and players, see FIFA, ‘Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players’, 2015, Chapter IV. Maintenance of contractual stability between professionals and clubs

[23] Annex to the Directive, ETUC-UNICE-CEEP Framework Agreement on Fixed-Term Work, recital 8

[24] Section 14 TzBfG indicates that objective grounds exist ‘in particular’ in situations provided for in the provision. The wording of the provision thus grants considerable flexibility to employers

[25] In case C-212/04 Konstantinos Adeneler en anderen tegen Ellinikos Organismos Galaktos (ELOG) [2006] ECR I-6057, para 72 the CJEU ruled, inter alia, that regarding the concept of objective reasons as provided under the Directive national provisions may not be of a purely formal nature, but must justify recourse to successive fixed-term contracts ‘by the presence of objective factors relating to the particular features of the activity concerned and to the conditions under which it is carried out […]’

Editor's note: Mark James is Professor of Sports Law at Manchester Metropolitan University and the author of a leading Sports Law textbook.

The opening days of the FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022 have already resulted in a number of issues of interest to sports lawyers and human rights lawyers, with FARE’s Piara Powar claiming that this is the most political major sporting event that he has attended. Both FIFA and the local organisers have been active in their suppression of expressions of support for LGBTQIA+ rights by players, fans and journalists alike, calling into question once again the legality of restricting free speech by sporting rules and regulations.

There have been two major flashpoints to date. First, seven European federations had asked FIFA for permission for their captains to wear armbands supporting the ‘OneLove’ campaign. FIFA’s response was to refuse, resulting in the German players covering their mouths for their pre-match photographs in protest at their being silenced. There are several grounds on which FIFA would seek to support its position:

•  Law 4.5 of the Laws of the Game prohibits any playing equipment from carrying any political, religious or personal slogans, statements or images.
• Regulation 4.3.1 of FIFA’s Equipment Regulations and Regulation 27.1 of the FIFA World Cup 2022 Regulations prohibits clothing or equipment that includes political, religious, or personal slogans, statements, or images, or otherwise does not comply in full with the Laws of the Game.
• Regulation 33.3 of the FIFA World Cup 2022 Regulations prohibits the display of political, religious or personal messages or slogans of any nature in any language or form by players and officials.
• Regulation 13.8.1 of FIFA’s Equipment Regulations states that for FIFA Final Competitions, the captain of each Team must wear the captain’s armband provided by FIFA (all Regulations available in the FIFA Legal Handbook 2022).

Although the DFB is considering a challenge to FIFA’s refusal to allow its captain to wear the OneLove armband, which would ultimately be heard before CAS, it is unlikely to succeed in the face of the strict requirements of the above Laws and Regulations. However, what could cause more difficulty for both FIFA and CAS is if the DFB frames its case as a challenge to the compliance of the rules that restrict players’ freedom of expression with Article 3 of FIFA’s Statutes, which states that ‘FIFA is committed to respecting all internationally recognised human rights.’ Article 3, together with the additional detail provided by FIFA’s Human Rights Policy, ensures that freedom of expression as defined in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights are limitative rules that can be applied directly to FIFA’s activities, as has been argued by Bützler and Schöddert. Further, if the affected players and associations can define themselves as human rights defenders, then Article 11 of FIFA’s Human Rights Policy states that, ‘FIFA will respect and not interfere with the work of … human rights defenders who voice concerns about adverse human rights impacts relating to FIFA.’ Any challenge using this approach would be the first real test of the enforceability of the human rights protections to which FIFA claims to be committed. It would also be a test of CAS’s ability to require adherence to the human rights commitments made by ISFs and to prove that they are more than simple window-dressing.

Secondly, members of The Rainbow Wall, a contingent of LGBTQIA+ rights-supporting Welsh fans, were prevented from entering the Ahmed bin Ali stadium whilst wearing bucket hats incorporating a rainbow into its design. No explanation for why was given, however, FIFA and the local organisers would argue that openly supporting LGBTQIA+ rights with the aim of promoting legal change in a country where homosexuality is illegal is a political statement on apparel and therefore entry into the stadium wearing the rainbow hat is in breach of the Regulation 3.1.23 of the Stadium Code of Conduct. A similar argument could be used to justify preventing US journalist Grant Wahl from entering the stadium wearing a t-shirt incorporating a rainbow into its design and Danish journalist Jon Pagh from wearing the OneLove armband. However, it must be stressed that no such explanation for the prohibitions applied to these garments was provided to any of the affected fans or journalists. It must also be recognised that the opinion that promoting LGBTQIA+ rights is a political expression is highly contested. In a statement from FIFPRO, the opposing view was stated succinctly: ‘We maintain that a rainbow flag is not a political statement but an endorsement of equality and thus a universal human right.’

It is clear that, as with Rule 50 of the Olympic Charter, the chilling effect that FIFA’s Regulations have on players’ and fans’ freedom of expression is likely to be unlawful, as has been discussed at length both on this blog and on the Verfassungsblog Debate on Freedom of Expression in the Olympic Movement. Instead of revisiting these arguments, which are taken to apply to FIFA’s actions at Qatar 2022, two additional issues related to the FIFA Statutes are explored here.

Articles 3 and 4 of FIFA’s Statutes state that:

3 Human rights

FIFA is committed to respecting all internationally recognised human rights and shall strive to promote the protection of these rights.

4 Non-discrimination, equality and neutrality

4.1 Discrimination of any kind against a country, private person or group of people on account of race, skin colour, ethnic, national or social origin, gender, disability, language, religion, political opinion or any other opinion, wealth, birth or any other status, sexual orientation or any other reason is strictly prohibited and punishable by suspension or expulsion.

FIFA is a long-time supporter of pride events and in its press release for Pride Month 2022 stated:

[The] FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022™ will be a celebration of unity and diversity – a joining of people from all walks of life – regardless of race, ethnicity, religion, age, disability, sex characteristics, sexual orientation, gender identity and expression – everybody will be welcome.

Claims that all staff involved in the Qatar 2022 including public and private security forces, would be trained on how to accomplish their tasks in a non-discriminatory manner, seem not to have been operationalised effectively.

This begs the question whether FIFA is in breach of its own Statutes by refusing to allow players to express themselves freely on armbands and failing to protect fans’ freedom of expression by wearing rainbows. At the very least, FIFA should have ensured that a protective LGBTQIA+ regime in the stadiums and the fan zones during the World Cup was implemented to enable the ‘celebration of unity and diversity’ it claims that Qatar 2022 should be. FIFA’s actions in Qatar call into question its claims to be an inclusive and supportive leader on anti-discrimination and human rights, and is likely to see a backlash from the LGBTQIA+ community that it claims to support when it engages with Pride 2023; accusations of hypocrisy and virtue signalling are guaranteed.

With no resolution to the debate at the time of writing, Articles 3 and 4 could provide players and fans with the opportunity to demonstrate their support for human rights and anti-discrimination causes. At the Sochi 2014 Winter Olympics, Athlete Ally developed the ‘Principle 6 Campaign.’ Instead of criticising directly Russia's so called anti-gay laws, which are currently in the process of being extended, athletes promoted Principle 6 of the Olympic Charter, which at the time stated that, ‘Any form of discrimination with regard to a country or a person on grounds of race, religion, politics, gender or otherwise is incompatible with belonging to the Olympic Movement.’ The eventual outcome of this campaign was the addition of sexual orientation to the list of characteristics protected by Principle 6. Unlike at Sochi 2014, there is no need to campaign for a change to either of Articles 3 or 4 of the FIFA Statutes; instead, activists want to ensure that they are being applied. An immediate response for both players and fans would be for them to quote specifically from Articles 3 and 4, as it would be extremely difficult for FIFA to claim that they are making political or personal statements when promoting FIFA’s own foundational values. A creative reminder of what FIFA claims to stand for could enable player and fan activism to continue throughout the tournament, and beyond, whilst affected players and associations can develop a compelling case for the restrictions on freedom of expression to be struck out by CAS, the Swiss Federal Tribunal and/or the European Court of Human Rights.

Introduction: The new WADA Code 2015
Day 2: The “Athlete Patient” and the 2015 World Anti-Doping Code: Competing Under Medical Treatment
Day 3: Proof of intent (or lack thereof) under the 2015 World Anti-Doping Code
Day 4: Ensuring proportionate sanctions under the 2015 World Anti-Doping Code

Editor's note
Herman Ram is the Chief Executive Officer of the Anti-Doping Authority the Netherlands, which is the National Anti-Doping Organization of the country. He has held this position since 2006. After working twelve years as a librarian, Herman Ram started his career in sport management in 1992, when he became Secretary general of the Royal Netherlands Chess Federation. In 1994, he moved on to the same position at the Netherlands Badminton Federation. He was founder and first secretary of the Foundation for the Promotion of Elite Badminton that was instrumental in the advancement of Dutch badminton. In 2000 he was appointed Secretary general of the Netherlands Ski Federation, where he focused, among other things, on the organization of large snowsports events in the Netherlands. Since his appointment as CEO of the Anti-Doping Authority, he has developed a special interest in legal, ethical and managerial aspects of anti-doping policies, on which he has delivered numerous presentations and lectures. On top of that, he acts as Spokesperson for the Doping Authority. Herman Ram holds two Master’s degrees, in Law and in Sport Management.

Introduction
The 2015 World Anti-Doping Code is not a new Code, but a revision of the 2009 Code. In total, 2,269 changes have been made (see here for the redlined version). Quite a number of these changes are minor corrections, additions and reformulations with little or no impact on the work of NADOs. But the number of truly influential changes is still impressive, which makes it hard to choose.

Luckily, WADA has identified the – in their view – more significant changes in a separate document and I have used this document to bring some order in a number of comments that I want to make on the impact of those revisions on our daily work.

Part of what follows is based on our experiences with the implementation of the revised Code so far, but quite a bit of what follows cannot be based on any actual experience, because the revised Code has only been in place for seven months, and only a rather small number of disciplinary procedures in relatively simple cases have come to a final decision under the revised rules. As a result, and because I am not in the business of predicting the future, on this occasion I have decided to share some of my expectations with you. Only the future can tell whether I am right on those issues.

Theme 1: sanctions
Probably the most discussed aspect of the revision is the longer period of ineligibility that can be imposed on – as WADA formulates it – ‘real cheats’. In other cases, especially cases of unintentional violations, the revision should lead to more flexibility to impose lower sanctions. Due to the amendments in most cases it will be crucial to establish ‘intent’ – or the lack of it – in order to be able to determine the appropriate sanction. And because of the Strict liability principle that applies to the burden of proof in cases with Adverse Analytical Findings, NADOs have not focused very much on the establishment of ‘intent’, simply because under the previous Codes it was not relevant for the outcome of most cases.

In the case of non-specified substances, it is now up to the athlete to prove that the violation was not intentional, and in the case of specified substances it is up to the (N)ADO to prove intent. This is new, and our current practice shows that this kind of evidence is very hard to deliver for both parties. As a consequence, four year sanctions have been imposed rather matter-of-factly until now in cases where non-specified substances are involved. And such severe sanctions will remain common if non-specified substances are detected, but they will be quite rare in other cases. No doubt, jurisprudence will be developed that will help to assess specific situations, but for most cases the four year sanction will more or less automatically result from the simple fact that a non-specified substance is involved.

Some exploratory analysis of the sanctions imposed under the 2009 Code for specified substances has shown that panels have already established a practice with a lot of flexibility in those kind of cases under the 2003 and 2009 Codes, and I do not expect major changes there.

Quite interesting from our (NADO’s) point of view is Article 10.6.3, which introduces a role for both the (N)ADO with result management responsibility and WADA in cases where athletes or other persons promptly admit an anti-doping rule violation. If both the (N)ADO and WADA agree, a sanction reduction from four years to a minimum of two years is possible. We do not yet know what WADA’s position will be in this kind of cases, but I do know that many NADOs will be inclined to grant a reduction of the period of ineligibility, because we want to stimulate admissions as much as possible. Information given by athletes and other persons is most valuable, and (less important, but still…) we can spare ourselves a lot of costly work in the process.

Somewhat related to prompt admissions (not new, but amended and expanded in the revised Code) is the possibility to reduce sanctions based on substantial assistance (Article 10.6.1). Because of the growing importance of Investigations and Intelligence (see Theme 3 below) and the increased emphasis on Athlete Support Personnel (Theme 4) I think that we will see that this Article will become more important in the work of NADOs. It seems to me that the revisions will help us considerably in all cases where athletes or other persons need reassurance that an agreed-upon reduction of sanctions will be respected ‘no matter what’. At the same time, more information will become available that may help us in uncovering and prosecuting other anti-doping rule violations.

Theme 2: proportionality and human rights
I can be quite short here: I have not identified a single consequence of this Theme for the NADO that I work for, and I can hardly imagine that other developed NADOs will see this differently. This is not because this Theme is not important (quite the contrary) but because NADOs do not need extra encouragement in order to ensure that proportionality and human rights are taken into consideration on an everyday basis. And because – at least in Europe – data protection issues and the related issues of public disclosure and the protection of minors are primarily governed by legislation, not by the Code.

Theme 3: Investigations and intelligence
Indeed, the development of ‘Intelligence & Investigations’ is one of the major issues that quite a few NADOs are dealing with now. In less than two years’ time, more than a dozen NADOs have attracted new staff for this purpose, and cooperation between NADOs (and some IFs) in this field is gradually developing, at a pace that is primarily determined by taking care of the legal side of things. The Code revision has not initiated this development, but it certainly confirms and strengthens it. And we are well aware that Intelligence has played a major role in practically all cases (old and recent) where large-scale, organized, doping practices have been uncovered. Which does not mean that we are all prepared for this kind of thing…

First of all, it is necessary to develop and sign bilateral cooperation agreements in which the preconditions for sharing information between (N)ADOs are defined. I have signed several, and there are more to come. But it is also necessary to start and develop a cooperation with customs and law enforcement agencies, and this kind of cooperation needs even more legal preparation in order to be successful (or just possible). Indeed, information sharing with government agencies is just as logical as it is complicated in practice.

I do not know one NADO that does not feel the need for cooperation with law enforcement agencies. And that fact, supported by the revised Code, means that NADOs are slowly but surely getting better acquainted with government agencies. It is my opinion that several legislation proposals in various countries in Europe illustrate this development nicely. Countries which have done without specific anti-doping legislations for years – including my own country – are now working on legal measures that aim to facilitate a close(r) cooperation between governments and (N)ADOs (in line with the expansion of Article 22.2 in the 2015 Code).

The investigative powers of Intelligence Officers of NADOs on the one hand, and law enforcement agents on the other hand, are wide apart. In most countries, an Intelligence Officer has no other rights than any citizen, while there are elaborate laws that define and regulate what law enforcement officers may and may not do. The gap between the two has to be narrowed, in order to facilitate and stimulate further cooperation. Which means that Intelligence Officers will need to have specific authorizations that enable them to do their job within sport, but without becoming law enforcement officers themselves. The solutions will be different per country, but the common factor will be that NADOs will have more tools to fulfil their tasks.

Apart from these legislative and regulatory developments, which open doors that have been firmly closed until now in many countries, there are not many ’quick wins’ to be expected because of ‘Intelligence & Investigations’. In the long run, however, ‘Intelligence & Investigations’ will probably have a significant impact on the effectiveness of doping control programs, which will not really become ‘smarter’ (more brain power has been invested in the testing programs under the 2003 and 2009 Codes than most people can imagine), but certainly more ‘targeted’ and tailor-made. This may be an equally important effect of ‘Intelligence & Investigations’ as collecting evidence.

The extension of the statute of limitations (Article 17) to ten years will not make a big difference in numbers, but the cases where this extension pays off, will for a large part be the kind of cases that we find especially important to bring to justice. There is a downside to this as well, of course, and one of the aspects that I have not seen mentioned often is the fact that relevant samples will have to be stored for another two years, which will lead to additional costs. Few people realize how expensive the storing of samples – under the right conditions – is.

Theme 4: Athlete Support Personnel (ASP)
This Theme is closely connected to Theme 3, because anti-doping rule violations by Athlete Support Personnel cannot be proven by the traditional means of proof of ADOs, i.e. the analysis of urine and blood samples. There can be no doubt that catching those coaches and doctors that supply and administer doping to the athletes must be a high priority for NADOs. We are well aware that athletes do not function in a vacuum. As a consequence, NADOs will dedicate a considerable part of their ‘Intelligence & Investigations’ capacity to ASP. A rise in the number of cases where ASP is involved can be predicted, although – unfortunately – a huge effect is unlikely. Not only because these cases will always be hard to prove (no matter what) but also because large groups of ASP are not (properly) bound by anti-doping regulations. The seriousness of this problem varies per country and per sport (discipline), and the problem may – at least partly – be solved through legislation. But in my own country, I do not see how the Code revision will help the NADO in prosecuting ASP, unless and until we manage to find ways to sufficiently bind all relevant ASP to our rules.

The new anti-doping rule violation ‘Prohibited Association’ brings us some serious new challenges, I think. One of them being the burden of proof, which often will not be easy to discharge. Here again, ‘Intelligence & Investigations’ will play a crucial role. But even if it can be proven that an athlete is working with an ineligible coach, trainer or doctor, there may be several legal challenges if the ineligible person has a private practice outside organized sport, and working with athletes is the livelihood of that person.

Theme 5: Smart testing and analyzing
As I mentioned above (see Theme 3) ‘Intelligence & Investigations’ will probably have a significant positive impact on the effectiveness of doping control programs. However, it remains to be seen whether this effectiveness will show in terms of the detection of more anti-doping rule violations, or in a better deterrence. Whichever it will be, a consequence of the development towards more targeted and tailor-made testing and analyzing, is that the price of testing will go up. Tailor-made testing means more individual testing, on odd hours, in (sometimes) strange places. This is – no surprise – considerably more expensive than testing a number of players at random after a training session of a team.

On top of that, the Technical Document for Sport Specific Analysis (TDSSA, https://wada-main-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/resources/files/wada-tdssa-v2.2-en.pdf) that has been developed after the implementation of the revised Code (based on Article 6.4 of that Code), prescribes a minimum percentage of additional analyses per sport discipline, with even more cost increase as a consequence. Some NADOs have managed to get additional funding in relation to these new requirements, but most of us have not (and not many of us foresee a budget increase in the near future). So the global number of tests performed by NADOs will in all likelihood decrease.

Whether this decrease in numbers will be acceptable, depends on the value added by the additional analyses that are now performed. If less tests bring more proof, then it is a good development. However, for the time being, there is no way to tell. And it is predictable that decreasing numbers of tests (the number of tests performed being the most commonly used measuring stick to assess the performance of a NADO) will generate critical questions about how serious we take the fight against doping in sport.

While I am writing this contribution, we are in the middle of the ‘IAAF controversy’, following the leakage of confidential information to the media, and the subsequent publication of sensitive data. I am not in the position to comment on what exactly is right and wrong in this case (I simply do not know) but I do know that the IAAF anti-doping program is ‘smarter’ than most, and that it can show results that few IFs can. Nonetheless, the public discussion is focusing on what has not been accomplished with all these data. So the large amounts of data that become available through ‘smart’ testing and elaborate biological passport programs, may become a burden instead of a blessing if the burden of proof is not reached in too many cases. Which – I fear – may be the case.

Theme 6: International Federations and NADOs
Another development that is not initiated by the Code revision – but certainly is supported and accelerated by it – is the improvement of NADO-IF cooperation. The revised Code clarifies and solves several of the problems that we have experienced with the 2009 Code. Examples are the control of therapeutic use exemptions (Article 4.4), the testing authority during international events (Articles 5.3, 5.2.6 and 7.1.1), and the coordination of whereabouts failures (Article 7.1.2). All these changes are improvements.

However, cooperation is more in the soul than it is in the rules, and we must acknowledge and accept that there are relevant differences between NADOs on the one hand and IFs on the other hand, in terms of culture, position and tradition. WADA has created Ad Hoc Working Groups of NADOs and IFs separately, and these groups have made inventories of existing problems that are subsequently brought to the table in joint meetings. The Articles in the Revised Code that underline the need for better cooperation will have no meaning if we stay separated in two worlds. But the impact will be huge, if and when we benefit from each other’s knowledge and experience. And although I am not an optimist by nature, I am pretty sure that this will work out fine.

Theme 7: A clearer and shorter Code
I think it is obvious that this Theme is quite ambitious, and I can only regretfully conclude that the revised Code is neither clearer, nor shorter than the 2009 version. The Code is the most important legal tool in the anti-doping world, and both lawyers and administrators may (and do) delight in the fact that the Code has proven to be an indispensable tool in our toolkit. It is, however, not a tool for athletes (except for those who are also lawyer or administrator) and it will never be. Clarity about the rules is delivered by the Education departments of NADOs, in the form of numerous publications, leaflets, manuals and (more and more) digital tools. And it is my personal opinion that there is not much wrong with accepting that the Code is not meant to educate athletes, but to protect them.

Miscellaneous
It is difficult to choose what other aspects of the revised Code are worth mentioning here. Let me name only a few.
The new possibility for an athlete to return to training during the last part of the period of ineligibility imposed on him (Art. 10.12.2), is – in my opinion – a balanced compromise between the need to fully execute sanctions, and the interests of team members that have not been sanctioned themselves. However, this refinement of the sanction regime further complicates the task that has been a burden for many NADOs for years already: how to monitor that sanctions are observed correctly and fully. This monitoring task usually cannot be fulfilled without the help of sport federations and clubs, and – to a certain extent – fellow athletes. Publicly known elite athletes will hardly have an opportunity to violate their sanction without being ‘caught’, but for lesser gods the situation is different, which fact collides with the Level playing field that we want to achieve.

Article 6.5 of the revised Code addresses the storing of samples for further analysis. It is good that these rules are now clarified, because it is to be expected that the percentage of samples that are stored for future analysis will rise over the years. The revised rules are meant to do justice to both the athlete and the (N)ADO and I think they actually do that, although I am sure that both NADOs and athletes will disagree in any particular case they are involved in.

The importance of the explicit wording of the Articles 20.4.3 and 22.6 that address the need for NADOs to be free from interference in our operational decisions, cannot be overestimated. Anti-doping issues can get a lot of attention in the media, and that may or may not lead to unleashing certain political powers. In my country, parliamentary questions have been asked about specific doping cases on several occasions. Thankfully, in no case this has led to actual interference in our work, but it is very good that the Revised Code is there to ward off such interference in countries where this may be necessary.

On 21 January 2015, the Court of arbitration for sport (CAS) rendered its award in the latest avatar of the Mutu case, aka THE sports law case that keeps on giving (this decision might still be appealed to the Swiss Federal tribunal and a complaint by Mutu is still pending in front of the European Court of Human Right). The decision was finally published on the CAS website on Tuesday. Basically, the core question focuses on the interpretation of Article 14. 3 of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players in its 2001 version. More precisely, whether, in case of a dismissal of a player (Mutu) due to a breach of the contract without just cause by the player, the new club (Juventus and/or Livorno) bears the duty to pay the compensation due by the player to his former club (Chelsea). Despite winning maybe the most high profile case in the history of the CAS, Chelsea has been desperately hunting for its money since the rendering of the award (as far as the US), but it is a daunting task. Thus, the English football club had the idea to turn against Mutu’s first employers after his dismissal in 2005, Juventus and Livorno, with success in front of the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber (DRC), but as we will see the CAS decided otherwise[1].

      I.         Facts and Procedure of the Mutu Case

The Mutu saga is probably one of the most well known sagas in the sports law world (with the unavoidable Bosman case and the up and coming Pechstein one). It cumulates the glamour drama of a star’s downfall due to a positive cocaine test and many important legal developments.

The saga started in July 2004 with a private drug test conducted by Chelsea on Mutu that turned out to be positive to cocaine. The club issued a fine and a warning. But, in October 2004, Mutu was again tested positive to cocaine, this time by the English FA. Upon this finding, and Mutu’s admission of having ingested cocaine, Chelsea decided to terminate his contract on 28 October 2004. On 29 January 2005 the player was registered at Livorno, before being transferred two days later to Juventus. Juventus had reached its quota of non-EU players it could recruit from outside Italy and used this strategy to circumvent the Italian rules applicable at that time.

Meanwhile, Mutu had challenged in front of the FA’s Appeals Committee (FAPLAC) the decision of Chelsea to terminate his employment contract. In April 2005, the FAPLAC decided that Mutu had committed a breach of his employment contract without just cause. Mutu appealed this decision to the CAS without success (CAS 2005/A/876). In May 2006, Chelsea launched a complaint before the DRC to obtain compensation against the player on the basis of the contractual breach without just cause. The DRC in its decision from 26 October 2006 (available here) held that it could not pronounce itself on the matter and that Chelsea had to turn to FAPLAC. Chelsea appealed the decision to the CAS, which enjoined the DRC to decide on the matter (CAS 2006/A/1192). Consequently, the DRC decided on 7 May 2008 to award €17, 173 990 in damages to Chelsea. Unsurprisingly, Mutu decided to appeal the decision to the CAS, he was especially contesting the amount of compensation awarded, which on 31 July 2009 endorsed the decision of the DRC (CAS 2008/A/1644). It even held that the damage claims of Chelsea were higher, but decided it could not go ultra petita and award a higher sum to the club. Mutu, which had unsuccessfully challenged the independence and impartiality of one of the arbitrators due to his previous participation in the first Mutu case (CAS 2005/A/876), went on to contest the validity of the award in front of the Swiss Federal Tribunal (SFT) mainly on this basis. In its decision (4A_458/2009), the SFT rejected Mutu’s claims regarding the lack of independence of the arbitrator, a decision that has attracted widespread criticisms in the literature.[2] Moreover, it also held that the amount of compensation awarded was not a restriction to free movement in the sense of the Bosman ruling and could not amount to an infringement of Mutu’s personality rights. Thereafter, Mutu decided to continue his fight in yet another forum: the European Court of Human Rights (40575/10).

Chelsea had the final award giving it the right to damages, but still needed to get hold on the money. To do so, it even asked (and obtained) for the recognition and the enforcement of the award in the US (see here), where Mutu was expected to have some property. Nevertheless, Mutu went on to play for smaller and smaller teams, thus earning less and less, and Chelsea’s hope of getting paid in full faded away. However, on 15 July 2010, five years after Mutu’s move to Italy’s Serie A in the first place, Chelsea decided to submit a petition to the FIFA DRC against Juventus and Livorno, asking the DRC to find them jointly liable for the awarded compensation. The claim was based on Article 14.3. of the RSTP 2001, stating that: "If a player is registered for a new club and has not paid a sum of compensation within the one month time limit referred to above, the new club shall be deemed jointly responsible for payment of the amount of compensation." The DRC, in an unpublished decision dated 25 April 2013 (see here and here), followed the interpretation of Article 14.3. RSTP suggested by Chelsea and found that “under the clear wording of Article 14.3, the Player's New Club was automatically jointly responsible for the payment of the Awarded Compensation due by the Player, should the latter fail to fulfil his obligations within a month of notification of the relevant decision”.[3] This provision would make “no distinction between the termination of the contract by a player without just cause and the termination of a contract by a club with just cause”.[4] It also held that "the registrations of the player with both [Appellants] were so closely connected that, given the exceptional circumstances of this specific matter, both Juventus and Livorno should be considered the player's new club in the sense of art. 14 of the Application Regulations”.[5]

Both Juventus and Livorno decided to appeal this decision to the CAS, which in its award decided to reject the DRC’s reasoning.

    II.         The Meaning of Article 14.3 FIFA RSTP

The whole case focuses on the interpretation of the wording of Article 14.3 of the RSTP 2001. Does it mean that every club, whatever the circumstances, must pay compensation when it hires a player that bears the responsibility of the breach of his contract? Or, does it restrict this duty to the cases where the breach can be reasonably imputed to the will of the player to leave his former club?

A. Contractual or statutory interpretation?

In order to determine the interpretative tools to be used to identify the meaning of article 14.3 RSTP, the Panel must first clarify the nature of Article 14.3 under Swiss law.[6] Basically, is the provision of a contractual or quasi-statutory nature? The Panel “does not consider that there is a contractual relationship between the Appellants and Chelsea”.[7] Indeed, “[i]f there is no contractual relationship between an indirect member (i.e. any of the Parties) and a sport federation (i.e. FIFA), the conclusion should be the same as regards the relationship between two indirect members of the same federation”.[8] Furthermore, the “[a]cceptance of general rules (such as FIFA Regulations) does not necessarily entail subjection to specific obligations when their scope must be determinable on the basis of minimum criteria”.[9] Thus, the question raised implies only the interpretation of the bylaw of a Swiss legal entity, FIFA.

The Panel highlights four methods of interpretation under Swiss law:

-  the literal interpretation ("interprétation littérale");

-  the systematic interpretation ("interprétation systématique");

-  the principle of purposive interpretation ("interprétation téléologique");

-  the principle of so-called "compliant interpretation" ("interprétation conforme").[10]

The “starting point” [11] is always the wording of the text. The Swiss Federal Tribunal recognizes that “[t]here is no reason to depart from the plain text, unless there are objective reasons to think that it does not reflect the core meaning of the provision under review”.[12] Moreover, when asked to interpret a law, the SFT “adopts a pragmatic approach and follows a plurality of methods, without assigning any priority to the various means of interpretation”.[13] However, the question is whether those interpretative methods should also apply to the (private) bylaws of a private association. The Panel notes that “[a]s regards the statutes of larger entities, it may be more appropriate to have recourse to the method of interpretation applicable to the law, whereas in the presence of smaller enterprises, the statutes may more legitimately be interpreted by reference to good faith”.[14] It finds that “FIFA's regulations have effects which are felt worldwide, and should therefore be subject to the more objective interpretation principles” applicable to Swiss laws.[15]

In short, the Panel is of the opinion that FIFA regulations, bylaws of an association under Swiss law, are to be interpreted analogously to national laws.

B. EU law as THE decisive contextual element to interpret the RSTP

The Panel first tries to interpret Article 14.3 on the basis of its wording. However, it is of the opinion that the wording is ambiguous and therefore “it is necessary to look beyond the wording of this provision”[16] and adopts what it calls a “contextual approach”.

In short, “the context surrounding the implementation of the RSTP 2001 is of crucial importance in interpreting Article 14.3”.[17] In the view of the Panel (and the appellants), this context is constituted by the application of EU law to sport and especially the Bosman case of the Court of Justice of the EU. Indeed, it is “[a]s part of the reform of the FIFA and UEFA rules following the Bosman decision, [that] FIFA adopted the RSTP 2001”.[18] Thus, the requirements set by the CJEU’s jurisprudence in sports matters are decisive to define the reach of the provisions included in the RSTP. Moreover, the rejection decision of the Commission regarding the complaint submitted against FIFA’s transfer regulations is also important.[19] Specifically, the Panel deduces from the Commission’s decision that it recognizes the need to sanction unilateral termination of contracts.[20]

In the present case, it is precisely the “contractual stability [that] is at the centre of the debate”.[21] In a nutshell, does the paramount objective of contractual stability justify that Juventus and Livorno be considered jointly liable for the breach of contract of Mutu leading to the termination by Chelsea of his contract?

In this regard, Chelsea considers that Article 14.3 “is designed to protect contractual stability by means of a deterrent, namely by ensuring that the parties who benefit from the player's breach – the player himself and his New Club – are not allowed to enjoy that benefit without paying compensation to the player's former club”.[22] While, Juventus and Livorno consider that “Article 14.3 – and FIFA regulations in general – are not meant to protect a club's bad investment”.[23] Which one of this two interpretations is EU law supporting? That is the question.

For the Panel “the Player was the author of his misfortune, but the Club was not required to terminate his employment if they still valued his services and preferred to hold him to his contract”. Indeed, “[t]he Club was entitled, not obliged, to dismiss him” and it “makes all the difference in terms of assessing the position of his subsequent employer(s) under the FIFA regulations, read in light of their object and purpose”.[24] As “Chelsea put an end to the Player's Employment Contract, no issue of contract stability, whose purpose was to safeguard the functioning and regularity of sporting competition, was at stake”.[25] Thus, “it strains logic for the club now to contend that the Appellants somehow enriched themselves by acquiring an asset (the player) which it chose to discard”.[26] Moreover, “the Panel finds it hard to understand how, in the name of contract stability, Chelsea's claim of € 17,173,990 against the Player is to be borne jointly and severally by the New Club, which has never expressed a specific agreement in this regard, had nothing to do with the Player's contractual breach, and was not even called to participate in the proceedings, which established the Awarded Compensation”.[27] Additionally, it seems “incongruous for Chelsea to try to seek an advantage from the fact that the New Club benefits from the Player’s services, whereas Chelsea was no longer interested in his service”.[28] Hence, “Chelsea's conduct appears to have had no other purpose than to increase its chances for greater financial compensation” and the Panel “does not see the connection between the damage being claimed and the interest of protecting legitimate contractual expectations”.[29] In other words, the interpretation of Article 14.3 RSTP supported by Chelsea does not fit the fundamental objective of this provision, as highlighted by its legislative context (mainly the Lethonen case of the CJEU and the Commission’s rejection decision in the competition law complaint against the FIFA transfer system) and cannot be followed.

Interestingly, the Panel also recognized that “[t]here must be a balance between the players’ fundamental right to free movement and the principle of stability of contracts, as supported by the legitimate objective of safeguarding the integrity of the sport and the stability of championships”.[30] In the present case, “[i]f the New Club had to pay compensation even if it is established that it bears no responsibility whatsoever in the breach of the Employment Contract, the player would be hindered from finding a new employer”.[31] Indeed, “it is not difficult to perceive that no New Club would be prepared to pay a multi-million compensation (or transfer fee), in particular for a player who was fired for gross misconduct, was banned for several months, and suffered drug problems”.[32] In short, “Chelsea's interpretation of Article 14.3 would bring the matter back into pre-Bosman times, when transfer fees obstructed the players' freedom of movement”.[33] This is unacceptable for the Panel. Had Chelsea’s interpretation been tolerated “the balance sought by the 2001 RSTP between the players' rights and an efficient transfer system, which responds to the specific needs of football and preserves the regularity and proper functioning of sporting competition would be upset”.[34] Consequently, this interpretation is deemed “incompatible with the fundamental principle of freedom to exercise a professional activity and is disproportionate to the protection of the old club's legitimate interests”.[35] Thus, the Panel concludes “that Article 14.3 does not apply in cases where it was the employer's decision to dismiss with immediate effect a player who, in turn, had no intention to leave the club in order to sign with another club and where the New Club has not committed any fault and/or was not involved in the termination of the employment relationship between the old club and the Player”.[36]

Conclusion

This award is of great interest, not so much for its solution - it is difficult to understand how the FIFA DRC could construct Article 14.3 RSTP as imposing a joint liability on Juventus and Livorno - as for the method used to reach it. The CAS had already in the past based its interpretation of the RSTP on its legislative history and especially on it being the result of a negotiation with the EU Commission in the aftermath of the Bosman ruling.[37] It is the first time, however, that it does so in such length and depth. This contextual reading of Article 14.3 tipped decisively the balance in favor of the appellants. Furthermore, it is a timely reminder for other CAS Panels that FIFA’s RSTP must be interpreted in conformity with EU law and especially the case law of the CJEU on the free movement of workers. If not, CAS awards will face problems at the enforcement stage, as highlighted by the recent SV Wilhelmshaven ruling of the OLG Bremen (see our comment here on the EU law dimension)[38]. This implies that the restrictions it imposes on the free movement of players must be justified by a legitimate objective recognized by the CJEU and be proportionate to attain this objective. In the present case, the interpretation of 14.3 promoted by the DRC runs counter to this requirement as it is not truly aimed at an acceptable legitimate objective and certainly not a proportionate mean to attain contractual stability. Nonetheless, this reasoning could also put into question previous interpretations of the FIFA RSTP. This is especially true for the case-law on the implementation of Article 17 RSTP. The Panel, conscious of the potential implication of the analysis used, is adamant that this case-law is compatible with an EU law conform interpretation. Yet, EU law scholars strongly oppose this view and it can be reasonably argued that the way damages are calculated in case of a breach of a contract under Article 17 is not compatible with the letter and spirit of EU law as applied to the transfer system in Bosman and after[39].

This case will set a resounding precedent for future CAS awards. Lawyers dealing with disputes involving the FIFA RSTP in front of the FIFA DRC and the CAS should take note of this development and introduce wider references to EU law in their briefs.

[1] For this article I have much profited from the outstanding research assistance of Thalia Diathesopoulou.

[2]G. Von Segesser, ‘Equality of Information and Impartiality of Arbitrators’, in P. Wautelet, T. Kruger, G. Coppens (eds), The Practice of Arbitration: Essays in Honour of Hans van Houtte

Hart, 2012, pp.45-51 and L. Beffa, ‘Challenge of International Arbitration Awards in Switzerland for Lack of Independence and/or Impartiality of an Arbitrator – Is it Time to Change the Approach?’ (2011) ASA Bulletin 598 et seq.

[3] CAS 2013/A/3365 & 3366, para 39.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid

[6]Ibid, para. 121-136

[7] Ibid, para. 131

[8] Ibid, para. 131

[9] Ibid, para. 131

[10] Ibid, para.137

[11] Ibid, para.138

[12] Ibid, para.139

[13]Ibid,  para.139

[14]Ibid, para.139

[15]Ibid, para.140

[16]Ibid, para.148

[17]Ibid, para.149

[18]Ibid, para.151

[19]Ibid, para.156

[20]Ibid, para.157

[21]Ibid, para.158

[22]Ibid, para.159

[23]Ibid, para.160

[24]Ibid, para. 161

[25]Ibid, para. 163

[26]Ibid, para. 163

[27]Ibid, para. 165

[28]Ibid, para. 166

[29]Ibid, para. 168

[30]Ibid, para. 169

[31]Ibid, para. 172

[32] Ibid

[33] Ibid, para.174

[34]Ibid, para.174

[35]Ibid, para.174

[36]Ibid,  para.177

[37] ‘It must be remembered that the FIFA Regulations have been issued to regulate the legal and economic aspects of the transfer of players in accordance with the principle of free movement of workers as established by the EC treaty and substantiated by the European Court of Justice in its ruling of 15 December 1995 (case C-415/93), thereby taking the specific needs of professional football into account. In this context, any provisions in the FIFA regulations affecting the player’s freedom of movement should be interpreted narrowly.’ CAS 2004/A/691 FC Barcelona SAD v. Manchester United FC, para. 38; ‘However, the principle behind Art. 5 para. 5 of the Application Regulations is clear: the free movement of workers within the EU/EEA must not be restricted by the imposition of a requirement for the payment of sums by way of compensation for training and education in respect of a player to whom the training club does not offer a contract. In such a case, the failure to offer a contract is an important factor in the assessment of compensation. The compensation payable should not be of such an amount as would impede the player’s ability to move to a new club.’ CAS 2006/A/1125 Hertha BSC Berlin v. Stade Lavallois Mayenne FC, award of 1 December 2006, para. 25; ‘Finally, because of the potentially high amounts of compensation involved, giving clubs a regulatory right to the market value of players and allowing lost profits to be claimed in such manner would in effect bring the system partially back to the pre-Bosman days when players’ freedom of movement was unduly hindered by transfer fees and their careers and well-being could be seriously affected by them becoming pawns in the hands of their clubs and a vector through which clubs could reap considerable benefits without sharing the profit or taking corresponding risks. In view of the text and the history of article 17 par. 1 of the FIFA Status Regulations, allowing any form of compensation that could have such an effect would clearly be anachronistic and legally unsound.’ CAS 2007/A/1298 Wigan Athletic FC v/ Heart of Midlothian & CAS 2007/A/1299 Heart of Midlothian v/ Webster & Wigan Athletic FC & CAS 2007/A/1300 Webster v/ Heart of Midlothian, para. 81.

[38] A. Duval, ‘The Court of Arbitration for Sport  and EU law: Chronicle of an Encounter’, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, forthcoming.

[39] See, R. Parrish, ‘Article 17 of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players: Compatibility with EU Law ‘Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, forthcoming. See also, Pearson, G. (2015), Sporting Justifications under EU Free Movement and Competition Law: The Case of the Football ‘Transfer System’. European Law Journal, 21: 220–238.