Day 1: FIFA must regulate TPO, not ban it.
Day 2: Third-party entitlement to shares of transfer fees: problems and solutions
Day 3: The Impact of the TPO Ban on South American Football.
Day 4: Third Party Investment from a UK Perspective.
Day 5: Why FIFA's TPO ban is justified.

On 22 December 2014, FIFA officially introduced an amendment to its Regulations on the Status and Transfers of Players banning third-party ownership of players’ economic rights (TPO) in football. This decision to put a definitive end to the use of TPO in football is controversial, especially in countries where TPO is a mainstream financing mechanism for clubs, and has led the Portuguese and Spanish football leagues to launch a complaint in front of the European Commission, asking it to find the FIFA ban contrary to EU competition law.

Next week, we will feature a Blog Symposium discussing the FIFA TPO ban and its compatibility with EU competition law. We are proud and honoured to welcome contributions from both the complainant (the Spanish football league, La Liga) and the defendant (FIFA) and three renowned experts on TPO matters: Daniel Geey ( Competition lawyer at Fieldfisher, aka @FootballLaw), Ariel Reck (lawyer at Reck Sports law in Argentina, aka @arielreck) and Raffaele Poli (Social scientist and head of the CIES Football Observatory). The contributions will focus on different aspects of the functioning of TPO and on the impact and consequences of the ban.

Before the five blogs (starting with the complainant, La Liga, on Tuesday) will be published next week on a daily basis, we have the pleasure to kick off today with a light introduction to TPO. At the end of next week we will synthesise the debate and provide our preliminary take on the ban’s compatibility with EU law.

With this exciting Blog Symposium on one of the hottest sports law topics, we celebrate the first anniversary of the ASSER International Sports Law Blog (last year’s opening blog is here). We hope you will enjoy the read and feel free to comment! 

What is TPO? 

The use of the notion of TPO is often criticized because it misrepresents the situation it purposes to qualify. Indeed, no third-party owns a player, but only a share of the “economic right” linked to the transfer of the player’s “federative right”[1]. This is why, as you will see later next week, some of our authors refuse to use the term and have opted for alternative concepts, such as TPE (third-party entitlements) or TPI (third-party investment). Due to our legal obsession with the written word, we will personally hold onto TPO as it is the notion enshrined in FIFA’s regulations.

Beyond this semantic debate, a plurality of contractual constellations is captured under the umbrella term TPO. What is common to all cases is that a company or an individual provides a football club or a player with money in return for being entitled to a share of a player’s future transfer value. Thus, TPO is enshrined in a separate private law contract between a third-party and a club or a player. The plurality of TPO situations derives from this contractual basis. The parties are free under national private law to creatively draft those contracts as they see fit, each one of them being a specific type of TPO in itself. 

The main aim of the practice is to finance clubs. Often TPO is used to externalise the costs of recruiting a player, sometimes it is used to finance the general functioning of a club. However, the use of TPO is always intimately connected to the drive of professional clubs to diversify their funding sources in order to leverage their competitiveness in national and international competitions. Nowadays, a club like Atletico Madrid would probably not have been able to reach the final of the Champions League or win La Liga without having widespread recourse to it.

What are the problems with TPO?

We do not want to spoil too much of next week’s discussion, but we need to at least mention the possible problems that have been linked with the use of TPO and that might serve as a potential justification for banning it. TPO is first and foremost seen as an intrusion of a third-party in the life of a football club and a player with the potential for an illegitimate influence on the management of the team and the player’s career. The many conflicts of interest that might arise in the shadow of multiple, sometimes contradictory, investments are particularly feared. TPO is also seen as a dubious financing technique used to circumvent the new UEFA Financial Fair Play regulations and to prop up clubs that are chronically in financial troubles. Finally, there is a moral dimension. For example, UEFA president Michel Platini likened TPO to a type of modern “slavery”. In short, should it be acceptable for someone to own a share of an economic right personally attached to a player? Can a player be forced-sold on the basis of a TPO agreement? All these issues will be discussed extensively next week; they are central to the evaluation of the ban’s compatibility with EU competition law. 

Regulating TPO or banning it? That is the question!

TPO has been banned for some time in England, France and Poland, while it was authorized in the rest of the World. The English FA, profoundly traumatized by the Carlos Tévez case, decided to ban the practice as early as 2008. In other countries, particularly Spain, Portugal and South America, TPO has been, and still is, part of the “football culture”. For example, it is estimated that in Brazil’s top division 90% of the players are subjected to a TPO agreement. In these countries TPO is seen as a necessity for national football clubs - not only to compete with clubs in richer countries, but also for professional football to be financially viable. It was no surprise that the leagues and clubs of the abovementioned countries were against a blanket ban of TPO and would rather see it being regulated. They consistently expressed this opposition during the FIFA Congress in June 2014 and the working groups created by FIFA in September 2014 with the aim of tackling the issue. Nonetheless, on 26 September the FIFA executive committee took the decision to ban third-party ownership of players’ economic rights (TPO) with a short transitional period. Following this announcement, the FIFA circular fleshing out the legal details of the ban was published on 22 December. Article 18bis of the Regulations on the Status and Transfers of Players was amended and the Regulations now include a new Article 18ter.[2] These new articles came into force on 1 January 2015 and, after a transition period, TPO will officially be banned as of 1 May 2015.

This total ban raises many practical and legal questions. What is to become of the already signed TPO agreements? Will the ban be fully enforced? Or, will creative schemes arise to circumvent it? Was there a less restricting alternative to attain its objective? And…is it compatible with EU competition law? 

The debate is open!

[1] The legal construction underlying TPO is clearly explained (unfortunately only in Italian) by Leandro Cantamessa in his article, ‘Un Tema Semi-Nuovo di Diritto Sportivo Internazionale: la Third Party Ownership (TPO)’, in L’Europa e lo sport (a cura di) S. Bastianon, G. Giappichelli Editore, 2014, pp.123-134.

[2] Article 18bis(1) will now read : “No club shall enter into a contract which enables the counter club/counter clubs, and vice versa, or any third party to acquire the ability to influence in employment and transfer-related matter its independence, its policies or the performance of its teams.”

Article 18ter:

1.      No club or player shall enter into an agreement with a third party whereby a third party is being entitled to participate, either in full or in part, in compensation payable in relation to the future transfer of a player from one club to another, or is being assigned any rights in relation to a future transfer or transfer compensation.

2.      The interdiction as per paragraph 1 comes into force on 1 May 2015.

3.      Agreements covered by paragraph 1 which predate 1 May 2015 may continue to be in place until their contractual expiration. However, their duration may not be extended.

4.      The validity of any agreement covered by paragraph 1 signed between 1 January 2015 and 30 April 2015 may not have a contractual duration of more than 1 year beyond the effective date.

5.      By the end of April 2015, all existing agreements covered by paragraph 1 need to be recorded within the Transfer Matching System (TMS). All clubs that have signed such agreements are required to upload them in their entirety, including possible annexes or amendments, in TMS, specifying the details of the third party concerned, the full name of the player as well as the duration of the agreement.

6.      The FIFA Disciplinary Committee may impose disciplinary measures on clubs or players that do not observe the obligations set out in this article.

The book under review is the published version of a PhD thesis defended in 2013 by Andrew Vaitiekunas at Melbourne Law School. A PhD is often taking stock of legal developments rather than anticipating or triggering them. This was definitely not the case of this book. Its core subject of interest is the study of the independence of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) – an issue that has risen to prominence with the recent Pechstein ruling of January 2015 of the Oberlandesgericht München. It is difficult to be timelier indeed.

The fundamental question underlying Vaitiekunas’ research is: “does CAS have sufficient independence to be a law-maker?”.[1] Indeed, as many in the field, Vaitiekunas considers the CAS as a key institution in the production of a lex sportiva or transnational sports law. Hence, he thinks that “the closer CAS’s standards of independence and impartiality are to those that apply to the judiciary, the stronger may be the claim that CAS’s lex sportiva constitutes law”.[2] Although I am myself sympathetic to the idea of the existence of a lex sportiva, I would be cautious in attributing it mainly to the CAS. Instead, I think that the notion of lex sportiva is rather reflecting the complex legal interaction between the rules (and raw political power) of international Sports Governing Bodies (SGBs) and the CAS’s jurisprudence.[3] Yet, this should not detract from the value of posing the question of CAS independence as a hallmark of its legitimacy.

The book is relatively slow in tackling this question. The author is keen on providing a comprehensive analysis of the general context of his work in Chapter 2 on the CAS and the lex sportiva[4], of his theoretical apparatus in Chapter 3 on the relevant theories of law[5] and of his analytical frame to assess the independence of the CAS in Chapter 4 on independence and impartiality.[6] Although these parts are certainly useful to comprehend the red thread guiding his research, they certainly could have been synthetized and shortened. Any reader interested mainly in the assessment of the independence of the CAS might be tempted to jump directly to Chapter 5 and 6 providing the core of the author's analysis and his most valuable contribution to legal scholarship.

Chapter 5 reviews in detail the well-known favourable assessment by the Swiss Federal Tribunal of the independence of the CAS.[7] Yet, the most important and interesting aspect of the chapter is that it already engages in a critical assessment of this jurisprudence. When discussing the impact of the post-Gundel Paris reform agreement, Vaitiekunas concludes that “a number of facets of the reform indicate continuing links, albeit indirect between the Olympic governing bodies and CAS, thus undermining the perception that CAS is truly an independent arbitral body”.[8] He notes that “[w]hether ICAS members are appointed from within or outside the membership of the top sports bodies, they ultimately owe their appointment to these bodies”.[9] He criticizes the CAS arbitrator list as it “does not indicate who nominated the individual arbitrators, leaving an athlete at risk of choosing an arbitrator nominated by the very IF [International Federation] against which they are taking CAS proceedings”.[10] In any case, “the appointment [as CAS arbitrator] can be seen as occurring under the control of the Olympic governing bodies through their members or delegates in ICAS”.[11] Interestingly, this reasoning is analogue to the one used by the Oberlandesgericht München in its Pechstein ruling.[12] Unsurprisingly, Vaitiekunas is also extremely critical of the SFT’s judgment in the Lazutina case endorsing the independence and the legitimacy of the CAS post-Gundel.[13] He argues that the SFT “appears almost as an apologist for CAS”[14] and criticizes its “non-objective approach to statements by people close to CAS”.[15] Moreover, he denounces a “formalistic approach in assessing CAS’s independence from the IOC”.[16] Indeed, by privileging formal factors, such as the ICAS formal legal independence, “the SFT implicitly chose not to lift ICAS’s veil to consider who has the real powers behind ICAS”.[17] Importantly in light of the Pechstein case, he attacks the fact that “the SFT limited its analysis concerning CAS’s institutional independence solely to CAS’s independence from the IOC and did not consider CAS’s independence from the Olympic governing bodies collectively”.[18] Finally, he reiterates his critique against the closed list system, arguing that “the very process for the nomination and selection of arbitrators to the list creates an appearance of bias in favour of the Olympic governing bodies”.[19] 

Henceforth, Chapter 6[20] vows to pitch CAS’s independence against judicial independence standards discussed in Chapter 4. Coming from Chapter 5, the suspense as to the outcome of the assessment is relatively limited, it is clear ex ante that the author is doubtful of the independence of CAS. He assesses first the individual independence of the arbitrators, referring to four main criteria: 

"The four main recognised safeguards of a judge’s personal independence under judicial independence norms are security of tenure in a judge’s appointment, restrictions on the removability of a judge, adequate and secure remuneration for judicial service and immunity from legal action in the exercise of judicial functions."[21]

Furthermore, he contends that an arbitrator must fulfil a yardstick of substantive independence implying “a judge to be free from any inappropriate connections or influences".[22] In this regard, he argues “all CAS arbitrators […] owe their presence on the closed list to the Olympic governing bodies, thereby creating the appearance of a lack of independence from them”.[23] Finally, regarding the institutional independence of the CAS, Vaitiekunas suggests three main focal points: the structural links, the administrative links and the financial links. The structural links of the CAS are perceived as the main hindrances to CAS’s independence. This is because, “[g]iven the mutual ties and links which the IOC, the IFs and the NOCs […] have under the Olympic Charter, these bodies may appear to have influence collectively on ICAS”.[24] His conclusions is sans appel: “The potential influence that the Olympic governing bodies may be perceived to exercise over ICAS and the CAS secretary general is inconsistent with judicial independence norms which require judicial matters to be exclusively within the responsibility of the judiciary”.[25]

This highly sceptical view regarding the independence of CAS, leads him to propose a set of potential reforms.[26] His first recommendation is to implement “a restructuring of ICAS to ensure that it is institutionally independent”.[27] This would imply that “appointments to ICAS should exclude members of the IOC, executive members of the IFs, NFs and NOCs and their employees and anyone recently in these roles”.[28] Moreover, “the CAS code should be amended to prohibit the appointment of Olympic governing body associates or athlete associates as CAS arbitrators”.[29] Regarding the funding of ICAS and CAS, he suggests “the imposition of a levy on the broadcasting rights to or sponsorships of major sports events”.[30] In order to secure CAS arbitrators individual independence, he is in favour of appointing them “on a tenured basis to a specified retirement aged”.[31] He also recommends, “that arbitrators be appointed randomly to cases or on a predetermined basis”.[32] Eventually, he advises “to provide arbitrators with greater security in remuneration by appointing them on a fixed salary, like judges, payable regardless of whether and how many cases they are appointed to arbitrate”.[33] Vaitiekunas is convinced that if his recommendations were implemented, “CAS would be a true sports court, rather than an arbitral tribunal”.[34] 

The final chapter 7 of the book dedicated to CAS’s independence from external judicial review is a bit of a mystery to the reviewer. Vaitiekunas offers a relatively succinct but rigorous comparative study of the various national (and European) judicial avenues where CAS awards can be reviewed. He concludes rightly that CAS awards can be subjected to the control of national courts and European Institutions. However, his assumption that “CAS awards must be independent from review or intervention by state courts, such that they operate as final authority in the resolution of sports disputes”[35] and especially the consequence he derives from it, denying to lex sportiva any status as a legal order seems to be flawed.[36] Indeed, in no legal context, national or otherwise, is a judicial decision absolutely final. National courts’ judgments are often contested when their recognition is asked in another country, this does not entail that national law is not law. Similarly, the subjection of the judgments of the highest national courts of the EU Member States to the preliminary reference mechanism in place under EU law should not lead us to deny any legal value to national law. We are living in a pluralist legal age ruled by complex transnational legal assemblages and lex sportiva fits very well into this picture. Nonetheless, on this point I share the view of the author of this book, the question of the legitimacy of both the rulemaking bodies of lex sportiva (read FIFA or the IOC) and its adjudicative bodies (read the CAS) is of great importance. In fact, their illegitimacy, and here I differ from Vaitiekunas’ argument, should not mainly imply their non-existence as law-making bodies, but the need for a reform (or even a revolution) in the way they operate.

This book is precious, because it highlights very well the challenges ahead in our transnationalizing legal world. Democratizing international (or transnational in this case) judicial bodies is key, if the ideal and democratic function of an independent justice for world citizens is to be sustained.[37]  We need to understand that transnational private bodies are in the business of exercising a kind of public authority and should live up to analogous accountability and legitimacy standards than the one that have been progressively developed in the framework of the nation-states for national courts. The CAS is one of those, and the pending Pechstein case is a necessary itch to reflexively trigger a much-needed reform of its internal structure and functioning. Which precise form this reform will take is not crucial. What is essential, however, is that it ensures that CAS arbitrators be seen as rendering sporting justice at a personal (if not geographical) distance from those who are adopting and enforcing the rules of the lex sportiva. This book is an important critical contribution in that direction.

[1] Vaitiekunas A (2014) The Court of Arbitration for Sport: Law-Making and the Question of Independence. Stämpfli Verlag, Berne, p 2.

[2] Ibid, p 3.

[3] Duval A (2013) Lex Sportiva: A Playground for Transnational Law. European Law Journal 19: 822-842.

[4] Ibid, pp 7-50.

[5] Ibid, pp 51-83.

[6] Ibid, pp 85-120.

[7] Ibid, pp 121-177.

[8] Ibid, p 142.

[9] Ibid, p 146.

[10] Ibid, p 150.

[11] Ibid, p 151.

[12] See supra n 1, Oberlandesgericht (OLG) München [2015], paras 3b, bb, 3aaa and bbb.

[13] Supra n 2, Vaitiekunas, pp 168-174.

[14] Ibid, p 169.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Ibid, p 171.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Ibid, p 174.

[20] Ibid, pp 179-200.

[21] Ibid, p 184.

[22] Ibid, p188.

[23] Ibid, p 189.

[24] Ibid, p 191.

[25] Ibid, p 193.

[26] Ibid, pp 197-199.

[27] Ibid, p 197.

[28] Ibid, p 198.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Ibid, p 199.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Ibid.

[35] Ibid, p 265.

[36] Ibid, p 269 : ”CAS’s lack of final authority, in particular where state public policy or EU law are in question, derogates from CAS’s lex sportiva being an independent legal order“.

[37] For a similar idea applied to international courts, see Von Bogdandy A, Venzke I (2014) In Whose Name? A Public Law Theory of International Adjudication. Oxford University Press, New York.

Editor's note: This report compiles all relevant news, events and materials on International and European Sports Law based on the daily coverage provided on our twitter feed @Sportslaw_asser. You are invited to complete this survey via the comments section below, feel free to add links to important cases, documents and articles we might have overlooked.

The Headlines 

2024 and 2028 Olympic Games to be held in Paris and Los Angeles respectively

On 13 September 2017, the Session of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) held in Lima, Peru, elected Paris and Los Angeles as host cities of the 2024 and 2028 Olympic Games respectively. On this occasion, the IOC President Thomas Bach said that ''this historic double allocation is a 'win-win-win' situation for the city of Paris, the city of Los Angeles and the IOC''. The idea of a tripartite agreement whereby two editions of the Olympic Games would be awarded at the same time was presented by a working group of the IOC Vice-Presidents established in March 2017. Both Paris and Los Angeles have pledged to make the Olympic Games cost-efficient, in particular through the use of a record-breaking number of existing and temporary facilities. In addition to economic aspects, it will be worthwhile to keep an eye on how both cities will address human rights and other similar concerns that may arise in the run-up to the Olympic Games. 

FIFA President accused of interfering with the work of the FIFA Governance Committee

On 13 September 2017, Miguel Maduro, a former Chair of the FIFA Governance Committee who was summarily dismissed in May 2017, appeared in the UK House of Commons to give testimony on the undue influence that FIFA's President Gianni Infantino allegedly exerted over the work of the Governance Committee. Most importantly, Maduro claimed that Infantino attempted to interfere with the Governance Committee's decision to bar Vitaly Mutko, a Deputy Prime Minister of Russia, from sitting on the FIFA Council. The former Chair of the Governance Committee commented that Infantino ''chose to politically survive'' and carried on to assert that FIFA has a ''deeply embedded structure that is extremely resistant to independent scrutiny, transparency and accountability''. FIFA denied Maduro's accusations, stating that ''exchanges between the administration and FIFA's committees […] are logical and even desirable, so for these exchanges to be portrayed as undue influence is factually incorrect''.

The CAS award in Jersey Football Association v. UEFA

In its press release of 28 September 2017, the CAS communicated that it had delivered an award in the dispute between the Jersey Football Association (JFA) and UEFA which emerged from the JFA's application for UEFA membership submitted in December 2015. The CAS set aside the decision rendered by the UEFA Executive Committee on 1 September 2016 in which the JFA's application for UEFA membership was rejected, and ordered that the respective application be forwarded to the UEFA Congress for consideration. In view of the CAS, it is the UEFA Congress and not the UEFA Executive Committee that is competent to consider membership applications. It should be stressed, however, that the CAS dismissed the JFA's request to ''take all necessary measures to admit the JFA as a full member of UEFA without delay'', noting that the UEFA Congress has discretionary powers to admit new members. In this regard, the CAS further held that, on the basis of the evidence provided, it appeared that the JFA did not satisfy the requirements for UEFA membership laid down in Article 5(1) of the UEFA Statutes.

Official Documents and Press Releases

• CAS – The CAS rules on the case Jersey Football Association v. UEFA
• Human Rights Now – Letters demanding that Olympic authorities end rainforest destruction and human rights abuses connected to Tokyo 2020 Olympics construction
• Human Rights Watch – Qatar: Take urgent action to protect construction workers
• IOC – Declaration of the IOC Executive Board in Lima
• IOC – IOC Athletes' Commission Strategy
• IOC – IOC makes historic decision by simultaneously awarding Olympic Games 2024 to Paris and 2028 to Los Angeles
• IOC – Report of the IOC 2028 Evaluation Commission
• UEFA – 13^th Extraordinary UEFA Congress decisions
• UEFA – Keeping competitive balance – Aleksander Čeferin
• UEFA – Nations League regulations approved
• UEFA – UEFA President reflects on a rewarding year of progress
• WADA – 2018 List of Prohibited Substances and Methods
• WADA – 2018 Summary of major modifications and explanatory notes
• WADA – Proposed International Standard for Code Compliance by Signatories – Version 2.0
• WADA – Tanzania ratifies UNESCO Anti-Doping Convention
• WADA – WADA launches Phase II of stakeholder consultation on Compliance Standard
• WADA – WADA provisionally suspends accreditation of Paris Laboratory

In the news

Doping

• Associated Press Russian doping whistleblower faces arrest if he returns
• Sean Ingle Anti-doping agencies call on IOC to ban Russia from 2018 Winter Olympics
• Tariq Panja IOC investigation of Russian doping might soon yield penalties
• RT News McLaren denies he 'dropped charges' of state involvement in doping in Russia
• Swimming World Court of Arbitration for Sport reduces sanctions on Canadian swimmer William Brothers

Football

• Ed Aarons FIFA and UEFA accused of being 'enablers' of tax evasion in football by MEPs
• CIES Football Observatory Balance sheets for transfer operations: From Monaco to Paris St-Germain
• David Conn FIFA's Infantino accused of interfering with governance committee decisions
• David Conn FIFA President Gianni Infantino accused of bad governance by former committee member
• Paul Ferguson Irish FA to ask FIFA for money back after poppy u-turn
• FIFPro Danish women's World Cup conflict explained
• Rob Harris Spanish league wants UEFA to investigate Man City's spending
• Steve Menary Tebas calls for European Union probe into Neymar transfer
• Tariq Panja FIFA President Gianni Infantino faces new ethics complaint
• Tariq Panja Former FIFA official's testimony could raise new ethics questions
• John Percy Leicester City submit appeal to FIFA in bid to complete £25 million Adrien Silva signing
• Ben Rumsby Chelsea face second FIFA investigation in eight years over youth transfer policy
  

Other

• BBC News Sergey Bubka: Athletics Integrity Unit looking into payment to ex-IAAF treasurer
• Tim Daniels Prosecutors allege Brazil's Olympic Committee conspired to buy IOC votes
• Marina Hyde IOC selective blindness continues but Rio 2016 scandal looks all too familiar
• Liam Morgan IOC admit votes may have been bought by Diack in Olympic Games bidding process
• Sebastian Smith Brazil police say Rio Olympics were bought in corrupt scheme

Academic Materials

• Antoine Duval and Oskar van Maren The Labour Status of Professional Football Players in the European Union: Unity in/and/or Diversity?

Blog

Asser International Sports Law Blog

• Christopher Flanagan The Evolution of UEFA's Financial Fair Play Rules – Part 1: Background and EU Law
• Christopher Flanagan The Evolution of UEFA's Financial Fair Play Rules – Part 2: The Legal Challenges
• Tomáš Grell FIFA's Human Rights Agenda: Is the Game Beautiful Again?

Law in Sport

• Jack Anderson and Neil Partington Duty of care in sport: The case for a sports ombudsman in the UK
• Hazar El-Chamaa The lifecycle of an international athlete: Part 2 – Key immigration issues when entering the UK
• Laura Dadswell The lifecycle of an international athlete: Part 3 – Key UK income tax points for non-residents
• Tim Meakin, Tim Walker and Richard Davies Confidential data leaks: What are the vicarious liability risks for sports organizations?
• John Mehrzad Who has jurisdiction over international football transfer disputes?
• Michael Savva An update on Financial Fair Play – Case study: The Neymar transfer
• Gavin Stenton The lifecycle of an international athlete: Part 4 – Dealing with branding and image rights

Others

• James M. Dorsey Tackling the elephant in the room: The incestuous and inseparable relationship between sports and politics
• Simon Kuper Soccer's culture of corruption
• Nick De Marco New regulation of football intermediaries

Upcoming Events

• 26-27 October – ISLJ Annual Conference on International Sports Law, T.M.C. Asser Institute, The Hague, the Netherlands [We have only a couple of seats left, register now!]

Camille Boillat & Raffaele Poli: Governance models across football associations and leagues (2014)

Vol. 4, Centre International d'Etude du Sport, Neuchâtel, Switzerland, softback, 114 pages, ISBN 2-940241-24-4, Price: €24

Source: http://www.cies.ch/en/cies/news/news/article/new-publication-in-the-collection-editions-cies-governance-models-across-football-associations-an/

This book derives from a research mandate carried out by the Centre International d'Etude du Sport (CIES) on behalf of FIFA. Camille Boillat is a scientific collaborator at the CIES, while Raffaele Poli is the head of the CIES Football Observatory. The book maps the various existing models of national football associations and leagues and attempts to study the relationship between the two. It is divided into the following four chapters: (1) Structural models, legal forms and agreements between national association leagues; (2) The league in the national association structure; (3) Division of labour between national associations and leagues and; (4) League internal governance. The authors studied thirty-two FIFA member associations from each football confederation representing various levels of football development. The methodology for the research consisted of collecting information from reports, official documents and online sources.

In chapter 1, the authors make a distinction between the association model and the separate entity model. In the association model, leagues take the legal form of an association, similar to the national football association to which they belong. The separate entity model refers to leagues for which the legal form is that of a company with an independent ownership structure. The association model is further divided in countries where the leagues are managed by the national associations on the one hand, and countries where leagues enjoy a wide margin of autonomy, called “self-management” leagues, on the other. The consequent mapping of the different models using these two distinctions forms the basis for many of the conclusions drawn in the book. Leagues will usually have less voting power within their national association when they themselves enjoy a large amount of independence. Equally, in association model leagues with national association management the league president will be chosen by the national association. Leagues that are self-managed will have greater autonomy when devising its own executive committee.

Other conclusions drawn in this book do not directly flow from the clear-cut distinction in models described in chapter 1. The English Premier league is a separate entity and therefore enjoys a large amount of independence. Nonetheless, it is the English FA that governs the disciplinary proceedings in English professional football. On the other hand, Cameroon’s top tier league follows the association model and is financially dependent of the national association. However, as regards the disciplinary proceedings, it is the league of Cameroon that is in charge.

Being geographers by training, the authors do not provide a legal analysis of their findings. For example, the book does not touch on the question whether the selection of a certain model finds its origin in the national law of a certain country, nor whether the differences found in jurisdictions can be transposed to the differences in models.

Although the authors do not state whether one model is better than another, the book is a useful tool to understand what it entails for countries to have a certain model and identify specific problems related to those models. For example, Spain is currently trying to reform its broadcasting rights distribution system from an individualised selling system to a joint selling system. However, the Spanish national association (RFEF), the Spanish league (LNFP) and the Sport Governmental Council for Sport (CSD) are encountering difficulties in reaching an agreement. Each party involved is trying to get the best deal possible for themselves. With the information provided by this book in the back of your mind, one can better understand the political and legal game being played: at which level decisions are being made, who the stakeholders are and what their voting power is. In other words, the analytical model provided by this book is very useful for analysing concrete examples.

All models show overlaps with other models. Nonetheless, there are no two national models that are exactly the same. The main difference between the different national models lies in the scope of independence that a league will have from its national association. Some leagues will be more independent than others, but no league is completely independent. In conclusion, finding the right balance is a delicate and thorny issue.

Qatar’s successful bid to host the 2022 World Cup left many people thunderstruck: How can a country with a population of 2 million people and with absolutely no football tradition host the biggest football event in the world? Furthermore, how on earth can players and fans alike survive when the temperature is expected to exceed 50 °C during the month (June) the tournament is supposed to take place?

Other people were less surprised when FIFA’s President, Sepp Blatter, pulled the piece of paper with the word “Qatar” out of the envelope on 2 December 2010. This was just the latest move by a sporting body that was reinforcing a reputation of being over-conservative, corrupt, prone to conflict-of-interest and convinced of being above any Law, be it national or international.

Interestingly enough, by 2011, FIFA itself was increasingly becoming aware of its loss of popularity. After his (third) re-election, President Blatter began to promote the idea of a “Solutions Committee to help promote reforms within FIFA”. In August of that same year Prof. Dr. Mark Pieth, Chairman of the OECD Working Group on Bribery, was asked to analyse the existing governance structure and to make recommendations for its improvement. His review, published on 19 September 2011, recommended FIFA to e.g. introduce a conflict-of-interest regulation foreseeing the removal of FIFA officials in case of breach and to set term limits for FIFA officials such as the President. As a result of the review, President Blatter decided to appoint an Independent Governance Committee (IGC), to be led by Prof. Pieth.

The project called the ‘FIFA Governance Reform Project’ was to “oversee the creation and implementation of a framework of good governance and controls for FIFA to ensure the organization’s integrity with the ultimate goal of restoring confidence amongst FIFA stakeholders, including fans and the wider public”[1]. The IGC’s first report, published on 20 March 2012, contained a set of recommendations that were very similar to what Prof. Pieth had recommended in his previous review: FIFA had to become more transparent and independent judicial and financial/compliance oversight bodies had to be established.

Initially, FIFA followed the IGC’s proposals by establishing an Ethics Committee and an Audit & Compliance Committee. However, The IGC stated that the reform process was far from completed, highlighting that there is still an urgent need to update internal regulations on compliance, conflict-of-interest and the internal organization in general. To the IGC’s growing disappointment, it soon became clear that FIFA was proving very reluctant to modernize in accordance with good governance requirements.

On numerous occasion the IGC stressed the need to introduce further transparency and accountability throughout FIFA[2]. To achieve this, FIFA officials would have to undergo an integrity check performed by an independent body prior to their (re-) election, the President and the Members of the FIFA Executive Committee would have to be be subjected to limited terms in office and two independent Members would have to attend the meetings of the FIFA Executive Committee. A major setback for the IGC was the unanimous declaration  of all 53 Member Associations of UEFA of 24 January 2013. UEFA was of the opinion that no term limits for members of the FIFA Executive Committee and that integrity checks on candidates shall not be performed by FIFA but by the Confederations, such as UEFA. Quoting IGC’s own report, this was a signal that the reform agenda was likely to be high-jacked by rivalling interest groups within FIFA, supported by those fearing to lose their long-time privileges and networks[3]. The fact that on the eve of the FIFA Congress of 2013 UEFA demanded a decision to be taken on the limited terms proposal, knowing that the motion would fail to meet the ¾ majority vote, meant that it would do everything in its power to prevent the IGC’s recommendations of being implemented. Feeling frustrated, several members of the IGC decided to leave the Independent Governance Committee after it became clear to them that FIFA was not serious about the proposed changes[4].  

The remaining Members of the IGC, whose mandate terminated at the end of 2013, published their final report on 22 April 2014. The 15 page report specifies a detailed chronological summary of the IGC’s work, including why FIFA gave it the task to provide recommendations and what recommendations had been implemented. More importantly, however, the report also mentioned all the difficulties the IGC encountered while performing its mandate and it highlighted once again the recommendations, which had not been implemented by FIFA: term limits for FIFA officials, integrity checks for all members of FIFA standing committees performed by FIFA itself and improved reviews of key processes, such as the World Cups bidding process[5]. Not surprisingly, the IGC strongly advocates that these recommendations are implemented nonetheless. Furthermore, the IGC insisted that the new Ethics Committee should be able to investigate events that occurred before the Governance Reform Project was started, especially Qatar’s successful bid to host the 2022 World Cup.  

The next FIFA Congress will take place in Sao Paulo on 11 June 2014, one day before the World Cup kicks off. As the supreme and legislative body, the Congress has the right to vote on proposals for amendments to FIFA Statutes and Regulations and is therefore competent for implementing scores of the IGC’s recommendations. Taking into account UEFA’s position at last year’s Congress and FIFA’s overall reluctance to reform itself in accordance with good governance standards, chances of a significant change are very slim. But, with the whole world looking at FIFA due to the World Cup, this could well be a golden opportunity to push FIFA to endorse the IGC’s remaining recommendations and finally become the transparent and accountable sporting governing body that the football family deserves.

[1] Final Report by the Independent Governance Committee to the Executive Committee of FIFA, 22 April 2014

[2] See for example: Media releases of 8 February 2013  and 21 March 2013

[3] Final Report by the Independent Governance Committee to the Executive Committee of FIFA, page 10

[4] See for example: Media release of 24 April 2013

[5] Final Report by the Independent Governance Committee to the Executive Committee of FIFA, page 12-13

Editor’s note
Wil is working as a lawyer since 1980. He started his legal career at Rechtshulp Rotterdam. Later on he worked for the Dutch national trade union FNV and law firm Varrolaan Advocaten. Currently he is participating in the Labour Law Section of lawfirm MHZ-advocaten in Schiedam in the Netherlands. He is also a member of a joint committee advising the government in labour issues.

Since 1991 he is dealing with the labour issues of the trade union for professional football players VVCS and cyclists’ union VVBW. Since 2002, he works for FIFPro, the worldwide union for professional football players based in Hoofddorp in the Netherlands. He is involved in many international football cases and provides legal support for FIFPro members all over the world. Wil was also involved in the FIFPro Black Book campaign on match fixing and corruption in Eastern Europe.

On the 2001 agreement between FIFA, UEFA and the European Commission:

What was FIFPro’s role in the negotiations leading to the 2001 agreement with the EU Commission on which the current FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfers of Players (RSTP) are based?

First the negotiations started between the Commission and FIFA/UEFA. Later on FIFPro joined as the Commission found it necessary to involve the players. From then on FIFPro was at the table and able to have influence. It proved not to be the level of influence we hoped to have.

To what extent was FIFPro (dis)satisfied with the agreement at that time?

The outcome of the negotiations was a compromise but to a certain extent acceptable for FIFPro as it was to improve in principle the situation of players. At that time, it seemed that free movement was accessible for them. Yet, the fact that the Commission did not subsequently evaluate the system - as agreed in 2001 - was disappointing.

On the current complaint: 

Why is FIFPro challenging the FIFA RSTP under EU Competition law? What has changed?

After a short while since 2001 we concluded that the way the informal agreement with the Commission was formulated in the RSTP was not consistent with what had been agreed. The clearest example is the repetition of the protected period after a contract was extended.

The parties agreed on a single protected period after a player signed his first contract with a club in order to preserve the stability of club squads and to allow them to amortize the investments made on acquiring these players. After this period the relation between a club and a player was intended to be a regular labour relation.

On several occasions the Commission confirmed that after the protected period the compensation to be paid in case of premature termination would be calculated based on the residual value of the contract. As the protected period re-starts in case of contract renewal, players never reach this situation. Players who refuse to sign a new contract are regularly side-lined by their clubs in order to force them to sign a prolongation. This is limiting the freedom of movement of players significantly and has substantial anti-competitive effects.

More precisely, are you challenging specific articles of the FIFA RSTP? If so, why do you deem those provisions in particular to have an anti-competitive effect or object?

When evaluating the RSTP internally, FIFPro identified twenty-three key issues on which the transfer system was failing the players. As we decided to lodge a complaint on an EU competition law basis, we picked out the strongest arguments for the purpose of substantiating our complaint. The repetition in the protected period is an example[1].

Could these alleged anti-competitive effects not be justified along the lines of the Wouters test[2] as being inherent to the achievement of legitimate objectives such as competitive balance or contractual stability?

It is important to notice that there is no transfer system in other sports and they seem to work fine. This means that a transfer system is not a necessity as such. The abuses we witness nowadays, especially non-payment of players is a direct consequence of the way the system works. We strongly believe that the restrictive effects are not inherent in the pursuit of any objectives. They certainly are not proportionate to them. FIFPro is convinced that the restrictive aspects of the system do not pass the Wouters test.

What is the rationale for going to the EU Commission and not, for example, to the national courts (or national competition authorities for that matter)?

First of all it was the Commission that initiated the process towards the new regulations in 2001. Now that we see the system failing it seems logical to approach the Commission first. As we are looking at a pan-European problem this forum would be more effective than national proceedings. But in case the complaint does not provide an appropriate result the way to national courts and national competition authorities is still open.

Did you envisage some non-confrontational strategies to change the FIFA RSTP through negotiations? What about using the European social dialogue committee for example?

The initial Social Dialogue meetings started eleven years ago. Although we concluded an autonomous agreement in 2012 we must conclude that the most serious problems for our players have not been solved through this mechanism nor have they been successfully tackled through our participation in the working groups and committees of FIFA and UEFA.

The problem of overdue payables is more serious than ever before. FIFPro feels that more pressure is needed to move things forward. The fact that we lodged the complaint does not mean that we stop negotiating. On the contrary, if our counterparts in the social dialogue are willing to solve the issues we put on the table we would prefer this over a long-lasting legal struggle.

Finally, don’t you think that this complaint could lead to a form of European imperialism? In other words, European institutions, clubs and players dictating the transfer system applied worldwide? Should (and could) FIFA (or UEFA) aim for a different European transfer system instead?

Although we are a global organization we cannot deny the fact that the center of gravity of professional football is in Europe. Moreover, after the Bosman ruling it was obvious that the new FIFA regulations had to be in full compliance with EU-law principles. As these rules apply worldwide this means that EU-principles must be respected around the world. As EU law provides generally more protection to workers than a lot of other legal systems in the world the players benefit from this extraterritorial application. FIFPro does not consider this as imperialism. In fact, we believe that a single system is preferable because of the global character of professional football.

[1] Editor’s note: For more examples see FIFPro’s Executive Summary of the complaint.

[2] Editor’s note: The Wouters test is used for the assessment of the alleged anti-competitive nature of a measure, agreement or concerted practice under Article 101(1) TFEU. According to this test, account must be taken of the overall context of the FIFA RSTP and how it produces its effects. More particularly, account must be taken of its potential legitimate objectives. One must then evaluate whether the restrictive effects on competition are inherent in the pursuit of those objectives and proportionate.