FIFA’s freshly adopted TPO ban entered into force on 1 May (see our Blog symposium). Though it is difficult to anticipate to what extent FIFA will be able to enforce the ban, it is likely that many of the third-party investors will try to have recourse to alternative solutions to pursue their commercial involvement in the football transfer market. One potential way to circumvent the FIFA ban is to use the proxy of what has been coined “bridge transfers”. A bridge transfer occurs when a club is used as an intermediary bridge in the transfer of a player from one club to another. The fictitious passage through this club is used to circumscribe, for example, the payment of training compensation or to whitewash a third-party ownership by transforming it into a classical employment relationship. This is a legal construction that has gained currency especially in South American football, but not only. On 5 May 2015, in the Racing Club v. FIFA case, the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) rendered its first award involving directly a bridge transfer. As this practice could become prevalent in the coming years we think that this case deserves a close look.

I. Facts and procedure

Fernando Ortiz is an Argentine professional football player who entered into an employment contract with Vélez Sarsfield, valid until 30 June 2012. After the expiration of the contract, Ortiz signed an employment contract with the Uruguayan team, Institución Atlética Sud América on 11 July 2012, valid until 30 June 2017. Institución was playing in the Second Division in Uruguay at that time. A week later, on 20 July 2012, Ortiz was transferred from Institución back to Argentina. Institución and Racing Club, Ortiz’ new club, agreed a transfer fee (which was not disclosed). The first instalment should be made before 24 July 2012. Ortiz’ new employment contract was valid until 30 June 2014. Both transfers were duly registered in the FIFA Transfer Matching System (TMS). First, on 23 July 2012, the Argentine Federation (AFA) provided the Uruguayan Federation (AUF) the International Transfer Certificate (ITC). After the transfer from Institución to Racing, the AUF sent the same paperwork to the AFA on 3 August 2012. At that time, no payments were made.

Meanwhile, in view of the number of similar transfers, AFA and the Argentine Tax Authorities agreed that the players concerned would not be allowed to play in the Argentine league. This resulted in the parties (Institución, Ortiz and Racing) concluding a Rescission Agreement of the transfer contract, stating that they had “nothing to claim from each other”.[1] This agreement was not uploaded at that time in the TMS. On 23 November 2012, the FIFA TMS body sent a letter[2] to Racing asserting that they were not aware of any proof of payment of the transfer fee, and that this transfer could constitute an infringement of the TMS rules. Racing replied[3] by enclosing the rescission agreement and confirming that no payments were to be made. On June 2013, FIFA TMS opened disciplinary proceedings against Racing, claiming a violation of articles 3 and 9.1 of Annexe 3 RSTP[AD1] . In response Racing blamed Ortiz for trying to benefit himself from such operation and argued that the club had a true sporting interest in signing Ortiz and did not receive any economic benefit out of the transfer. On 14 August 2013, the FIFA TMS body submitted the disciplinary proceeding to the FIFA Disciplinary Committee (FIFA DC) for a proper investigation of the facts.

In its decision of 5 March 2014, the FIFA DC analysed the two transfers and concluded that they lacked a sporting objective. Even if, from a formal point of view, the first of the two transfers did not involve Racing directly, the FIFA DC considered, taking into account the chronological unfolding of the transfers, that the transfer of Ortiz to Institución would not make sense (according to the playing level of Institución and Ortiz), if his subsequent transfer to another club, in this case Racing Club, was not already planned. Accordingly, the FIFA DC found that the two “parts of the operation” cannot be considered separate. Hence, the whole bridge transfer scheme was deemed known to all parties involved. Thus, the FIFA DC concluded that Racing was involved in the operations carried out and therefore liable to face sanctions.[4]

Moreover, the FIFA DC drew attention to the effects the rescission agreement should have had in a rational context. Indeed, in a normal constellation, one would have expected Ortiz to return to Institución, instead the fact that he stayed on to play at Racing corroborated the non-sporting interest of the transfer. The FIFA DC considered that the aim of the TMS rules is to create transparency (Article 1 Annexe 3 RSTP) in players’ international transfers. In the view of the FIFA DC, Racing, however, used the TMS fraudulently to give a sporting appearance to such a transfer. Therefore, Racing is found to have infringed Articles 3(1)[5] and 9.1(2)[6] Annexe 3 FIFA RSTP, since the transfer was conducted through the TMS for illegitimate purposes and it did not act in good faith. As a consequence of this infringement, the Argentine club was fined CHF 15,000 and warned in accordance with the FIFA Disciplinary Code.[7] In the same proceedings, the Uruguayan club was sanctioned with a transfer ban for two complete and consecutive transfer periods and a fine of CHF 40,000.

Racing Club decided to appeal the decision to the CAS. The Argentine club based its appeal[8] on the grounds that there is no legal basis in the FIFA Regulations to sanction the club for correctly registering a transfer without a sporting reason in the FIFA TMS system.  

II. Commentary

First, we need to explicate in greater details the functioning and purposes of bridge transfers. Before, tackling the substance of the award rendered by the CAS.

A.    What is a bridge transfer?

As explained by Ariel Reck[9] (who was Racing’s lawyer in the present case), a bridge transfer has three main characteristics:

• A bridge transfer is made for no apparent sporting reason, there is a non-sporting purpose underlying the move.

• Secondly, there are three clubs involved in this triangular structure: on the one hand the club where the player was firstly registered (club of origin); secondly, the so-called ‘bridge club’, which will usually be a club of a lower level than the player involved and the final club of destination, i.e. the club where the player was intended to play for from the beginning. The lack of balance between the player and the bridge club is usually evident.

• The last feature is the short period of time that the player is engaged with the bridge club. Frequently, such a player does not play any game at all with this club.

There are three important reasons why football clubs enter into a triangular agreement that constitutes a bridge transfer:

1. The bridge transfer helps to reduce the cost of training compensation or payments to be made under FIFA’s solidarity contribution mechanism.

2. The bridge transfer allows the use of a club to circumvent the FIFA rule that prohibits TPO.[10]

3. The bridge transfer is used to evade taxes.

1.   Reducing training compensation

As far as the reduction of the value of the training compensation is concerned, it should be noted that there is already an award dealing with this matter, though without making an explicit reference to the notion of “bridge transfer”. In 2009, CAS rendered an award in a dispute between MTK Budapest and FC Internazionale. In this case, Inter was interested in signing a Hungarian player from MTK Budapest. After negotiations between the two clubs broke down, the player entered into a professional contract with a Maltese club. Yet, after nine days at the Maltese club, the player was transferred to Inter. According to the FIFA’s training compensation rules[11], if the player would have been transferred directly from MTK Budapest to the Italian club, the payable amount to the Hungarian team, for the three seasons that the player was trained by MTK Budapest, would have been €160,000.[12] The Panel, found this transfer to be irrational and considered that the training efforts of MTK Budapest should in any case be rewarded. Therefore, it decided that Inter should pay a training compensation to the Hungarian team.

On the other hand, by means of a comparable manoeuvre, the solidarity mechanism can also be manipulated. The RSTP provisions on the solidarity mechanism are only applicable to international transfers (Article 1(1) RSTP). The transfers between two clubs of the same association are “governed by specific regulations issued by the association concerned” (Article 1(2) RSTP). Thus, one can reduce the amount of the solidarity contribution via a bridge construction. The first (international) transfer is concluded for a low amount, which would be subject to the solidarity contribution. Later, a second (national) transfer is concluded for the real amount.[13]

2.   Circumventing the FIFA TPO ban

Another purpose for the use of bridge transfers is to circumvent the FIFA rules prohibiting agents (or intermediaries) or other third parties to acquire economic rights from players. This is “a way to anchor a players economic rights to a club”[14] instead of a mere third party (agent or a company). By controlling a club, the former third-party owners are able to continue investing in players while making sure that this investment is at least formally in conformity with the RSTP. With this mechanism, a third party, who controls a club (a bridge club), also enjoys the legal protection awarded by the FIFA RSTP to clubs, for example, in case of breach of the contract without just cause (17 RSTP).

 3.   Reducing Taxes

Bridge transfers are also designed to reduce taxes or hide the financial beneficiary of the amounts.[15] Bridge clubs, in these cases, are based in “tax heavens”. Consequently, two transfers need to be concluded: One from the team of origin to the bridge club, and the other one from the bridge club to the club of destination. If the bridge transfer is made with the sole purpose of reducing taxes, the fee for the first transfer would be low because this transfer fee is highly taxed. The second transfer would be concluded for a higher amount and the fee will be taxed at a low rate.

Secondly, a bridge transfer could also be used to disguise a compensation for a player (this mechanism is generally used by free agents) or payments to third parties. Usually, players who move to a new club as free agents tend to receive higher salaries than players who have been transferred to another club while still on a contract with their old club. In order to prevent the payment of high income taxes, a player and a bridge club agree to share the transfer payment made by the club of destination. Thus, the bridge club is rewarded for taking part in the bridge transfer; this reward is usually limited to a small share of the total transfer sum.[16]

The third alternative is the configuration at play in the Racing case. In Uruguay, clubs are considered cultural institutions and according to the Article 69 ‘Constitución Nacional’ (National Constitution), they are exempted from paying taxes, even on transfers of players. The clubs take the legal form of either ‘Sports Association’ or ‘Sociedad Anónima Deportiva’ (Public limited sports company), the latter being considered a cultural institution as well. A recent Uruguayan judgment[17] extended the tax exemption to the ‘Socidades Anónimas Deportivas’. However, since bridge transfers have no sporting interest and are aimed at an economic profit derived from reducing the tax burden, the Uruguayan court also held that bridge transfers are not to be tax exempted.  

B.    The Racing case: FIFA’s interpretative bridge too far

1.     The argument of the parties

Racing Club argued in front of CAS that neither Article 3(1), nor Article 9.1(2) of Annexe 3 FIFA RSTP could constitute a sufficient legal basis to impose sanctions in case of a bridge transfer. Basically, “neither the Regulations nor the TMS generates a new substantive law”.[18] No provision states that transfers with a purely economic purpose violate any FIFA provision, which “precludes any sanction based on such concept”.[19] Racing Club also pleaded the ‘principle of estoppel’. As neither FIFA nor the FIFA TMS have sanctioned bridge transfers in the past, Racing Club is of the opinion that the FIFA DC is estopped from sanctioning them in the case at hand.

FIFA recognises that “although (the FIFA regulations) are not applicable to the present matter, (they) present an unambiguous view of what falls within the scope of the Regulations in general terms”.[20] The body argues that this loophole might be covered by the association’s usual practice or, if not, by the rules that they would lay down if they were acting as legislators. Also, FIFA argues that the FIFA Disciplinary Code (FDC) has to be read in accordance with the language used, the grammar and syntax of the provisions, the historical background and the regulatory context. In other words, FIFA pleads that the Panel must sanction the club interpreting the FIFA rules by analogy, if the wording of articles 76 FDC[21] and 62 FIFA Statutes[22] in connection with the TMS rules invoked is not sufficient to ground the decision of the FIFA DC.

2.     The decision of the Panel

In the view of the Panel, the FIFA DC was competent to render a decision in this matter. However, this decision must be grounded on a legal basis found in the FIFA regulations. The key question in the present case is whether Articles 3(1) and 9.1(2) Annexe 3 FIFA RSTP can constitute such a legal basis.

Therefore, taking into account that Racing was sanctioned for having violated the provisions of Annexe 3 by having entered untrue or false data and/or having misused the TMS for illegitimate purposes in bad faith by concluding a “bridge transfer”, the Panel must decide whether the transfer breached these provisions, and if it did so, whether the sanction is proportionate according the TMS rules.

The Panel considers that it is “undisputed that the present case involves a transfer structure which, […], is to be considered as a “bridge transfer”.[23] The Panel considers that Racing Club could not ignore that it was involved in a bridge transfer and was not acting in good faith when arguing that the transfer via Institución was conducted exclusively on the basis of a sporting interest. However, this does not imply per se that Racing acted in bad faith as far as the TMS registration of the Player’s transfer from Institución to Racing is concerned.[24] Indeed, FIFA had to satisfy its burden of proof and demonstrate to the comfortable satisfaction of the Panel that Racing Club had entered untrue or false data and/or misused the TMS for illegitimate purposes. In this regard, the Panel finds that “insufficient evidence is available to prove that the Appellant must be assumed not to have acted in good faith in connection with Player’s transfer registration in the TMS”, as “it has not been proven that the Appellant has registered misleading or false information in the TMS”.[25]

If FIFA is to outlaw the recourse to bridge transfers it must do so in an express fashion. In other words, “the parties involved, in conformity with the principle of legality, shall be provided with specific guidelines in order to know how to act when international transfers of players take place”.[26] Critically, “the lack of such clear and specific set of rules does not justify, in the eyes of the Panel, the “secondary use” of the TMS rules for these purposes”[27]. The principle of legality implies that a sanction must be based on a previously existing legal rule. The CAS had emphasized this principle at various instances in its earlier jurisprudence.[28] Consequently, the Panel found that the “bridge interpretation” used by the FIFA DC to sanction Racing for taking part in a transfer construct qualified as a bridge transfer was going too far and could not be followed. In short, “the current TMS rules represent neither an appropriate nor an effective tool for combating and/or sanctioning bridge transfers”.[29] Hence, the arbitrators decided to reduce the sanction imposed to a mere reprimand.

This is not to say that the Panel endorses the recourse to bridge transfers. Instead, it clearly states that it “concurs entirely with the Respondent (FIFA) that measures should be applied against bridge transfers when such transfers are conducted for the purpose of engaging in unlawful practices, such as tax evasion, or to circumvent the rules concerning, for instance, the payment of training compensation or solidarity contributions, or to assure third party's anonymity in relation to the relevant authorities”.[30]

Yet, the basic rule of law principle requiring that FIFA must first devised clearly positivized rules on the basis of which it can then adopt the required sanctions must be respected. This is a bold move by the Panel in light of the bad reputation of bridge transfers. FIFA, as any public or private authority, cannot free itself from the duty of acting in the framework of the regulations it has adopted. The decision is an important reminder of the limits faced by the discretionary power of International Sports Governing Bodies when CAS Panels review their disciplinary decisions. These Bodies do not have an absolute discretion to exercise the disciplinary power that they derive from their statutes. This power is checked by reference to the same legal principles restricting State power in a national context. Thus, it is the duty of FIFA to make sure that it disposes of an appropriate legal basis to act. Consequently, in the (near) future, instead of jumping an interpretative bridge too far, it is advisable that FIFA adopts specific rules to tackle the potential ethical and legal challenges posed by the surging use of bridge transfers.

[1] CAS 2014/A/3536 Racing Club Asociación Civil v. FIFA, paragraph 2.9

[2] Ibid, paragraph 2.10

[3] Ibid, paragraph 2.13

[4] Ibid, paragraph 2.19

[5] “All users shall act in good faith.”

[6] “Sanctions may also be imposed on any association or club found to have entered untrue or false data into the system or for having misused TMS for illegitimate purposes.”

[7] Articles 10.c) and 15 for the fine and Articles 10.a) and 13 for the warning.

[8] CAS 2014/A/3536 Racing Club Asociación Civil v. FIFA, paragraph 7.2.2

[9] World Sports Law Report – April 2014, by Ariel Reck.

[10] CAS 2014/A/3536 Racing Club Asociación Civil v. FIFA, paragraph 7.3.2(o)

[11] Article 20 and Annexe 4 FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players.

[12] CAS 2009/A/1757 MTK Budapest v. Internazionale Milano, paragraph 24.

[13] Ariel Reck, “What is a ‘bridge transfer’ in football”.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Ibid.

[16] “El otro triángulo de las Bermudas: los pases fantasmas a Uruguay y Chile”, 18 August 2012, Perfil.com

[17] Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo (Uruguay), fallo no. 301, 16 abril 2015.

[18] CAS 2014/A/3536 Racing Club Asociación Civil v. FIFA, paragraph 7.2.2.d)

[19] Ibid.

[20] CAS 2014/A/3536 Racing Club Asociación Civil v. FIFA, paragraph 7.3.2.k)

[21] “The FIFA Disciplinary Committee is authorised to sanction any breach of FIFA regulations which does not come under the jurisdiction of another body.”

[22] “1.The function of the Disciplinary Committee shall be governed by the FIFA Disciplinary Code. The committee shall pass decisions only when at least three members are present. In certain cases, the chairman may rule alone. 2. The Disciplinary Committee may pronounce the sanctions described in these Statutes and the FIFA Disciplinary Code on Members, Clubs, Officials, Players, intermediaries and licensed match agents. 3. These provisions are subject to the disciplinary powers of the Congress and Executive Committee with regard to the suspension and expulsion of Members. 4. The Executive Committee shall issue the FIFA Disciplinary Code.”

[23] Ibid, para.9.11

[24] Ibid, par. 9.14

[25] Ibid, para.9.15

[26] Ibid, par. 9.18

[27] Ibid.

[28] "In the Panel’s opinion, this provision of the Olympic Charter is to be properly read in accordance with the “principle of legality” (“principe de légalité” in French), requiring that the offences and the sanctions be clearly and previously defined by the law and precluding the “adjustment” of existing rules to apply them to situations or behaviours that the legislator did not clearly intend to penalize. CAS arbitrators have drawn inspiration from this general principle of law in reference to sports disciplinary issues, and have formulated and applied what has been termed as “predictability test”. Indeed, CAS awards have consistently held that sports organizations cannot impose sanctions without a proper legal or regulatory basis and that such sanctions must be predictable. In other words, offences and sanctions must be provided by clear rules enacted beforehand." CAS 2008/A/1545 Andrea Anderson, LaTasha Colander Clark, Jearl Miles-

Clark, Torri Edwards, Chryste Gaines, Monique Hennagan, Passion Richardson v. International Olympic Committee (IOC), award of 16 July 2010, para.30. See also CAS 2011/A/2670 Masar Omeragik v. Macedonian Football Federation (FFM),  award of 25 January 2013, para.8.13.

[29] Ibid. Para.9.19

[30] Ibid, para.913

It may come as a surprise to laymen, but chess players are subjected to doping testing. Naturally, then, the questions follow as to why they are tested, and if they are really tested (at least, with a level of scrutiny comparable to that which physically-oriented athletes are regularly subjected).

The answer to the first question is two-fold. There is an “official” answer and a “pragmatic” answer. Regarding the ostensible one, rather typical doping terminology is employed: certain substances might enhance performance in chess, and thus, they are prohibited. A layperson might ask: “what substances are these?” One fair guess could be beta-blockers – those medications which help reduce heart rates in times of anxiety and thus contribute to clearer thinking, and which are prohibited inter alia in shooting. That sounds pretty sensible; however (mainly due of the lack of scientific evidence on the actual performance enhancing), beta-blockers are not prohibited in chess.[1] As far as I know, chess players do not use beta-blockers, and I cannot imagine that they ever actually will use them to enhance their performance. Nor do chess players use anabolics, EPO, growth hormones – or any other of the “classical” doping substances. What might be an issue is caffeine because of its stimulant properties, but it was excluded from the list of prohibited substances in 2004.[2]

So what are the substances chess players do use? The reigning world champion Magnus Carlsen drinks freshly squeezed orange juice and many top players drink either water or coffee, or both… This is “doping” for chess players. The aforementioned champion was tested several times and said that “there is not so much point of drugs testing in chess, I must admit. However, if I must, then I must.”[3] In 2008 Dresden Chess Olympiad, Vassily Ivanchuk refused to participate in a doping control and actually no penalties were applied as the whole chess community defended him. The official FIDE (World Chess Federation) statement was that he “apparently failed to understand the instructions, especially since English is not Mr. Ivanchuk’s first language.”[4] Such a “flexible” formulation employed by FIDE suggests that the anti-doping system hardly has a real deterrent effect on elite chess players.

Returning to the legal discourse, we should pose some fundamental questions originally coming from the jurisprudence of European Court of Human Rights. These questions read as follows: Is the anti-doping system restrictive, and is the restrictiveness proportionate to the aim that is being sought to achieve? The answer to the first question is positive: the doping system is undoubtedly restrictive. Testing might not only be unpleasant, but also, some accidental factors must be taken into account, and additional time is needed to grasp the medical instructions in order not to trigger a positive test because of some inadvertently taken substances. Most people might not know it, but ephedrine and its form pseudoephedrine[5] (used to treat nasal and sinus congestion and available as the well-known medicine Theraflu) are prohibited, as is heptaminol [6] which falls into Ginkorfort and/or other herbal products. These medicines are sold in pharmacy without a prescription. So, all the athletes – including chess players – should avoid such substances in-competition and some period before the competition. For instance, although the swimmer Frédérick Bousquet stated that he bought the incriminated medicine from a pharmacy, he was tested positive for the heptaminol in 2010, and handed a two month doping ban. Last but not least, each doping test costs about $400 USD. Therefore, some proportionality test should also be applied, weighing the costs and benefits of the anti-doping fight. Thus, to my mind the anti-doping system within the context of chess is not proportionate to achieve its aim – which is to create a level playing field and a clean game.

Perhaps, leaving the legal discourse aside is necessary to unveil the real (not postulated) aims lying behind the adoption of an anti-doping policy in chess. Indeed, political considerations overruled the proportionality test, and all the more interesting is that the chess community, in turn, “silently” accepted those pragmatic considerations. Guess what? Chess officials as well as players really want to get into the Olympic Games. In other words, the chess community would love being an Olympic sport, and hence, if we must, we would silently accept those unnecessary tests. To my knowledge, only a few players have ever been caught and punished. For instance, the games of two players were forfeited, since they refused to provide a sample to doping control at the Calvia Olympiad 2004.[7] It is quite a telling indicator of the potential gap between anti-doping rules and the practical implementation of those rules. And it is not because chess players are absolutely clean (who knows – perhaps they use cannabis or cocaine not less frequently than other athletes caught). It is because everyone understands that the system is designed not for chess, and therefore, “sensibly” does not strictly implement it.

Regarding the title of the blog post: chess players hardly could be associated with doping, but they are! Chess and doping could be compared to the two ships in the darkness that are just saying “hello” to each other, but not really communicating. Hence, we carry the little burden of some inconvenience related to doping testing, but the sweetness of such burden (that is the utopian hopes for inclusion in the Olympics, which probably will not come into effect in the upcoming decade or so) somehow compensates for such discomfort.

By Salomeja Zaksaite, Postdoctoral researcher[8] at Mykolas Romeris University (Lithuania), and Woman International Chess Master (WIM)

[1] Beta-blockers are prohibited in Archery (WA) (also prohibited Out-of-Competition), Automobile (FIA), Billiards (all disciplines) (WCBS), Darts (WDF), Golf (IGF), Shooting (ISSF, IPC) (also prohibited Out-of-Competition), Skiing/Snowboarding (FIS) in ski jumping, freestyle aerials/halfpipe and snowboard halfpipe/big air, http://list.wada-ama.org/prohibited-in-particular-sports/prohibited-substances/.      

[2] In 2004, WADA took all caffeine products out of the prohibited list, in spite of the fact that some caffeine products, such as Animine, can induce serious heart problems and even death if taken in high dosages (de Mondenard, 2004). Quoted from: Paoli L., Donati A. (2014), The Sports Doping Market. Understanding Supply and Demand, and the Challenges of Their Control. Springer New York Heidelberg Dordrecht London, pp. 8.

[3] Venkata Krishna “Now, even Chess players subjected to dope testing”, 20 November 2013, http://www.newindianexpress.com/sport/Now-even-Chess-players-subjected-to-dope-testing/2013/11/20/article1899989.ece .

[4]Decision of the FIDE Doping Hearing Panel, Wijk aan Zee (NED), 21 January 2009, http://www.fide.com/component/content/article/1-fide-news/3704-decision-of-the-fide-doping-hearing-panel

[5] Ephedrine is classified as a specified stimulant (S6) and is prohibited in-competition in all sports, http://list.wada-ama.org/prohibited-in-competition/prohibited-substances/.

[6] Heptaminol is classified as a specified stimulant (S6) and is prohibited in-competition in all sports, http://list.wada-ama.org/prohibited-in-competition/prohibited-substances/.

[7] Actually, the events at Calvia Olympiad are the most known to the chess community. One of those players wrote a blog post accusing FIDE of somewhat “highly flawed” disciplinary hearing.  Shaun Press “FIDE gets it right on drug testing”, 29 November 2008, http://chessexpress.blogspot.nl/2008/11/fide-gets-it-right-on-drug-testing.html. Yet, of course, there were more attempts to test and sanction chess players for anti-doping violations. For example, 2013 WADA report indicates that there were 3 adverse analytical findings (AAF) within those tested (80 samples were taken), however, to my knowledge, the outcomes of these AAF are not publicly available. 2013 Anti‐Doping Testing Figures Samples Analyzed and Reported by Accredited Laboratories in ADAMS, http://www.wada-ama.org/Documents/Resources/Testing-Figures/WADA-2013-Anti-Doping-Testing-Figures-SPORT-REPORT.pdf, pp. 6.

[8] Postdoctoral fellowship is being funded by European Union Structural Funds project ”Postdoctoral Fellowship Implementation in Lithuania”, www.postdoc.lt.

Editor’s note: Josep F. Vandellos is an international sports lawyer associated to RH&C (Spain). He is also a member of the Editorial Board of the publication Football Legal and a guest lecturer in the ISDE-FC Barcelona Masters’ Degree in Sports Management and Legal Skills.

Article 6 of Annexe IV (Training compensation) of the FIFA-RSTP (Ed. 2016) contains the so-called “Special Provisions for the EU/EEA” applicable to players moving from one association to another inside the territory of the European Union (EU) or the European Economic Area (EEA).
The provisions regarding training compensation result from the understanding reached between FIFA and UEFA with the European Union in March 2001[1], and subsequent modifications introduced in the FIFA-RSTP revised version of 2005 to ensure the compatibility of the transfer system with EU law.[2]
This blog will focus on the exception contained in article 6(3) Annexe IV of the FIFA-RSTP. According to this article, when “the former club” fails to offer a contract to the player, it loses its right to claim training compensation from the players’ new club, unless it can justify that it is entitled to such compensation. Instead, the right of “previous clubs” to training compensation is fully preserved irrespective of their behaviour with the player.[3] From a legal standpoint, such discrimination between the “former club” and the “previous clubs” raises some questions that I will try to address in this paper.
For that purpose, the author will depart from the restrictive interpretation of article 6(3) adopted by the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber (DRC) and continue with a substantive assessment of the rule, firstly by looking at its purposive aim and secondly, by evidencing the potential negative impact on players’ mobility and its inherent anticompetitive effects. 

A. Article 6(3) Annexe IV of the FIFA-RSTP (Ed. 2016)

Article 6(3) of the FIFA-RSTP reads as follows: “3. If the former club does not offer the player a contract, no training compensation is payable unless the former club can justify that it is entitled to such compensation. The former club must offer the player a contract in writing via registered post at least 60 days before the expiry of his current contract. Such an offer shall furthermore be at least of an equivalent value to the current contract. This provision is without prejudice to the right to training compensation of the player’s previous club(s).”[4]
In summary, as a general rule, the former club of the player loses its right to claim training compensation if it fails to offer the player a contract in the terms described by the article, or cannot demonstrate a legitimate interest.
So far, the DRC has been consistent in interpreting that the obligation to offer the player a contract lies exclusively with the former club of the player as opposed to the previous clubs. In other words, the previous club is entitled to ask for training compensation when the player signs the first professional contract[5] no matter whether they offered the player a contract or showed bona fide interest in retaining him.
At first glance, this rigid interpretation might appear controversial in light of the more pragmatic approach towards the formal requirements of article 6(3) adopted in the CAS award 2009/A/1757 between MTK Budapest v. FC Internazionale Milano SpA[6]. In this case, in order to conclude that MTK Budapest was still entitled to request training compensation despite not having offered the player a contract in the terms indicated in the regulation, the adjudicating Panel emphasized that “[the] aims of sporting justice shall not be defeated by an overly formalistic interpretation of the FIFA Regulations which would deviate from their original intended purpose”.[7]
The DRC has thus systematically admitted claims of previous clubs against clubs that have registered professional players for the first time (e.g. DRC decision of 17 May 2016[8]) without delving into whether such clubs are indeed entitled to training compensation or not.
In an attempt to defy such dogmatic approach to the issue, I question whether the different references made in Annexe IV of the FIFA RSTP to the “former club”[9] could and should instead be interpreted more extensively, so as to include all former clubs (thus including previous clubs) where a player has been registered. Firstly, by having a look at the systematic context of the rule and its purposive interpretation[10], and secondly, by taking into consideration the potential competitive disadvantages between European clubs resulting from the regulation.
As to the rationale of the rule, the FIFA DRC jurisprudence (vid. e.g. DRC Decision of 27 April 2006 ref. no. 461185[11]) indicates that “the spirit of and purpose of article 6 para 3 of Annexe 4 of the RSTP, 2016 edition, is to penalise clubs which are obviously not interested in the players’ services as a professional, no matter if the club would have to offer the player an employment contract for the first time or a renewal due to the expiry of an already existing contract.”[12]
It appears therefore, contrary to the spirit of the rule that a club that has shown no interest in keeping the player as a professional, a roster or for its academy, can at a later stage request to be rewarded for the training of that player, irrespective of whether it was the former club, strictly speaking, or the former former club, so to speak (i.e. the previous club in the RSTP exact wording).
One could easily argue at this point, and I would subscribe to it, that at very young ages it is either legally prohibited for training clubs to offer a contract, or unreasonable to require clubs to offer contracts to all its players in order to safeguard their potential right to training compensation.  This was highlighted by the CAS Panel in the CAS award 2006/A/1152 ADO Den Haag v. Newcastle United FC[13] which was the appeal against the above cited DRC Decision of 27 April 2006.
However, nothing prevents training clubs to at least show a genuine interest in retaining the player as an amateur by formally offering him to continue training with them or even through a simple positive evaluation of the player. In order to alleviate the unreasonable burden that such obligation would suppose on training clubs, a solution could be to require the genuine interest at least, for players as from the season of their 16^th birthday. This would coincide with the age when in most EU countries players are legally allowed to sign employment contracts, and form a strict sportive perspective, the age from when training compensation is calculated in full according to article 5(3) of Annexe IV.
The final reference in article 6(3) (i.e. “This provision is without prejudice to the right to training compensation of the players’ previous club(s)”) helps to ground this interpretation. It is difficult to justify from a legal standpoint, why previous clubs should be exempted (as they, in fact, are) from observing the same rules and obligations as the former clubs, especially considering the principle of free movement of workers in the EU. The right to claim training compensation is, being redundant, “without prejudice to the right (…) of the players’ previous club(s)”. Previous clubs should therefore, demonstrate as well their entitlement to training compensation by evidencing a genuine interest in the player, such as former clubs do. 
To illustrate the situation, consider the case were an EU football club omits to offer one of its players (e.g. 18 years old) a professional contract in the terms of article 6(3) of Annexe IV, and that player further registers as an amateur with another EU club for one season. That second club also fails to offer the player (now 19 years old) a professional contract. After two seasons as an amateur, the player, finally signs a professional contract with a third EU club at the age of 20 years. The current interpretation of the exception leads to conclude that the first club, which failed to offer the player a professional contract, perhaps because he was simply not sufficiently interesting to retain, would now be reinstated in the right to claim training compensation, while the former club, under identical circumstances and reasons would be deprived from it.
Within those parameters, de lege ferenda the exception of article 6(3) could reasonably be extended to those previous clubs that failed to show the so-called bona fide interest. This way, by failing to show real interest in keeping a player, the previous clubs would be also prevented from asking training compensation upon the first registration of the player as a professional, to the same extend as the former club when it fails to offer the player a contract, in the terms indicated by the exception.
Turning now the attention, to EU law, the conclusions on why article 6(3) Annexe 4 current interpretation seems unfair and should be reformulated, point towards the same direction. 
 

B. Article 6(3) Annexe IV of the FIFA RSTP and EU competition law

The Bosman ruling and its most recent successor, the Bernard ruling, stand out as constant reminders that EU Law applies to the realm of European club football insofar as it constitutes an economic activity in the sense of Article 2 of the Treaty.[14] It is nowadays unarguable that football is a real economic activity and that the regulations adopted by its governing bodies must respect EU Law as long as they apply in the territory of the EU, or in case the player concerned has a European passport and is transferring to an EU Member State. Only rules which are “inherent to sport” such as the rules of the game, and other “practices likely to be exempted” meaning, those activities not necessarily linked to sport but which are worth of protection, could potentially fall outside the remit of EU competition law (the sporting exception) as pointed out by the “Helsinki Report on Sport” in 1999. However, the decision in the Meca-Medina case went even further, overcoming the traditional distinction between rules of purely sporting nature from others, to determine that rules cannot be of purely sporting nature when they have economic repercussions, and consequently, making it possible to explore new legal avenues to test regulations that in principle may seem outside the scope of EU competition law (such as the doping regulations in Meca-Medina).
According to Bosman[15] and Bernard, training compensation is a practice worth of protection, but it is undeniable that its rules have strong economic implications, for they are expressly meant to financially reward[16] football clubs involved in the training and education of players when these move to other clubs. For that reason, they fall under the remit of EU Law.
The legitimate aim of the training compensation system is also embraced by legal scholars. For example, while delving into the aftermath of the Bosman case and the agreement reached between FIFA and the EU Commission in 2001, S. Weatherill remarked that “(…). Sport has special features that deserve respect. In accordance with Bosman, it should be regarded as legally permissible for football to devise an internal taxation system to transfer money into the hands of nursery clubs, as part of a scheme for sustaining a larger number of clubs than would survive in ‘pure’ market conditions and to diminish gaps in economic strength between clubs.”[17]
However, it is my firm belief that Annexe IV of the FIFA RSTP has in many ways gone beyond the indications in Bosman, the Helsinki Report[18] and later in Bernard. In this last case, the Court referred to a system meant to compensate[19] and not reward training; and it is precisely that difference regarding the foundations of the system implemented by FIFA that leads to disproportionate results when the amounts to pay as training compensation are superior to the real costs incurred by the training clubs.[20]
All these issues jeopardize free mobility within the EU[21], for they restrict the chances of clubs to recruit players, and have an impact on the commercial relations between clubs and players in the sense of Article 101. By way of example, a Romanian football club registering a 21-year old player trained in Romania as a professional for the first time, would end up paying the training club a significantly lower amount of training compensation than a Hungarian club of the same category, wishing to sign that same player. The reason for that is that whilst in the first scenario the Romanian club would be subject to the internal training compensation mechanism; in the second scenario, the Hungarian club would be subject to the FIFA regulations that impose higher training compensations.
With these premises in mind, the testing of article 6(3) Annexe IV of the FIFA RSTP under EU competition law seems appropriate, although the application of EU competition law in this type of cases will probably remain an exception.[22]
In short, Article 101 TFEU[23] prohibits agreements, decisions of associations and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion within the internal market.[24] Saskia King, explaining the so-called “objective criterion”[25], has highlighted that “when determining whether an agreement restricts competition under Article 101(1) TFEU, ‘object’ expresses a true alternative to ‘effect’ and as such requires separate consideration”. Therefore, if the object of the agreement is anticompetitive, there is no need to look behind the effects.
A primary aspect of competition law is the identification of the relevant market where a possible anticompetitive practice takes place. In the present context, the relevant market is the transfer market of football players, that is, the market on which the offer and supply of players meets and clubs compete against each other to recruit the best players.[26] Geographically speaking, the market is limited to the territory of the Member States of the EU.
Assuming also, that the FIFA RSTP (ed. 2016) qualifies as a “decision by an association of undertakings”[27] and that the rules of training compensation have an appreciable affect in trade between Member States[28] since any change of clubs for players under the age of 23 requires the payment of a training compensation[29]; the questions left to answer are therefore, whether or not article 6(3) of Annexe IV of the FIFA-RSTP (Ed. 2016), in its current formulation is (1) likely to prevent, restrict or distort competition in the EU transfer market of football players under Article 101(1) TFEU and more importantly, (2) whether the restrictive effects are proportionate and “[reasonably] necessary for the organization and proper conduct of sport?”[30]
As to the first question, it is my view that both the object and the effects produced by, article 6(3) restrict and distort competition between clubs, for they discriminate former clubs vis-à-vis previous clubs with regard to their right to claim training compensation. Additionally, the compensation limits the ability of clubs to take on players acting as free agent.
As to the second question, the Meca-Medina case –though in a different context[31]- offered valuable guidance to test the compatibility of rules of sports associations with EU competition law: “42. Not every agreement between undertakings or every decision of an association of undertakings which restricts the freedom of action of the parties or of one of them necessarily falls within the prohibition laid down in Article 81(1) EC. For the purposes of application of that provision to a particular case, account must first of all be taken of the overall context in which the decision of the association of undertakings was taken or produces its effects and, more specifically, of its objectives. It has then to be considered whether the consequential effects restrictive of competition are inherent in the pursuit of those objectives (Wouters and Others, paragraph 97) and are proportionate to them.”
Following the Meca-Medina reasoning, and focusing on the rationale behind article 6(3) Annexe IV, in the CAS award 2006/A/1152 ADO Den Haag v. Newcastle United FC, the CAS Panel corrected the view of the original DRC decision of 27 April 2006. Specifically, it remarked that the aim of the rule is “to ensure that no player, whether amateur or professional, in whom the training club has no interest, is impeded to accept the offer of another club because he carries some sort of ‘compensation price tag”[32] rather than to penalize clubs failing to offer a contract to their amateur players. The unquestionably legitimate goal of “the exception to the exception” - as the Panel calls article 6(3) - is thus to limit the obstacles to the free mobility of players aforementioned.
However, as to “whether the consequential effects restrictive of competition are inherent in the pursuit of those objectives and are proportionate to them” there cannot be a positive answer. To me it is doubtful whether the anticompetitive effects produced by establishing different conditions between former clubs and previous clubs are inherent or a necessary consequence to ensure the objective of rule (i.e. contributing to free mobility). I believe the contrary to be true. (i.e. uently,conditions ctive of the rule, tt of EU Law. by scholars.r compensation. in the application of such principle. nsatI bI be The effects generated by the current interpretation of article 6(3) collide with the aim of the rule (i.e. protecting free mobility), for reinstating previous clubs in their rights to claim training compensation irrespective of their behaviour vis-à-vis the player, compromises free movement within the EU and creates unfair competitive advantages for previous clubs.
In conclusion, my suggestion is to rethink, the current formulation of article 6(3) (if not the entire training compensation system) and correct its detrimental effects by preventing all previous clubs that fail to offer players a professional contract or to show bona fide interest as from the season in which a player turns 16 years old from requesting training compensation. It is certainly not the role of the CAS to do so, but the responsibility of the EU Commission to take an active lead to ensure full compliance of football regulations with EU law. 

[1] See FIFA Executive Committee, “Commentary on the Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players”, Annex 4 (29 June 2005) at page 124.

[2] European Commission Press Release of 5 March 2001, “Outcome of discussions between the Commission and FIFA/UEFA on FIFA Regulations on international football transfers”.

[3] A bona fide and genuine interest in keeping the player must be demonstrated before the DRC cf. Arbitration CAS award 2009/A/1757 MTK Budapest v. FC Internazionale Milano S.p.A., award of 30 July 2009.

[4] FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, article 6(3) Annexe IV.

[5] In cases of subsequent transfer, the club entitled to claim training compensation will always be the “former club”.

[6]“17. As noted earlier, it is the 2005 Regulations which apply in the present case. At the same time, however, FIFA itself has clarified that the aim of the revisions introduced in 2005 was simply to “facilitate the evidence of a contract offer being made”. In its Decision, the DRC stated that “...when revising the Regulations it was decided to integrate in the 2005 edition of the Regulations some formal preconditions in order to facilitate the evidence that a contract offer was effectively made...This is the actual aim of the relevant formalities”. Consequently, the Panel does not interpret the 2005 revisions to the Regulations as constituting a substantive or material alteration to the 2001 regulatory regime because, as FIFA has said, the changes introduced related only to matters of form, and not of substance.”

[7] See para. 31 of the award. Although, the transfer structure used in this case could qualify as a bridge transfer used for the purpose of circumventing the FIFA regulations on transfer compensation.

[8] Decision of the Single Judge of the Sub-committee of the DRC case Budapest Honved FC (Hungary) v. AFC ASA 2013 Targu Mures (Romania) ref. TMS 243. Unpublished.

[9] See also FIFA RSTP, article 2 para. 2 of Annex IV.

[10] See the CAS award 2007/A/1363 TTF Liebherr Ochsenhausen v/ETTU, award of 5 October 2007 para 12 page 8: “10. By interpreting rules and regulations of associations, the starting point and the predominant element of construction is the wording (literal interpretation). Other elements such as the systematic context, the purpose and the history of the rule may contribute to the correct understanding of the meaning of the rule. This principle is accepted in both civil and common law and it has been constantly applied by CAS panels. It is also embedded in the law of Luxembourg (see, e.g., Art. 1156 of the Code Civil of Luxembourg) and the parties have not argued otherwise.” Emphasis added.

[11] Decision not published.

[12] De Weger, The Jurisprudence of the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber, Asser Press, 2^nd Edition, 2016. Page 401.

[13] See para. 22 of the CAS award 2006/A/1152 ADO Den Haag v. Newcastle United FC, award of 7 February 2007.

[14] See also Case 36/74, Walrave and Koch v UCI, ECLI:EU:C:1974:140.

[15] Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association and Others v Bosman and Others, ECLI:EU:C:1995:463, paras. 106-110.

[16] See FIFA Executive Committee, “Commentary on the Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players”, article 1(2) and Annex 4 para. 1 (Objectives), page 112.

[17] S. Weatherill, European Sports Law Collected Papers, Asser Press, 2^nd Edition (2014), pages 218 and 219.

[18] See Report from the Commission to the European Council of 10 December 1999 with a view to safeguarding current sports structures and maintaining the social function of sport within the Community framework – The Helsinki Report on Sport - para. 4.2.1.3: The Report refers to a system of objectively calculated payments that are related to the costs of training.

[19] Case C-325/08, Olympique Lyonnais SASP v Olivier Bernard and Newcastle UFC, ECLI:EU:C:2010:143, paras. 44 and 45.

[20] As an example of this disproportionality, a simple comparison between the training costs established for Cat. III UEFA clubs (30.000 Euro per) with the training costs established for internal transfers by the Romanian Football Football Federation (5.000 RON per year equivalent to 1.107 Euro).

[21] Training compensation rules were recently tested against EU law, and in particular with regard to the freedom of movement of workers, by TAS-CAS in the Riverola case (CAS award 2014/A/Bologna FC 1909 SpA v. FC Barcelona). The award is not public, but a full comment and legal analysis is published in: Luca Smacchia, “The Riverola case: how the enforcement of FIFA rules may restrict the freedom of movement for workers within the EU”, Football Legal, #5 (June 2016), pages 20-24.

[22] See e.g. Ben Van Rompuy, “Sport and EU Competition Law: New developments and unfinished business”, Asser International Sports Law Blog (22 May 2015).

[23] Article 101 TFEU: “The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market: all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market, and in particular those which: (…) (d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;”

[24] “The distinction between "restrictions by object" and "restrictions by effect" arises from the fact that certain forms of collusion between undertakings can be regarded, by their very nature, as being injurious to the proper functioning of normal competition.” - Commission Staff Working Document of 25 June 2014, Guidance on restrictions of competition “by object” for the purpose of defining which agreements may benefit from the De Minimis Notice, page 3.

[25] Saskia King, “Agreements that restrict competition by object under Article 101 (1) TFEU: Past, present and future”, PhD Thesis – The London School of Economics and Political Science (2015), Page 28.

[26] “The combined investment of summer and winter transfer windows in the top five European leagues was almost €3.4 billion. That was up by 29 per cent versus last season and again a record high ever.” - Soccerex Transfer Review Winter Edition 2016, Prime Time Sport, page 4.

[27] See, for example, Case T-193/02, Piau v. Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2005:22, para. 69: “As regards, first, the concept of an association of undertakings, and without it being necessary to rule on the admissibility of the arguments put forward by an intervener which go against the claims made by the party in support of which it is intervening, it is common ground that FIFA's members are national associations, which are groupings of football clubs for which the practice of football is an economic activity. These football clubs are therefore undertakings within the meaning of Article 81 EC and the national associations grouping them together are associations of undertakings within the meaning of that provision.”

[28] For an in-depth economic data analysis see, e.g., FIFA T.M.S., Global Transfer Market 2012 Highlights, pages 14 and 15 – Overall Market Activity - and pages 23 and 24 - Player Age.

[29] David Nilsson, “The Revised FIFA Regulations for the Status and Transfers of Players’ Compatibility with EU competition law – the Transfer System revised”. Master Thesis. Faculty of Law - University of Lund, (September 2006).

[30] Supra, 30.

[31] Doping rules under EU competition law.

[32] See para. 20 page 7 of the award: “The Panel does not share the DRC’s view that the purpose of the first sentence of Article 6 para. 3 is to penalise clubs which do not offer professional terms to their amateur players. Rather, in the Panel’s opinion, the purpose of the above provision is to ensure that no player, whether amateur or professional, in whom the training club has no interest is impeded to accept the offer of another club because he carries some sort of “compensation price tag”.

Editor’s note: This report compiles all relevant news, events and materials on International and European Sports Law based on the daily coverage provided on our twitter feed @Sportslaw_asser. You are invited to complete this survey via the comments section below, feel free to add links to important cases, documents and articles we might have overlooked. 

The Headlines

The eagerly awaited FIFA Presidential elections of 26 February provided for a “new face” at the pinnacle of international football for the first time since 1998. One could argue whether Infantino is the man capable of bringing about the reform FIFA so desperately needs or whether he is simply a younger version of his predecessor Blatter. Both men are of course Swiss[1], and both were general secretaries of an international football governing body (UEFA and FIFA respectively) before becoming FIFA President. Only time will tell whether Infantino manages to cleanse FIFA from all the corruption and demonstrate that he is the right man for the job. In this regard, Infantino’s portrait by Sam Borden is definitely worth a read.

Though no FIFA official was lifted from his hotel bed by the police in the days before this FIFA Extraordinary Congress, the build-up was not entirely flawless. Two of the four Presidential Candidates, Prince Ali and Jérôme Champagne, turned to CAS prior to the elections with the aim of “incorporating transparent voting booths as well as independent scrutineers, in order to safeguard the integrity of the voting process and to ensure that the vote is conducted in secret. In addition, Prince Ali also asked for the FIFA Presidential Election to be postponed in the event the CAS could not rule on the request for provisional measures before the election.”[2] Unfortunately for the two candidates, on 24 February CAS rejected their requests (press releases are accessible here and here), promising that the “full order with grounds will be communicated in a few days”. Yet, the CAS website remained mute since then.

At that same Extraordinary FIFA Congress of 26 February, several reforms were also approved. The reforms include term limits for the FIFA President, FIFA Council members and members of the Audit and Compliance Committee and of the judicial bodies of max. 12 years, and the disclosure of individual compensation on an annual basis of the FIFA President, all FIFA Council members, the Secretary General and relevant chairpersons of independent standing and judicial committees. A summary of these reforms can be read here.

Another headline involving FIFA was the FIFA’s Appeal Committee’s decision to uphold the sanctions imposed on the Belgian club FC Seraing for infringing the rules on Third Party Ownership (TPO). The sanctions include a fine of CHF 150.000 and a complete transfer ban for four consecutive transfer windows starting in the summer of 2016. TPO (or FIFA’s decision to ban the practice) was once again making headlines in February, in large part thanks to the website of footballleaks (for more on the people behind this website, I recommend this interview published by Der Spiegel). On 1 February footballleaks published the Economic Rights Participation Agreement (ERPA) between Doyen Sport and the Spanish club Sevilla FC regarding the economic rights of the French football player Geoffrey Kondogbia. Another ERPA that was made accessible for the general public also involved Doyen and a Spanish club, namely Sporting de Gijón.

In addition to new agreement releases by footballleaks, the consequences of earlier releases were slowly being felt in February. For example, the release of the Gareth Bale transfer agreement between Tottenham Hotspur and Real Madrid on 20 January caused quite a few raised eyebrows throughout Europe. Most interestingly, three Members of the European Parliament officially asked the European Commission whether it is planning to “take action under its competition law and state aid responsibilities”, since one of the banks involved in the transfer agreement (Bankia) was previously saved by the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) with public money. The Commission’s answer to this question can be expected shortly.

As regards other issues involving EU law and sport, February was a relatively quiet month. The most interesting new development took place on 22 February with the Euroleague Basketball stating that it submitted a competition complaint before the European Commission against FIBA and FIBA Europe. In a nutshell, Euroleague Basketball is attacking the “unacceptable and illegal threats and pressures that FIBA and its member federations are making against clubs, players and referees to force them to abandon the Euroleague and the Eurocup and only participate in FIBA competitions”. The point of view of FIBA on this issue can be read here. It remains open whether the Commission decides to investigate the matter formally.

This same question can be asked about FIFPro’s complaint against the transfer system. FIFPro has decided to launch #GameChangers campaign to support the complaint and pressure the European Commission into opening an investigation. For an in-depth analysis of the issue, I recommend this piece by Nick de Marco and Alex Mills. 

A report listing the sportslaw headlines would be incomplete these days without references to all the doping related news. It is worth remembering that the two reports by the WADA Independent Commission into doping in international athletics[3] lead to the IAAF banning for life three of its senior officials.[4] This IAAF decision was appealed by the three officials in front of CAS on 1 February. The outcome of this appeal is currently still pending. The Russian Government, meanwhile, heavily criticised the two reports, holding that there is no evidence that it was involved in State-supported doping.  

Case law

The German Appeal Court in Rheinland-Pfalz reached a decision in the Müller case on 17 February.  Contrary to what the Labour Court of Mainz held in March 2015[5], the Appeal Court argued that football players are employed under a fixed-term contract. The judgment has not been made public (yet), so we do not know the full extent of the Appeal Court’s legal argumentation. Further appeal options were available to Müller, but it is unclear whether he exercised them.

On 4 February, another German Appeal Court (the OLG Frankfurt) rendered its decision in the Rogon case (we commented the first ruling on provisory measure in June) involving the German implementation of the new FIFA Regulations on Working with Intermediaries. Here again, the full text of the ruling is still missing and we can only elaborate on press reports (here and here). Yet, it seems that the Court has decided to partially uphold the new Regulations (especially the no-fee for minors provision), while it also stroke down some aspects of the new rules (especially the intermediary’s duty to register with the DFB). 

Official Documents and Press Releases

• CFCB Adjudicatory Chamber renders Galatasaray FFP decision

  Full Decision

WADA Statement on Kenyan Athletes Doping Bribery Allegations

FIFA Congress approves landmark reforms

FIFA Appeal Committee dismisses appeals from investigatory chamber, Joseph S. Blatter and Michel Platini; grants a reduction on sentences

FIFA rejects appeal of Belgian club sanctioned under third-party influence and third-party ownership rules

Euroleague Basketball presents a complaint before the European Commission against FIBA and FIBA Europe

In the news

Athletics

• The Telegraph - Nestle terminate sponsorship programme with IAAF over doping and corruption scandals

Ben Bloom - Athletics world records blow as Wang Junxia 'admits' being part of Chinese state-sponsored doping regime

Australian Football

• Michelangelo Rucci - Some Essendon players to appeal two-year WADA in Swiss courts

Baseball

• UPI.com - New York Mets' Meija receives 162-game suspension after third failed doping test

Cycling

• Stuart Clarke - Spain ordered to pay Roberto Heras €720,000 over reversed doping ban

Football

• Paul Hayward - FIFA presidential election is beyond a joke - abolition is the only solution to their game of thrones

Sam Borden - A Guide to This Week’s Extraordinary FIFA Congress

Speed skating – Pechstein

• Amanda Coletta - Speedskater Is Poised to Upend Rule of Sports’ Highest Court

Tennis

• BBC - Tennis match-fixing claims: MPs to question authorities

Sean Ingle - Revealed: tennis umpires secretly banned over gambling scam

Other

• Transparency International - Global Corruption Report: Sport[6]

Academic materials

• Ben Van Rompuy and Oskar van Maren – ‘EU Control of State Aid to Professional Sport: Why Now?’

Arnout Geeraert - 'The EU in international sports governance'

Drs Raffaele Poli, Loïc Ravenel and Roger Besson - Foreign players in football teams

Geoff Pearson - Review of Pijetlovic 'EU Sports Law and Breakaway leagues in football' 2016 Common Market Law Review

Schwell, A., Buchowski, M., Kowalska, M., Szogs – ‘New Ethnographies of Football in Europe’

Mark Giancaspro - 'Buy-out clauses in professional football player contracts: questions of legality and integrity'

[1] In fact, Infantino grew up in the town of Brig, less than 10 km from Visp, Blatter’s home town.

[2] Media Release by the Court of Arbitration for Sport of 24 February 2016, “CAS rejects HRH Prince Ali Al Hussein’s request for urgent provisional measures”, http://www.tas-cas.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Media_Release_4459_decision.pdf accessed 23 March 2016.

[3] The Independent Commission Report #1 of 9 November 2015, https://wada-main-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/resources/files/wada_independent_commission_report_1_en.pdf accessed 24 March 2016; and The Independent Commission Report #2 of 14 January 2016, https://wada-main-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/resources/files/wada_independent_commission_report_2_2016_en_rev.pdf accessed 24 March 2016.

[4] I.e. Papa Massata Diack, Valentin Balakhnichev and Alexei Melnikov.

[5] For more information on the Müller case in first instance, read the blogs by Piotr Drabik: “Compatibility of Fixed-Term Contracts in Football with Directive 1999/70/EC. Part.1: The General Framework”, http://www.asser.nl/SportsLaw/Blog/post/part-1-compatibility-of-fixed-term-contracts-in-football-with-directive-1999-70-ec-the-general-framework-by-piotrek-drabik accessed 24 March 2016; and “Compatibility of fixed-term contracts in football with Directive 1999/70/EC. Part 2: The Heinz Müller case”, http://www.asser.nl/SportsLaw/Blog/post/compatibility-of-fixed-term-contracts-in-football-with-directive-1999-70-ec-part-2-the-heinz-muller-case-by-piotr-drabik accessed 24 March 2016.

[6] Prof. Ben Van Rompuy of the Asser Institute contributed tot his report with his piece “The role of the betting industry”, pages 236-241.

 Editor's note: This report compiles all relevant news, events and materials on International and European Sports Law based on the daily coverage provided on our twitter feed @Sportslaw_asser. You are invited to complete this survey via the comments section below, feel free to add links to important cases, documents and articles we might have overlooked.

The Headlines

#Save(d)Hakeem

The plight of Hakeem al-Araibi – the 25-year-old refugee footballer who was arrested last November in Bangkok upon his arrival from Australia on the basis of a red notice issued by Interpol in contravention of its own policies which afford protection to refugees and asylum-seekers – continued throughout the month of January. Bahrain – the country Hakeem al-Araibi fled in 2014 due to a (well-founded) fear of persecution stemming from his previous experience when he was imprisoned and tortured as part of the crackdown on pro-democracy athletes who had protested against the royal family during the Arab spring – maintained a firm stance, demanding that Hakeem be extradited to serve a prison sentence over a conviction for vandalism charges, which was allegedly based on coerced confessions and ignored evidence.

While international sports governing bodies were critised from the very beginning for not using enough leverage with the governments of Bahrain and Thailand to ensure that Hakeem’s human rights are protected, they have gradually added their voice to the intense campaign for Hakeem’s release led by civil society groups. FIFA, for example, has sent a letter directly to the Prime Minister of Thailand, urging the Thai authorities ‘to take the necessary steps to ensure that Mr al-Araibi is allowed to return safely to Australia at the earliest possible moment, in accordance with the relevant international standards’. Yet many activists have found this action insufficient and called for sporting sanctions to be imposed on the national football associations of Bahrain and Thailand.      

When it looked like Hakeem will continue to be detained in Thailand at least until April this year, the news broke that the Thai authorities agreed to release Hakeem due to the fact that for now the Bahraini government had given up on the idea of bringing Hakeem ‘home’ – a moment that was praised as historic for the sport and human rights movement.

Russia avoids further sanctions from WADA despite missing the deadline for handing over doping data from the Moscow laboratory 

WADA has been back in turmoil ever since the new year began as the Russian authorities failed to provide it with access to crucial doping data from the former Moscow laboratory within the required deadline which expired on 31 December 2018, insisting that the equipment WADA intended to use for the data extraction was not certified under Russian law. The Russian Anti-Doping Agency thus failed to meet one of the two conditions under which its three-year suspension was controversially lifted in September 2018. The missed deadline sparked outrage among many athletes and national anti-doping organisations, who blamed WADA for not applying enough muscle against the Russian authorities.

Following the expiry of the respective deadline, it appeared that further sanctions could be imposed on the Russian Anti-Doping Agency, but such an option was on the table only until WADA finally managed to access the Moscow laboratory and retrieve the doping data on 17 January 2019. Shortly thereafter, WADA President Sir Craig Reedie hailed the progress as a major breakthrough for clean sport and members of the WADA Executive Committee agreed that no further sanctions were needed despite the missed deadline. However, doubts remain as to whether the data have not been manipulated. Before WADA delivers on its promise and builds strong cases against the athletes who doped – to be handled by international sports federations – it first needs to do its homework and verify whether the retrieved data are indeed genuine.  

British track cyclist Jessica Varnish not an employee according to UK employment tribunal

On 16 January 2019, an employment tribunal in Manchester rendered a judgment with wider implications for athletes and sports governing bodies in the United Kingdom, ruling that the female track cyclist Jessica Varnish was neither an employee nor a worker of the national governing body British Cycling and the funding agency UK Sport. The 28-year-old multiple medal winner from the world and European championships takes part in professional sport as an independent contractor but sought to establish before the tribunal that she was in fact an employee of the two organisations. This would enable her to sue either organisation for unfair dismissal as she was dropped from the British cycling squad for the 2016 Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro and her funding agreement was not renewed, allegedly in response to her critical remarks about some of the previous coaching decisions.

The tribunal eventually dismissed her challenge, concluding that ‘she was not personally performing work provided by the respondent – rather she was personally performing a commitment to train in accordance with the individual rider agreement in the hope of achieving success at international competitions’. Despite the outcome of the dispute, Jessica Varnish has insisted that her legal challenge contributed to a positive change in the structure, policies and personnel of British Cycling and UK Sport, while both organisations have communicated they had already taken action to strengthen the duty of care and welfare provided to athletes.  

Sports Law Related Decisions

•  Employment Tribunal – Reserved judgment in the case involving Jess Varnish

Official Documents and Press Releases

• CAS – Bulletin 2018/02
• CAS – Code of sports-related arbitration (effective from 1 January 2019)
• FIFA – Statement on Hakeem al-Araibi
• FIFA – Letter to the Thai authorities concerning Hakeem al-Araibi
• FIFA – FIFA Appeal Committee partially upholds appeal lodged by Kalusha Bwalya
• FIFA – FIFA, UNESCO and the World Food Programme agree innovative partnership
• FIFA – Global Transfer Market Report 2018 - women
• FIFA – Global Transfer Market Report 2018 - men
• FIFA – Intermediaries in International Transfers 2018
• FIFA – Joint public statement on behalf of FIFA, UEFA, AFC, the Premier League, LaLiga and Bundesliga on beoutQ
• FIFA – Normalisation committee appointed for Namibian FA
• Human Rights Watch – Qatar: Partial reforms risk undermining progress
• IBSF – IBSF sanctions Russian bobsleigh athletes and official for anti-doping rule violation with a period of ineligibility of two years
• IOC – New year’s message 2019
• IOC – IOC disappointed at decision of Swiss Federal Tribunal
• IOC – IOC sanctions one athlete for failing anti-doping tests at London 2012
• IOC – Stockholm-Are and Milan-Cortina submit innovative Games plans for the Olympic Winter Games 2026
• Tennis Integrity Unit – Annual Review 2018
• Tennis Integrity Unit – Cristobal Saavedra-Corvalan suspended and fined for failing to cooperate with TIU corruption investigation
• UEFA – Club Licensing Benchmarking Report Financial Year 2017
• UEFA – UEFA report details European football’s journey to profitability
• WADA – New Year message to stakeholders from WADA President and Director General
• WADA – Reminder: WADA is soliciting feedback on the Anti-Doping Charter of Athlete Rights
• WADA – Update on extraction of Moscow Laboratory data and RUSADA compliance status
• WADA – Statement from the WADA Athlete Committee on Russian compliance situation
• WADA – WADA expert team to return to Moscow
• WADA – WADA successfully retrieves data from Moscow Laboratory
• WADA – WADA Executive Committee endorses CRC recommendation to continue applying conditions of RUSADA compliance
• WADA – WADA Compliance Review Committee update

In the news

Doping

• Associated Press Russian court says bobsledder can keep Olympic titles
• BBC Sport Alexandr Zubkov to keep Olympic titles in Russia despite IOC ruling
• Andy Brown WADA’s Intelligence & Investigations department covering 20% of cases
• Sean Ingle Marathon champion Jemima Sumgong has doping ban doubled to eight years
• Sean Ingle Tribunal to hear claims ex-Team Sky doctor Freeman ordered testosterone
• Sean Ingle WADA accussed of being ‘played’ after Russians miss doping data deadline
• Sean Ingle WADA athletes body adds to pressure for new ban on Russia
• Sean Ingle WADA experts set to return to Russia to investigate doping data after IT row
• Sean Ingle WADA retrieves doping data from Moscow but doubts linger over veracity
• Sean Ingle Russia avoids further WADA sanctions despite missing data deadline

Football

• David Conn Europe’s top-tier football clubs reap benefit of FFP with first overall profit
• David Conn Manchester City refuse to give UEFA any comment on FFP allegations
• David Conn Revealed: The ‘dire consequences’ of football’s relationship with gambling
• Helen Davidson Hakeem al-Araibi: Bahrain says refugee footballer’s life is not in danger
• Helen Davidson Call for FIFA’s Salman al-Khalifa to step down if Hakeem al-Araibi is not freed
• Sean Ingle FIFA urges Thailand to release Bahraini footballer Hakeem al-Araibi
• Sean Ingle Real Madrid and Barcelona overtake Manchester United as top earning clubs
• Sean Ingle and Helen Davidson Campaigners say case of Bahraini footballer Hakeem al-Araibi now an ‘emergency’
• Tariq Panja FIFA’s boss wants to remake the game. Europe wants no part of it.
• Tariq Panja Politics looms over empty seats as Saudi Arabia faces Qatar in Asian Cup
• Tariq Panja U.A.E. accuses Qatar of fielding ineligible players at Asian Cup
• Tariq Panja When is a hacker whistle-blower? In Football Leaks case, a Hungarian judge will decide
• Tariq Panja and Kevin Draper Cristiano Ronaldo’s DNA sought by Las Vegas police in rape investigation
• Tariq Panja and Hiroko Tabuchi Japan’s Olympic chief faces corruption charges in France

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• Stine Alvad FIFA fails to live up to own human rights standards in #SaveHakeen case, critics say
• Philip Blenkinsop Nike’s Dutch tax status investigated by EU regulators
• Sean Ingle Jess Varnish loses employment tribunal case against British Cycling and UK Sport
• Sean Ingle Jess Varnish: I lost, but my stance has exposed a culture of fear
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• Sam Jones Police in Spain break up tennis match-fixing ring involving 28 pros
• Braden Keith FINA relaxes rules, won’t ban athletes for competing in non-FINA events
• Malay Mail CAS dismisses Karim’s appeal against IAAF
• Liam Morgan Japanese Olympic Committee President indicted on corruption charges in France
• Jonathan Taylor Response to open letter from Sebastian Samuelsson

Academic Materials

International Sports Law Journal

• Cem Abanazir E-sport and the EU: The View from the English Bridge Union
• Alexander Brown and Roger Baines The Potential Exploitation of Non-English Speaking Players in UK Professional Football Contracts
• James Brown Genetic Doping: WADA We Do About the Future of ‘Cheating’ in Sport?
• John Didulica Changing the Game: The Legal Framework for the Laws of the Game, Management of Human Performance Data and Related Safety Considerations in Women's Professional Sport
• Matteo Maciel and Adam Walton Can Player Economic Value Rights Be Used as Collateral?

Other

• Jan Exner Sporting Nationality in the Context of European Union

Blog

Law in Sport

• Katherine Apps Can you ‘temporarily step down’ from an employment role? A view on Craig Bellamy’s position
• Kevin Carpenter Podcast on career in sports law and sports integrity
• Angela Collins Gender equality in football – how much does FIFA ‘value’ the women’s game?
• Zoe Dudgeon and Elinor Boote A comprehensive guide for sports bodies on tackling discrimination
• Nick Hawkins and Naomi Latham Top tips for football clubs on navigating complex employment negotiations
• Marc Peltier French law brought into line with the World Anti-Doping Code
• Angelo Rigopoulos A guide to UEFA’s good governance reform
• Toni Roca FIFA’s proposed solidarity mechanism reforms – an effective solution or a lost opportunity?
• Brendan Schwab Podcast on the Hakeem al-Araibi case 

Other

• Jack Anderson Sport scandals of 2018
• Nikki Dryden Why Hakeem al-Araibi’s plight is a test of the Olympic movement itself
• Marina Hyde Inconceivable! Russia yet again leaves Sir Craig Reedie looking the fool
• Marina Hyde Saudi Arabia, sportwashing and golf’s daring sortie into enemy coffers
• Marina Hyde The anti-WADA ‘lynch mob’ is not one Vernon Kay and co would recognise
• Sean Ingle Football must go in hard on Bahrain over the Hakeem al-Araibi affair
• Doug MacQuarrie Another point of view from Doug MacQuarrie, Chair of iNADO
• Sportschau The duped cheat
• Minky Worden Hakeem al-Araibi’s case is a true test of FIFA’s new human rights policy

Upcoming Events

• 8 May – FIFA and Human Rights: Impacts, Policies and Responsibilities, T.M.C. Asser Institute, The Hague, Netherlands
• 22-23 May – Football Law 2019: Player Transfers, Agents, Politics and the Business of Football, London, UK
• 27-28 June – 14^th Sport&EU Annual Conference, Valleta, Malta
• 12-13 September – Understand the Rules of the Game 2019: LawInSport Annual Conference, London, UK
• 24-25 October – Third Annual International Sports Law Conference of the International Sports Law Journal, T.M.C. Asser Institute, The Hague, Netherlands

The selling of media rights is currently a hot topic in European football. Last week, the English Premier League cashed in around 7 billion Euros for the sale of its live domestic media rights (2016 to 2019) – once again a 70 percent increase in comparison to the previous tender. This means that even the bottom club in the Premier League will receive approximately €130 million while the champions can expect well over €200 million per season.

The Premier League’s new deal has already led the President of the Spanish National Professional Football League (LNFP), Javier Tebas, to express his concerns that this could see La Liga lose its position as one of Europe’s leading leagues. He reiterated that establishing a centralised sales model in Spain is of utmost importance, if not long overdue.

Concrete plans to reintroduce a system of joint selling for the media rights of the Primera División, Segunda División A, and la Copa del Rey by means of a Royal Decree were already announced two years ago. The road has surely been long and bumpy. The draft Decree is finally on the table, but now it misses political approval. All the parties involved are blaming each other for the current failure: the LNFP blames the Sport Governmental Council for Sport (CSD) for not taking the lead; the Spanish Football Federation (RFEF) is arguing that the Federation and non-professional football entities should receive more money and that it should have a stronger say in the matter in accordance with the FIFA Statutes;  and there are widespread rumours that the two big earners, Real Madrid and FC Barcelona, are actively lobbying to prevent the Royal Decree of actually being adopted.

To keep the soap opera drama flowing,  on 30 December 2014, FASFE (an organisation consisting of groups of fans, club members, and minority shareholders of several Spanish professional football clubs) and the International Soccer Centre (a movement that aims to obtain more balanced and transparent football and basketball competitions in Spain) filed an antitrust complaint with the European Commission against the LNFP. They argue that the current system of individual selling of LNFP media rights, with unequal shares of revenue widening the gap between clubs, violates EU competition law.

Source:http://www.gopixpic.com/600/buscar%C3%A1n-el-amor-verdadero-nueva-novela-de-televisa/http:%7C%7Cassets*zocalo*com*mx%7Cuploads%7Carticles%7C5%7C134666912427*jpg/

The complaint will surely be frowned upon in Brussels. First, Spain is on the verge of introducing a joint selling arrangement. So what is the point of using competition law as an instrument to obtain … a joint selling arrangement? Second, the argument that a horizontal agreement, preventing LNFP clubs from individually competing in the sale of their media rights, is needed to ensure fair and effective competition seems, to put it mildly, counterintuitive. Third, who files an antitrust complaint on 30 December?

The complainants essentially target the polarization of revenues between the two top clubs (Real Madrid and FC Barcelona) and the other clubs. This is a well-known and long-standing feature of the LNFP, which is only in part attributable to disparities in the clubs’ media rights income. The complainants point out, however, that media coverage is also an important driver of other main revenue streams (e.g. value of sponsorship deals, ticket sales, and merchandising). 

Since the end of the 1990s, clubs have been selling the LNFP media rights individually. In a system of individual selling, a club’s bargaining power is evidently determined by the market potential of the matches of a specific club and not by the collective attractiveness of the competition as a whole. This has resulted in a pronounced imbalance between the two top clubs Real Madrid and FC Barcelona, who are able to extract supra-normal profits, and the other clubs.

For the 2010-2011 season, for example, the two Spanish giants both received around €125 million for their live media rights, leaving their domestic peers fighting over the scraps (i.e. the next biggest clubs earned around €40 million and the majority of the clubs sold their rights for about €15 million). In other words, Real Madrid and FC Barcelona generate ten times more revenue from their media rights as compared to the smaller clubs.

While it is easy to see why this situation may be considered unfair from the perspective of the majority of the clubs, it is less evident to find a competition law problem. 

A competition law perspective 

As stated above, the complaint is launched against the LNFP who, according to FASFE, by means of authorising the individual selling of TV rights system, is violating EU competition law.

First, the complainants argue that the system of individual selling strengthens the dominant positions of Real Madrid and FC Barcelona and, subsequently, undermines the competitive position of the other clubs. So far so good. But then they jump to the conclusion that Article 102 TFEU is being violated, not by the LNFP, but by Real Madrid and FC Barcelona. 

There they lost us – and presumably anyone remotely familiar with EU competition law. But let’s be a good sport and contemplate this line of reasoning a bit further.  

It might be argued that Real Madrid and FC Barcelona hold a (collective) dominant position on certain product markets in Spain and, by extension, in a substantial part of the internal market – even though the complaint fails to properly define those relevant markets. On the upstream market for the acquisition of media rights of La Liga, both clubs behave to a certain extent independently of their competitors. Spanish broadcasters first seek to acquire the media rights to their matches, which undercuts the bargaining position of the other clubs in the subsequent negotiations for the purchase of their rights. A more fundamental flaw is that the complainants contend that the possession or even strengthening of a dominant position by way of competition falls within the prohibition of Article 102 TFEU. The complaint does not put forward a single argument substantiating how both clubs engage in abusive conduct. 

Second, the complainants argue that the LNFP, according to Article 49 of its statutes, must look after the common interests of the competitions that it organises and of its members. In their view, the 1996 decision of the LFNP General Assembly to re-introduce a system of joint selling, which has negatively affected the majority of clubs and a large majority of fans, does not comply with this objective. 

While it can be argued that the LNFP’s decision constitutes a decision of an association of undertakings within the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU, it is difficult to see how it has an anti-competitive object or effect. Quite on the contrary, the decision lifted the competitive constraints on the clubs’ independent decision-making that were in place up until the season 1997-1998. 

It should be noted that a system of joint selling of media rights does not necessarily bring about an equitable distribution of the revenues among the clubs. Albeit connected, the distribution mechanism is a separate measure, which is typically for the most part performance-based. Moreover, financial solidarity can also be implemented through other mechanisms, such as a taxation system or the redistribution of voluntary contributions. That said, it must be acknowledged that a system of joint selling does facilitate the sharing of revenues among clubs. The ability of sports organisers to impose alternative financial solidarity mechanisms might be constrained by the pressure of the larger clubs (which evidently wish to see a larger share of the revenues flow back to them because they are primarily responsible for generating these revenues). The clubs’ media rights income ratio in the other top European football leagues, where media rights are sold collectively, illustrates this point. In the season 2011-2012 the earnings ratio of the top to the bottom club was as follows: Premier League (1,55 to 1); Serie A (4,35 to 1); Bundesliga (2,3 to 1); and Ligue 1 (3,2 to 1).[1] 

Considering that joint selling only creates incentives for horizontal solidarity, the financial solidarity justification in itself could not outweigh the anti-competitive effects of a joint selling arrangement. The restrictions of competition are considerable. First, joint selling agreements prevent clubs from individually competing in the sale of their media rights. Access to the market can therefore be foreclosed to competing buyers. Second, joint selling leads to uniform prices and other trading conditions. Price-fixing is a hard-core restriction that is normally prohibited. Third, joint selling could lead to output restrictions when certain rights are withheld from the market. 

As the discussion of the competition law decisional practice below will demonstrate, it is even unclear whether the financial solidarity argument can be invoked as a partial legal defence against the prohibition of restrictive agreements. 

The financial solidarity conundrum

One of the key assumptions underlying the complaint is that the EU institutions advocate the joint selling of media rights. This is presumably one of the main reasons why they are turning to Brussels for help. While it is true that the European Council (e.g. in the 2001 Nice Declaration) and the European Parliament have always been supportive of the link between joint selling and the principle of financial solidarity, the same cannot be said about the European Commission. In policy documents, the Commission has refrained from making (strong) pronouncements on the solidarity benefits of joint selling vis-à-vis individual selling. In the Helsinki Report on Sport (1999) the Commission underscored the need to examine the precise link between the joint selling of media rights and financial solidarity between professional and amateur sport. In its White Paper on Sport (2007) the Commission acknowledged that joint selling “can be a tool for achieving greater solidarity within sports”, but immediately added that also a system of individual selling by clubs can be linked to a robust solidarity mechanism. Only in the Communication on Developing the European Dimension of Sport (2011) the Commission expressed some general support for a system of joint selling. Surely some of the Commission’s press releases coinciding its decisions in this area mention benefits for financial solidarity (see e.g. here). If the complainants had looked at the actual decisions, however, they would have realised that that rhetoric is inconsistent with the legal argumentation.

After the need to address competition issues in relation to joint selling arrangements for football media rights emerged in the 1990s, several National Competition Authorities (NCAs) found that the system was incompatible with the national competition rules. The NCAs were sceptical about the necessary link between joint selling and revenue distribution and, subsequently, did not consider it to be a pro-competitive benefit capable of offsetting the identified restrictive effects. Even though the NCAs spoke out uniformly against the joint selling of football media rights, in three Member States their decisions were either overruled by a national court (United Kingdom) or circumvented through legislative action (Germany) or executive orders (the Netherlands).[2] This created uncertainties regarding the circumstances under which joint selling could be considered compatible with EU and national competition law. 

In the UEFA Champions League decision (2003) the European Commission for the first time assessed the compatibility of the joint selling of football media rights with Article 101 TFEU. In two subsequent decisions, German Bundesliga (2005) and FA Premier League (2006), the Commission raised similar competition concerns and imposed similar remedies to address these concerns. 

In all three decisions, the Commission found that joint selling arrangements are caught by the prohibition of Article 101(1) TFEU, but may create substantial efficiency gains so that Article 101(3) TFEU could be invoked as a legal defence. It identified three main benefits: (1) the creation of a single point of sale (which creates efficiencies by reducing the transaction costs for sports organisers and media content operators); (2) branding of the output by one entity (which creates efficiencies as it helps the media products receive wider recognition and distribution); and (3) the creation of a league product focused on the competition as a whole rather than individual clubs. 

To ensure that the efficiency benefits outweigh the toxic cocktail of anti-competitive effects (i.e. price-fixing and considerable risks of market foreclosure and output restrictions), the Commission carefully prescribed the way in which the rights must be marketed by imposing a list of behavioural remedies. 

In all three of the Commission’s investigations, the parties put forward the financial solidarity argument as the main justification for an exemption of their joint selling arrangements under Article 101(3) TFEU.[3] Yet the Commission never substantially addressed that argument. Only in the UEFA Champions League decision, the point was briefly considered. The Commission simply noted that UEFA had failed to substantiate the indispensability of a joint selling agreement for the redistribution of revenue and, subsequently, for the organisation of the Champions League.[4] Since it could exempt the joint selling agreement on economic efficiency grounds, however, the Commission concluded that “it is not necessary for the purpose of this procedure to consider the solidarity argument any further”.[5] As such, the Commission conveniently got round the issue.

The national decisional practice subsequent to the Commission’s precedents equally refrained from addressing the issue. The NCAs started focusing their assessments exclusively on efficiency benefits, as instructed by the Commission.  

In short, in competition law proceedings related to joint selling arrangements, the financial solidarity defence has never been very compelling – it was either considered unsound (early national enforcement practice) or remained unaddressed. Of course, one may still argue that the elephant in the room was surreptitiously taken into account (bearing in mind that the acceptance of a similar price-fixing cartel in other sectors would be difficult to imagine).[6] 

Redistribution formulas for media rights income  

After the European Commission de facto legitimized the joint selling of football media rights, the system became the common practice for marketing such rights in Europe. Since Italy reintroduced the system of joint selling in 2010, Cyprus, Portugal, and Spain are now the last EU markets in which first division football clubs sell their rights individually. 

To put the distribution key foreseen in the pending Spanish Royal Decree into perspective, we will first summarize how the other four big European leagues redistribute the media rights income. 

England: Since 1992, the year in which the Premier League was formed, it was decided that 50% of the revenue is split equally between the 20 clubs, 25% is paid in Merit Payments (depending on where a club finishes in the final League table), and the final 25% is paid in Facility Fees (based on each time a club’s matches are broadcast in the UK). All international broadcast revenue, and central commercial revenue, is split equally amongst the 20 clubs. For the season 2013/2014, the ratio between the top (Liverpool at €132 million Euros) and the bottom earning club (Cardiff City at €84 million) was 1.57:1.

Germany: Within the German Bundesliga clubs, the criteria for the distribution of revenues will be determined by a 2:1 ratio between the top-ranked and the bottom-ranked teams in an ad hoc distribution ranking for the years 2013 – 2017. This means that the revenue sharing distribution will range from a maximum of 5.8% of the total amount for the first place team to at least 2.9% for the 18th place team. The Bundesliga’s international media rights income distribution, however, remains based on both international and domestic sport performance.

Italy: Italy’s Serie A joint selling system had an earnings ratio of the top to bottom club of 5.25:1 for the season 2013/2014. Juventus, the top earning club, had an income from TV rights of €94 million, whereas the bottom earning club, Sassuolo, of €17.9 million.[7] Out of the total amount distributed, 40% is distributed to all the clubs as a fixed amount. Furthermore, 30% is distributed on the basis of past results (15% on results during last five seasons, 10% on historical results[8], and 5% on last season’s final league position); and 25% according to club supporters base.  

The planned Royal Decree in Spain will have a distribution system that guarantees Real Madrid and FC Barcelona an amount that is very close to what they earn now. The income ratio of the clubs will start at 4:1 and diminishes as the total amount of income increases. From the total income, about 3% will be deducted for the Spanish FA and for non-professional sports. Additionally, 10% will be assigned to the Second Division. The remaining amount will be distributed as follows: 50% as fixed amount for all the clubs, 25% depending on sports results while taking into account historical results. The other 25% will be distributed in relation to public awareness similar the Italian system (calculated on the basis of TV audiences, city population, and number of fans of the club).  

Conclusion

It is safe to say that the competition complaint launched by FASFE will not lead to the European Commission opening a formal investigation. The complainants fail to demonstrate how the current Spanish individual selling system breaches, or even potentially breaches, Article 101 and/or 102 TFEU. In that regard, it should be noted that they already tried their luck with the national competition authority (CNC), alleging infringements of national competition law. On 8 January 2013, the CNC decided to reject the complaint because it only prescribed the results of the current media rights sales process without demonstrating violations of the national competition rules. 

Whether FASFE is aware of the same judicial inaccuracies in its Commission complaint is unknown. On the other hand, it is quite evident that invoking competition law to argue for the introduction of a cartel with significant anti-competitive effects is paradoxical. The ex post fairness (i.e. the outcome of market competition) that FASFE is looking for is quite different from the ex ante fairness in the market place that competition policy is concerned with. One can therefore interpret the complaint as an attempt to add pressure on the involved Spanish parties (the CSD, the LNFP, and the RFEF) to introduce the new Royal Decree once and for all. Although the Spanish public is provided daily episodes full of jabbering, backstabbing and other drama, as with all Telenovelas, the soap is dragging on and on and should have ended ages ago. 

Whether the switch to a joint selling arrangement will significantly improve the competitive balance in La Liga remains to be seen. Since FC Barcelona and Real Madrid are guaranteed an amount similar to what they receive now, this will ultimately depend on how much the total income from the sale of the media rights will increase. The inexorable rise in the value of the broadcasting deals in the UK, which is the unique result of a duopoly of two powerful deep-pocket players (i.e. the incumbent dominant pay-TV operator Sky and new market entrant BT) that emerged after the introduction of the “no single buyer” obligation, cannot be realistically expected – at least not in the short term. Yet it is relatively certain that the overall income from media rights will go up – ultimately to the benefit of all the clubs. A (minimum) earnings ratio of the top to bottom club of 4:1 is not overly ambitious, but surely is a welcome step towards remedying the current imbalance between the two top clubs and their less fortunate competitors.

[1] See T.M.C. Asser Institute and Institute for Information Law, “Study on Sports Organisers' Rights in the EU”, Commissioned by the European Commission, DG Education and Culture, February 2014.

[2] Idem.

[3] See e.g. Commission, “Case No IV/37.214 - DFB - Central marketing of TV and radio broadcasting rights for certain football competitions in Germany” (Notice) (1999) OJ C/610, para. 7; Commission, “Notice published pursuant to Article 19(3) of Council Regulation No 17 concerning case COMP/C.2/38.173 and 38.453 - joint selling of the media rights of the FA Premier League on an exclusive basis” (2004) OJ C 115/3, para. 10.

[4] UEFA Champions League (Case COMP/37.398) Commission decision 2003/778/EC (2003) OJ L291/25, para. 131.

[5] Idem, para. 167.

[6] See e.g. Giorgio Monti, “Article 81 EC and Public Policy” (2002) 39 CMLR 1057 (calling it a “sector-specific exemption”).

[7] FASFE Antitrust Complaint of 30 December 2014, page 11

[8] In other words, this revenue is determined by overall league placings since 1946. In this category, Juventus, AC Milan and Inter Milan are the top earning clubs. For more info see: http://www.financialfairplay.co.uk/latest-news/tv-revenue-distribution-%E2%80%93-comparing-italian-and-english-models.

Introduction

On 13 September 2017, more than 40,000 people witnessed the successful debut of the football club RasenBallsport Leipzig (RB Leipzig) in the UEFA Champions League (UCL) against AS Monaco. In the eyes of many supporters of the German club, the mere fact of being able to participate in the UEFA's flagship club competition was probably more important than the result of the game itself. This is because, on the pitch, RB Leipzig secured their place in the 2017/18 UCL group stage already on 6 May 2017 after an away win against Hertha Berlin. However, it was not until 16 June 2017 that the UEFA Club Financial Control Body (CFCB) officially allowed RB Leipzig to participate in the 2017/18 UCL alongside its sister club, Austrian giants FC Red Bull Salzburg (RB Salzburg).[1] As is well known, both clubs have (had) ownership links to the beverage company Red Bull GmbH (Red Bull), and therefore it came as no surprise that the idea of two commonly owned clubs participating in the same UCL season raised concerns with respect to the competition's integrity.

The phenomenon of multi-club ownership is nothing new in the world of football. As will be seen below, the English company ENIC plc. (ENIC)[2] established itself as a pioneer in this type of business activity, having acquired in the late 1990s, through subsidiaries, controlling interests in several European clubs, including SK Slavia Prague in the Czech Republic (Slavia), AEK Football Club in Greece (AEK) or Vicenza Calcio in Italy (Vicenza). Apart from ENIC and Red Bull, a more recent example of a global corporation investing in multiple football clubs worldwide is the City Football Group owned by Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed Al Nahyan. In August 2017, the City Football Group acquired 44.3% stake in Girona FC, a Spanish club that had just been promoted to La Liga for the first time in their history, thereby adding a sixth club to its portfolio consisting of Manchester City, New York City, Melbourne City, Yokohama Marinos[3] (Japan) and Club Atlético Torque (Uruguay).[4] Private individuals may also become owners of two or more football clubs, the most prominent examples being Giampaolo Pozzo and his son Gino who are in possession of the Italy's second oldest club Udinese Calcio and the English top-flight club Watford FC respectively,[5] or Roland Duchâtelet, a Belgian millionaire whose dubious management of his five clubs, namely Charlton Athletic (England), Carl Zeiss Jena (Germany), AD Alcorcón (Spain), Sint-Truiden (Belgium) and Újpest FC (Hungary), has been met with considerable opposition. Moreover, clubs themselves have acquired stakes in other clubs, including, for instance, Atlético Madrid's investment in RC Lens (France) and Club Atlético de San Luis (Mexico), or AS Monaco's recent takeover of the Belgian second-division club Cercle Brugge.

Leaving commercial and marketing aspects aside, the investment in multiple football clubs is often driven by the vision of recruiting talented players at low cost, preferably in Latin American or African countries, and subsequently facilitating their development in smaller European clubs to prepare them for the level required at the lead club. Hence, should Manchester City discover in Uruguay a 'new Luis Suárez', it will not take much effort (and money) to convince such a player to join the academy of Club Atlético Torque, especially if he is promised further development at language-barrier-free Girona and sees himself wearing the Citizens' sky blue shirt one day. Along these lines, it could well be argued that the phenomenon of multi-club ownership in fact creates a supply chain for talent.

For reasons suggested above, qualification for a UEFA club competition is normally not the primary objective of clubs like Girona, which find themselves somewhere in the middle of this supply chain. This at least partially explains why, to the best of my knowledge, only twice the prospect of two or more commonly owned clubs participating in the same UEFA club competition became so imminent that it required UEFA's direct intervention. The first intervention dates back to May 1998 when the UEFA Executive Committee adopted a landmark rule entitled 'Integrity of the UEFA Club Competitions: Independence of the Clubs' (Original Rule) in response to Slavia and AEK, both under ENIC's control, having qualified for the 1998/99 UEFA Cup. The Red Bull case, for its part, revolved around the interpretation of 'decisive influence in the decision-making of a club', a concept that could not be found in the Original Rule.

Against this background, this two-part blog will focus on the UEFA rule(s) aimed at ensuring the integrity of its club competitions. The first part will take a closer look at how the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) and the European Commission (Commission) dealt with ENIC's complaints alleging that the Original Rule was incompatible, inter alia, with EU competition law. The second part will then examine the relevant rule as it is currently enshrined in Article 5 of the UCL Regulations 2015-18 Cycle, 2017/18 Season (Current Rule) and describe how the CFCB Adjudicatory Chamber interpreted the aforementioned concept of decisive influence[6] in the Red Bull case. Finally, in light of the conclusions reached by the CFCB Adjudicatory Chamber, the second part of this two-part blog will discuss whether any modification of the Current Rule is desirable.

The ENIC saga: How the Original Rule survived EU competition law scrutiny

Background

It has already been noted that the adoption of the Original Rule was prompted, first and foremost, by the fact that ENIC-controlled Slavia and AEK qualified on sporting merit for the 1998/99 UEFA Cup. However, what needs to be added is that the initial impulse came a season before, when Slavia, AEK and Vicenza all reached the quarter-final of the UEFA Cup Winners' Cup. Although UEFA was fortunate that time as the clubs were not drawn to play against each other and only Vicenza advanced to the semi-final, it learnt its lesson and as a result of this situation adopted robust rules aimed at ensuring the integrity of its club competitions.

The Original Rule

The Original Rule made admission to the UEFA club competitions conditional upon fulfilment of three specific criteria. First, a club participating in a UEFA club competition must have refrained from (i) holding or dealing in the securities or shares; (ii) being a member; (iii) being involved in any capacity whatsoever in the management, administration, and/or sporting performance; and (iv) having any power whatsoever in the management, administration and/or sporting performance of any other club participating in the same UEFA club competition. Second, the Original Rule stipulated that no person could be simultaneously involved in any capacity whatsoever in the management, administration and/or sporting performance of more than one club participating in the same UEFA club competition. Third, an individual or legal entity was prohibited from exercising control over more than one club participating in the same UEFA club competition. The Original Rule further clarified that an individual or legal entity was deemed to have control over a club, and thus the third criterion was not satisfied, where he/she/it (i) held a majority of the shareholders' voting rights; (ii) was authorized to appoint or remove a majority of the members of the administrative, management or supervisory body; or (iii) was a shareholder and single-handedly controlled a majority of the shareholders' voting rights. In principle, under this third criterion, it was permissible for an individual or legal entity to hold up to 49% of the shareholders' voting rights in multiple clubs participating in the same UEFA club competition.

Proceedings before the CAS

It was the third criterion that was applicable to ENIC, a company listed on the London Stock Exchange. Given that both Slavia and AEK were owned as to more than 50% by ENIC, the respective criterion was not satisfied. Consequently, the Committee for the UEFA Club Competitions, a body responsible for monitoring fulfilment of the aforementioned criteria, ruled that only Slavia was eligible to take part in the 1998/99 UEFA Cup on account of its higher club coefficient. Not content with this decision, Slavia and AEK filed a request for arbitration with the CAS on 15 June 1998, challenging the validity of the Original Rule, inter alia, under Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (TEC) (now Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)). On the same day, the clubs also lodged a request for interim relief which was eventually granted on 16 July 1998.[7] As a result, UEFA was barred from giving effect to the Original Rule for the duration of the arbitration procedure and both Slavia and AEK were given the green light to participate in the 1998/99 UEFA Cup. On 20 August 1999, the CAS rendered its award in which it upheld the validity of the Original Rule and allowed UEFA to apply the rule in question as of the 2000/01 season.

Before embarking on a comprehensive analysis of the compatibility of the Original Rule with EU competition law, the Panel recognized that participation of two or more commonly owned clubs in the same UEFA club competition creates fertile ground for conflicts of interest, and thus ''represents a justified concern for a sports regulator and organizer''.[8] The Panel then confirmed that EU law was applicable to the case before it as the Original Rule could not benefit from any 'sporting exception'.[9] That being clarified, the Panel moved on to examine the relevant market potentially affected by the Original Rule. It defined the relevant product market as the ''market for ownership interests in football clubs capable of taking part in UEFA competitions'' which would include, on the supply side, ''all the owners of European football clubs which can potentially qualify for a UEFA competition'', and, on the demand side, ''any individual or corporation potentially interested in an investment opportunity in a football club which could qualify for a UEFA competition''.[10] The relevant geographic market, for its part, was confined to the territories of national football federations affiliated to UEFA.[11]

Analysis under Article 81 TEC

Article 81 TEC (now Article 101 TFEU) prohibits ''all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which […] have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market''. While it is evident that UEFA could be classified as an undertaking[12] or an association of undertakings (representing national football federations) within the meaning of Article 81 TEC, it is less clear whether UEFA could also be regarded, through national football federations representing both professional and amateur clubs, as an association of 'club undertakings'. This question is of crucial importance because if UEFA was not to be regarded as an association of 'club undertakings', the Original Rule would not be considered as the product of a horizontal collusion between clubs and, as a result, would fall outside the scope of Article 81 TEC.[13] The role of UEFA in such a case would not go beyond a mere sports regulator.[14] In this context, Advocate General Lenz insisted in the Bosman case that even though national football federations encompass a sheer number of amateur clubs not engaged in economic activities, this does not alter the conclusion that (i) national football federations are to be regarded as associations of undertakings in accordance with Article 81 TEC; and consequently that (ii) UEFA, through these national football federations, is to be regarded as an association of 'club undertakings'.[15] Although not entirely persuaded by the respective argument, the Panel assumed for the purposes of conducting an analysis under Article 81 TEC that the Original Rule represented a decision by an association of 'club undertakings' and, as such, did not fall outside the scope of Article 81 TEC.[16]

The Panel then turned to the question lying at the heart of the dispute, that is, whether the Original Rule had as its object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market. It found that the Original Rule was only designed to ''prevent the conflict of interest inherent in commonly owned clubs taking part in the same competition and to ensure a genuine athletic event with truly uncertain results'', thereby excluding any anti-competitive object of the Original Rule.[17] With respect to the effect of the Original Rule, the Panel asserted that even though the rule in question may have discouraged an owner who had already been in possession of a high-level European club from acquiring controlling interest in another such club, its overall effect was pro-competitive in that it enabled more undertakings to enter the relevant market, and thus stimulated investment in professional football.[18] Moreover, the Panel was concerned that, in the absence of the Original Rule, high-level European clubs would potentially be concentrated in few hands which would, in turn, lead to an increase in prices for ownership interests in those clubs.[19]

Having found that neither the object nor the effect of the Original Rule was anti-competitive, the Panel was further not required to pronounce itself on whether the Original Rule was necessary and proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Yet, it held that the Original Rule was ''an essential feature for the organization of a professional football competition and [was] not more extensive than necessary to serve the fundamental goal of preventing conflicts of interest''.[20] In a similar vein, the Panel could not identify any plausible less restrictive alternative to the Original Rule, and therefore it declared that the Original Rule was proportionate to the stated aim of preventing conflicts of interest.[21]

Based on the above considerations, the Panel ultimately concluded that the Original Rule was compatible with Article 81 TEC.       

Analysis under Article 82 TEC 

Article 82 TEC (now Article 102 TFEU) prohibits abusive conduct by companies that have a dominant position on a relevant market. Since UEFA cannot become an owner of a football club, the Panel maintained that it was not present on the relevant market for 'ownership interests in football clubs capable of taking part in UEFA competitions', and for that reason UEFA could not be held to enjoy a dominant position.[22] Accordingly, the Panel concluded that the Original Rule did not violate Article 82 TEC.  

Proceedings before the Commission

In the wake of the CAS award, ENIC's business strategy suffered a blow. However, the English company was not yet ready to give up and lodged a complaint with the Commission on 18 February 2000, again claiming that the Original Rule infringed Articles 81 and 82 TEC.

In its decision, the Commission relied to some extent on the CAS award, adopting the definition of the relevant market or confirming that the Original Rule could not benefit from any 'sporting exception'. As far as the object of the Original Rule was concerned, the Commission articulated that the rule was not intended to distort competition, but rather to ''avoid conflicts of interest that may arise from the fact that more than one club controlled by the same owner […] play in the same competition''.[23] With respect to the Original Rule's effect, the Commission referred to the Wouters case in which the European Court of Justice held that an agreement between undertakings or a decision of an association of undertakings restricting the freedom to act may nevertheless fall outside the scope of Article 81 TEC, provided that its restrictive effects are inherent in the pursuit of a legitimate objective.[24] Applied to the case before it, the Commission ruled that the restrictive effects of the Original Rule were ''inherent in the pursuit of the very existence of credible pan-European football competitions''.[25] Consequently, the Commission found no violation of Article 81 TEC. Turning to Article 82 TEC, the Commission briefly noted that ''if one were to assume that UEFA enjoys a dominant position in whatever market, the fact that UEFA has adopted such a rule does not appear to constitute in itself an abuse of dominant position''.[26]

Conclusion

It is quite intuitive that the aim of preserving the integrity of the UEFA club competitions should outweigh the restriction introduced by the Original Rule which essentially rendered owners of high-level European clubs unable to acquire controlling interests in similar clubs. However, the fact that the Original Rule appeared bullet-proof under EU competition law does not mean that it was entirely without flaws. As will be seen in the second part of this blog, UEFA later decided to make the Original Rule more stringent since it realized that even if an individual or legal entity does not have de jure control over a club, it may still be able to exercise de facto control over such club.

[1]   RB Salzburg were eliminated by HNK Rijeka in the third qualifying round.

[2]   ENIC is currently a majority shareholder of the English top-flight club Tottenham Hotspur.

[3]   Among the clubs listed, Yokohama Marinos is the only club in which the City Football Group holds a minority stake (20%).

[4]   Furthermore, Manchester City have a formal cooperation agreement with Dutch side NAC Breda.

[5]   The Pozzo family also owned Spanish side Granada FC, before selling the club to a Chinese firm in 2016.

[6]   UCL Regulations 2015-18 Cycle, 2017/18 Season, Article 5.01(c)(iv).

[7]   According to the CAS, the fact that UEFA enacted the Original Rule shortly before the start of the 1998/99 season contravened the principles of good faith, procedural fairness and legitimate expectations. See CAS 98/200 AEK Athens and SK Slavia Prague / UEFA, Award of 20 August 1999, p. 5.

[8]   CAS 98/200 AEK Athens and SK Slavia Prague / UEFA, Award of 20 August 1999, para. 48.

[9]   Ibid. para. 83. According to the well-established jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice, ''the practice of sport is subject to [EU] law only in so far as it constitutes an economic activity''. See Case 36/74 Walrave [1974] ECR 1405, Judgment of 12 December 1974, para. 4. See also Case C-415/93 Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921, Judgment of 15 December 1995, para. 73. On the 'sporting exception', see also Richard Parrish and Samuli Miettinen, The Sporting Exception in European Union Law (T.M.C. Asser Press 2008).

[10] AEK Athens and SK Slavia Prague / UEFA (n 8) paras 101-104.

[11] Ibid. para. 108.

[12] According to the European Court of Justice, ''the concept of an undertaking encompasses every entity engaged in an economic activity, regardless of the legal status of the entity and the way in which it is financed''. See Case C-41/90 Höfner [1991] ECR I-1979, Judgment of 23 April 1991, para. 21.

[13] AEK Athens and SK Slavia Prague / UEFA (n 8) para. 88.

[14] Ibid.           

[15] Bosman, Opinion of Advocate General Lenz delivered on 20 September 1995, para. 256.

[16] AEK Athens and SK Slavia Prague / UEFA (n 8) para. 94.

[17] Ibid. para. 113.

[18] Ibid. paras 114-119.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Ibid. para. 136.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Ibid. para. 141. It should be noted, however, that this assertion was later challenged, albeit in the context of FIFA, by the Court of First Instance in the Piau case. The Court held in this case that the fact that FIFA is not itself an economic operator on the market for the services provided by players' agents was ''irrelevant as regards the application of Article 82 TEC, since FIFA is the emanation of the national associations and the clubs, the actual buyers of the services of players' agents''. See Case T-193/02 Piau [2005] ECLI:EU:T:2005:22, Judgment of 26 January 2005, para. 116.

[23] Case COMP/37 806: ENIC / UEFA [2002] Commission, para. 28.

[24] Case C-309/99 Wouters [2002] ECR I-1577, Judgment of 19 February 2002, para. 97.

[25] See Commission decision (n 23) para. 32.

[26] Ibid. para. 45.