Editor's Note: Pedro is an intern at the
Asser Institute and currently studying the Erasmus Mundus Master Degree in
Sports Ethics and Integrity (KU Leuven et al.) He worked as a research fellow for the Centre for Sport and
Human Rights, and his
primary research interests lie in the fields of International Human Rights
and sport.
I.
Introduction
“I
can’t do everything and I can’t do it alone. I need allies.” These are the words of the seven-time Formula 1 (F1) world champion,
Lewis Hamilton. He was urging more support to advocate for the protection of
human rights in the countries visited by Formula 1. During the last years, Hamilton together with Sebastian Vettel, have become the leaders of a movement demanding
accountability and greater awareness of the impact of F1 on society.
The
inclusion of the Bahrain GP on the F1 racing calendar for the first time in
2004 ignited concerns, which have grown with the inclusion of Abu Dhabi in
2007, Russia in 2014, Azerbaijan in 2017, and Saudi Arabia and Qatar in 2021.
The inability and lack of commitment of state authorities to protect and
respect human rights, the ineffectiveness of judicial procedures and the
systematic repression of political opposition are some of the factors that make
these countries prone to human rights violations. Academics and CSOs regularly argue that F1, by signing multi-million dollar contracts with these countries, is complicit in sportswashing. Those pulling the sport’s strings deny
these accusations and claim that human rights are at the centre of their agenda when they visit these countries. They
claim F1 can drive the improvement of human rights standards in a particular
country. However, reality tells a different story. The Bahrain GP has been
running for more than a decade and the situation in the country has only worsened, without any signs of F1 contributing to the
improvement of the protection of human rights there.
This
blog aims to provide an overview of the human rights challenges F1 is facing when
hosting a Grand Prix. For this purpose, a case study of the Bahrain GP, one of
the longest-running on the modern/current
F1 calendar, will be carried out. This will allow us to examine in detail the
historical evolution of the GP, the complaints from civil society organisations
and the reaction of the Federation Internationale de l’Automobile (FIA) and
other stakeholders to the ongoing allegations of human rights violations.
II.
The
beginning of the story: 2011 Bahrain GP
The
inclusion of the Bahrain GP on the Formula 1 calendar came years before the
country ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR) in 2006 and 2007 respectively. Already before this, several
international organisations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch (HRW) were documenting the systematic human rights
violations in Bahrain, at least since the 1990s. However, the turning point in
the country was the protests in 2011, inspired by the demonstrations in Tunisia
and Egypt, in what is known as the “Arab Spring”. As the Report
of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry highlighted, people mostly belonging to
the Shia community were killed, tortured, unlawfully imprisoned or arrested during
the armed repression of the protests.
In
the same year, the protests directly impacted the organisation of the Bahrain
GP. Initially, the race was postponed because it was to be held during the
weekend when the first uprisings began. This measure was applauded by the teams, drivers and the authorities as the
priority at the time for the Bahraini royal family was to heal divisions and overcome the
tragedy. Nevertheless, three months later, FIA decided to approve the return of the Bahrain
GP to the F1 calendar and host the race in December. The decision was taken on
the basis of a report drafted by Carlos Gracia, FIA Commissioner, who in
May of the same year went to Bahrain to analyse the situation and meet with
different stakeholders. The report concluded that there was “NO indication of
any problems or reasons why Bahrain’s F1 Grand Prix should not return to the
2021 Calendar”. This report contrasts starkly with the situation that civil
society organisations were reporting at that time. Five days after Mr Gracia’s visit, a letter from HRW to Jean Todt, Chair of FIA, and Martin
Whitmarsh, Chair of F1 Teams Association, expressed concern about the possible rescheduling
of the Bahrain GP. The letter reiterated that the human rights situation in the
country had “worsened considerably since the cancellation decision in February”.
It explicitly indicated that arrests, tortures and restrictions on the work of
CSOs and the media continued to be a daily occurrence in the country.
The
response to the decision of the FIA to reschedule the Grand Prix was not
unanimous, with some of the drivers expressing their disagreement. Red Bull F1
driver Mark Webber stated, “like it or not, F1 and sport in general isn’t above
having a social responsibility and conscience. I hope F1 is able to return to
Bahrain eventually but now isn’t the right time.” CSOs also started to advocate
for the complete suspension of the race, collecting more than 300,000
signatures on a petition hosted by the organisation Avvaz. Ultimately,
following a letter from The Formula One Teams Association (FOTA) to FIA
expressing their objections, the event was suspended from the 2011 F1 calendar.
At
the beginning of 2012, the situation was still tense, and the successful
staging of the Bahrain GP for the new season was still in the air. Some CSOs
were putting pressure on the teams to boycott the race while pointing out that the situation
concerning human rights violations was similar to or worse than the previous year. In the end, with the support of many of the
teams, FIA decided that the Bahrain GP would go ahead as planned.
Obviously,
the protests in 2011 had a direct impact on the organisation of the Bahrain
Grand Prix, to the extent that they led to its cancellation. This set the bar
high for what needs to happen in terms of humanitarian reasons or human rights
violations for the cancellation of an event. However, despite the deteriorating
human rights situation in the country, the Bahraini authorities, F1 and FIA did
not hesitate to reschedule the event from 2012 onwards. These decisions echoed
beyond the world of sport and triggered reactions from civil society.
III.
The
Bahrain GP and the growing human rights expectations of civil society vis a vis
F1
The
events of 2011 and 2012 were the perfect breeding ground for CSOs to exert
pressure in the years to come. Different organisations since then have been
demanding more significant consideration of human rights by F1 and other
commercial stakeholders.
In 2013, four Bahraini NGOs stressed, in a letter to
F1 race organisers, drivers, sponsors and broadcasters, that the situation in
the country did not differ much from previous years. For these organisations,
the intention of the government and organisers in hosting the Grand Prix was
clear: “to broadcast a false picture of normality to the outside world”. The
letter also prompted a political
backlash from some
British MPs who called for the Bahrain GP to be cancelled. But for the F1 chief
executive at that time, Bernie Ecclestone, the allegations had nothing to do with the race. He
expressed that “We [F1] don’t go anywhere to judge how a country is run. I keep
asking people, ‘What human rights?’ – I don’t know what they are”. Thus, during
2013 and 2014, the race was run despite clear opposition from a number of CSOs.
Given
the limited impact of the various reports and letters sent by CSOs to different
stakeholders involved in the Bahrain GP, one of these organisations decided to
explore a new approach. In 2014, Americans for Democracy & Human Rights in
Bahrain (ADHRB) submitted a complaint to the United Kingdom National Contact
Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. ADHRB alleged that “companies in the Formula One Group [a company
registered in the UK] had failed to address human rights impacts associated
with the Bahrain Grand Prix.” After a mediation procedure, ADHRB and F1 reached
a common ground. F1 issued a statement including a commitment to respect internationally recognised
human rights in all of its operations and to develop and implement a due
diligence policy. The statement also states that “where domestic laws and
regulations conflict with internationally recognised human rights, the Formula
1 companies will seek ways to honour them to the fullest extent which does not
place them in violation of domestic law.” At first, this step was welcomed by the CSOs, but as time passed, it proved to be
merely a mirage and not a substantial change in F1 practices.
The
consistent violation of human rights in Bahrain continued in the years following the publication of the
statement, especially through political repression and the use of violence
against demonstrators, media and workers of human rights organisations, and so
did the racing in Bahrain. During different demonstrations in 2016 and 2017
against the Bahrain GP, the police used excessive force, resulting in several
arrests and even the death of one teenager. This revived the criticisms of the
CSOs, who again demanded with more forcefulness and support for the respect of
the commitments that F1 itself had published years ago. In a letter by different CSOs, it was highlighted that “failing
to exercise due diligence and thus abide by your own Statement of Commitment to
Respect for Human Rights risks greater complicity in human rights abuses in
Bahrain and the tarnishing of your brand’s [F1] reputation.” In response to the
letter, F1 stated that
“We believe that Formula 1’s presence in every country on its calendar
is positive and a force for good. Sport engages people from all walks of life
and plays an important role in uniting communities and encouraging tolerance
and acceptance. We believe too that Formula 1’s global profile shines a light
and brings transparency to the internal affairs of every country that we
visit.”
It
was only at the end of 2018 that F1 publicly expressed its concerns about the
human rights situation in Bahrain, more specifically about the imprisonment of the activist Najah Yusuf for protesting against the GP.
The United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (WGAD) considered this detention arbitrary, unlawful, and in violation
of her rights to free speech and to a fair trial. Nevertheless, F1 never took
action in the investigation process or strongly condemned the imprisonment.
This prompted a large number of CSOs, including HRW and Amnesty International,
to call on F1 again in 2019 to cancel the Grand Prix in
response to a lack of investigation into Yusuf’s claims and urged drivers to
boycott the race.
The
second turning point was the postponement of the Bahrain GP in March 2020 due
to the Covid-19 pandemic. In November of the same year, seventeen CSOs,
including World Players Association, HRW and Amnesty International, issued a statement on the worsening situation in the country and how the
pandemic has increased the risk of human rights violations linked to F1.
Moreover, the focus was no longer only on the violations directly linked to the
GP, but also on the use of the sporting event to whitewash the image of the
country, what has been called “sportswashing”. This latter line of argument was
also followed by a letter delivered by thirty British MPs to F1 chief Chase
Carey. It is at this point that CSOs begin to gain more support from public
officials for their demands. For example, 90 parliamentarians from Britain,
Spain, Ireland, France, Belgium, Italy and Germany sent a letter in 2022 to Mohammed ben Sulayem, president of FIA,
accusing FIA and F1 of actively facilitating sportswashing in Gulf countries.
We
have charted ten years of human rights advocacy and demands linked to the
Bahrain Grand Prix and directed at the FIA. Initially, these human rights
claims were related to the 2011 uprisings, when CSOs claimed that the Bahrain GP
could not be held due to the fragile political situation in the country and the
constant human rights violations linked to the protests. Subsequently, from
2014 onwards, the discourse focused mainly on the direct links of some human
rights violations with the organisation of the GP, with CSOs reproaching F1 for
not exercising due diligence and thus failing to comply with its own human rights
commitments. The final phase, from 2020 onwards, is mainly characterised by the
involvement of other actors, such as politicians and F1 drivers, who protested
against the F1 being used as an instrument by authoritarian states to launder
their reputations. What has been the impact of such public protests and
mobilizations by CSOs and others? Have they triggered transformative changes in
the way F1 tackles human rights risks linked to the Bharain GP?
IV.
What
has F1 done to improve the human rights situation in Bahrain?
While
the human rights expectations of civil society vis a vis F1 are clear and
increasingly demanding, as exposed in the previous section, only a few of these
expectations have had a practical impact to some degree. In order to analyse
these actions, it is necessary first to identify the two organisations with the
power to take appropriate measures. On the one hand, the Formula One Group (FOG)
is composed of a diverse cluster of companies and, on the other hand, the
actions taken by the governing body of F1, FIA.
The
position of the FOG until 2015 was highly criticised by CSOs, as the previous
section illustrates, not only because of its lack of action but also because of
its official discourse, mainly led by Bernie Ecclestone, which belittled human rights. The exit of the
British magnate from the FOG prompted a discursive change in the organisation,
now recognising certain links between human rights violations and the
organisation of the Bahrain GP. Nevertheless, the only real action taken was
forced by the ADHRB when they submitted the complaint to the UK National
Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines, resulting in the F1 Human Rights
Commitment.
Now
the FOG includes in its Code of Conduct (CoC) a section regarding human rights and modern
slavery. Nevertheless, they only refer to what has already been stated in their
Human Rights Commitment. In this CoC, they also add that if “you believe that
an individual’s human rights may be adversely affected, you must report it to
the Compliance Team as soon as possible”. This compliance team is led by two
legal counsels, notably without experience in human rights topics that also deal
with other areas such as compliance, brand protection, human resources and
administration functions. In fact, Sacha Woodward, one of the members of the compliance team, when
asked in 2019 about the impact of F1 on human rights, stated that “we
[FOG] don’t see ourselves as a political organisation. We just want to bring a
great entertainment spectacle to as big an audience as possible to as many
countries as we can reach”. This comment clearly shows the priorities of the FOG,
profit over human rights, and tries to reinforce the idea that F1 is a bubble
free from human rights violations. A change in this dynamic seems unrealistic at this point since the FOG is a sport business
entity that seeks primarily economic profit, which Bahrain brings to it in spades.
The
passivity of the FOG is not beyond reproach, but the position of the FIA is
even more flagrantly disregarding human rights. Since 2011, the sport governing
body has not taken any initiative or seriously addressed the human rights
issues in Bahrain that CSOs have brought to its attention year after year. Although
in recent years, some SGBs are adopting human rights policies (e.g., FIFA) or recognising the importance of their protection
(e.g., IOC), the organisation that safeguards motorsports seems
unwilling to take that road. This unwillingness was clearly shown by the new
FIA president, who recently stressed that drivers should devote more time to driving and
less to advocating for human rights problems. Nevertheless, we could be witnessing
the end of this passivity, as some signs of change can be glimpsed recently. At
the end of 2021, the World Council for Automobile Mobility and Tourism (WCAMT), the body responsible for all FIA issues affecting
the automobile in society, hold their Annual General Assembly. In this meeting, Prince Zeid Ra’ad Al
Hussein, former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, and Rachel Davis, Vice
President of the non-profit organisation Shift, presented a set of
recommendations “to take the authoritative international framework – the United
Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights – and apply it to the
FIA’s reality”. These recommendations are the result of a process that FIA, in
the context of its Diversity, Inclusion and Human Rights Strategic Framework, started
to develop in 2020. The group of experts took a look at three spheres of FIA’s activity: FIA “as an employer and procurer of goods and
services; as the regulator of world motorsport, and as a major player in
mobility”.
Unfortunately, both the
Framework and the recommendations are not public, which underlines how FIA is still far
from achieving the standards of transparency and integrity in governance that society has
been demanding of SGBs.
The
highlighted actions, or rather inactions, show a clear lack of will from both
organisations over the last ten years. Small
shoots seem to flourish recently, but it is still necessary for
both organisations to commit more human and financial resources to address this
problem
and
improve their governance standards.
V.
Conclusion.
What needs to change in Formula 1?
The
blog has illustrated how FIA and F1 have come under increasing public pressure
from CSOs (and beyond) over the human rights impacts of the Bahrain Grand Prix.
Civil society and drivers are increasingly demanding more profound changes in
both organisations. Therefore, to conclude this piece, some basic
recommendations to FIA and F1 are presented as a point to start with, all of
them inspired by the report “For the game. For the world. FIFA and human rights” prepared by John Ruggie at the
request of FIFA.
First
of all, FIA, like FIFA, has to adopt a Human Rights policy. As of today, the FIA statutes only refer to human rights in article 1.2, which
states that “the FIA shall promote the protection of human rights and human
dignity […]”. A future human rights policy shall specify and expand on the
implications of this commitment. It should not only address the internal organisation
of FIA but also consider its business relationship with the FOG. In this
context, the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights and OECD Due Diligence Guidance seem to be the most appropriate frameworks
through which to articulate and implement the policy.
Secondly,
as Ruggie mentions in the report, “even the best human rights policy is no more
than words on paper without the necessary actions and incentives to make it
part of everyday practice”. The Human Rights commitment adopted by the FOG in
2015 is a clear example of this discrepancy between words and deeds. Instead, both
organisations should embed their human rights policies and commitments in their
daily operations. Decision-making, especially those concerning the decision to
host a Grand Prix in a particular country, should be subjected to detailed
human rights impact assessments.
Lastly,
once these actions have been adopted, it is necessary to adopt mechanisms to
monitor their effects and effectiveness. Without it, the policies will not cover the
new challenges and will not adapt to the changing circumstances of the
countries hosting a Grand Prix.
For
all of the above reasons, both FIA and the FOG must stop ignoring the CSOs
working in Bahrain and the rest of the community demanding a change. All
stakeholders must work for the common good: the protection of human rights.