The Headlines

Human rights and sport  

Caster Semenya

Human rights issues are taking the headlines in the sporting world at present. A short time ago, Caster Semenya’s appeal at the Swiss Federal Tribunal against the CAS decision was dismissed, perhaps raising more questions than answering them. Within the last few days however, the message from the Semenya camp has been that this is not over (see here).  See the contributions from a range of authors at Asser International Sports Law Blog for a comprehensive analysis of the Semenya case(s) to date.

Navid Afkari

As the sporting world heard of the execution of Iranian Wrestler Navid Afkari, a multitude of legal and ethical questions bubbled to the surface. Not least of all and not a new question: what is the responsibility of sport and the governing bodies therein, in the space of human rights?  And, if an athlete is to acquire a high profile through sporting excellence, does that render athletes vulnerable to be made an example of and therefore in need of greater protection than is currently afforded to them? There are differing views on how to proceed. Consider the following from the World Players Association (Navid Afkari: How sport must respond) and that from the IOC (IOC Statement on the execution of wrestler Navid Afkari) which shows no indication through this press releases and other commentary, of undertaking the measures demanded by World Players Association and other socially active organisations. (See also, Benjamin Weinthal - Olympics refuses to discuss Iranian regime’s murder of wrestler).

Yelena Leuchanka

As this is written and relevant to the above, Yelena Leuchanka is behind bars for her participation in protests, resulting in several sporting bodies calling for her immediate release and for reform in the sporting world around how it ought to deal with these issues. As a member of the “Belarus women's national basketball team, a former player at several WNBA clubs in the United States and a two-time Olympian”, Leuchanka has quite the profile and it is alleged that she is being made an example of. (see here)

Uighur Muslims and Beijing Winter Olympics

British Foreign Secretary, Dominic Raab does not rule out Winter Olympics boycott over Uighur Muslims. ‘The foreign secretary said it was his "instinct to separate sport from diplomacy and politics" but that there "comes a point where that might not be possible".’ Though Raab’s comments are fresh, this issue is shaping as a “watch this space” scenario, as other governments might echo a similar sentiment as a result of mounting pressure from human rights activist groups and similar, in lead up to the Winter Games.

Major International Sports Law Decisions

CAS Decisions (September)

• CAS 2017/A/5444 Olga Zaytseva v. International Olympic Committee (IOC)
• CAS 2017/A/5435 Yana Romanova v. International Olympic Committee (IOC)
• CAS 2017/A/5434 Olga Vilukhina v. International Olympic Committee (IOC)
• CAS 2019/A/6483 Wydad Athletic Club v. Confédération Africaine de Football (CAF) & Espérance Sportive de Tunis

Official Documents and Press Releases

CAS

• Decisions rendered by the CAS in the appeal arbitrations between Russian athletes Olga Vilukhina, Yana Romanova and Olga Zaytseva, and the IOC
•  CAS dismisses the appeal of Wydad Athletic Club
• CAS decides that the International Surfing Association shall be the International Federation governing and administrating the sport of Stand-Up Paddleboard at Olympic level
•  CAS finds Ibai Salas Zorrozua guilty of an anti-doping rule violation; imposes four-year period of ineligibility
•  CAS dismisses the appeal filed by the UAE Football Association

FIFA

•  FIFA publishes first-ever manual on third-party influence and ownership
•  Manual on “TPI” and “TPO” in football agreements
• FIFA publishes first reports for Disciplinary & Ethics Committees and on anti-doping activities
• DISCIPLINARY & ETHICS REPORT 2019/20
• ANTI–DOPING REPORT 2019/20
• FIFA publishes its Guide to Submitting a Minor Application
•  PROTECTION OF MINORS Guide to submitting a Minor Application SEPTEMBER 2020 EDITION
• Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players October 2020 Edition (including COVID-19 temporary amendments)
• Post FIFA Congress press conference
• FIFA President meets US President and US Attorney General
• FIFA COVID-19 Relief Plan helps restart Thai league
• UNODC, FIFA partner to kick out corruption and foster youth development through football
• Normalisation committee appointed for Venezuelan Football Association
• FIFA suspends the Trinidad and Tobago Football Association

FIFPro

• Fake contracts with Turkish clubs

IOC

• IOC Executive Board meeting – Information for the media
• IOC and Tokyo 2020 agree on measures to deliver Games fit for a post-corona world

UEFA

• UEFA allows return of fans at maximum 30% of capacity pending approval of local authorities
• The Executive Committee approved special rules for the group stage of the UEFA Champions League and UEFA Europa League with regard to the organisation of matches in the light of Covid-19.
• 2020/21 UEFA Women’s Champions League, competition regulations revised accordingly and special rules have been introduced, in case of both travel restrictions and positive Covid-19 tests.

WADA

• WADA publishes new Guidelines for Education
• WADA welcomes decision of French court in Diack case
• WADA to boost investigations capabilities with new compliance team
• WADA publishes revised Technical Letter TL22: Ethylmorphine
• WADA issues revised 2021 International Standard for the Protection of Privacy and Personal Information
• WADA publishes redesigned, more athlete-friendly, 2021 Prohibited List
• WADA issues 2021 International Standard for Laboratories
• WADA launches stakeholder consultation regarding 2021 Technical Documents

ITF

• TENNIS GOVERNING BODIES STATEMENT: PLAYER REPRESENTATION

World Athletics

• World Athletics Council extends deadline for RusAF’s reinstatement plan
• World Athletics statement on today's Paris Criminal Court ruling
• World Athletics welcomes Swiss Federal Tribunal decision on its Eligibility Rules for Athletes with Differences of Sex Development (DSD)
•  World Athletics publishes Annual Report

Other Civil Society Organizations/Unions

• World Players responds to WADA’s new rules for substances of abuse: urgent action required
• EU Athletes report - Covid-19 impact on players and their player associations
• Full report - Preliminary Research on the impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Players and their Player Associations European Elite Athletes Association
• EU Athletes supports Belarusian athletes and calls for the release of Yelena Leuchanka

In the News

Cricket

• CSA may consider criminal case against Thabang Moroe after damning findings - Cricket South Africa (CSA) has finally released a summary of the Fundudzi Report which revealed serious allegations of mismanagement by former chief executive Thabang Moroe.

Doping

• U.S. Cycling Athlete Jeff Martin Accepts Sanction for Anti-Doping Rule Violation
• U.S. Weightlifting Athlete Morgan Millican Accepts Sanction for Anti-Doping Rule Violation
•  Liam Morgan - Kenyan President troubled by doping cases among country's athletes
• Sean Ingle - Former Team Sky doctor destroyed laptop before handing it to experts, tribunal told

• French Open 2020: Alleged match-fixing investigated in women's doubles match

Academic Materials

International Sports Law Journal

• Shaun Star & Sarah Kelly - A level playing field in anti-doping disputes? The need to scrutinize procedural fairness at first instance hearings
• Cedrick Aghey - Integration of eSports in the structure of Ifs: disruption or continuity?
• Jacob Kornbeck - What can sports governing bodies do to comply with EU antitrust rules while maintaining territorial exclusivity?

Blog

Asser International Sports Law Blog

• SFT rejects Semenya appeal: nothing changes - By Andy Brown
• The Semenya Decision of the Swiss Federal Tribunal: Human Rights on the Bench - By Faraz Shahlaei
• The SFT’s Semenya Decision under European human rights standards: Conflicting considerations and why a recourse could be successful at Strasbourg - By Kevin Gerenni
• Selected procedural issues –and questions– arising out the Caster Semenya Judgment of the Swiss Federal Tribunal - By Despina Mavromati
• Caster Semenya Case Exposes Design Flaws in International Sports Governance - By Roger Pielke Jr.
• Caster Semenya at the SFT – in 10 points - By Jack Anderson
• Chronicle of a Defeat Foretold: Dissecting the Swiss Federal Tribunal’s Semenya Decision - By Marjolaine Viret
• New Transnational Sports Law Articles Released on SSRN - Antoine Duval

 Law in Sport

• WADA v. Sun Yang & FINA: Reflections of a Chinese lawyer & lessons for sports in China
• Freedom of speech vs. employment obligations in Germany – the cases of Joshiko Saibou & Jadon Sancho
• Cheating in esports: a review of ESIC’s "coach spectator bug" decision
• How rugby union is responding to Covid-19: a legal update
• Is there trouble on the horizon for algorithms in sport?
• What does The Singapore Convention mean for the future of international sports mediation?

Play the Game

• Athletes’ gestures are protected by international human rights law
• The same clubs dominate Champions League despite the corona pandemic: CL Diversity Index 2020/21
• Athletes should not be gagged in exchange for Olympic dream
• Australian football executives sue FIFA whistleblower

Sport and EU Blog

• The Professional Tennis Players Association: a vehicle for improvement in governance standard

Sport Integrity Initiative

• Six tennis players involved in fixed matches
• Fiji footballers set to appeal doping bans
• Sports Integrity Briefs – 1 October 

SportLegis

• Lack of legal interest worthy of protection in case of a sporting competition that already took place
• A letter of appointment of a sole arbitrator is not a decision that can be appealed directly to the Swiss Federal Tribunal
•  Questions of standing to be sued and alleged violation of procedural public policy
• Partial annulment of a CAS award due to violation of the party’s right to be heard

Podcasts

LawInSport

• Ricky Volante, Chief Executive Officer at the Professional Collegiate League - E95
• #Justice4Navid - How should sport respond? – E94
• Moving from exclusive to inclusive models of sport - Takuya Yamazaki - E93

The Forward Line

• EPISODE 27: TFL TACKLES Broadcast Wars, the Big 10 Conference & Conor McKenna's Retirement
• EPISODE 25: TFL TACKLES the Pink Mercedes, Free the Flag & the Tour of Poland

Editor’s note: Rhys Lenarduzzi is a final semester Bachelor of Law (LL.B) and Bachelor of Philosophy (B.Phil.) student, at the University of Notre Dame, Sydney, Australia. As a former professional athlete, then international sports agent and consultant, Rhys is interested in international sports law, policy and ethics. He is currently undertaking an internship at the T.M.C. Asser Institute with a focus on Transnational Sports Law.

In 2019, training compensation and solidarity contributions based on FIFA’s Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (RSTP) amounted to US$ 75,5 million. This transfer of wealth from the clubs in the core of the football hierarchy to the clubs where the professional players originated is a peculiar arrangement unknown in other global industries. Beyond briefly pointing out or reminding the reader of how these systems work and the history behind them, this blog series aims to revisit the justifications for FIFA-imposed training compensation and the solidarity mechanism, assess their efficacy and effects through a case study of their operation in the African context, and finally analyse the potential impact of upcoming reforms of the FIFA RSTP in this context.

First, it is important to go back to the roots of this, arguably, strange practice. The current transfer system and the legal mechanisms constituting it were largely the result of a complex negotiation between European football’s main stakeholders and the European Commission dating back to 2001. The conclusion of these negotiations led to a new regulatory system enshrined in Article 20 and Annex 4 of the RSTP in the case of training compensation, and at Article 21 and Annex 5 in the case of the solidarity mechanism. Before paying some attention to the historical influences and how we arrived at these changes, as well as the justifications from the relevant bodies for their existence, let us briefly recall what training compensation and the solidarity mechanisms actually are.

1.     FIFA’s training compensation and solidarity mechanism: A very short introduction

Training compensation is the obligation of an acquiring/buying/signing/new club to compensate the training clubs of a player. A training club is considered to be the clubs of the player between the ages of 12 and 21, though the obligation to compensate continues if either of the following two instances take place, up until the season of a player’s 23^rd birthday:  i) “[A] player is registered for the first time as a professional” or,  ii) “a professional is transferred between clubs of two different associations…”. The obligation does not arise if a former club terminates a player’s contract without just cause, when a professional reacquires amateur status in moving clubs, or when a player transfers to a category 4 club. Regarding the categories, this is important because the amounts owed to a training club hinge on where clubs fall within four categories (For more on the four categories see HERE).

There are some regulatory differences between the EU/EEA and the rest of the football world. A significant distinction is that without sufficient justification that it is worthy of compensation, a former club will not be owed by a “new club”[1] if they have not offered a contract of equivalent value to the player in question.[2]

The Solidarity mechanism provisions stipulate that when a player moves to a new club, mid contract, for a fee agreed between the new club and former club, then 5% of that fee is designated as a solidarity contribution, and each of the player’s training clubs will receive a portion. The apportionment varies depending on what age the player was registered with the training club (further information on apportionment can be found HERE). This obligation arises when a player is transferred definitively or on loan, between clubs from different associations, as well as when a transfer takes place within the same association, but a training club of the player is affiliated to another association.

For both training compensation and the solidarity mechanism, the regulations provide that the national association will instead receive the money when the club owed “has in the meantime ceased to participate in organised football and/ or no longer exists”.[3] In cases as such, the compensation is to be used for youth football development.

Disputes can arise when the new club does not pay on time or at all, or if there is a disagreement on the amount owed, as well as when a new club attempts to make the case that a player has already terminated his training period prior to age of 21. Given the above explanation of the systems is brief, further detail may be found within the relevant articles and annexes (see HERE for the full regulations).

2.     A brief history: From the ‘retain and transfer system’ to the FIFA RSTP 2001

Much of the current framework is the product of various events surrounding the birth of the regulations in 2001, though the ideas and concepts it captures go way back beyond this time. The English Football League’s registration system that would go on to be touted as the ‘retain and transfer system’ dates back to at least 1893.[4] Both this system and the American Baseball ‘reserve rule’ system are often mentioned in the same breath. As Sloane pointed out in 1969: “The justification for the reserve rule and the retain and transfer system lies in their alleged function in bringing about a more or less equal distribution of playing talent between clubs, whilst, their advocates argue, free competition would lead to a concentration of 'star' players into a few rich clubs.”[5]  Both systems were the target of an array of challenges over the years, though up until ‘free agency’[6] in the case of American Baseball (much earlier) and Bosman[7] in football, each system remained largely the same in existence and justification.[8] To further emphasise that the issues recognised, and in turn the ideas and justifications pertinent to the current system are hardly new, the Chester Report of 1969 on the situation regarding employment and transfers in football in England had striking similarities to much of what was raised within the European-level negotiations that lead to the changes in 2001.[9]

With the momentous Bosman case in 1995, the previously commonplace practice of an out of contract player being retained and unable to transfer (regardless of that player’s preferences) was found contrary to EU law. Importantly for the subject of this blog, the court also recognised that “encouraging the recruitment and training of young players must be accepted as legitimate”[10] aim, on the basis of which the free movement rights of players could in principle be restricted. Thus, leaving an opening for a regulatory system that would support the “recruitment and training of young players”[11] and restrict free movement in a proportionate way.

In 1998, the European Commission decided to open an investigation against FIFA based on competition law concerns linked to its then applicable RSTP.  This decision brought FIFA, UEFA and FIFPro to the European Commission’s negotiating table to hammer out a compromise that would satisfy their divergent interests and be compatible with the EU’s antitrust rules. The regulations as they now stand, aside from some minor amendments, reflect the outcome of those negotiations. The final press release of the European Commission concluded that FIFA’s new regulations would have to reflect a set of principles in order to be deemed compatible with EU competition law. In particular it accepted that:

• in the case of players aged under 23, a system of training compensation should be in place to encourage and reward the training effort of clubs, in particular small clubs;
• creation of solidarity mechanisms that would redistribute a significant proportion of income to clubs involved in the training and education of a player, including amateur clubs; 

These are in fact quite faithfully transposed in the FIFA RSTP provisions discussed above. Since then, the Bernard[12] ruling of the CJEU further clarified that the societal significance of sport, rendered the incentivisation of training legitimate. In its ruling, the court specified that in order to comply with EU law, a training compensation system ‘must be actually capable of attaining that objective and be proportionate to it, taking due account of the costs borne by the clubs in training both future professional players and those who will never play professionally’.^[13] This remains the main benchmark that any FIFA training compensation system must meet in order to comply with EU law.

As we have shown in this section, the shape of the current FIFA training compensation system and solidarity mechanism are very much a direct result of the EU’s interventionism in the regulation of football in the aftermath of the Bosman case. In doing so, the EU institutions also recognised that the idea of redistributing funds to compensate the costs incurred by the training club in instructing a player is a legitimate one.

3.     Justifying redistribution: Sharing the costs of training

Why do football institutions want this system in place and how was it justified? As was alluded to above, these ideas are not new ideas and are rooted in tradition.[14] Football and its intricacies have been deemed in need of protection for a long time, at least from within. More importantly for this blog, there is a desire for wealth to be redistributed in the form of compensation to the training clubs, to manufacture solidarity between the different levels of football and to incentivise goals such as training, education and development. This justification for FIFA’s redistributive systems is largely connected to the recognition that sport is important for the social fabric, and that incentivising development and training clubs goes beyond football and has societal benefits.

These objectives are reflected in the compromise agreed between FIFA and the EC in 2001. The latter’s press release emphasised that training compensation was “to encourage and reward the training effort of clubs, in particular small clubs“. Similarly, FIFA stated in Circular no. 769; “This system is designed to encourage more and better training of young football players, and to create solidarity among clubs, by awarding financial compensation to clubs which have invested in training young players.” Thus, it is clear that both the football authorities and the EU institutions recognise that the core aim of the FIFA’s training compensation and (though less obviously) its solidarity mechanism are to support the recruitment and training of young professional footballers. In fact, the CJEU’s advocate general in Bernard later recognised that training compensation rules “ensure that clubs are not discouraged from recruitment and training by the prospect of seeing their investment in training applied to the benefit of some other club, with no compensation for themselves”.[15] She went on to emphasise that “there is a broad public consensus that the training and recruitment of young players should be encouraged rather than discouraged”.[16]

At the heart of these rationalisations lies the core belief that failing to compensate the club that has helped a young player grow into a professional player is unfair and would discourage the club’s future effort to train players. Whether a training compensation system is necessary to attain such an objective is, however, far from evident. As was pointed out by advocate general Lenz in the Bosman case, such objectives could as well “be attained by a system of redistribution of a proportion of income, without the players' right to freedom of movement having to be restricted for that purpose“.[17] Nevertheless, the idea of redistribution between clubs remains the fundamental policy objective that underpins both FIFA’s training compensation system and solidarity mechanism.

Concluding remarks and subsequent blogs

This blog has highlighted that FIFA’s training compensation system and solidarity mechanism were introduced, after lengthy discussions with the European Commission and relevant stakeholders, in order to create a solidarity and redistributive relationship between the club where a player was trained and the club were a player pursues his professional career. The core justification behind them is that the training clubs provide an important educational service and that their work would be discouraged if they would not be enjoying some economic returns on their investment (in time and resources) to train players that go on to play professionally for a bigger/richer club.

While this objective is certainly respectable, there are, however, questions that remain regarding the adequacy and necessity of these systems to effectively redistribute funds between clubs. First, one should always keep in mind that training compensations are restricting the players’ freedom to move between clubs. Second, as we will see in the coming blog focusing on African players and clubs, it is questionable whether the current FIFA rules are in practice achieving their main redistributive function. Third, if these mechanisms are necessary to encourage training, it is as well remarkable that they are not also introduced in the context of women professional football, as will be discussed in our third blog. Finally, my last blog will assess how the coming changes to FIFA’s RSTP will affect the structure and operation of both the training compensation system and the solidarity mechanism.

[1] “New club” is the language used in the RSTP.

[2] “[I]n writing via registered post at least 60 days before the expiry of his current contract” per RSTP Annex 4 (6) ‘Special provisions for the EU/EEA’.

[3] RSTP - Annex 4 (3) 3; Annex 5 (2) 3.

[4] Sloane, P. J. (1969), The labour market in professional football, British Journal of Industrial Relations, 7, 181-199.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Established from the decision in Curt Flood v. Bowie Kuhn, et al. 407 U.S. 258.

[7] Case C-415/93 Union Royale Belge des Socie´te´s de Football Association and others v. Bosman and others, ECLI: EU: C:1995:463

[8] Gerrard, B. (2002), The Muscle drain, Coubertobin-Type Taxes and the International Transfer System in Association Football,  European Sport Management Quarterly at 50 – “High Court in England ruled in 1963 that the retain-and transfer system was a restraint of trade. This led to a progressive relaxation of the transfer system with players being given more freedom to move between teams at the end of their contracts while transfer fees remained payable”.

[9] Per Sloane (1969) – “Contracts should have a terminable date and be renewable only on the consent of both parties… The committee did, however, suggest that a special levy should be imposed by the Football League on transfer fees, in addition to the present arrangement and graded according to the size of fee at a progressive rate. This levy could be returned to clubs for the purpose of ground improvements and would thereby tend to offset the tax advantage which clubs derive by signing players, since such payments, unlike the cost of ground improvements, are tax allowable.

[10] Bosman, para 106.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Case C-325/08 Olympique Lyonnais SASP v Olivier Bernard and Newcastle UFC, ECLI: EU: C:2010:143

[13] Ibid para 45.

[14] Pearson, G. Sporting Justifications under EU Free Movement and Competition Law: The Case of the Football ‘Transfer System’, European Law Journal, Vol. 21, No. 2, (March 2015) pp. 222.

[15] Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in CJEU case C-325/08 Olympique Lyonnais SASP v Olivier Bernard and Newcastle UFC, para 46.

[16] Ibid para 47.

[17] Opinion of Advocate General Lenz CJEU case C-415/93 Union Royale Belge des Socie´te´s de Football Association and others v. Bosman and others, para 239.

The editor’s note:

Two weeks ago we received the unpublished CAS award rendered in the Eskişehirspor case and decided to comment on it. In this post Thalia Diathesopoulou (Intern at the ASSER International Sports Law Centre) analyses the legal steps followed and interpretations adopted by CAS panels in this case and in a series of other Turkish match-fixing cases. The first part of the post will deal with the question of the legal nature of the ineligibility decision opposed by UEFA to clubs involved in one way or another into match-fixing and with the personal and material scope of UEFA’s rule on which this ineligibility is based. The second part is dedicated to the procedural rules applied in match-fixing cases.

Introduction

The unpredictability of the outcome is a sine qua non feature of sports. It is this inherent uncertainty that draws the line between sports and entertainment and triggers the interest of spectators, broadcasters and sponsors. Thus, match-fixing by jeopardising the integrity and unpredictability of sporting outcomes has been described, along with doping, as one of the major threats to modern sport.[1] 

It does not come as a surprise, therefore, that the fight against match-fixing has been elevated over the past years to a general interest issue, being also included in European Commission’s Agenda on sports as a priority. The urge to protect the integrity of sport, has stimulated the adoption by sports-governing bodies, and especially UEFA and FIFA, of regulations specifically intended to combat match-fixing. The evolution of UEFA Disciplinary Regulations (UEFA DR) in the last 10 years has been remarkable: it follows a path from a broad capture of match-fixing conduct by reference to the general values of loyalty, integrity and sportsmanship[2] in the 2004 version, to the explicit - first ever- reference to the offence of match-fixing in the revised 2013 edition.[3]

In this context, the CAS has been called to implement these rules in a series of match-fixing cases. Especially Turkey’s unprecedented match-fixing scandal in 2011 led to a series of important CAS awards tackling match-fixing. The latest episode of this Turkish series was written on 2 September 2014: following Fenerbahçe and Besiktas, it was Eskişehirspor’s turn to face a CAS ruling on a match-fixing related case.

CAS jurisprudence on match-fixing being in its infancy, the approach of the CAS panels towards procedural, evidentiary and matters of substance in match-fixing disputes is still uncertain. Considering the magnitude of the match-fixing threat and the CAS role as a ‘cartographer’ of the so called lex sportiva, it is worthwhile to monitor the emerging trends of CAS on these integrity-related issues. This blog series will, therefore, use the Turkish cases as a vehicle in order to build a legal roadmap in match-fixing cases and shed light on four issues that have been extensively addressed in recent CAS jurisprudence: the qualification of the legal nature of the measure of ineligibility as a result of a Club’s involvement in match-fixing, the scope of application of this measure, the standard of proof to be applied and, finally, the admissibility of evidence in match-fixing cases

Particularly, two substantial problems that emerged in match-fixing disputes, i.e. the legal qualification of the match-fixing related measure of ineligibility under Article 2.08 of the UEL Regulations as administrative or disciplinary measure (1) and the scope of application of Article 2.08 (2), will constitute the axes of this first blog series. 

The 2011 Turkish match-fixing series in brief

In the summer of 2011, following Turkish’s police investigation into 19 football matches suspected of being fixed, 61 individuals were arrested, including club managers and Turkish national players. Fenerbahçe, Besiktas and Eskişehirspor were connected with match-fixing allegations in domestic tournaments in 2011.

Istanbul giant Fenerbahçe was at the epicentre of this match-fixing scandal, with its Chairman, Aziz Yildirim, being convicted by Istanbul’s 16^th High Criminal Court of establishing and leading a criminal organisation, which rigged four games and offered payments to players or rival clubs to fix three others. Particularly, among other matches, it was found that under the leadership of the then President of Fenerbahçe, match-fixing agreements were made for the matches of Eskişehirspor against Fenerbahçe and Eskişehirspor against Trabzonspor dating from 9 April 2011 and 22 April 2011 respectively. The Eskişehirspor head coach and the player were found guilty for match-fixing in the match with Trabzonspor and were sentenced to imprisonment. Furthermore, the High Criminal Court convicted Besiktas’ Officials of match-fixing activities with regard to the Final Cup played between Besiktas and Istanbul BB on 11 May 2011.

As a result of this alleged match-fixing involvement Fenerbahçe was banned by the Turkish Football Federation (TFF) from participating in the 2011-2012 CL. Later on, the 25 July 2013, Fenerbahçe was found ineligible by the UEFA Appeals Body (UAB) to participate in the next two UEFA club competitions including the 2013/14 UEFA CL, since it could not comply with the UEFA Champions League (UEL) admission requirements. Similarly, Besiktas and Eskişehirspor, in 2013 and 2014 respectively, were considered by the UAB ineligible to participate in the next UEL season, on the grounds of a breach of the UEL admission criteria and particularly of Article 2.08.

A next round of proceedings was brought before the CAS. On 28 and 30 August 2013, the CAS rejected Fenerbahçe’s and Besictas’ appeals.[4] One year later, on 2 September 2014, Eskişehirspor faced the same fate. Interestingly enough, the Eskişehirspor panel was the first CAS panel to deal with the sanction of a club victim of a match-fixing arrangement.

The outcome of the Turkish cases is not necessarily surprising. The CAS practice has been consistently embracing the UEFA zero tolerance policy against match-fixing. However, the legal reasoning followed by CAS to reach a similar outcome differs significantly fostering legal uncertainty in the match-fixing context. At this point, therefore, this blog post will attempt to map the reasoning of the CAS over the following thorny issues which were particularly raised in the Turkish cases: the legal nature of the measure of ineligibility under Article 2.08 of the UEL Regulations (1) and the scope of application of Article 2.08 (2).   

Qualifying Article 2.08 UEL Regulations: administrative measure or disciplinary sanction?

At a first glance, the question of the legal nature of the ineligibility measure of Article 2.08 is rather theoretical, but it also bears important practical implications. The identification of the legal nature of Article 2.08 as administrative or disciplinary determines ‘how this measure shall be applied and under which legal principles’.[5] In other words, the characterization of the measure of Article 2.08 as a disciplinary one may trigger the application of UEFA Disciplinary regulations, including the strict liability principle and the possibility of issuance of a probationary period. Before proceeding with our analysis, it should be pointed out that the Fenerbahçe case, deals with the legal nature of Article 2.05 UEFA Champions League Regulations (UCLR). However, since the wording of Article 2.05 UCLR and Article 2.08 UELR is exactly the same, the panel’s findings are transposable.

When qualifying the legal nature of the ineligibility measure in match-fixing disputes, the Fenerbahçe,Besiktas and Eskişehirspor panels used as a landmark the well-established distinction between administrative acts and disciplinary measures.[6] This is the common point of reference for the three cases, which thereafter differentiates in the interpretation of the ineligibility measure.

In the first case, the Fenerbahçe panel introduced the idea of a ‘two stage process’ in match-fixing disputes: the first stage encompasses an administrative measure, akin to a preliminary minimum sanction, while the second stage is a disciplinary measure, imposing an additional sanction. Thereafter, in a surprising twist the CAS declared the inherent disciplinary nature of the administrative measure of ineligibility, since the subject matter of Article 2.08 is ‘the imposition of a sanction’. According to this panel, the minimum sanction serves the legitimate interest of UEFA to exclude a club from European competitions with immediate effect, while additional sanctions can be imposed if the circumstances so justify. However, this interpretation creates a paradox in that it blurs the lines between acts of administrative and disciplinary nature, a distinction well entrenched in CAS case law.

The Besiktas case adds to the legal uncertainty with regard to the legal nature of the ineligibility measure. According to this panel and contrary to the assessment in the Fenerbahçe case, Article 2.08 UELR does not have a sanctioning character, even if it excludes a club from UEFA competition. This argument is based on the wording of Article 50 (3) UEFA Statutes which, by referring to the ineligibility measure as a measure imposed ‘without prejudice to any possible disciplinary measures’, implicitly excludes its sanctioning nature.

This contradictory interpretation of the ineligibility measure by the previous panels triggered the concerns of the Eskişehirspor panel, which aimed to put an end to the legal uncertainty surrounding the definition of the legal nature of Article 2.08. Therefore, the CAS proceeded for the first time with an extensive analysis of the legal nature of Article 2.08. First of all, the CAS recognized the existence of a double regulatory regime in match-fixing cases: an administrative measure aiming at preventing match-fixing, laid down in Articles 2.05 UCL or 2.07, 2.08 of UEL Regulations and Article 50.3 of the UEFA Statutes 2008, and a disciplinary measure enshrined in the Disciplinary Regulations, specifically at Art 5.2j of the UEFA Disciplinary Regulations (DR) 2008. While this distinction seems to be inspired by the ‘two stage process’ elaborated in the Fenerbahçe case, this panel went a step further by drawing a clear line between measures of administrative and disciplinary character. After having clarified this distinction between measures of different legal nature and effect, the panel concluded that the measure of ineligibility of Article 2.08 is of a purely administrative nature. This assessment is based on an interpretation of Articles 2.09 UEL Regulations and Article 50.3 of the UEFA Statutes 2008 similar to the one adopted in the Besiktas case: both provisions refer to the automatic administrative application of the measure of ineligibility, leaving the door open for potential additional disciplinary measures ‘if the circumstances so justify’. Furthermore, the CAS noted that the administrative measure of Article 2.08 has a broad scope of application encompassing ‘any activity aimed at arranging or influencing the outcome of the match’, as compared to the disciplinary offence which in line with its sanctioning character is more restrictive.

Thereafter, the panel highlighted the consequences to be drawn from this qualification. As a result of the pure administrative nature of Article 2.08, the legal principles usually applicable to disciplinary measures are considered irrelevant. In practice, this means that the CAS excludes the application of: a) Articles 5.2 .j. and 17.1 of UEFA DR about the evaluation of mitigating circumstances when disciplinary measures are imposed; b) Article 6 of UEFA DR imposing a strict liability system; c) Article 11 of UEFA DR about the elimination of the ineligibility measure or the issuance of a probationary period; and finally, d) the ‘nulla poena sine culpa’ principle recognized in criminal law.

This straightforward position of the CAS in the Eskişehirspor case reflects its intention to put a provisory end to the legal uncertainty with regard to the legal nature of Article 2.08 and the legal consequences it entails. Borrowing elements from the previous Turkish cases, the CAS came up with a more sophisticated and coherent interpretation of the legal nature of the ineligibility measure, an interpretation that may serve as a reliable guideline for subsequent arbitral panels dealing with match-fixing. 

The scope of application of Article 2.08 UEL Regulations

Article 2.08 UEL Regulations does not define precisely the activities of a club that is directly or indirectly involvement in match-fixing. In match-fixing disputes, therefore, the CAS has a decisive role in clarifying the scope of application of the ineligibility measure.

As far as the scope ratione materiae is concerned, the Fenerbahçe and Besiktas panels converged in a broad understanding of the scope of Article 2.08. Indeed, based on the ordinary meaning of Article 2.08 which encompasses ‘any activity aimed at arranging or influencing the outcome of a match at a national or international level’ in conjunction with the ratio legis of this provision, which reflects the zero tolerance policy of UEFA against match-fixing, the CAS considered that Article 2.08 targets not only activities directly intending to fix the outcome of a game, but also activities that may have an unlawful influence on it. In this sense, for instance, the fact that Eskişehirspor accepted a bonus from a third party, i.e. Fenerbahçe, for winning, even though it cannot be qualified as match-fixing, is influencing the outcome of the match and, therefore, falls within the scope of Article 2.08. Furthermore, the Besiktas panel offered a broad interpretation of the wording ‘aimed at’ suggesting that not only the act of match-fixing, but also an attempt falls within the broad scope of Article 2.08. Hence, the Turkish cases establish an important finding with regard to the scope of application of the ineligibility measure in match-fixing disputes: a broad interpretation of Article 2.08 is in line with UEFA’s statutory objectives and, therefore, has to be adopted.

On the other hand, with regard to the scope ratione personae of Article 2.08, the CAS panels have been inconsistent. In order to identify whose actions are attributable to the club, the Besiktas panel applied the strict liability principle enshrined in Article 6 of the 2008 UEFA Disciplinary Regulations (DR). Here, the application of UEFA DR seems to be at odds with the previous characterization of Article 2.08 as an administrative measure. By contrast, in the Eskişehirspor case, where the issue whether the actions of a coach, who is a mere employee, can be attributed to the club is raised. In that case, the panel relying on the pure administrative character of Article 2.08, rejected the application of the strict liability principle. The Eskişehirspor panel, insisting on the qualification of the measure of ineligibility as an administrative measure, suggested an entirely different, but equally broad, interpretation of the ratione personae scope of article 2.08. Indeed, it suggests a broad interpretation of the term ‘official’, an interpretation that would capture ‘every board member ….coach, trainer and any other person responsible for technical, (…) as well as other persons obliged to comply with the UEFA Statutes’. In other words, the coach has to be considered as an official in the sense of Article 2.08 and his actions were, thus, attributable to the club.

To conclude, it seems that whatever the interpretative road chosen, the scope of application rationae personae and materiae of article 2.08 will be understood broadly. Nevertheless, it would be more coherent to have such a broad interpretation rely on a stabilized legal practice and the Eskişehirspor award provides an interesting first step in this direction.

The series of Turkish cases has provided the CAS with the opportunity to frame a consistent approach in substantive matters linked to match-fixing cases. In the Eskişehirspor case, the CAS attempts to clarify its approach to match-fixing in football. Two important conclusions can be drawn: the ineligibility measure imposed by Article 2.08 UELR has a broad scope of application and, secondly, it should be qualified as having an administrative nature. As a result, disciplinary rules do not apply to match-fixing disputes involving the eligibility of a club to European competitions. Regarding certain procedural matters, however, disciplinary standards and rules do apply. This is the real Achilles’ heel of the CAS approach in match-fixing cases: how can the application of rules of different nature to substantial and procedural matters in an identical match-fixing dispute be explained? 

(To be continued)

[1] Match-fixing in sport-A mapping of criminal law provisions in EU 27,  (http://ec.europa.eu/sport/library/studies/study-sports-fraud-final-version_en.pdf), 14.

[2] CAS 2009/A/1920 FK Pobeda, Aleksandar Zabrcanec, Nikolce Zdraveski v/ UEFA, para 78.

[3] UEFA Disciplinary Regulations 2013, Article 12 ‘Integrity of matches and competitions and match-fixing’ (http://www.ecaeurope.com/Legal/UEFA%20Documents/2013_0241_Disciplinary%20Regulations%202013.pdf)

[4] CAS 2013/A/3256 Fenerbahçe Spor Kubülü v UEFA & CAS 2013/A/3258 Besiktas Jimnastik Kulübü v. UEFA

[5] CAS 2014/A/3628 Eskişehirspor Kulübü v UEFA, para 98.

[6] CAS 2007/A/1381 & CAS 2008/A/1583

Editor's note: This report compiles the most relevant legal news, events and materials on International and European Sports Law based on the daily coverage provided on our twitter feed @Sportslaw_asser. 

The Headlines

WADA Conference and the Adoption of 2021 WADA Code Amid Calls for Reform

On November 5-7, WADA held its Fifth World Conference on Doping in Sport where it faced a busy schedule, including the adoption of the revised 2021 World Anti-Doping Code and the election of a new WADA President and Vice-President by the Foundation Board. Concerning the latter, Witold Bańka, Poland’s Minister of Sport and Tourism, was elected as WADA President and Yang Yang, a former Chinese speed skater, elected as Vice-President, replacing Sir Craig Reedie and Linda Helleland respectively.  As Helleland leaves her position, she has expressed some strong views on the state of sport governance, particularly that ‘there is an absence of good governance, openness and independence in the highest levels of international sports’. Helleland was not the only one to recently voice governance concerns, as Rob Koehler, Director General of Global Athlete, also called for a ‘wholesale structural change at WADA’, which includes giving ‘independent’ athletes a vote in WADA’s Foundation Board, ensuring a greater ‘separation of powers’ and ensuring greater protection of athletes’ rights.

In the midst of the calls for reform, the amended 2021 WADA Code and the amended International Standards were also adopted after a two year, three stage code review process. Furthermore, a major milestone in athletes’ rights was achieved with the adoption of the Athletes’ Anti-Doping Rights Acts (separate from the WADA Code), which enumerates certain basic rights to help ‘ensure that Athlete rights within anti-doping are clearly set out, accessible, and universally applicable’. On the other hand, the Act ‘is not a legal document’, which clearly circumscribes some of the potential effects the Act may have. Nonetheless, athlete representative groups have ‘cautiously welcomed’ some of the changes brought by the 2021 WADA Code, such as the ‘modified sanctions for substances of abuse violations’.

Sung Yang’s Historical Public Hearing at the CAS

After much anticipation, the second public hearing in CAS history occurred on November 15 in Montreux, Switzerland in the Sun Yang case (details of this case were discussed in August and September’s monthly report), which was livestreamed and can be seen in its totality in four different parts (Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4). This was an extremely unique opportunity, which hopefully will become a more common occurrence, to see just how CAS hearings are conducted and perhaps get a taste of some of the logistical issues that can emerge during live oral hearings. One of these problems, accurate translations, rapidly became apparent as soon as Sun Yang sat in the witness chair to give his opening statements. The translators in the box seemed to struggle to provide an intelligible English interpretation of Sun Yang and other witnesses’ statements, while Sun Yang also seemingly had trouble understanding the translated questions being posed to him. The situation degenerated to such an extent that ultimately one of WADA’s officials was called to replace the translators. However, the translation drama did not end there, since during Sun Yang’s closing statements an almost seemingly random person from the public appeared next to Sun Yang who claimed to have been requested from Sun Yang’s team to ‘facilitate’ the translation. Franco Frattini, president of the panel, questioned the identity of the ‘facilitator’ and explained that one could not just simply appear before the court without notice. Interestingly, Sun Yang’s legal team also rapidly intervened claiming that it had not been made of aware of the inclusion of the supporting translator, further complicating the matter. In the end, Sun Yang concluded his statements with the translation from the WADA official.

While it was Sun Yang’s legal team that had provided the original translators in the box, it still raises the question as to how translation at CAS could be improved to ensure a certain standard of translators. After all, quality translation is critical to the parties’ right to be heard under Article 6 (e) ECHR. Regardless, in the end, neither parties made an objection that their right to be heard was violated.

Russian Doping Saga Continues: WADA Compliance Review Committee Recommends Strong Sanctions

As was already discussed in August and September’s monthly report, WADA uncovered numerous inconsistencies concerning data taken from the Moscow Laboratory. After further investigation, WADA’s Compliance Review Committee has recommended that the Russian Anti-Doping Agency (RUSADA) be found non-compliant with the WADA Code. Accompanying the recommendation, the Compliance Review Committee also suggested several sanctions, which include prohibiting Russian athletes from participating in major events like the Olympic Games and ‘any World Championships organized or sanctioned by any Signatory’ for the next four years unless they may ‘dmonstrate that they are not implicated in any way by the non-compliance’. It would also see an embargo on events hosted in Russia during the same period. However, these sanctions did not go far enough for some, like Travis Tygart, chief executive of USADA, who wishes to prevent a repeat of Rio 2016 and PyeongChang 2018 ‘in which a secretly-managed process permitting Russians to compete – did not work’. On the other hand, the IOC has advocated for a softer, individual based approach that pursues ‘the rules of natural justice and respect human rights’. In the midst of these developments, the Athletics Integrity Unit also decided to charge several members of the Russian Athletics Federation (RusAF), including its President Dmitry Shlyakhtin, after a 15 month investigation for ‘tampering and complicity’ concerning a Russian athlete’s whereabouts violations.

Following many calls for strong consequences, the WADA Executive Committee met on December 9^th and adopted the recommendations of the Compliance Review Committee. Athlete representatives have expressed their disappointment with the sanctions, calling the decision ‘spineless’ since it did not pursue a complete ban on Russian participation at events such as Euro 2020 and the 2020 Olympics. At this point, RUSADA has sent notice to WADA that it will be disputing the decision of WADA’s Executive Committee’s decision at the CAS.

Major International Sports Law Decisions

Court of Arbitration for Sport – Sun Yang Public Hearing Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4

Court of Arbitration for Sport – CAS 2019/A/6110 Liam Cameron v. UK Anti-Doping Limited (UKAD)

Court of Arbitration for Sport – CAS 2018/A/5989 IAAF v. Qatar Athletics Federation & Musaeb Abdulrahman Balla

Official Documents and Press Releases

CAS

• CAS – Manchester City FC v. UEFA: CAS rules that Manchester City’s appeal is inadmissible
• CAS - CAS Public Hearing – WADA v. Sun Yang & FINA - Further Information
• CAS - CAS registers the appeals filed by Dr. Jeffrey Brown and Mr Alberto Salazar
• CAS - CAS confirms the suspension imposed on the Egyptian Weightlifting Federation
• CAS - FC Nantes / Cardiff City FC / Emiliano Sala - Cardiff City Football Club files an appeal at the CAS
• CAS - Chelsea FC v. FIFA: Sanctions reduced by half
• CAS – Procedure WADA v. Sun Yang & FINA: Post-Hearing Update
•  CAS – Bulletin 2019/2

FIFA

• FIFA - FIFA and ASEAN countries sign landmark collaboration agreement
• FIFA - FIFA announces latest disciplinary sanctions for incidents during FIFA World Cup™ qualifying
• FIFA - FIFA to hold second Football Law Annual Review in Buenos Aires
• FIFA - Global spend on intermediary commissions rises to new record high of USD 653 million
• FIFA - FIFA explores commercial options for new club world cup tournament
• FIFA - FIFA welcomes Brussels Court of Appeal ruling on FIFA’s TPO and TPI rules
•  FIFA - FIFA files claims against Joseph Blatter and Michel Platini
• FIFA - Adjudicatory chamber of the independent Ethics Committee sanctions Ariel Alvarado
• FIFA Ethics Committee – Decision concerning Jamal Malinzi
• FIFA - Players’ Status Committee – Decision concerning Emiliano Raul Sala

IOC

• IOC – Statement from the IOC on WADA Recommendations
• IOC - IOC President Announces USD 10 Million “Action Plan” and Calls for Tougher Sanctions Against “Entourage” Members to Strengthen Protection of Clean Athletes
• IOC – IOC EB Announces a USD 5 Million Budget for Long-term Storage of Pre-games Testing Samples
• IOC – IOC Sanctions One Athlete for Failing Anti-doping Tests at London 2012
• IOC - IOC President Stresses Importance of Unity and Solidarity as UN General Assembly Adopts Olympic Truce for Tokyo 2020 by Consensus
• IOC - Statement From the IOC on WADA Recommendations
• IOC - Declaration of the 8th Olympic Summit

WADA

• WADA - WADA Executive Committee takes a number of decisions ahead of fifth World Conference on Doping in Sport
• WADA - WADA update regarding RUSADA Code Compliance
• WADA - WADA suspends accreditation of Bangkok Laboratory
• WADA - WADA’s Compliance Review Committee recommends non-compliance for RUSADA
• WADA - WADA Compliance Review Committee recommends series of strong consequences for RUSADA non-compliance
• WADA - WADA publishes approved 2021 World Anti-Doping Code and International Standards
• WADA - WADA publishes revised International Standard for Testing and Investigations
• WADA - WADA clarifies next steps of the RUSADA Compliance Process
• WADA - WADA launches Stakeholder consultation phase for the 2021 International Standard for Laboratories, version 11.0
• WADA - WADA Executive Committee unanimously endorses four-year period of non-compliance for the Russian Anti-Doping Agency
• WADA - WADA publishes 2021 Model Rules for Code Signatories
• WADA - WADA publishes Anti-Doping Rule Violations report for 2017
• WADA - WADA publishes conclusions of annual audit of Intelligence and Investigations Department
• WADA - WADA publishes 2018 Testing Figures Report
• WADA - WADA receives notice of RUSADA’s dispute of Agency’s Executive Committee decision

Other

• Athletics Integrity Unit - Athletics Integrity Unit Charges Russian Athletics Federation With Obstructing an Investigation and Provisionally Suspends Several Senior Federation Officials for Tampering and Complicity
• Athletics Integrity Unit - Decision of the Athletics Integrity Unit In the Case of Ms Angela Ndungwa Munguti
• Athletics Integrity Unit – Cyrus Rutto Decision
• Athletics Integrity Unit – Abraham Kiptum Decision
• Athletics Integrity Unit – Decision of the Athletics Integrity Unit in the Case of Mr Philip Sanga Kimutai
• Athletics Integrity Unit - Decision of the Athletics Integrity Unit in the Case of Mr Hassan Laqouahi
• Athletics Integrity Unit - Decision of the Athletics Integrity Unit in the Case of Mr Sammy Kitwara
• Athletics Integrity Unit - Decision of the Athletics Integrity Unit in the Case of Mr Belal Ahmed
• Conseil d’État - Le principe d’un plafonnement de la rémunération des sportifs ne pose pas de difficulté au regard de la Constitution
• Fédération Equestre Internationale (FEI) – FEI Tribunal issues Final Decisions
• Fédération Equestre Internationale (FEI) - Prohibited substance cases under FEI anti-doping rules
• Fédération Internationale de Gymnastique (FIG) - Chinese Taipei coach sanctioned by the Disciplinary Commission
• Fédération Internationale de Ski (FIS) - Mainau Environment Forum 2019 outcomes
• Fédération Internationale de Ski (FIS) - IOC and FIS join forces in sports group to protect mountains
• Fédération Internationale de Ski (FIS) – FIS Statement on WADA Executive Committee decision on RUSADA
• FIBA – Basketball Arbitral Tribunal (BAT) : Arbitration Rules (1 December 2019 Version)
• FIFPRO - FIFA and FIFPRO Develop Standards on Management of Personal Player Performance Data
•  Global Athlete - Global Athlete Calls for Wholesale Structural Change at World Anti-Doping Agency
•  Global Athlete - WADA’s Failure to Recommend a Full Russian Ban for Tokyo 2020 Falls Short of What Athletes and the Public Expect
• Human Rights Watch - China: FIFA Broke Own Rules for Club World Cup
• Human Rights Watch - Correspondence with FIFA on China Club World Cup
• Human Rights Watch - Saudi Arabia’s Strategy to ‘Sportswash’ Abuses
• International Biathlon Union - IBU progresses on implementation of Target 26 and governance reforms
• International Canoe Federation - Lipkin banned after positive test 1
• International Skating Union - Decision of ISU Disciplinary Commission - Mr. Salnikov
• International Skating Union - Full Decision of the Disciplinary Commission - Mr. Salnikov
• International Skating Union - Statement - 4 year period of non-compliance for the Russian Anti-Doping Agency
• International Tennis Federation – ITF and Tennis Integrity Supervisory Board Agree Integrity Investment
• International Weightlifting Federation - Open Letter to Weightlifters
• International Weightlifting Federation - CAS decision upholds IMFSP sanction against Egypt
• Tennis Integrity Unit - Albina Khabibulina Provisionally Suspended by Independent Anti-Corruption Hearing Officer
• Tennis Integrity Unit - Ksenia Palkina Provisionally Suspended by Independent Anti-Corruption Hearing Officer
• Tennis Integrity Unit - Tennis Integrity Supervisory Board and International Tennis Federation Agree Plans for Removal of Live Data and Major Integrity Investment in World Tennis Tour
• UEFA – Financial fair play and licensing review
• UEFA – Three clubs sanctioned for breach of FFP regulations
• UEFA - UEFA welcomes Brussels Court of Appeal ruling on third-party player ownership
• UKAD – UKAD v Ryan Martin
• UKAD - UK Anti-Doping work supports case which sees pharma boss who ran “world’s biggest” anabolic steroid distribution network jailed for five years and four months
• UKAD – UKAD Athlete Commission statement calls for strongest sanctions on Russia ahead of WADA ExCo meeting
• UNI Global Union - Time for WADA to study the true human cost of the global anti-doping system
• United World Wrestling - Purevdorj Suspended After Anti-Doping Violation at Asian Games
• USADA - Statement from USADA CEO Travis Tygart on the WADA CRC’s Latest Russia Recommendations
• USADA - AAA Arbitrator Imposes Four-Year Sanction on U.S. Weightlifting Athlete Kiara Akuna for Doping Violation
• USADA - Statement from USADA CEO Travis T. Tygart on the WADA Executive Committee’s Decision on Russia
• World Athletics - International federations discuss consensus on establishing rules for transgender athletes
• World Athletics - IAAF v Sarah Chepchirchir
• World Rugby - RWCL v SRU Disputes Committe Decision - full written decision

In the News

Football

• Andrew Das - U.S. Women’s Soccer Team Granted Class Status in Equal Pay Lawsuit
• Duncan Mackay - Former FIFA secretary general appeals to European Court of Human Rights to have 10-year ban overturned
• James Ellingworth - Ceferin meets Putin as Russia confirmed to host Euro games
• Tariq Panja - Tucked in WADA Rules, a Ticking Bomb for European Soccer
• Tariq Panja - Manchester City Appeal Rejected at CAS
• Tariq Panja - Did FIFA Accidentally Confirm a World Cup Bribery Scandal?
• Tariq Panja - Real Madrid’s President Plots a Way for Richest Clubs to Get Richer
• Tariq Panja - In Offer to Investors, FIFA Angles for Bigger Role in Club Soccer
• Graham Dunbar - Swiss prosecutors quiz PSG president in FIFA bribery case
• Andrew Dampf - Napoli fines contested by world players’ union FIFPro
• Murad Ahmed - CVC in talks to fund new global football tournaments
• David Conn - Liverpool back calls for investigations into migrant worker deaths in Qatar
• Rory Smith - Soccer Is Politics, Whether It Likes It or Not
• Rory Smith - In Premier League, V.A.R. Exposes the Limits of the Laws

Doping

• Richard W. Pound - Here’s to 20 years of fighting doping in sports – and to as many more as we need
• Tariq Panja - WADA Committee Recommends Russia Face New Olympic Ban
• Tariq Panja - Inside Russia’s Failed Doping Cover-Up
• Tariq Panja - Russian Doping Blurs Innocence and Guilt, With Olympics Caught in Middle
• Akaash Maharaj - Will WADA live up to the ideals of sport and ban Russia from the Olympics?
• Graham Dunbar - Russia faces next wave of punishment in endless doping saga
• Steve Scott - 'World Anti-Doping Agency is a Russian lapdog,' says one of its former investigators
• Sean Ingle - Athletes condemn ‘spineless’ Wada as Putin considers appeal

Other

• Tariq Panja - A Star Swimmer’s Doping Hearing Gets Lost in Translation
• Dan Roan - Some of Britain's top athletes threaten legal action over sponsorship regulations
• Tom Wigmore - Major sports bodies guilty of 'shocking' lack of women's representation at board level
• Phil Lutton - John Coates says Sun Yang has little to complain about in CAS hearing
• Stephen Wade - IOC’s Bach asked to intervene in Tokyo Olympic labor dispute
• Graham Dunbar - Human rights experts debate risks and gains for FIFA, IOC
• Sean Ingle - Too many heads remain in the sand when it comes to hosting of sport
• Craig Lord - European Commission competition authority Says Olympic Charter Must Change To Grant All European Athletes Their Rights
• David Wharton - 2020 Tokyo Olympics could cost Japan more than $26 billion

Academic Materials

International Sports Law Journal

• Margareta Baddeley - The extraordinary autonomy of sports bodies under Swiss law: lessons to be drawn

• Johan Lindholm - Who tweets about sports law?
• Florian Kirschner - Breakthrough or much ado about nothing? FIFA’s new bidding process in the light of best practice examples of human rights assessments under UNGP Framework
• Gregory Ioannidis - Football intermediaries and self-regulation: the need for greater transparency through disciplinary law, sanctioning and qualifying criteria
• Antonio Di Marco - The internal governance of sporting organisations: international convergences on an idea of democracy
• Lloyd Freeburn - The fiction of democracy in FIFA’s governance of football and the case of Football Federation Australia
• Alexander Brown and Roger Baines - The potential exploitation of non-English-speaking players in UK professional football contracts
• Aynur Nuriev - Non-intentional anti-doping rule violations: Does a new trend in evidence provision suffice?
• Marlaina Lemmon - Evening the playing field: women’s sport as a vehicle for human rights
• James Brown - Genetic doping: WADA we do about the future of ‘cheating’ in sport?  

Other

• Marcelo Moriconi and César de Cima - To report, or not to report? From code of silence suppositions within sport to public secrecy realities
• Kirstin Hallmann and others - Match-fixing and legal systems: An analysis of selected legal systems in Europe and worldwide with special emphasis on disciplinary and criminal consequences for corruption in sport and match-fixing
• Carolynne Mason - Rights, Risks and Responsibilities in the Recruitment of Children within the Global Football Industry
• Jonas Visschers, Letizia Paoli & Abhishek Deshpande - Match-fixing: Football referees’ attitudes and experiences
• John T. Holden, Thomas Baker and Marc Edelman - The #E-Too Movement: Fighting Back Against Sexual Harassment in Electronic Sports
• Sahiba Gill, Edouard Adelus and Francisco de Abreu Duarte - Whose Game? FIFA, Corruption and the Challenge of Global Governance
• David Shilbury and Lesley Ferkins - Routledge Handbook of Sport Governance

Blog

Asser International Sports Law Blog

• Thomas Terraz - Is UCI the new ISU? Analysing Velon’s Competition Law Complaint to the European Commission

Law in Sport

• Jack Anderson  - A detailed analysis of the legal arguments in WADA v Sun Yang & FINA - a very public hearing
• Tomás Nolan - What it takes to sponsor Liverpool Football Club (why New Balance failed to match Nike’s offer)
• Toni Roca and Xai Fernández - Why FIFA should reform football's training compensation regulations
• Tom Bruce and Jack Verdan - Bury Beware: lessons on the importance of good governance from Bury F.C.’s football league expulsion
• Ariel Reck - Argentine Football Association and Player´s Union reach agreement on pregnancy rights for players
• Tom Rudkin - WADA v Sun Yang & FINA - The benefits (or otherwise) of a public hearing
• Braham Dabscheck - A second bite of the cherry: reviewing the 2019-2022 wage deal for the Australian Football League Women
• Victoria Brown - The importance of giving clear reasons in sports disciplinary decisions: lessons from the Gerwyn Price decision
• Joseph M. Hanna - NCAA offers a lifeline: college athletes allowed to benefit from name, image and likeness
• Daniel Lust - (Anti)-trust the process: is the NCAA legally permitted to ban schools?
• Carlo Rombola - A short review of the Italian Association of Sport Attorneys' 'Sport and Women' conference in Rome
• Justin Humphries - Brexit means Brexit, but what does it mean for the Premier League and its players?
• Philipp Wehler and Matthias Greulich - Would FIFA’s newly proposed agents’ regulations comply with German & EU law?
• Peter Crowther, Lisa Hatfield and Jake White - Are the British Olympic Association’s new Rule 40 Guidelines still too restrictive?

Play the Game

• Matthias Fett - More – not less – democracy is often better for organising a World Cup

Sports Integrity Initiative

• Steven V. Selthoffer - Sun Yang vs. WADA: What’s really at stake?
• Andy Brown - Tentative RusAF reforms as WADA recommends severe action
• Andy Brown - Sport intervened to make changes to Athletes Anti-Doping Rights Act

SportLegis

• Despina Mavromati - FC A. v. B & Algerian Football Federation – Football contract & jurisdiction of the CAS
• Despina Mavromati - A v. International Athletics Federation (doping) – Interpretation of Art. 38.3 IAAF Rules
• Despina Mavromati - FIFA v. WADA – Lack of a “personal” legal interest to appeal against a CAS Award

Other

• Alex Kelham - Rule 40 – Team GB under fire from Olympians wanting faster pace of change

Podcasts

• The Ticket Podcast  - WADA v Sun Yang
• The Lead - Dope. Cheat. Repeat.
• Law in Sport - Jonathan Taylor QC explains WADA's decision to sanction Russia

Upcoming Events

• 17-18 March 2020 – WADA Annual Symposium, SwissTech Convention Center, Lausanne, Switzerland
• 26-27 March 2020 – 14^th Conference of the PSA Sport & Politics Group, Etihad Stadium, Manchester, UK
• 18-19 June 2020 – Sport & EU 2020 Annual Conference, Rijeka and Opatija, Croatia

Editor's note: This is a call for papers for a workshop inviting sports lawyers and historians to reflect on how the lex olympica developed within the last 128 years through the prism of challenges and disruptions to the Olympic Games and the sharp and incremental changes they provoked.

Background

The lex olympica are legal rules the International Olympic Committee created to govern the Olympic Movement. Since the revival of the Olympic Games in 1896, the lex olympica, with the Olympic Charter taking its central place, has undergone tremendous changes. It has increased not only in volume but also in complexity and reach.

While some changes were designed to give further detail to the Olympic values, others seem to serve as responses to numerous disruptions and challenges that the Olympic Games experienced on their way. History shows that the Olympic Games faced boycotts, apartheid, armed conflicts, wars, propelled commercialisation, corruption, critique based on human rights and sustainability, pandemics, and many other obstacles.

One can see triggers for changes in specific incidents, broader societal changes, external political interests, long-term internal processes, etc., or further differentiate them according to relevant stakeholders impacting the change, such as IOC, NOCs, IFs, NFs, athletes, commercial partners, television, activist groups, NGOs, governments, host countries, etc. Regardless of their taxonomies, all these challenges met different reactions and affected the Olympic regulation in various ways. The IOC chose to distance the Olympic Games from some challenges and fully embrace others.

Keynote speakers

• Jörg Krieger, Associate Professor, Department of Public Health and Sport Science, Aarhus University; co-leader of the Lillehammer Olympic and Paralympic Studies Center; Associate Professor II Inland Norway University of Applied Sciences.

• Mark James,  Professor of Sports Law and Director of Research in the Manchester Law School at Manchester Metropolitan University, Editor-in-Chief of the International Sports Law Journal.

Deadline for abstract submission: 15 June 2024

Confirmation of participation: 30 June 2024

Publication: Selected contributions will be considered for a special issue at International Sports Law Journal

Contact information

Yuliya Chernykh (Associate Professor)

yuliya.chernykh@inn.no

Organizer

Lillehammer Olympic and Paralympic Studies Center (LOSC), Inland School of Business and Social Sciences and Legal development research group at INN University