The Proposed Binding Business and Human Rights Treaty: Introducing the Draft - By Shamistha Selvaratnam

Editor’s note: Shamistha Selvaratnam is a LLM Candidate of the Advanced Masters of European and International Human Rights Law at Leiden University in the Netherlands. Prior to commencing the LLM, she worked as a business and human rights solicitor in Australia where she specialised in promoting business respect for human rights through engagement with policy, law and practice.

By resolution, on 26 June 2014 the UN Human Rights Council adopted Ecuador’s proposal to establish an inter-governmental working group mandated ‘to elaborate an international legally binding instrument to regulate, in international human rights law, the activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises’. The proposal was adopted by 20 to 14 votes, with 13 abstentions, and four years later, in July this year, the working group published the first draft of the treaty (from herein referred to as the ‘treaty’). Shortly after, the draft Optional Protocol to the draft treaty was released. The Optional Protocol focuses on access to remedy for victims of human rights abuses by businesses.

This first blog of a series of articles dedicated to the proposed BHR Treaty provides an overview of the main elements of the draft. It will be followed by a review of the reactions to the Draft, and a final piece outlining some recommendations for the upcoming negotiations.

Key Provisions of the Treaty

Preamble (Treaty, Article 1)

The preamble of the treaty makes it clear that it is the primary responsibility of the States to ‘promote, respect and fulfill human rights and fundamental freedoms’, including human rights abuses committed by businesses. Accordingly, the treaty seeks to indirectly impose obligations on businesses by calling on State Parties to adopt legislation that is consistent with the treaty requirements.

Purpose (Treaty, Article 2)

The purpose of the treaty is to ‘strengthen the respect, promotion, protection and fulfillment of human rights’ and to ‘ensure effective access to justice and remedy to victims of human rights violations’ in the context of business activities of transnational character, and to ‘advance international cooperation’ so that States fulfill their obligations under international human rights law.

Scope and jurisdiction (Treaty, Articles 3 to 5)

The treaty will apply to ‘human rights violations in the context of any business activities of a transnational character’. ‘Business activities of a transnational character’ is defined to mean ‘any for-profit economic activity … undertaken by a natural or legal person … that take place or involve actions, persons or impact in two or more natural jurisdictions’. Accordingly, unlike the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, the treaty does not apply to and bind businesses that only have domestic activities.

Jurisdiction for acts or omissions arising under the treaty vests in the court of the State where the acts or omissions occurred or where the alleged perpetrator (whether a natural or legal person) is domiciled. The alleged person is considered to be domiciled at the place where it has its: ‘(a) statutory seat; (b) central administration; (c) substantial business interest; or (d) subsidiary, agency, instrumentality, branch, representative office or the like.’

Rights of victims (Treaty, Article 8)

‘Victims’ are defined to mean persons who individually or collectively alleged to have suffered harm, including physical or mental injury. The treaty recognises that victims have the right to ‘fair, effective and prompt access to justice and remedies in accordance with international law’, including restitution, compensation and environmental remediation. It also imposes a number of obligations on State Parties to the treaty, namely, State Parties must:

  • Guarantee the rights of victims to present claims to their court.
  • Investigate all human rights violations effectively, promptly, thoroughly and impartially and take action against alleged perpetrators.
  • Ensure their laws do not unduly limit the right of victims to appropriate access to information relevant to the pursuit of remedies.
  • Provide proper and effective legal assistance to victims throughout the legal process (for example, by informing victims of their procedural rights).
  • Assist victims in overcoming financial barriers to commencing proceedings.
  • Establish an International Fund for Victims to provide legal and financial aid to victims.
  • Provide effective mechanisms for the enforcement of remedies.
  • Protect victims, their representatives, families and witnesses from unlawful interference with their privacy, and from intimidation and retaliation.

The treaty also provides that in no case will victims be required to pay the legal expenses of the other party to a claim.

Human rights due diligence (Treaty, Article 9)

A key article of the treaty requires State Parties to ensure that their domestic legislation requires all businesses to which the treaty applies to undertake due diligence throughout their business activities. The due diligence must take into account ‘the potential impact of human rights resulting from the size, nature, context of and risk associated with the business activities’ (including the activities of its subsidiaries and controlled entities).

The due diligence undertaken by businesses must include:

a)     Preventing human rights violations within the context of its business activities.

b)     Monitoring the human rights impact of its business activities.

c)     Identifying and assessing any actual or potential human rights violations that may arise through its activities.

d)     Reporting publicly and periodically on non-financial matters (for example, environmental and human rights matters).

e)     Undertaking pre and post-environmental and human rights impact assessments covering its activities.

f)      Reflecting the requirements set out in a) to e) above in its contractual relationships.

g)     Carrying out ‘meaningful consultations with groups whose human rights are potentially affected by the business activities and other relevant stakeholders’.

h)     Establishing and maintaining financial security, if required.

Failure to comply with the above requirements will result in commensurate liability and compensation. However, the treaty provides that State Parties can exempt certain small and medium-sized businesses from selected due diligence obligations to avoid imposing undue administrative burdens on those businesses.

Legal liability (Treaty, Article 10)

The treaty requires State Parties to ensure that both natural and legal persons can be held criminally, civilly or administratively liable for human rights violations undertaken in the context of business activities through their domestic law.

The treaty also sets out the principles for civil and criminal liability. With respect to civil liability, businesses to which the treaty applies will be liable for harm caused by human rights violations in the context of their business activities in various circumstances, namely:

a.     to the extent it exercises control over the operations; or

b.     to the extent it exhibits a sufficiently close relation with its subsidiary or entity in its supply chain and where there is strong and direct connection between its conduct and the wrong suffered by the victim; or

c.     to the extent risk have been foreseen or should have been foreseen of human rights violations within its chain of economic activity. 

With respect to criminal liability, States are required to ‘provide measures under domestic law to establish criminal liability for all persons with business activities of a transnational character that intentionally, whether directly or through intermediaries, commit human rights violations that amount to a criminal offence’. Where criminal responsibility is not applicable to legal persons in the legal system of a State Party, that Party must ensure that legal persons are subject to ‘effective, proportionate and dissuasive non-criminal sanctions, including monetary sanctions or other administrative sanctions’.

Mutual legal assistance and international cooperation (Treaty, Articles 11 and 12)

States Parties must ‘cooperate in good faith to enable the implementation of commitments' under the treaty and the fulfilment of the treaty’s purposes. They must afford one another the widest measure of mutual legal assistance in initiating and carrying out investigations, prosecutions and judicial proceedings’. This includes taking evidence from persons, executing searches and seizures and facilitating the freezing and recovery of assets. However, a narrow exception to mutual legal assistance is also provided.

With respect to international cooperation, State Parties must undertake ‘appropriate and effective measures’ to allow for international cooperation among the States. This may include sharing experiences, good practices and challenges.

Enforcement and remedies (Treaty, Article 14; Optional Protocol, Articles 1, 3 to 8, 10 and 11)

The treaty does not contemplate any international enforcement or complaint mechanism. Instead, it establishes a monitoring and oversight mechanism – a Committee of experts. The Committee will perform a number of functions including making general comments on the treaty, considering and providing concluding observations and recommendations on reports submitted by State Parties and providing support to State Parties in order to allow for the implementation of the treaty.

In contrast, State Parties that ratify the Optional Protocol recognise ‘the competence of the Committee … to receive and consider communications from or on behalf of individuals or groups of individuals’. If the Committee receives a communication, it must bring it to the attention of the State Party concern and the involved person conducting business activities who can then submit written explanations or statements clarifying the matter and the remedy within six months. The Committee can then designate its members to carry out a confidential inquiry into the matter and report to the Committee urgently. The findings of the inquiry will then be provided to the State Party and the involved person conducting business activities, together with comments and suggestions.

Further, pursuant to the Optional Protocol, State Parties are required to establish a National Implementation Mechanism (NIM) ‘to promote compliance with, monitor and implement’ the treaty within two years. The functions of the NIM are to: (a) make the treaty content known to the general public, business and victims; (b) cooperation with other national institutions, foreign NIMs and civil society organisations ‘to raise awareness on the implementation’ of the treaty; and (c) make recommendations to a State Party’s competent authorities.

As such, NIMs will have the power to:

  • request necessary information from a State Party in relation to the implementation of the treaty, including financial and non-financial information. It also has the power to request information from other State Parties;
  • conduct reviews on the implementation of a State Party’s due diligence obligations when requested by ‘victims, natural or legal persons conducting business activities of a transnational character or all other persons with a legitimate interest’, or where the NIM deems it necessary;
  • where non-compliance is identified, provide recommendations to natural or legal persons conducting business activities in order for it ‘to bring its operation into compliance, [or] inform the competent authorities about such conduct or omission’;
  • receive, consider and investigate complaints of human rights violations alleged to have been committed by natural or legal persons conducting business activities brought by victims or a group of victims, their representatives or other interested parties’, and assist parties to reach an amicable settlement; and
  • monitor the compliance of parties that have reached an amicable settlement, and, in the event of any non-compliance, communicate the non-compliance to the Committee of experts, ‘without prejudice to the right to institute appropriate judicial or administrative procedures against the non-complying party.’

Implementation (Treaty, Article 15)

In order to implement the treaty, State Parties are required to, inter alia, ‘take all necessary legislative, administrative or other action’ to ensure the effective implementation of the treaty. The treaty does not elaborate on how State Parties are to do this in practice.

Next Steps

So where to from here? The working group’s next session is scheduled for 15 to 19 October 2018 in Geneva during which it will discuss the treaty and Optional Protocol. While the treaty and Optional Protocol are a step in the right direction to imposing human rights obligations on businesses there are still gaps that it needs to address, which will be explored in the next blog post.

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Doing Business Right Blog | Corporate (Ir)responsibility made in Germany - Part I: The National (In)Action Plan 2016-2020 - By Mercedes Hering

Corporate (Ir)responsibility made in Germany - Part I: The National (In)Action Plan 2016-2020 - By Mercedes Hering

Editor's note: Mercedes is a recent graduate of the LL.B. dual-degree programme English and German Law, which is taught jointly by University College London (UCL) and the University of Cologne. She will sit the German state exam in early 2022. Alongside her studies, she is working as student research assistant at the Institute for International and Foreign Private Law in Cologne. Since September 2020, she joined the Asser Institute as a research intern for the Doing Business Right project.


On the international stage, Germany presents itself as a champion for human rights and the environment. However, as this blog will show, when it comes to holding its own corporations accountable for human rights violations and environmental damage occurring within their global supply chains, it shows quite a different face.

In recent years, German companies were linked to various human rights scandals. The German public debate on corporate accountability kickstarted in earnest in September 2012, when a factory in Karachi, Pakistan, burned down killing almost 300 people. The factory had supplied KiK, Germany’s largest discount textile retailer with cheap garments. Then, over a year and a half ago, a dam broke in Brazil, killing 257 people. The dam had previously been certified to be safe by TÜV Süd Brazil, a subsidiary of TÜV Süd, a German company offering auditing and certification services. There are many more examples of incidents in which German companies were involved in human rights violations occurring within their supply chains, yet eight years after the factory in Pakistan burned down, and nine years after the unanimous endorsement of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights by the UN Human Rights Council, there is still no binding German legislation imposing some type of liability onto companies that knowingly, or at least negligently, fail to uphold human and labor rights in their supply chain.

This is despite the fact that Germany, the third-largest importer worldwide, with its economic power and negotiation strength on the international stage, could have a dramatic impact on business practices if it were to embrace a stronger approach to business and human rights.  

In the coming two blogs I am to take a critical look at Germany’s recent policies related to corporate accountability and discuss the current developments (and roadblocks) linked to the potential adoption of a Lieferkettengesetz (Supply Chain Law). In this first post, I focus on the effects of the National Action Plan 2016-2020, building on recently released interim reports. In my second blog, I will then turn to the various proposals and political discussions for mandatory due diligence regulation (Lieferkettengesetz).

 

National Action Plan 2016-2020

In 2011, the European Commission in its communication paper “A renewed EU strategy 2011-2014 for Corporate Social Responsibility” called on all EU Member States to develop their own national action plans for the implementation of the UN Guiding Principles.

The German Government followed the Commission’s call. In 2013, the following statement was included in the coalition agreement between the CDU (Christian Democratic Union) and the SPD (Social Democratic Party):

“We are working towards the consistent implementation of the National Action Plan for Human Rights and the Economy (NAP), which also includes public procurement. If an effective and comprehensive review of the NAP in 2020 finds that companies’ voluntary commitment is insufficient, we will introduce appropriate legislation at the national level and advocate an EU-wide regulation.” 

After a two-year consultation and drafting process, the Cabinet adopted the National Action Plan implementing the UN Guidelines on Business and Human Rights on 21 December 2016.

The National Action plan rests on four pillars: (1) Germany’s obligation to protect human rights; (2) the Government’s expectations vis à vis the private sector; (3) access to remedies and redress; (4) a monitoring process.

The fourth pillar, the monitoring process, is distinct from the companies’ reporting obligation and goes further than any other European NAPs did. ‘Monitoring’ entails a process in which, from 2018, a third party will review the effectiveness of the NAP by conducting three surveys. It was to provide an objective benchmark and timeframe, that is to serve as basis for the government to decide if it will take further steps towards mandatory regulation.

Nevertheless, NGOs have accused the Government of lacking true commitment. The main criticism of the NAP centers around the hope (or wishful thinking) that companies would implement human rights due diligence regulation voluntarily: the NAP does not include any possibility to impose fines or other sanctions. This is reflected in the NAP’s wording: It merely formulates certain expectations towards businesses. Corporate social responsibility, as envisaged by the NAP, relies on businesses to implement the following voluntary measures: (1) a declaration to respect human rights; (2) a procedure for identifying real and potential negative effects of corporate activity and human rights risks in supply chains; (3) measures to be taken to prevent negative effects and monitoring thereof; (4) reporting; (5)  a complaints mechanism. NGOs did welcome the clear language the Government used to formulate its expectations towards enterprises. However, on certain crucial points the actual content of the companies’ duties is left to their imagination. Examples include that companies should apply an “appropriate standard of care” when respecting human rights; the extent of duties depends on “size and position in supply and value chain” –  with no further details on what this means in practice for multinational groups or medium-sized companies. 

The policy statement is intended to make companies reflect on human rights issues their businesses face with reference to particular human rights frameworks. In the policy statement they should also include the internal processes they utilize to realize human rights due diligence. In order to fulfil this due diligence requirement itself, businesses need to identify risks generated directly by the enterprise itself, or any direct and indirect contractual relationship (e.g. in the case of numerous intermediary dealers). Once this analysis is completed, businesses ought to optimize their processes; proposed measures comprise specialist training, changes in supply chain and participation in sectoral initiatives. These are, however, limited to preventive measures only – identification, prevention and mitigation. There is no mention of any remediation or compensation for those affected. The NAP also includes some important caveats: Businesses must not suffer from a disproportionate bureaucratic burden; financial services between banks or insurance companies are out of its scope of application.

Furthermore, companies are not required to submit reports on their progress to the Government. They are merely required to keep information “at their disposal”. This is regrettable because gathering information could help to identify difficulties companies face when implementing due diligence into their global value and supply chains. Companies are advised to issue reports to demonstrate that they are aware of their human rights impact; and only companies that operate in particular high-risk sectors are advised to issue public reports.

Lastly, there is little to no guidance when it comes to the grievance mechanism companies should set up. The guidelines state that companies must have their own grievance procedures or participate in external (sectoral) procedures. The grievance mechanism should be fair, balanced, and predictable – but apart from the elimination of linguistic or technical barriers, there is no explanation of what such a system might look like. 

The German Institute for Human Rights criticizes that the Government’s NAP fails to capture the realities of global supply and value chains, and even ignores the hurdles individuals face when they try to enforce their rights before German courts. According to the Government, individuals affected enjoy access to the judicial system, remedies and redress. It only deemed necessary to issue a multilingual leaflet containing information on the German court system in order to help potential claimants to navigate the system.

 

Monitoring process and interim reports 

The monitoring process comprises three surveys, followed by three reports. In the first one, stakeholders were consulted to agree on a methodology and assessment criteria for the next two (substantive) surveys.  Just like the National Action Plan, the monitoring process turned out to be a disappointment. From the very beginning of the consultations, lobby groups tried to tailor the monitoring process according to their needs and it seems they succeeded in doing so. In an official letter, obtained by Initiative Lieferkettengesetz in the course of a freedom of information request, Peter Altmaier (Minister for Economic Affairs and Energy, CDU) thanked the International Chamber of Commerce for their input regarding the monitoring process, which, as explicitly stated in the letter, led to the questions and requirements being amended. Companies, which had failed to fill out the form or had left the survey incomplete, were taken out of the statistic. EY, the auditing firm that had been instructed to conduct the survey, first intended to categorize these companies as “non-compliant” with the due diligence standards set out by the NAP. The Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy assured lobby groups (particularly the Federation of German Industries) that the changes to the monitoring process they had demanded were included, and praised the compromise reached.

The methodology and assessment criteria can therefore be described as business-friendly, to say the least. NGOs were very outspoken against the survey methodology adopted by EY. In particular, they criticized the fact that companies that have not yet implemented the guidelines as set out in the NAP are still considered “companies with implementation plan” and even “companies on the right track”. The survey did not consider “non-responders”.

The first quantitative survey was completed on 31 October 2019. In February 2020, its findings were published in the second interim report. Only 465 of 7,285 companies with over 500 employees took part in the survey and only 17-19% of responders had implemented the NAP requirements. Companies performed the worst in assessing potential or existing risks to human rights in their supply chain and in adopting measures to prevent those. When looking at these numbers, it must be borne in mind that business lobby groups were actively involved in drawing up the framework of the survey. Because non-responders were excluded, it is even more disappointing that the numbers stem from companies that arguably are already receptive to the benefits of human rights due diligence. 

After the damning report had been published, business associations suddenly showed strong sentiment against the surveys that previously had been labelled a good “compromise”. They criticized, with the support of government officials from the Ministry of Economic Affairs, the very monitoring process that they had been closely involved in setting up. And pointed out that even though the “comply-or-explain-mechanism” allowed companies to deviate from the requirements set out in the NAP, it still counted them as “compliant” only if they were able to prove the implementation of an equivalent measure. This meant, according to business associations, that there was no margin of error for companies that were not yet fully compliant with the NAP but had taken substantive steps to align their business practices with the government’s guidelines, which were not considered of equivalent nature.

On 2 March 2020, the second and final phase of the quantitative survey began. The final report was presented to the public on 5 October 2020. Even fewer companies responded and roughly 13-17% implemented the NAP requirements. The coalition agreement envisaged the drafting of the Lieferkettengesetz to begin after the final report had been published. The fact that companies are so far below the 50% threshold set out in the coalition agreement shows that human rights due diligence is not in itself a priority for German companies; binding legislation seems needed for them to take it seriously.

Business lobby groups are now playing for time. They first argued that the whole survey period until the end of 2020 must be exhausted; as a precise picture of the situation can only be drawn if companies that plan to implement human rights due diligence towards the end of the year are included. However, in light of the fact that not even 20% of the respondents to the survey have so far implemented the NAP guidelines, it is highly doubtful that we would reach the 50% threshold by the end of the year. The Corona pandemic provided lobby groups with another excuse as businesses pleaded with politicians not to burden them with additional costly regulatory obligations. Actually, it is likely that businesses would oppose any form of binding regulation, irrespective of the outcome of the monitoring process. From the beginning they spoke out strongly against any type of Lieferkettengesetz.

 

Conclusion

In December 2015, Michael Addo, member of the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights, when participating in the last NAP plenary session at the Federal Ministry for Development and International Cooperation, emphasized that the international spotlight was on Germany and its NAP. Its European and international partners were scrutinizing the drafting and implementation process – and rightly so. Germany could have taken the lead with an ambitious NAP, providing mandatory measures to impose human rights due diligence to its companies, but it did not. Germany’s NAP joins the ranks of other European NAPs that have been proven to be of limited impact. As of now, 23 countries have adopted a National Action Plan. All of them rely primarily on voluntary commitments. The companies’ responsibilities are not formulated as “obligations” but as mere moral responsibilities, derived from social expectations. None of them include specific guidelines, concrete enforcement measures or objective parameters to monitor corporate activity.  Even Germany’s independent monitoring process was not able to drive German businesses to implement human rights due diligence throughout their operations and supply chains.

It seems that absent some form of binding legislation, there is no way for effective progress in the realm of business and human rights. That is why civil society (76% of the German public) is putting pressure on Germany’s political class to stop waiting (like Godot) for companies to voluntarily comply with the UN Guiding Principles. Even some companies and investors signed a collective statement in support of binding due diligence legislation. Hence, some form of Lieferkettengesetz will have to be adopted – the only remaining (crucial) questions (for my next blog) are when will it occur and what will it look like.

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