The EU Conflict Minerals Regulation: Challenges for Achieving Mineral Supply Chain Due Diligence - By Daniel Iglesias Márquez

Editor’s note: Daniel Iglesias Márquez is an external researcher in Business and Human Rights at the Tarragona Centre for Environmental Law Studies. He holds a PhD from the Rovira Virgili University in Tarragona (Spain). Other main fields of interest include International Environmental Law, International Criminal Law and European law.


The EU and its Member States have largely endorsed the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs) in their Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) strategy and have committed to supporting their implementation.[i] The UNGPs state that companies have a responsibility to respect human rights wherever they operate. Companies are therefore expected to take proactive steps to ensure that they do not cause or contribute to human rights abuses within their global operations and to respond to human rights abuses when they do occur. This implies establishing due diligence processes to identify, prevent, mitigate and record potential and actual adverse human rights impacts.

Although the EU has not played a constructive role at the Geneva negotiations for a UN Treaty on business and human rights,[ii] some modest developments in the right direction have been made at the EU level to foster a culture of ‘doing business right’ among companies in certain industrial sectors. Put differently, the EU has adopted regulations and directives that implement the UNGPs.

Due diligence requirements are the most common way of ensuring that business behavior meets social expectations. An example of this is the new EU Conflict Minerals Regulation (Regulation),[iii] which requires EU companies to ensure the responsible sourcing of minerals and metals. This EU law has an extraterritorial reach since due diligence requirements must be exercised by a company throughout its international supply chain. However, the Regulation raises a number of challenges ahead that may affect its purpose and implementation.


Conflict Minerals in the EU

In 2013, global trade in so-called 'conflict minerals' such as tin, tantalum, tungsten and gold (3TG) ores, concentrates, and metals was worth in excess of €123 billion.[iv] The EU has become one of the main destinations for these conflict minerals, which end up in products such as phones, computers, cars and jewelry.[v] Member States depend on the importation of mineral raw materials by European companies to sustain their modern-day high-tech societies. At the same time, the extraction of and trade in these minerals have been linked to corporate abuses (including human rights violations and environmental degradation) and have fueled some of the world’s most brutal conflicts in weak or unstable countries such as Colombia, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the Central African Republic (CAR) and Zimbabwe. In Colombia, the mining of tantalum, wolframite, coal and gold, which is controlled and taxed by armed groups, has cost the lives of millions and led to the forced disappearance of millions of others. This situation is also witnessed in the eastern DRC, where trade in tin, tantalum, tungsten and gold has provoked violent conflict in the provinces of North and South Kivu for almost a decade and a half. Similarly, in the CAR the trade in gold and diamonds has financed the conflict between the Seleka and the anti-Balaka.[vi] Although evidence shows that these minerals are associated with conflict, they are still used in products that are traded and sold on the European market.

Against this background, Guiding Principle 7 calls on States to assist businesses that are exposed to a greater risk of involvement in human rights abuses. Such assistance includes passing laws that require businesses to set in place adequate forms of human rights due diligence.


Responsible Mineral Supply Chain Efforts in the EU

In March 2014, the European Commission proposed a regulation to help reduce the financing of armed groups and security forces through mineral proceeds in conflict-affected and high-risk areas. The proposed regulation introduced a voluntary system of self-certification for 300 EU traders, 19 EU smelters/refiners, and over 100 EU manufacturers of components and semi-finished goods based on those minerals and metals. However, it lacked ambition, and the Commission’s non-legally-binding approach predominated in the text.

The proposal was a disappointment for civil society organizations and the European Parliament, which argued that a system of voluntary self-regulation would not be sufficient to convince EU upstream companies to take meaningful steps to improve their supply chain due diligence and demanded a strong mandatory law that would require all EU companies trading in minerals to undertake basic checks on their supply chains.[vii] In 2015 the European Parliament voted for radical amendments aimed at creating binding due diligence requirements on both upstream and downstream companies that bring minerals into the EU.[viii]

In 2016, after months of trilogue negotiations, EU institutions reached a political understanding on a law aligned with other landmark initiatives aimed at ensuring that minerals are sourced responsibly and do not fund conflict or human rights abuses, including the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chain of Minerals from Conflict-Affected Areas and High-Risk Areas (OECD Due Diligence Guidance or OECD Guidance), Resolution 1952 (2010) endorsed by the UN Security Council, section 1502 of the US Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), and various laws passed by several African countries, including the DRC and Rwanda, requiring companies to check their supply chains. The legal text of the EU Conflict Minerals Regulation was adopted and published early in 2017.


Aim, Scope and Obligations of the EU Conflict Minerals Regulation

The EU Conflict Minerals Regulation, which will enter into force on 1 January 2021, aims to ensure that minerals entering the EU do not finance conflict or result in human rights violations. The geographical scope of the EU Regulation is broader than its American counterpart, the Dodd-Frank Act,[ix] and targets imports not only from conflict zones and areas where a risk of armed confrontation exists but also from failed states and areas where widespread and systematic violations of international law, including human rights abuses, occur.[x] However, it excludes countries that are not conflict-affected or failed but in which documented links exist between grave human rights violations and minerals extraction, such as the use of child labor for hazardous work in Ghana’s gold mining industry.[xi]

The Regulation’s material scope comprises the 3TGs (article 1), since these are the resources that are most mined in conflict areas or in mines that rely on forced labor. However, this means that other minerals linked to conflicts and human rights abuses (such as diamonds, rubies, cobalt, coal and jade) are not subject to the same checks on their supply chains.

In line with the OECD Due Diligence Guidance, the EU Regulation combines mandatory and voluntary elements for implementing supply chain due diligence measures. This requires EU-based companies trading in the 3TGs (importers, smelters and refiners)[xii] to take responsibility for their supply chains and adopt the measures needed to prevent their trade being linked to conflicts or human rights abuses. These due diligence measures consist of five steps: establish strong company management systems, identify and assess risk in the supply chain, design and implement a strategy to respond to identified risks, carry out an independent third-party audit of supply chain due diligence, and report annually on supply chain due diligence (articles 4-7).

This five-step due diligence framework is not addressed at companies whose annual import volumes do not exceed the specified thresholds included in Annex 1[xiii] or to downstream companies that import the same minerals into the EU as part of electronic or other products (article 1). These are significant omissions since conflict minerals find their way into Europe mainly via the manufacture of tablets and smartphones, while the volume thresholds could leave the door open to trade in conflict minerals through small importers.


Challenges to Achieving the Aims of the EU Conflict Minerals Regulation

Adopting an EU Regulation on conflict minerals is just the first step to meeting the commitment to break the links between conflict, human rights abuses and the sourcing of minerals. Challenges must still be overcome to ensure that all EU companies source their resources responsibly. These challenges, which include, among others, engaging EU downstream companies, potential market distortion and lack of sanctions, may affect the implementation of the EU Regulation.

Arguably, due diligence is most effective when it involves companies throughout the supply chain. EU downstream companies are excluded from the scope of the Regulation and could create loopholes in the due diligence scheme by importing conflict mineral-derived products. It is expected that these companies comply voluntarily with the due diligence requirements and report on their sourcing practices. One of the main challenges in this regard is therefore to determine how to make sure that these companies do not import conflict mineral-derived products, by taking all reasonable steps to identify and address any risks arising in their supply chains for minerals and metals coming within the scope of this Regulation. The Commission has stressed that it will press large-scale manufacturers to disclose details of any products that may contain conflict minerals.[xiv] In line with the OECD Due Diligence Guidance that applies to all companies in the mineral supply chain that supply or use minerals sourced from conflict-affected or high-risk areas, EU downstream companies must therefore be provided with the tools they need to provide regular information on the source of their minerals and their trading routes. For example, the OECD Guidance suggests that downstream companies should visit the smelters and refiners in their supply chains and require them to source responsibly. Otherwise corporate complicity in human rights abuses may arise from a company’s business relationship with the entities in its supply chain. In this context, the UNGPs state that businesses should treat the risk of causing or contributing to gross human rights abuses as a legal compliance issue wherever they operate (Guiding Principle 23). Long supply chains and complex business relationships may therefore threaten the implementation of the EU Regulation.

The Regulation compliance is not limited to EU economic operators. Companies in third countries are de facto obliged to comply with the OECD Guiding Note for Upstream Companies Risk Assessment[xv] in order to access the EU market. This may create market distortion in the formal sector in the form of less demand and lower prices for minerals from certain conflict regions due to EU importers disengaging with upstream companies from those regions that fail to mitigate the risk of dealing in minerals.[xvi] Indeed, this unintended impact occurred after the implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act[xvii] when countries covered by the law suffered an immediate collapse of their formal 3TG exports, affecting the people that the Act was intended to help. The Regulation is greater in scope, as it covers all conflict-affected and high-risk areas, making it much more difficult to create an uneven regulatory landscape that may cause market distortions. However, it should be accompanied by measures to be deployed through political, diplomatic, and development cooperation means in order to ensure the effective implementation of the Regulation. In March 2014, the European Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) published, at the same time as the Commission proposal, a Joint Communication entitled Towards an Integrated EU Approach for the responsible sourcing of minerals originating in conflict-affected and high-risk areas, proposing measures covering different areas of intervention (incentivizing measures for the private sector, measures for policy dialogue with third countries and development cooperation measures) in order to alleviate some of the unintended consequences of the Regulation, like the creation of de facto embargos from certain conflict regions. These actions aim to assist and build the capacity of relevant stakeholders to transpose the due diligence requirements into a national framework and legislation to formalize the informal and small scale mining sector in areas like the Great Lakes region. The implementation of these ‘accompanying measures’ is essential to ensure not only a uniform approach towards mineral supply chain due diligence but also a positive socio-economic impact in conflict-affected and high-risk areas.[xviii]

Nationally, implementing the Regulation depends on the responsible authorities designated by Member States. These authorities should conduct ex-post checks on companies (article 10-11), be engaged, and have enough resources to fully implement the Regulation, otherwise the whole process involved in the responsible sourcing of minerals may slow down. It is noticeable that the Regulation focuses on compliance rather than on punishing companies (since it lacks sanctions). Member States set the rules that apply to infringements of the Regulation. When an infringement occurs, the competent authorities issue a notice of remedial action to be undertaken by the company (article 16). This hardly affects the conduct of EU upstream companies at all. Effective, dissuasive and proportionate sanctions would send out a clear message that failure to comply with the Regulation’s obligations will not be tolerated.


The Value of Experience with Other EU Due Diligence Law

Due diligence laws already exist at the national (French duty of vigilance law) and EU levels. This is not the first time that the EU has pursued due diligence systems through trade measures aimed at conditioning market access from third countries on compliance with EU values and standards. The EU Timber Regulation (EUTR), which aims to combat illegal logging, unilaterally extends obligations to all importers in order to prevent the placement of illegally harvested timber and its derived products in the EU market. Whether the timber is legal depends on whether it was harvested in accordance with the legislation applicable in the country of origin, even if that country is not a member of the EU.

The EUTR covers all companies that bring timber into the EU market for the first time. It requires companies to collect verifiable data on the timber’s origin so that it can be established that it was legally harvested for the entire chain of custody. Sometimes companies are also required to compile a risk inventory, analysis and assessment. However, as with the Conflict Minerals Regulation, certain types of timber and timber products are covered while other manufactured products such printed books, newspapers, manuscripts, musical instruments and seats with wooden frames are excluded.

The EUTR’s due diligence system affects business operations if the businesses wish to access the EU market, especially if they are from countries with high levels of corruption. Full implementation of the EUTR has been slow because the competent authorities in EU member states have been unwilling to begin enforcement.[xix] However, the situation is changing. Today, according to the Commission’s EUTR scoreboard, all 28 Member States have begun to conduct checks on companies and designated a competent authority, while only one Member State (Slovakia) has no legislation on penalties for breaching the EUTR.[xx] In recent rulings in Sweden[xxi] and the Netherlands[xxii], competent authorities sanctioned companies for not collecting enough verifiable information to demonstrate that the purchase complied with the laws of the country of origin. These cases both prove this paradigm shift is occurring and help to clarify the practical aspect of the due diligence requirements for companies. However, there is a need to increase efforts and priorities to correctly and constantly implement and enforce the EUTR[xxiii] and to expand its scope so that all wood-based products are covered.

Despite the notable differences between the Conflict Minerals Regulation and ETUR in terms of regulatory goals and design, both regulatory regimes require importing companies to provide information on the behavior of their suppliers. Experience gained from implementing and enforcing the EUTR should be taken into account for the Conflict Minerals Regulation in order to secure traceability and transparency in the global mineral supply chains of EU companies. The EUTR proves that mandatory due diligence measures are enforceable and therefore more pressure can be mounted onto EU companies and non-EU companies. Many national authorities have a good understanding of the flexible, progressive nature of the EUTR’s due diligence system. Despite its recent full implementation, companies are taking significant steps to meet the due diligence standards (trade association materials and dialogue with authorities).[xxiv] Therefore, this experience should provide mineral-trading companies with the insights they need to fully meet their due diligence requirements, especially since the Conflict Minerals Regulation will not enter into force until 1 January 2021.


Concluding Remarks

The EU Conflict Minerals Regulation is to be welcomed as an important step towards the responsible sourcing of minerals and metals. It may also be seen as the EU’s response to translating the UNGPs into effective legislation and policies that may significantly influence business conduct and, therefore, to support businesses meeting their commitment to implement the Guiding Principles, especially with regard to the second pillar. Arguably, the positive effects of the Regulation may eventually pave the way for greater legally binding due diligence obligations for EU companies in other sectors that outsource their production to third countries. These may include measures aimed at securing traceability and transparency since the European Parliament has repeatedly requested that the Commission should include rules on corporate liability for violations of human rights in all trade and investment agreements.

However, despite the Regulation’s positive aspects and opportunities, several challenges must be seriously taken into account before it enters into force. To achieve the responsible sourcing of 3TG and mitigate the risk of incomplete due diligence chains, legally binding obligations on disclosing information about sources of minerals and trading routes must be extended to EU downstream companies. The EU should also take political and diplomatic measures to avoid market distortion and involve crucial third countries in supporting the implementation of the Regulation. The first review on the functioning and effectiveness of the Regulation, scheduled for 2023, is another opportunity to afford responsible authorities the competence to impose penalties on companies that do not comply with their obligations. Indeed, the three-yearly reviews should play an important role in establishing a more ambitious Regulation that broadens its scope to other minerals that are linked to conflicts and human rights abuses and its obligations to downstream companies.

Given that the Conflict Minerals Regulation does not enter into force until 2021, the EU, its Member States, and companies have both the awareness and the time to overcome some of the obstacles it presents. Experience with similar instruments in other jurisdictions should provide a reference for improving its implementation and enforcement. There are therefore no excuses for not fully meeting supply chain due diligence requirements at this first stage of the process towards the responsible sourcing of minerals and metals in the European Union.


[i] Directorate-General for External Policies, Implementation of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/578031/EXPO_STU(2017)578031_EN.pdf.

[ii] Friends of the Earth, EU Fails to derail UN Treaty Negotiation, http://www.foeeurope.org/un-binding-treaty-eu-derails-311017.

[iii] Regulation (EU) 2017/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2017 laying down supply chain due diligence obligations for Union importers of tin, tantalum and tungsten, their ores, and gold originating from conflict-affected and high-risk areas, L 130/1.

[iv] European Commission, Website for DG Trade, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/

[v] See “A conflict minerals regulation that works. Strengthening the European Commission’s proposal for a ‘Regulation setting up a Union system for supply chain due diligence self-certification of responsible importers of tin, tantalum and tungsten, their ores, and gold originating in conflict-affected and high-risk areas’”, https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/conflict-minerals/conflict-minerals-shaping-eu-policy/.

[vi] See, “Breaking the links between natural resources and conflict: The case for EU regulation. A civil society position paper”, https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/conflict-minerals/conflict-minerals-shaping-eu-policy/.

[vii] For more information on these issues, see also Steffen van der Velde, The End of Conflict Minerals on the EU Market?, Asser Institute Policy Brief 2017, pp. 1-11.

[viii] European Parliament. Conflict minerals: MEPs secure mandatory due diligence for importers, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20161122IPR52536/conflict-minerals-meps-secure-mandatory-due-diligence-for-importers.

[ix] The Dodd-Frank Act applies only to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and nine adjoining countries.

[x] The European Commission is preparing guidelines to help firms identify conflict-affected and high-risk areas. The guidelines should be ready by the end of 2017.

[xi] Chiara Macchi, The Draft EU Regulation on Conflict Minerals: “Smart Mix” or Missed Opportunity? http://rightsasusual.com/?p=1106.

[xii] According to Commission estimates, the regulation applies directly to between 600 and 1,000 EU companies.

[xiii] The threshold for tin ores and concentrates is set at 5,000 kg, and for tungsten and concentrates at 250,000 kg. The threshold for tantalum or niobium and ores is to be determined through a delegated act of the Commission pursuant to article 1(2)(a) and article 15(b) Regulation.

[xiv] European Parliament. Conflict minerals: MEPs secure mandatory due diligence for importers, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20161122IPR52536/conflict-minerals-meps-secure-mandatory-due-diligence-for-importers.

[xv] See OECD Guiding Appendix to Supplement on Tin, Tantalum and Tungsten, Guiding Note for Upstream Company Risk Assessment, p. 54.

[xvi] For more information on these issues, see Enrico Partiti and Steffen van der Velde, Curbing Supply-Chain Human Rights Violations Through Trade and Due Diligence. Possible WTO Concerns Raised by the EU Conflict Minerals Regulation, T.M.C. Asser Institute for International & European Law 2017-02.

[xvii] Commission staff working document impact assessment, SWD (2014) 53 final, Brussels, 5 March 2014, pp. 26-28.

[xviii] EurAc, Accompanying Measures to the EU Regulation on the Responsible Sourcing of Minerals. Towards a strengthening of the governance of the artisanal mining sector in the DRC, https://www.tecnologialibredeconflicto.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/EurAc2017-executive-summary.pdf.

[xix] See Wybe Th. Douma, Towards a ‘due diligence’ jurisprudence: The EU Timber Regulation’s requirements in courts, Doing Business Right Blog, 27 July 2017.

[xx] See EUTR newsletter from ClientEarth: https://www.clientearth.org/eutr-news-march-2016-to-march-2017/

[xxi] Förvaltningsrätten Jönköping (Jönköping Administrative Court), 5 October 2016, case nr. 2095-16, Almträ Nordic AB v Skogsstyrelsen.

[xxii] B.V. X v de staatssecretaris van Economische Zaken, Rechtbank Noord-Holland 24-05-2017, AWB - 16 5358, ECLI:NL:RBNHO:2017:4474. 

[xxiii] For more information about how Member States implement and enforce the EUTR, see https://www.clientearth.org/eu-timber-regulation-implementation-and-enforcement-updates/.

 

[xxiv] Timber Design and Technology, Big brands back battle against illegal timber, http://www.timberdesignandtechnology.com/big-brands-back-eu-battle-against-illegaltimber/.

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Doing Business Right Blog | Corporate (Ir)responsibility made in Germany - Part I: The National (In)Action Plan 2016-2020 - By Mercedes Hering

Corporate (Ir)responsibility made in Germany - Part I: The National (In)Action Plan 2016-2020 - By Mercedes Hering

Editor's note: Mercedes is a recent graduate of the LL.B. dual-degree programme English and German Law, which is taught jointly by University College London (UCL) and the University of Cologne. She will sit the German state exam in early 2022. Alongside her studies, she is working as student research assistant at the Institute for International and Foreign Private Law in Cologne. Since September 2020, she joined the Asser Institute as a research intern for the Doing Business Right project.


On the international stage, Germany presents itself as a champion for human rights and the environment. However, as this blog will show, when it comes to holding its own corporations accountable for human rights violations and environmental damage occurring within their global supply chains, it shows quite a different face.

In recent years, German companies were linked to various human rights scandals. The German public debate on corporate accountability kickstarted in earnest in September 2012, when a factory in Karachi, Pakistan, burned down killing almost 300 people. The factory had supplied KiK, Germany’s largest discount textile retailer with cheap garments. Then, over a year and a half ago, a dam broke in Brazil, killing 257 people. The dam had previously been certified to be safe by TÜV Süd Brazil, a subsidiary of TÜV Süd, a German company offering auditing and certification services. There are many more examples of incidents in which German companies were involved in human rights violations occurring within their supply chains, yet eight years after the factory in Pakistan burned down, and nine years after the unanimous endorsement of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights by the UN Human Rights Council, there is still no binding German legislation imposing some type of liability onto companies that knowingly, or at least negligently, fail to uphold human and labor rights in their supply chain.

This is despite the fact that Germany, the third-largest importer worldwide, with its economic power and negotiation strength on the international stage, could have a dramatic impact on business practices if it were to embrace a stronger approach to business and human rights.  

In the coming two blogs I am to take a critical look at Germany’s recent policies related to corporate accountability and discuss the current developments (and roadblocks) linked to the potential adoption of a Lieferkettengesetz (Supply Chain Law). In this first post, I focus on the effects of the National Action Plan 2016-2020, building on recently released interim reports. In my second blog, I will then turn to the various proposals and political discussions for mandatory due diligence regulation (Lieferkettengesetz).

 

National Action Plan 2016-2020

In 2011, the European Commission in its communication paper “A renewed EU strategy 2011-2014 for Corporate Social Responsibility” called on all EU Member States to develop their own national action plans for the implementation of the UN Guiding Principles.

The German Government followed the Commission’s call. In 2013, the following statement was included in the coalition agreement between the CDU (Christian Democratic Union) and the SPD (Social Democratic Party):

“We are working towards the consistent implementation of the National Action Plan for Human Rights and the Economy (NAP), which also includes public procurement. If an effective and comprehensive review of the NAP in 2020 finds that companies’ voluntary commitment is insufficient, we will introduce appropriate legislation at the national level and advocate an EU-wide regulation.” 

After a two-year consultation and drafting process, the Cabinet adopted the National Action Plan implementing the UN Guidelines on Business and Human Rights on 21 December 2016.

The National Action plan rests on four pillars: (1) Germany’s obligation to protect human rights; (2) the Government’s expectations vis à vis the private sector; (3) access to remedies and redress; (4) a monitoring process.

The fourth pillar, the monitoring process, is distinct from the companies’ reporting obligation and goes further than any other European NAPs did. ‘Monitoring’ entails a process in which, from 2018, a third party will review the effectiveness of the NAP by conducting three surveys. It was to provide an objective benchmark and timeframe, that is to serve as basis for the government to decide if it will take further steps towards mandatory regulation.

Nevertheless, NGOs have accused the Government of lacking true commitment. The main criticism of the NAP centers around the hope (or wishful thinking) that companies would implement human rights due diligence regulation voluntarily: the NAP does not include any possibility to impose fines or other sanctions. This is reflected in the NAP’s wording: It merely formulates certain expectations towards businesses. Corporate social responsibility, as envisaged by the NAP, relies on businesses to implement the following voluntary measures: (1) a declaration to respect human rights; (2) a procedure for identifying real and potential negative effects of corporate activity and human rights risks in supply chains; (3) measures to be taken to prevent negative effects and monitoring thereof; (4) reporting; (5)  a complaints mechanism. NGOs did welcome the clear language the Government used to formulate its expectations towards enterprises. However, on certain crucial points the actual content of the companies’ duties is left to their imagination. Examples include that companies should apply an “appropriate standard of care” when respecting human rights; the extent of duties depends on “size and position in supply and value chain” –  with no further details on what this means in practice for multinational groups or medium-sized companies. 

The policy statement is intended to make companies reflect on human rights issues their businesses face with reference to particular human rights frameworks. In the policy statement they should also include the internal processes they utilize to realize human rights due diligence. In order to fulfil this due diligence requirement itself, businesses need to identify risks generated directly by the enterprise itself, or any direct and indirect contractual relationship (e.g. in the case of numerous intermediary dealers). Once this analysis is completed, businesses ought to optimize their processes; proposed measures comprise specialist training, changes in supply chain and participation in sectoral initiatives. These are, however, limited to preventive measures only – identification, prevention and mitigation. There is no mention of any remediation or compensation for those affected. The NAP also includes some important caveats: Businesses must not suffer from a disproportionate bureaucratic burden; financial services between banks or insurance companies are out of its scope of application.

Furthermore, companies are not required to submit reports on their progress to the Government. They are merely required to keep information “at their disposal”. This is regrettable because gathering information could help to identify difficulties companies face when implementing due diligence into their global value and supply chains. Companies are advised to issue reports to demonstrate that they are aware of their human rights impact; and only companies that operate in particular high-risk sectors are advised to issue public reports.

Lastly, there is little to no guidance when it comes to the grievance mechanism companies should set up. The guidelines state that companies must have their own grievance procedures or participate in external (sectoral) procedures. The grievance mechanism should be fair, balanced, and predictable – but apart from the elimination of linguistic or technical barriers, there is no explanation of what such a system might look like. 

The German Institute for Human Rights criticizes that the Government’s NAP fails to capture the realities of global supply and value chains, and even ignores the hurdles individuals face when they try to enforce their rights before German courts. According to the Government, individuals affected enjoy access to the judicial system, remedies and redress. It only deemed necessary to issue a multilingual leaflet containing information on the German court system in order to help potential claimants to navigate the system.

 

Monitoring process and interim reports 

The monitoring process comprises three surveys, followed by three reports. In the first one, stakeholders were consulted to agree on a methodology and assessment criteria for the next two (substantive) surveys.  Just like the National Action Plan, the monitoring process turned out to be a disappointment. From the very beginning of the consultations, lobby groups tried to tailor the monitoring process according to their needs and it seems they succeeded in doing so. In an official letter, obtained by Initiative Lieferkettengesetz in the course of a freedom of information request, Peter Altmaier (Minister for Economic Affairs and Energy, CDU) thanked the International Chamber of Commerce for their input regarding the monitoring process, which, as explicitly stated in the letter, led to the questions and requirements being amended. Companies, which had failed to fill out the form or had left the survey incomplete, were taken out of the statistic. EY, the auditing firm that had been instructed to conduct the survey, first intended to categorize these companies as “non-compliant” with the due diligence standards set out by the NAP. The Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy assured lobby groups (particularly the Federation of German Industries) that the changes to the monitoring process they had demanded were included, and praised the compromise reached.

The methodology and assessment criteria can therefore be described as business-friendly, to say the least. NGOs were very outspoken against the survey methodology adopted by EY. In particular, they criticized the fact that companies that have not yet implemented the guidelines as set out in the NAP are still considered “companies with implementation plan” and even “companies on the right track”. The survey did not consider “non-responders”.

The first quantitative survey was completed on 31 October 2019. In February 2020, its findings were published in the second interim report. Only 465 of 7,285 companies with over 500 employees took part in the survey and only 17-19% of responders had implemented the NAP requirements. Companies performed the worst in assessing potential or existing risks to human rights in their supply chain and in adopting measures to prevent those. When looking at these numbers, it must be borne in mind that business lobby groups were actively involved in drawing up the framework of the survey. Because non-responders were excluded, it is even more disappointing that the numbers stem from companies that arguably are already receptive to the benefits of human rights due diligence. 

After the damning report had been published, business associations suddenly showed strong sentiment against the surveys that previously had been labelled a good “compromise”. They criticized, with the support of government officials from the Ministry of Economic Affairs, the very monitoring process that they had been closely involved in setting up. And pointed out that even though the “comply-or-explain-mechanism” allowed companies to deviate from the requirements set out in the NAP, it still counted them as “compliant” only if they were able to prove the implementation of an equivalent measure. This meant, according to business associations, that there was no margin of error for companies that were not yet fully compliant with the NAP but had taken substantive steps to align their business practices with the government’s guidelines, which were not considered of equivalent nature.

On 2 March 2020, the second and final phase of the quantitative survey began. The final report was presented to the public on 5 October 2020. Even fewer companies responded and roughly 13-17% implemented the NAP requirements. The coalition agreement envisaged the drafting of the Lieferkettengesetz to begin after the final report had been published. The fact that companies are so far below the 50% threshold set out in the coalition agreement shows that human rights due diligence is not in itself a priority for German companies; binding legislation seems needed for them to take it seriously.

Business lobby groups are now playing for time. They first argued that the whole survey period until the end of 2020 must be exhausted; as a precise picture of the situation can only be drawn if companies that plan to implement human rights due diligence towards the end of the year are included. However, in light of the fact that not even 20% of the respondents to the survey have so far implemented the NAP guidelines, it is highly doubtful that we would reach the 50% threshold by the end of the year. The Corona pandemic provided lobby groups with another excuse as businesses pleaded with politicians not to burden them with additional costly regulatory obligations. Actually, it is likely that businesses would oppose any form of binding regulation, irrespective of the outcome of the monitoring process. From the beginning they spoke out strongly against any type of Lieferkettengesetz.

 

Conclusion

In December 2015, Michael Addo, member of the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights, when participating in the last NAP plenary session at the Federal Ministry for Development and International Cooperation, emphasized that the international spotlight was on Germany and its NAP. Its European and international partners were scrutinizing the drafting and implementation process – and rightly so. Germany could have taken the lead with an ambitious NAP, providing mandatory measures to impose human rights due diligence to its companies, but it did not. Germany’s NAP joins the ranks of other European NAPs that have been proven to be of limited impact. As of now, 23 countries have adopted a National Action Plan. All of them rely primarily on voluntary commitments. The companies’ responsibilities are not formulated as “obligations” but as mere moral responsibilities, derived from social expectations. None of them include specific guidelines, concrete enforcement measures or objective parameters to monitor corporate activity.  Even Germany’s independent monitoring process was not able to drive German businesses to implement human rights due diligence throughout their operations and supply chains.

It seems that absent some form of binding legislation, there is no way for effective progress in the realm of business and human rights. That is why civil society (76% of the German public) is putting pressure on Germany’s political class to stop waiting (like Godot) for companies to voluntarily comply with the UN Guiding Principles. Even some companies and investors signed a collective statement in support of binding due diligence legislation. Hence, some form of Lieferkettengesetz will have to be adopted – the only remaining (crucial) questions (for my next blog) are when will it occur and what will it look like.

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