Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

ASSER Exclusive! Interview with Charles “Chuck” Blazer by Piotr Drabik

Editor’s note: Chuck Blazer declined our official interview request but thanks to some trusted sources (the FIFA indictment and Chuck’s testimony) we have reconstructed his likely answers. This is a fictional interview. Any resemblance with real facts is purely coincidental.



Mr Blazer, thank you for agreeing to this interview, especially considering the circumstances. How are you doing?

I am facing ten charges concerning, among others, conspiracy to corrupt and money laundering. But apart from that, I am doing great (laughs)!

 

It is good to know that you have not lost your spirit. And since you’ve been involved in football, or as you call it soccer, for years could you please first tell us what was your career at FIFA and its affiliates like?

Let me see… Starting from the 1990s I was employed by and associated with FIFA and one of its constituent confederations, namely the Confederation of North, Central American and Caribbean Association Football (CONCACAF). At various times, I also served as a member of several FIFA standing committees, including the marketing and television committee. As CONCACAF’s general secretary, a position I proudly held for 21 years, I was responsible, among many other things, for negotiations concerning media and sponsorship rights. From 1997 to 2013 I also served at FIFA’s executive committee where I participated in the selection process of the host countries for the World Cup tournaments. Those years at the helm of world soccer were truly amazing years of travel and hard work mainly for the good of the beautiful game. I might add that I even managed to document some of my voyages on my blog. I initially called it “Travels with Chuck Blazer” but Vladimir (Putin) convinced me to change the name to “Travels with Chuck Blazer and his Friends”. You should check it out.

 

Sure, but you ended up facing corruption and tax fraud charges in the US. What happened?

Concerning the charges I am currently facing, I pleaded guilty to participating in a conspiracy to corrupt FIFA and its related constituent organizations through various bribery schemes. In addition, I acknowledged taking part in money laundering process, violation of certain financial reporting laws, and tax evasion. But please keep it quiet. My family was devastated when they heard about this. After all, they know me as a kind-hearted and giving type, especially if you consider that, given my appearance, I’m always Santa Claus when Christmas time is around.

Concretely, around 1992 and together with other representatives of the soccer world, I agreed to accept a bribe in connection with the selection of the host nation of the 1998 World Cup. Together with other FIFA executive committee members I also accepted illegal payments concerning the selection of South Africa as the 2010 World Cup host. Simultaneously, since approximately 1993, still with the same bunch of soccer executives, I accepted bribes connected to the award of broadcasting and other rights to the 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002 and 2003 Gold Cup, a tournament analogue to the Copa América, featuring member associations of CONCACAF.

I know it’s wrong. But at FIFA a lot of people were doing it and it was just a common practice at that time. Money was flowing in my bank accounts and it felt right. We were working so hard to organize those tournaments, you know.

 

How come the US authorities’ ended up investigating you and FIFA?

I am not completely sure. When I testified back in 2013 the judge indicated that FIFA and its attendant or related constituent organizations were identified as a RICO enterprise, that is, a Racketeering Influenced Corrupt Organization if I remember correctly. I was terrified, it sounded very intimidating at first. Now I guess I got used to the sound of it. I am even thinking about calling my next cat Rico (laughs). I also recall that the Department of Justice’s involvement in the case was due to the fact that we used the US financial system to funnel the money. In hindsight, it was a very bad idea.

 

Could you give us some more details on how the corruption mechanism actually worked in practice?

In general terms there were media and marketing rights to be sold. Those rights, and often their extensions, were awarded in exchange for bribes, sometimes via intermediaries. The sports marketing companies engaged in the schemes were then able not only to profit from the acquired rights themselves, but also to accept illegal payments for passing on some of those rights to sponsors.

(Long pause) Take for instance Copa Libertadores. The tournament developed and gained popularity which sparked sports marketing companies’ interest in acquiring marketing rights to the competition. Around 2000 an entity affiliated with one of the sports marketing companies was awarded sponsorship rights for the tournaments which took place between 2001 and 2007, with a subsequent renewal of the contract in 2007 and 2012. In the early 2000s Nicolás Leoz, acting as the president of Confederación Sudamericana de Fútbol (CONMEBOL) and a member of its executive committee, sold his support to award the rights to a specific company. What is more, not only did he receive the money, he also gave instructions to forward approximately $2 million to his personal bank accounts, a sum which was owed to CONMEBOL itself based on the awarded sponsorship rights’ contract. The Copa Libertadores was only one of the many affected soccer competitions.

 

And what were the other tournaments affected?

I am American so please excuse my accent, but besides Copa Libertadores, also Copa América, Copa do Brasil, Gold Cup, and the World Cup qualifiers games. I might also add that corruption affected at least the FIFA 2011 presidential elections, the voting process concerning the hosts of the 1998 and 2010 World Cups, and Brazil’s national team’s sponsorship.

 

Who would you identify as the main players in the corruption schemes?

Except myself you mean (laughs)? Well, definitely a number of FIFA officials that you hear a lot about in the news lately. I can easily mention a few of my colleagues, like Rafael Esquivel who served as the president of the Venezuelan soccer association and a vice president on the CONMEBOL executive committee. There was also my good friend Eugenio Figueredo, a former president of the Uruguayan soccer association who was a member of FIFA’s executive committee, a vice president at FIFA, a member of various FIFA standing committees, and a vice and then president of CONMEBOL. Surely you know of José Maria Marin and Jeffrey Webb. The former was the president of the Brazilian soccer association, and sat on several FIFA standing committees. The latter was the president of Cayman Islands Football Association and a member of the Caribbean Football Union’s (CFU) executive committee. He was also appointed as the president of CONCACAF and a FIFA vice president. The funny thing is that Webb took these positions in order to clean up after the corruption scandal which led to the resignation of Jack Warner.

 

Jack Warner, you mean the former president of CONCACAF and the vice president of FIFA?

Correct. But do not forget that he was also the secretary and then a special advisor to the Trinidad and Tobago Football Federation (TTFF), and the president of the CFU. Jack is probably the most corrupt soccer official I ever met.  Personally I did not like him, he just couldn’t get enough. Already in the early 1990s he began exploiting his position for personal gains. In this regard, he did not only treat the assets of the organizations he served as his own, but also actively solicited bribes in connection with for example the 1998 World Cup. Hundreds of thousands of dollars in bribes were also paid to him with regard to the award of commercial rights to several editions of the Gold Cup. Moreover, acting as the president of the CFU and a special advisor to the TTFF he orchestrated the sale of media rights to World Cup qualifying matches which the national members of the CFU decided to sale as a bundle. Following negotiations Traffic, a sports marketing company, acquired the rights to 2002, 2006, 2010, and 2014 World Cup qualifier matches. A substantial part of the value of the contracts concluded by Warner on behalf of the CFU was automatically transferred to accounts under his personal control. He was also involved in a $10 million bribe related to the award of the 2010 World Cup to South Africa. I could go on and on.

 

You mentioned Traffic. Could you tell us more about it?

Of course. Several of these sports marketing companies were involved, but to my knowledge Traffic was one of the biggest players. This multinational company was based in Brazil and comprised of subsidiaries operating around the globe including the US where it commenced its operations around 1990. The US branch alone was engaged in a number of bribery and fraud schemes in connection with their efforts to obtain various rights from soccer organization and federations in the region. The beneficiaries of these schemes included, among others, Jack Warner, Nicolás Leoz, and Rafael Esquivel. Traffic’s main goal was to expand its operations through developing ties with soccer governing bodies. I remember that in 1991 during Nicolás’ term as CONMEBOL’s president Traffic acquired exclusive commercial rights to three editions of Copa América. Nicolás then threatened to walk away. He claimed that Traffic was about to make a lot of money out of the deal and that it was only fair for him to get his share of the pie. With each of the new editions of the Copa América, Nicolás would demand fresh bribes, a personal business of his which, to my knowledge, went on until 2011. Additional payments were made by Traffic based on their subsequent profits. Esquivel also benefited by requesting bribes in exchange for his ongoing support for Traffic’s position. As I said, bribery at FIFA was often the result of the initiative on the part of its officials. But coming back to Traffic, their involvement is best described in numbers. Out of the twelve bribery schemes I know of, Traffic was involved in nine of them. However, if we disregard the schemes concerning FIFA elections and the voting process for the World Cup hosts the share is nine out of ten. You also need to keep in mind that a former employee of the US branch of Traffic involved in the corruption scheme went on to serve as a general secretary of CONCACAF. On a side note, I think I was a much better general secretary than he ever was. I still receive birthday cards from my former colleagues at CONCACAF.

 

You stated that several companies were involved. How did they share the rights acquisition between themselves?

I’m not entirely sure about the exact mechanisms involved. What I know, however, is that sometimes conflicts emerged between the different companies seeking to secure contracts for themselves. On other occasions they were able to join forces, for example with the media and marketing rights to Copa América. At first, CONMEBOL entered into a contract with Traffic on the basis of which the latter was awarded the exclusive rights to, among others, the 2015 edition of the tournament, and an option to retain those rights for the next three editions. But in 2010 CONMEBOL signed another agreement, this time with Full Play, on the basis of which Full Play was granted media and marketing rights to several editions of the tournament, including the 2015 edition already sold to Traffic. As you can imagine, Traffic was not happy. They decided to sue CONMEBOL and Full Play. In the end the companies came to an understanding and formed Datisa, a new entity which was to obtain and exploit the commercial rights to the Copa América. In return, Traffic was to shoulder a share of the bribes offered to CONMEBOL officials.

I also recall that there were tensions between Traffic and another company established by a former employee of Traffic who, after bribing Brazilian federation’s officials in order to acquire a contract for the rights to Copa do Brasil, was accused by Traffic’s owner of stealing his business. But they also managed to solve the issue by combining their “efforts” and by sharing the financial burden of the “investments” made to acquire the rights.

 

And what sums are we talking about?

Not so much, really (laughs). Concerning Datisa the company agreed to pay between $100 and $110 million in bribes to CONMEBOL officials all of whom worked also at FIFA. The FBI told me that they estimated that the “business” generated approximately $150 million in bribes, an amount which may increase if new information come to light. In the end, I did not get so much out of it compared to some of my dear colleagues. Sometimes I think that I should have been more firm during the “negotiations”. For a long time I have been dreaming about having an additional apartment in the Trump Tower. I remember that when I got the first one it almost seemed as it came from some divine intervention.

 

Wow, that’s a lot. How did they manage to conceal it?

As I already mentioned the “business” was sometimes conducted via intermediaries. Jose Margulies was one of the prominent ones. He was the brother of an old friend of the owner of Traffic, and often used accounts in the names of offshore corporations in order to makes payments on his behalf. In addition, he tried to conceal the bribes by using accounts at Swiss banks, made recourse to currency dealers, destroyed documentation, and discouraged the corrupt soccer officials from using accounts in their own name in order to avoid detection from law enforcement bodies, an advice which was not always taken seriously. People like Nicolás Leoz for example did not hesitate to have sums being paid to their personal bank accounts on the basis of “consulting contracts”. As I already mentioned, Jack (Warner), for his part, concluded a double agreement in the name of the TTFF concerning rights to World Cup qualifier games. He first sold the TTFF’s rights as part of a bundle, and later on sold them again, but this time separately. There was also the famous $10 million paid by South Africa’s authorities to the CFU in order to “support the African diaspora”, a payment which was in fact made in exchange for votes regarding the 2010 World Cup host. This money was diverted back into Jack’s pockets via a number of tricks. Using family members’ accounts was another way of deception. Lately, the business of taking bribes was getting more and more complicated, prompting officials to look for new complex schemes. In fact, the attempts to conceal illegal payments made in connection with the rights to the World Cup 2018 and 2022 qualifiers caused a lot of headache to Jeffrey Webb in his capacity as a high level CFU official. One of the companies with whom Traffic was to make payment to Webb had difficulties finding the right way to discretely transfer the money to him. This led to long negotiations between Webb’s associate and the company’s executives in order to find a clean method to make the outstanding payment.

 

Thank you so much Mr Blazer for your time and your invaluable insights!

You’re welcome. I am a big fan of the ASSER International Sports Law Blog so anything for you guys.

 



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Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

Call for Papers - How football changed Qatar (or not): Transnational legal struggles in the shadow of the FIFA World Cup 2022 - Deadline 6 January 2023

The FIFA World Cup 2022 in Qatar is now well under way, yet the relentless public debates around Qatar’s human rights record, be it regarding the rights of LGBTQ+ or the rights of migrant workers who built the infrastructure that underpin the competition, is not dying down. In fact, the whole build-up towards the event has been defined by an intense public scrutiny of Qatar, with civil society organizations and international labor unions engaging in continuous advocacy to report on and improve the living and working conditions of migrant workers active on Qatar’s many building sites. This issue also attracted attention and critique from both the international media and public authorities all around the globe. In fact, the question of Qatar’s (lack of) compliance with internationally recognized human rights and core labor standards caused so much negative publicity and external pressure that a number of legislative and institutional reforms were initiated, officially aimed at improving the rights and standing of migrant workers in Qatar. While it is highly disputed whether these reforms have led to actual changes on the ground or should be seen only as window-dressing, it remains clear that the global public attention brought to Qatar by its hosting of the FIFA World Cup 2022 has forced the Qatari authorities to engage legislative reforms and pay at least lip service to the concerns raised.

In spite of the fact that this issue continues to play a major role in the transnational public discourse, it received until now relatively scant attention in the academic literature, specifically in the international/transnational legal field. Yet, the debates around the Qatar 2022 World Cup are in practice mobilizing a range of legal arguments connected to the interpretation and application of international human rights law and international labor law, as well as activating international (at the ILO) or transnational (at the Swiss OECD National Contact Point) legal processes. Furthermore, they raise well-known questions regarding the compliance of states with international legal commitments and connect with debates on the universality of human rights and their translation in particular social contexts. In short, we believe there is room for a multi-disciplinary engagement with the legal processes and social mobilizations triggered by Qatar’s successful bid to host the FIFA World Cup 2022 and their impacts on local social and legal rules and institutions. Hence, Qatar’s journey towards the FIFA World Cup 2022 constitutes an interesting case study to investigate more generally the transnational social and legal mechanisms which underpin the concretization of international (human rights/labor) law in a particular context and give it a specific reality.

We invite paper submissions from different methodological backgrounds (e.g. law, anthropology, sociology, history, public policy) which engage with the many entanglements of Qatar with international (human rights and labor) law in the context of the organizing and hosting of the FIFA World Cup 2022. The papers will be first discussed in a digital workshop that will take place on 15 and 16 February 2023. Please note that we have an agreement with the German Law Journal (Open access journal on comparative, European and international law published by Cambridge University Press) to publish a selection of the papers.

If you wish to participate in the workshop and the ensuing publications, please send an abstract of max. 300 words and a CV to a.duval@asser.nl by 6 January 2023. The selected participants will be informed by 9 January 2023. Extended abstracts (2000 words) will be due on 6 February 2023.


Supported by German Law Journal

 

New Event! Governing European football: What role for the European Union? - 16 December - Brussels

Join us for a round table co-organized by GLawNet and the Asser Institute at the Campus Brussels of the Maastricht University (Avenue de Tervueren 153, 1150 Brussels) just one day after the publication of the Opinion of Advocate General Rantos in the European Super League (ESL) case. The discussion between academics and stakeholders will focus on the role played by the EU, as well as the role it ought to play, in determining the way football is organised and governed.


In 2021, the announcement of the creation of a breakaway European Super League (ESL), as well as the drama of its early demise, stunned the world.  Since then, the company behind the ESL and UEFA (as well as FIFA) are locked into a legal battle that will soon come to an end at the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). Following the preliminary questions raised by a Spanish court, the CJEU will weigh in on whether UEFA and FIFA breached EU competition law with their attempts to thwart the emergence of the ESL. It will not be the first time that the governing bodies of football, both Swiss associations, face scrutiny before the EU courts - many will remember the 1995 Bosman ruling. However, this time around various stakeholders and observers are calling for the EU to not only referee this particular dispute, but to as well start playing a stronger governance role by regulating European football.


Programme:

15:00 – 15:05 Opening: Mariolina Eliantonio (Maastricht University)

15:05 – 16:30 - Roundtable: Governing European Football: What role for the European Union?
Moderator: Carlo Colombo (Maastricht University)

16:30 Reception


This is an In-Person event only and will take place at the Campus Brussels of the Maastricht University (Avenue de Tervueren 153, 1150 Brussels). If you wish to attend, please register HERE.


Supported by undefined

Time to focus on freedom of expression: Rainbows, armbands, and FIFA’s commitment to human rights - By Prof. Mark James (Manchester Metropolitan University)

Editor's note: Mark James is Professor of Sports Law at Manchester Metropolitan University and the author of a leading Sports Law textbook.


The opening days of the FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022 have already resulted in a number of issues of interest to sports lawyers and human rights lawyers, with FARE’s Piara Powar claiming that this is the most political major sporting event that he has attended. Both FIFA and the local organisers have been active in their suppression of expressions of support for LGBTQIA+ rights by players, fans and journalists alike, calling into question once again the legality of restricting free speech by sporting rules and regulations.

There have been two major flashpoints to date. First, seven European federations had asked FIFA for permission for their captains to wear armbands supporting the ‘OneLove’ campaign. FIFA’s response was to refuse, resulting in the German players covering their mouths for their pre-match photographs in protest at their being silenced. There are several grounds on which FIFA would seek to support its position:

  •  Law 4.5 of the Laws of the Game prohibits any playing equipment from carrying any political, religious or personal slogans, statements or images.
  • Regulation 4.3.1 of FIFA’s Equipment Regulations and Regulation 27.1 of the FIFA World Cup 2022 Regulations prohibits clothing or equipment that includes political, religious, or personal slogans, statements, or images, or otherwise does not comply in full with the Laws of the Game.
  • Regulation 33.3 of the FIFA World Cup 2022 Regulations prohibits the display of political, religious or personal messages or slogans of any nature in any language or form by players and officials.
  • Regulation 13.8.1 of FIFA’s Equipment Regulations states that for FIFA Final Competitions, the captain of each Team must wear the captain’s armband provided by FIFA (all Regulations available in the FIFA Legal Handbook 2022).

Although the DFB is considering a challenge to FIFA’s refusal to allow its captain to wear the OneLove armband, which would ultimately be heard before CAS, it is unlikely to succeed in the face of the strict requirements of the above Laws and Regulations. However, what could cause more difficulty for both FIFA and CAS is if the DFB frames its case as a challenge to the compliance of the rules that restrict players’ freedom of expression with Article 3 of FIFA’s Statutes, which states that ‘FIFA is committed to respecting all internationally recognised human rights.’ Article 3, together with the additional detail provided by FIFA’s Human Rights Policy, ensures that freedom of expression as defined in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights are limitative rules that can be applied directly to FIFA’s activities, as has been argued by Bützler and Schöddert. Further, if the affected players and associations can define themselves as human rights defenders, then Article 11 of FIFA’s Human Rights Policy states that, ‘FIFA will respect and not interfere with the work of … human rights defenders who voice concerns about adverse human rights impacts relating to FIFA.’ Any challenge using this approach would be the first real test of the enforceability of the human rights protections to which FIFA claims to be committed. It would also be a test of CAS’s ability to require adherence to the human rights commitments made by ISFs and to prove that they are more than simple window-dressing.

Secondly, members of The Rainbow Wall, a contingent of LGBTQIA+ rights-supporting Welsh fans, were prevented from entering the Ahmed bin Ali stadium whilst wearing bucket hats incorporating a rainbow into its design. No explanation for why was given, however, FIFA and the local organisers would argue that openly supporting LGBTQIA+ rights with the aim of promoting legal change in a country where homosexuality is illegal is a political statement on apparel and therefore entry into the stadium wearing the rainbow hat is in breach of the Regulation 3.1.23 of the Stadium Code of Conduct. A similar argument could be used to justify preventing US journalist Grant Wahl from entering the stadium wearing a t-shirt incorporating a rainbow into its design and Danish journalist Jon Pagh from wearing the OneLove armband. However, it must be stressed that no such explanation for the prohibitions applied to these garments was provided to any of the affected fans or journalists. It must also be recognised that the opinion that promoting LGBTQIA+ rights is a political expression is highly contested. In a statement from FIFPRO, the opposing view was stated succinctly: ‘We maintain that a rainbow flag is not a political statement but an endorsement of equality and thus a universal human right.’

It is clear that, as with Rule 50 of the Olympic Charter, the chilling effect that FIFA’s Regulations have on players’ and fans’ freedom of expression is likely to be unlawful, as has been discussed at length both on this blog and on the Verfassungsblog Debate on Freedom of Expression in the Olympic Movement. Instead of revisiting these arguments, which are taken to apply to FIFA’s actions at Qatar 2022, two additional issues related to the FIFA Statutes are explored here.

Articles 3 and 4 of FIFA’s Statutes state that:

3 Human rights

FIFA is committed to respecting all internationally recognised human rights and shall strive to promote the protection of these rights.

4 Non-discrimination, equality and neutrality

4.1 Discrimination of any kind against a country, private person or group of people on account of race, skin colour, ethnic, national or social origin, gender, disability, language, religion, political opinion or any other opinion, wealth, birth or any other status, sexual orientation or any other reason is strictly prohibited and punishable by suspension or expulsion.

FIFA is a long-time supporter of pride events and in its press release for Pride Month 2022 stated:

[The] FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022™ will be a celebration of unity and diversity – a joining of people from all walks of life – regardless of race, ethnicity, religion, age, disability, sex characteristics, sexual orientation, gender identity and expression – everybody will be welcome.

Claims that all staff involved in the Qatar 2022 including public and private security forces, would be trained on how to accomplish their tasks in a non-discriminatory manner, seem not to have been operationalised effectively.

This begs the question whether FIFA is in breach of its own Statutes by refusing to allow players to express themselves freely on armbands and failing to protect fans’ freedom of expression by wearing rainbows. At the very least, FIFA should have ensured that a protective LGBTQIA+ regime in the stadiums and the fan zones during the World Cup was implemented to enable the ‘celebration of unity and diversity’ it claims that Qatar 2022 should be. FIFA’s actions in Qatar call into question its claims to be an inclusive and supportive leader on anti-discrimination and human rights, and is likely to see a backlash from the LGBTQIA+ community that it claims to support when it engages with Pride 2023; accusations of hypocrisy and virtue signalling are guaranteed.

With no resolution to the debate at the time of writing, Articles 3 and 4 could provide players and fans with the opportunity to demonstrate their support for human rights and anti-discrimination causes. At the Sochi 2014 Winter Olympics, Athlete Ally developed the ‘Principle 6 Campaign.’ Instead of criticising directly Russia's so called anti-gay laws, which are currently in the process of being extended, athletes promoted Principle 6 of the Olympic Charter, which at the time stated that, ‘Any form of discrimination with regard to a country or a person on grounds of race, religion, politics, gender or otherwise is incompatible with belonging to the Olympic Movement.’ The eventual outcome of this campaign was the addition of sexual orientation to the list of characteristics protected by Principle 6. Unlike at Sochi 2014, there is no need to campaign for a change to either of Articles 3 or 4 of the FIFA Statutes; instead, activists want to ensure that they are being applied. An immediate response for both players and fans would be for them to quote specifically from Articles 3 and 4, as it would be extremely difficult for FIFA to claim that they are making political or personal statements when promoting FIFA’s own foundational values. A creative reminder of what FIFA claims to stand for could enable player and fan activism to continue throughout the tournament, and beyond, whilst affected players and associations can develop a compelling case for the restrictions on freedom of expression to be struck out by CAS, the Swiss Federal Tribunal and/or the European Court of Human Rights.

New Event - Zoom In - Sports Governing Bodies and the Russian invasion of Ukraine - The end of neutrality? - 12 October - 16.00-17.30 CET

Sport is often presented by Sports Governing Bodies (SGBs), and in particular the International Olympic Committee, as apolitical. A neutral endeavor, which ignores the whims of politics and keeps national governments at arm’s length. In short, it is thought of as an autonomous sphere of transnational society wishing to remain unaffected by the political turbulences out there. In fact, many SGBs enforce strict rules banning political speech by individuals, and in the spaces, subjected to their contractual power. Moreover, FIFA, for example, regularly issues effective sanctions against states which are perceived as threatening the autonomy of the governance of football on their territory. Hence, this apolitical ideal of international sports is not only a founding myth of the Olympic Movement, it is actively pursued by SGBs through their private regulatory powers and has hard consequences for athletes, clubs, sport officials alike.


Yet, on 24 February, Russia decided to invade Ukraine, in what has become the most important land war in Europe since the implosion of ex-Yugoslavia. This invasion was quickly followed by condemnations from the IOC and many other SGBs, leading in many cases, most prominently by UEFA and FIFA, to the exclusion of Russian teams and athletes from international sporting competitions. This reaction is difficult to square with the neutrality and autonomy of sport so vigorously defended by the international SGBs until recently. It raises also many questions of double standards: why did this illegal invasion lead to sporting consequences and not others? Furthermore, the Court of Arbitration of Sport recently released two orders (available here and here) concerning UEFA and FIFA’s decisions to exclude Russian national teams and clubs from their football competitions, which outline the legal strategies pursued by the SGBs to reconcile the public urge to exclude Russia(ns) from international sporting competitions, and their commitments to political neutrality.

We are very happy to welcome three outstanding scholars to discuss these issues with us from different methodological perspectives.

Speakers:

  • Prof. Carmen Pérez (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid), who wrote a blog on the reactions of SGBs to Russia’s invasion
  • Dr. Daniela Heerdt (Asser Institute and Centre for Sports and Human Rights), who is the co-author of a blog mapping the reactions of SGBs to Russia’s invasion
  • Carole Gomez (University of Lausanne and Institut de Relations Internationales et Strategiques), who has been interviewed numerous times by international media on the issue (see here and here)

Moderators:

Register for free HERE!


ISLJ Conference 2022 - Transnational sports law and governance in turbulent times - Early Bird Registration Ends Tomorrow!

On 25 and 26 October 2022, the Asser Institute in The Hague will host the 2022 edition of the International Sports Law Journal (ISLJ) Conference. The ISLJ is the leading academic journal in transnational sports law and governance and is proud to provide a platform for transnational debates on the state of the field. 2022 has put a number of complex issues and disputes on the top of the transnational sports law agenda, which will be at the heart of the conference.


Sports governing bodies react to Russia's invasion of Ukraine
First, Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine in February triggered a swift and decisive reaction by a wide range of international sports governing bodies (SGBs), leading in particular to the exclusion of Russian teams and athletes from many international sporting competitions, including most prominently the FIFA World Cup 2022 in Qatar. These reactions have shown, once again, that sport is far from immune from the turbulences of international relations and raise the question of its alleged neutrality and apolitical nature. To engage with these issues, we have invited Prof. Jonathan Grix (Metropolitan Manchester University) to deliver a keynote speech and will dedicate a specific panel to discussing the intersection between transnational sports law and international law/relations.

Monopoly of sports governing bodies
Second, the organization of international sports is also currently threatened by challenges to the traditional monopoly position of international SGBs raised under EU antitrust law. Early July 2022, the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union heard two crucial cases (International Skating Union and Superleague) concerning the compatibility of the rules of international SGBs aimed at sanctioning athletes and clubs who participate in unauthorized third-party competitions. Dr. Van Rompuy (Leiden University), the driving force behind the ISU case, will be discussing with us the potential impact of competition law on the governance of sport and what to expect from the pending decisions of the CJEU. Additionally, we will host two panels dedicated to the application of competition law to sports governance, both at an international and national level.

Human rights and mega-sporting events
Third, with both Beijing and Qatar hosting mega-sporting events this year, it is difficult to ignore the human rights issues raised by international sporting competitions. A fast-growing social movement aimed at urging the SGBs to abide by their human rights responsibilities has been developing around the activism of some NGOs and the creation of the Centre for Sport and Human Rights (CSHR). The CEO of the CSHR, Mary Harvey, will be joining us to share her thoughts on the role of sports lawyers and sports law academics in this discussion. Her intervention will be followed by a panel dedicated to the intersections between human rights and transnational sports law and governance.

Trans and queer participation in sporting competitions
Finally, the question of the participation of transgender athletes in sporting competitions has become an extremely contentious issue of debate in recent years, especially in the United States. Furthermore, International SGBs, such as FINA recently, have started to impose specific requirements to the participation of trans athlete in international competitions. Our closing panel will take a fresh look at this question by foregrounding the way in which trans and queer participation in sporting competitions has been accommodated in South Asia.

Online participation available
For the first time this year, we will allow online participation to the conference for an affordable price. Our aim is to internationalise and diversify further our audience and to reach people who in light of the current challenges, be it Covid-19 or climate change, are not in a position to come in person to The Hague.

Programme
Download the full programme.

Register HERE! (Early Bird Registration is available only until 1 October, 23:59CET)

A personal reflection on the Summer Programme on Sports Governance and Human Rights - By Pedro José Mercado Jaén

Editor’s note:Pedro is an intern at the Asser Institute and currently studying the Erasmus Mundus Master Degree in Sports Ethics and Integrity (KU Leuven et al.) He was one of the participants of the first edition of the Summer Programme on Sports Governance and Human Rights.


In early September, the first Summer Programme on the Governance of Sport and Human Rights took place at the Asser Institute. During one week, various experts in the field presented different lectures to a very diverse group of participants with a wide range of professional backgrounds. Being a participant myself, I would like to reflect on this one-week course and share what I learned. More...



Can Formula 1 drive to protect human rights? A case study of the Bahrain GP - By Pedro José Mercado Jaén

Editor's Note: Pedro is an intern at the Asser Institute and currently studying the Erasmus Mundus Master Degree in Sports Ethics and Integrity (KU Leuven et al.) He worked as a research fellow for the Centre for Sport and Human Rights, and his primary research interests lie in the fields of International Human Rights and sport. 


I.               Introduction

“I can’t do everything and I can’t do it alone. I need allies.” These are the words of the seven-time Formula 1 (F1) world champion, Lewis Hamilton. He was urging more support to advocate for the protection of human rights in the countries visited by Formula 1. During the last years, Hamilton together with Sebastian Vettel, have become the leaders of a movement demanding accountability and greater awareness of the impact of F1 on society.

The inclusion of the Bahrain GP on the F1 racing calendar for the first time in 2004 ignited concerns, which have grown with the inclusion of Abu Dhabi in 2007, Russia in 2014, Azerbaijan in 2017, and Saudi Arabia and Qatar in 2021. The inability and lack of commitment of state authorities to protect and respect human rights, the ineffectiveness of judicial procedures and the systematic repression of political opposition are some of the factors that make these countries prone to human rights violations. Academics and CSOs regularly argue that F1, by signing multi-million dollar contracts with these countries, is complicit in sportswashing. Those pulling the sport’s strings deny these accusations and claim that human rights are at the centre of their agenda when they visit these countries. They claim F1 can drive the improvement of human rights standards in a particular country. However, reality tells a different story. The Bahrain GP has been running for more than a decade and the situation in the country has only worsened, without any signs of F1 contributing to the improvement of the protection of human rights there.

This blog aims to provide an overview of the human rights challenges F1 is facing when hosting a Grand Prix. For this purpose, a case study of the Bahrain GP, one of the longest-running on the modern/current F1 calendar, will be carried out. This will allow us to examine in detail the historical evolution of the GP, the complaints from civil society organisations and the reaction of the Federation Internationale de l’Automobile (FIA) and other stakeholders to the ongoing allegations of human rights violations.More...



Call for papers - ISLJ Conference on International Sports Law - Asser Institute - 25 and 26 October 2022

 

Call for papers

ISLJ Conference on International Sports Law

Asser Institute, The Hague

25 and 26 October 2022


The Editors of the International Sports Law Journal (ISLJ) invite you to submit abstracts for the ISLJ Conference on International Sports Law, which will take place on 25 and 26 October 2022 at the Asser Institute in The Hague. The ISLJ, published by Springer and TMC Asser Press, is the leading academic publication in the field of international sports law. The conference is a unique occasion to discuss the main legal issues affecting international sports and its governance with renowned academic experts.


We are delighted to announce the following confirmed keynote speakers:

  • Jonathan Grix (Professor of Sport Policy and Politics at Manchester Metropolitan University), and
  • Mary Harvey (CEO at the Centre for Sport and Human Rights),
  • Ben Van Rompuy (Assistant Professor at Leiden University).


We welcome abstracts from academics and practitioners on all issues related to international sports law and governance. We also welcome panel proposals (including a minimum of three presenters) on a specific issue. For this year’s edition, we specifically invite submissions on the following themes and subthemes:

  • International sports law and governance in times of conflict:
    • The emergence of the idea(l) of political neutrality of SGBs and its translation in legal/governance practice
    • The intersection between public international law and international sports law and governance in the context of international conflicts
    • The role of sports diplomacy/conditionality in the context of international conflicts
    • International sports law and the Russian invasion of Ukraine

  • Human rights and mega sporting events (MSEs)
    • The adverse or positive impact of MSEs on (specific) human rights
    • The influence of human rights commitments on the organisation of MSEs
    • The effects of MSEs on human rights in organising countries
    • The responsibilities and strategies of SGBs to ensure respect of human rights at MSEs
    • The role and responsibilities of states in ensuring respect of human rights in the context of MSEs

  • Competition law and challenges to the governance monopoly of SGBs
    • The impact of competition law on SGBs and their governance
    • The limits of competition law on effecting change in the governance of sport
    • The specific modalities of application of competition law to sports governance
    • The legitimacy of competition authorities in challenging SGBs


Please send your abstract of 300 words and CV no later than 1 July 2022 to a.duval@asser.nl. Selected speakers will be informed by 15 July.

The selected participants will be expected to submit a draft paper by 10 October 2022. Papers accepted and presented at the conference are eligible for publication in a special issue of the ISLJ subject to peer-review. Submissions after this date will be considered for publication in later editions of the Journal.

The Asser Institute will cover one night accommodation for the speakers and may provide a limited amount of travel grants (max. 250€). If you wish to be considered for a grant, please indicate it in your submission.

Reactions of International Sport Organisations to the Russian Invasion of Ukraine: An Overview - By Daniela Heerdt & Guido Battaglia

Editor's note:

Daniela is a researcher at the Asser Institute in the field of sport and human rights. She has a background in public international law and human rights law and defended her PhD project entitled “Blurred Lines of Responsibility and Accountability – Human Rights Abuses at Mega-Sporting Events” in April 2021 at Tilburg University. She also works as independent consultant in the field of sport and human rights for the Centre for Sport and Human Rights, or the European Parliament among other clients from the sports ecosystem

As Head of Policy and Outreach, Guido is in charge of the Centre for Sport & Human Rights engagement with governments, international and intergovernmental organisations and sports organisations. He represents the Centre at conferences, events and bilateral dialogues to reach new audiences and partners and raise public awareness and understanding of the Centre’s work .



On February 24, 2022, the Russian military invaded Ukrainian territory. What followed was an escalation of the war, day by day, causing thousands of victims and forcing millions of people to flee. On March 2, the UN General Assembly overwhelmingly adopted a resolution deploring "in the strongest possible terms" Russia's aggression against Ukraine by a vote of 141 to 5, with 35 abstentions. On March 29, Russian and Ukrainian representatives met in Istanbul for another round of negotiations. No ceasefire has been agreed and hostilities continue.

Many states, international organizations and corporations quickly took measures in response to this invasion. Hundreds of companies decided to withdraw from Russia. Some countries decided to strengthen economic sanctions against Russia and Belarus and to provide military and economic help to Ukraine. Many civil society actors mobilised to organize and provide humanitarian support for Ukraine. Interestingly, international sports organisations like the International Olympic Committee (IOC), the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), World Athletics and many other international federations, issued statements condemning the invasion and imposed bans and sanctions on Russian and Belarussian sports bodies and athletes.

This blog post provides an overview of the measures adopted by a number of international sports federations (IFs) that are part of the Olympic Movement since the beginning of the war and analyses how they relate to the statements issued by the IOC and other sanctions and measures taken by international sports organisations in reaction to (geo)political tensions and conflict.

More...